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Asylum as a Moral Panic
In his introduction to the third edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 
Stanley Cohen (2002: vii–xxvi) gives fresh examples of ‘moral panics’ that 
arose in the 30 years following the first appearance of his book; one of these 
examples concerns refugees and asylum seekers. He characterises such panics 
as focused on issues that are actually new forms of older worries and con-
cerns, and in these terms the ‘asylum panic’ is understood as a particular 
manifestation of a long-running, perhaps immemorial, fear of strangers or 
outsiders (Simmel 1976). Indeed, the policy approaches of European gov-
ernments display both of the classic responses to outsiders identified by 
Zygmunt Bauman (1997). ‘Anthropophagy’—‘devouring’ strangers and 
‘metabolically transforming them into a tissue indistinguishable from one’s 
own’ (ibid.: 18)—is evident in the long running penchant for ‘assimilation-
ist’ strategies towards immigration in various European countries (Vertovec 
and Wessendorf 2010). At the same time ‘anthropoemy’—‘vomiting’ out 
strangers and ‘banishing them from the limits of the orderly world’ (Bauman 
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1997: 18)—has been vividly exemplified in recent years by the erection of 
new barriers. Hungary, for example, faced with the receipt of significantly 
more first-time asylum applications in the first half of 2015 than in previous 
years, famously constructed a wire fence along its 175-kilometer border with 
Serbia in order to deter new entries (Migration Policy Centre 2016), result-
ing in the onward migration of thousands of rejected would-be immigrants.
Cohen (2002) suggests, however, that the moral panic surrounding asy-
lum is ‘crucially different’ (ibid.: xxiii) from his other examples of moral 
panics, including those surrounding benefit cheats, paedophiles and high 
school massacres. Rather than being focused on ‘specific newsworthy epi-
sodes’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii), the moral panic about asylum seekers has been 
long drawn-out, characterised by a ‘virtually uninterrupted message of hos-
tility and rejection’ (ibid.: xxii). Asylum is a rare example of a moral panic 
that is chronic rather than acute in nature. Tyler (2013) dates the more or 
less continuous moral panic about Britain as a ‘soft touch’ for criminals and 
bogus refugees to the early 1990s. Similarly, talk of ‘crisis’ in France dates 
back to at least the mid-1980s, when annual numbers of asylum claims tre-
bled within a few years (Legoux 1995: xxiii).
Cohen also argues that the moral panic surrounding asylum is ‘more 
overtly political than any others’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii). For example, although 
the 1951 Refugee Convention is a recognition of the special moral claims 
of refugees, as persons suffering persecution because of their beliefs or eth-
nicity, the political purpose of the Convention has altered significantly since 
its inception. Despite the popular impression that it safeguards refugees, 
its continued observance is a paradoxical confirmation of the legitimacy of 
immigration controls more generally in modern liberal democracies.
Furthermore, the asylum issue is deeply contested as a result of an inher-
ent contradiction between the need for Western states to portray themselves 
as representing shared communities with common values, including recog-
nition of basic human rights such as the right not to suffer persecution; and 
the discretionary right assumed by modern states to decide who can enter 
and reside in their territory. This tension accounts for what Gibney (2014) 
terms the ‘schizophrenic response’ (n.p.) of European states, whereby they 
‘continue to embrace asylum but spurn the asylum seeker’ (n.p.) and offer 
protection only grudgingly. It has also resulted in the occasional eruption of 
pro-asylum voices from various quarters over the last two decades, and espe-
cially since the summer of 2015, which gives the asylum issue a particularly 
disputed feel (see Conlon and Gill 2015).
This contestation relates to what Goodwin-Gill conceptualises as two 
competing models for approaching refugee issues: a model that focuses on 
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the need to treat every individual asylum applicant on their own merits; and 
an instrumental security model that emphasises control of refugees on the 
basis of the balance between the perceived risks they pose and the oppor-
tunities they offer to receiving countries (2001: 14–15). This book is full 
of examples wherein particular administrative and legal systems display one, 
and sometimes both, of these tendencies.
The Asylum System ‘in Crisis’
One manifestation of this schizophrenia is the repeated invocation of the 
trope of ‘crisis’ in relation to asylum. Thus, the ‘refugee crisis’ that domi-
nated European political attention in 2015–2016—provoked largely by 
the unusually large numbers of people entering Europe in flight from the 
Syrian conflict—was a particularly intense form of the moral panic that has 
surrounded the questions of asylum and immigration more generally over 
the last few decades. This ‘crisis’ is commonly portrayed, by politicians and 
in the media, using either fluvial or animal metaphors, such as likening the 
arrival of asylum seekers to a ‘flood’, ‘tide’, ‘torrent’ or ‘wave’ that threatens 
to ‘swamp’ the recipient society (Charteris-Black 2006: 570–572), or alter-
natively likening it to a ‘stampede, ‘flock’ or ‘swarm’ of arrivals with a sim-
ilar potential to overwhelm receiving countries. Both types of metaphor are 
clearly dehumanising, but they also both employ a rhetorical ruse in relation 
to the notion of disaster. On the one hand, immigration itself is represented 
as a ‘natural’ disaster (Charteris-Black 2006). This view implicitly relieves 
liberal democracies of their own responsibilities for the immigration pres-
sures they experience: responsibilities rooted in the often invisible ‘systemic 
violence’ (Žižek 2009: 8) of global capitalism, historical exploitation, une-
qual trading relationships and neo-colonialism of which they are a part. On 
the other hand, immigration systems are portrayed as the disaster: bureau-
crats are typically portrayed as inept and inadequate to the task of respond-
ing effectively to the challenges migration poses.
This elision of asylum as crisis—whereby asylum seekers are seen as cultural, 
economic, or security threats; and asylum in crisis—whereby the administra-
tive systems for controlling the numbers of applicants, deciding on the validity 
of their claims, and deporting those whose claims are deemed to be false, are 
seen as inadequate—‘serves as an important mechanism in the reproduction 
of dominant asylum discourse’ (Moore 2010: 145). Specifically, it affords the 
opportunity to project the supposed disaster of migration onto an evidently 
disastrous administration. This slippage is extremely expedient politically 
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because it provides a particularly direct way for sensationalist media and oppo-
sition parties to portray the ‘crisis’ as stemming from the incompetence of pol-
iticians. The obvious subtext is that the challenging political party will provide 
a more competent administration by being more efficient and, typically, more 
exclusionary. Over time this configuration of ‘crisis’, political critique and pol-
icy response results in an inexorable ratchetting up of immigration controls 
as power either swaps hands between parties who make increasingly bold and 
ambitious promises about control whilst in opposition, or as incumbent par-
ties become more exclusionary in order to hold on to power.
This discourse of crisis can also be linked to distrust, political alienation 
and the rise of the political right in Europe in recent years (see New York 
Times 2017). Paying attention to why large sections of liberal society have 
turned towards right-wing, immigration-restricting parties in recent years 
is crucially important for understanding the development of immigration 
and asylum law. Working class, low skilled voters in many Western econo-
mies are facing unemployment, falling real wages, rising personal debt and 
a mismatch between their own skills and those required by largely tertiary 
and quaternary industrial economies. The rise of right wing populism in 
the United States and Britain, for example, has been driven by structural 
changes in their economies that have rendered this social group disillusioned 
and feeling politically unrepresented (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Similarly 
in much of continental Europe, the economic difficulties of the late 2000s, 
including the sovereign debt crisis that erupted at the end of 2009, pro-
duced rising unemployment levels, fuelling right wing sentiments and 
increasing pressure on politicians to restrict numbers of immigrants, includ-
ing asylum seekers and refugees (Greven 2016). Although radical right–wing 
parties are once again ‘a force to be reckoned with’ (Akkerman et al. 2016: 
3), the most notable feature of the right-wing parties that have benefitted 
from these developments is their strengthened mainstream appeal; policies 
and rhetoric that might once have been considered radically right-wing are 
becoming more acceptable and politically potent.
The issue of refugee migration to Europe played a part in the United 
Kingdom Independence Party’s (UKIP) successful campaign for Britain to 
vote to leave the EU in 2016 for instance, which involved poster images 
of refugees making their way on foot across the Balkans alongside the cap-
tion ‘Breaking Point: The EU has Failed us all’, a tactic which opponents 
interpreted as ‘exploiting the misery of the Syrian refugee crisis in the most 
dishonest and immoral way’.1 Moreover, those governments that welcomed 
1Yvette Cooper, British Member of Parliament, quoted in The Huffington Post (Hopkins 2016).
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the most refugees in 2015, such as Germany and Sweden, have faced harsh 
criticism from sections of their electorates in the following years as racial 
tensions, poverty among incumbent populations and the fear of terrorism 
nurtured a backlash of anti-refugee sentiment. In consequence, attention 
has gradually turned towards measures to contain refugee flows in Turkey or 
other locations closer to the source of the migratory movements.
As in many other contexts the term ‘crisis’, which was ‘once a signifier 
for a critical decisive moment’, has ‘come to be construed as a protracted 
historical and experiental condition’ (Roitman 2013: 2; see also Agamben 
2005). Its widespread use, says Roitman, subordinates particular events, 
in all their singularity and uniqueness, to a ‘generic logic’ that seems ‘self- 
explanatory’ (2013: 3). Its use also inevitably entails explicit or implicit 
judgments about what a normal state of affairs would look like: ‘crisis com-
pared to what?’ (ibid.: 4). In the case of asylum in Western Europe this may 
be the situation at the height of the Cold War, when asylum seekers came 
mostly from the Soviet Bloc and ‘each one constituted a vote for the political 
system of the West and a reproach to that of the East’ (Schuster 2003: 190). 
Consequently almost all such refugees were granted asylum with very little 
individual scrutiny, reinforcing the presumption that they must, therefore, 
‘have been authentic refugees fleeing authentic persecution’ (Legoux 1995: 
xxiii). Use of crisis discourse also, importantly, legitimates and supports the 
redistribution and extension of state power (Strasser 2016: 48; Klein 2007; 
Mountz and Heimstra 2014), allowing the adoption of measures of govern-
ance that would otherwise seem excessively authoritarian (Buzan et al. 1998: 
21–23).
In the Cold War period security threats were commonly presented as 
political or military in character, and the entity posing the threat was a state 
or some supra-national grouping like ‘the Soviet Bloc’. The focus was on 
material factors such as the scale of a state’s military capacity. More recently, 
however, it has become common to identify threats in economic, environ-
mental and health-related contexts too as part of a pandemic of anxieties 
that seem to accompany modern everyday life (Furedi 2002; Pain and Smith 
2008; Beck 1992). Popular understanding of the consequences of migration 
is an important form of this heightened sense of social fear. Furthermore, 
when a strong state response is seen as the antidote to the fearful con-
dition in question, it becomes in the interests of state bureaucrats, as well 
as their contracted agencies, to confirm and reproduce the sense of unease 
that provokes an appeal to them (Bigo 2002; see also Isin 2004). From this 
perspective the increasingly common tendency among politicians to iden-
tify refugees and migrants as, on the one hand, threats to the ‘culture’ or 
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‘identity’ of the indigenous population and, on the other, as posing criminal 
or terrorist threats to citizens’ personal safety and security, is unsurprising 
(Huysmans 2000: 751).
The constructivist approach to securitisation pioneered by the 
Copenhagen School of Security Studies foregrounds the performative 
aspects of security discourse. Buzan et al. define securitisation as a perlocu-
tionary ‘speech act’—whereby some particular issue is ‘presented as an exis-
tential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside 
the normal bounds of political procedure’ (1998: 23–24)—that is accepted 
as valid by its target audience. In other words, securitisation is the inter-sub-
jective process whereby a phenomenon like migration becomes a security 
issue, not because it necessarily poses an actual or significant threat, but 
because it is successfully presented as doing so.
During the post Cold War era of the 1990s and early 2000s, immigra-
tion was one area wherein securitisation ‘opened up a number of discursive 
opportunities to correlate terrorism with immigration, thereby helping to 
legitimise practices and technologies in migration control that were usually 
reserved for emergencies’ (Boswell 2007: 589; see Buzan et al. 1998: 23–26; 
Huysmans 2000). Here it is helpful to distinguish analytically between secu-
ritisation as framed in political discourse and securitisation as manifest in 
administrative action (Boswell 2007: 591). Unlike in the United States, 
it is at this latter level in particular, argues Boswell, that securitisation has 
been most apparent in Europe. Furthermore, rather than counter-terrorism 
practices having been incorporated into practices of migration control, the 
process has been rather the reverse, namely that tools developed in further-
ance of migration policy, such as databases on foreign nationals, airline pas-
senger lists, and frontier passport controls, ‘have been harnessed in order to 
enhance the surveillance of suspected or potential terrorists’ (2007: 601).
In short, for all the reasons identified above, national and supra-national 
legal and administrative structures for processing and assessing asylum 
claims, and controlling or deporting those who make them, have been 
portrayed on the one hand as increasingly important to the economic 
and social well-being, and even the physical safety, of citizens; and on the 
other, as grossly inadequate and inefficient, and in urgent need of root and 
branch reform. In such circumstances it is remarkable that so little empirical 
research has been carried out into how these structures actually operate in 
practice. The great bulk of the research that has been done on administrative 
and legal systems of asylum determination falls under the heading of legal 
studies rather than social science and is thus primarily normative rather than 
critical in its stance. The present volume seeks to help remedy these lacunae.
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The ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Perspective
The crisis rhetoric surrounding asylum seeking in Europe was exacerbated by 
the civil war in Syria, compounded by the human rights abuses perpetrated 
by the self-styled Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq. These had resulted in 
the deaths of over 250,000 people by mid-2015 (BBC 2016) and produced 
one of the largest human migration events in history. Around 11 million 
people were forced to leave their homes and seek safety between the begin-
ning of the civil war in March 2011 and mid-2016 (www.syrianrefugees.eu 
2016). It is well known that attempts to reach Europe often end in tragedy, 
underscoring the lengths to which migrants have been forced to go to find 
safety. 3700 people lost their lives in the Mediterranean in 2015, and over 
4900 died in the same way in 2016 (IOM 2016). The risk of dying along 
this route was estimated at one in 269 arrivals in 2015 and one in 88 (one 
in 47 between Libya and Italy) in 2016 as migrants turned to more perilous 
routes and smugglers resorted to more dangerous tactics in an attempt to 
avoid heightened border controls (UNHCR 2016a).
Yet for all the crisis talk about refugees in Europe, it is notable that the 
vast majority of Syrians affected by the violence in their country sought 
safety either within Syria itself or within Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt 
and Iraq. It is estimated that 6.6 million Syrians were internally displaced 
within Syria, and a further 4.8 million sought safety in the region, between 
March 2011 and the end of 2016 (www.syrianrefugees.eu 2016). Despite 
this, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had 
received only just over half of the required aid needed to respond to the 
humanitarian needs of the displaced in mid-2016. This shortfall contributed 
to inadequate living conditions in refugee camps and cities2 in the region 
around Syria. For its part, the European Union received 1.18 million appli-
cations for asylum from Syrians between April 2011 and September 2016 
(UNHCR 2016b). Although this helps to explain the substantial increase in 
total asylum claims received by the European Union illustrated in Fig. 1.1 it 
is only a fraction of the total numbers displaced.
Indeed, as Moreno-Lax (2017a) demonstrates in her comprehensive 
analysis of EU asylum law, although there is a right to asylum enshrined 
in EU law, the EU is highly active in curtailing access to this right. This is 
achieved through a panoply of pre-border, extra-territorial and  preemptive 
2Koizumi and Hoffstadter (2015) note that many of the world’s refugees live in urban areas rather than 
dedicated camps, posing distinctive policy challenges that are only belatedly beginning to be addressed.
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measures, including offshore border checks, outsourced visa processing, 
privatised pre-boarding controls, and maritime interdiction. These ‘remote 
control’ activities effectively limit access to asylum in Europe and introduce 
a fundamental inconsistency between the lofty aspirations of the Union as 
articulated by its commitment to asylum, effective judicial protection and 
non-refoulement (that is, a commitment to not return anyone to a situation 
in which they will face persecution), and the practical barriers that asylum 
seekers face in attempting to access Europe.
Fig. 1.1 Total number of asylum applications, first instance decisions and final deci-
sions for EU-28 countries, and percentage of positive first instance and final decisions, 
2008–2017
Sources Eurostat ‘Asylum and first time asylum applicants’—annual aggregated data 
(rounded)—tps00191, ‘First instance decisions on asylum applications by type of decision—
annual aggregated data’—tps00192, and ‘Final decisions on applications by citizenship, 
age and sex Annual data (rounded)’—migr_asydcfina, all at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
data/database (accessed 21 June 2018). ‘Positive’ decisions include Geneva Convention, 
humanitarian, subsidiary and temporary protection status. Note what are referred to 
as final decisions in the graph are decisions taken by administrative or judicial bodies in 
appeal or in review and which are no longer subject to remedy. The true ‘final instance’ 
may be, according to the national legislation and administrative procedures, a decision 
of the highest national court. However, these statistics refer to what is effectively a final 
decision in the vast majority of all cases: i.e. that all normal routes of appeal have been 
exhausted
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It should also be noted in the context of the development of the preemp-
tive, extraterritorial controls that Moreno-Lax (2017b) describes, that the 
rising death toll in the Mediterranean is part of a broader and longer-term 
escalation in the number of migrants dying in and en route to Europe. The 
European Network against Nationalism, Racism, Fascism and in Support 
of Migrants and Refugees (UNITED) has kept a ‘list of deaths’ since 1993, 
which includes reported deaths that have occurred as a result of European 
border militarisation, asylum laws, poor accommodation conditions, deten-
tion, deportations and carrier sanctions. It stood at 22,394 on 19 June 2015 
(UNITED 2015), roughly two months before the publication of the pho-
tograph of the dead body of Alan Kurdi, the drowned toddler whose death 
ignited a renewed round of moral panic surrounding the “refugee crisis” in 
Europe.
Asylum determination—meaning the process of reaching a decision on 
a claim for international protection on the grounds of asylum—has long 
played an important role in European politics, but during 2015 and 2016 
it rose in prominence as the refugee issue took centre stage. Figure 1.1 
charts the number of applications, first instance decisions and final deci-
sions reached on asylum claims to Europe between 2008 and 2017, as well 
as the percentage of positive first instance and final decisions.3 First instance 
decisions refer to decisions on asylum claims usually made by a govern-
ment official in the country of asylum. Where asylum seekers receive a neg-
ative decision on their first instance claim, they have the right to appeal, in 
European countries at least, either through legal or administrative means 
depending on the country in question. The decision on appeal is usually4 
the final decision on an application and Fig. 1.1 illustrates how significant 
these final decisions are. In 2011 for example, the number of final decisions 
reached through appeal totaled over half the number of initial decisions, 
underscoring how indispensable appeal processes are to the overall deci-
sion-making system.
Figure 1.1 reveals various facets of the politics surrounding European 
asylum determination. Firstly, the volume of decisions, both first instance 
and final, increased markedly between 2008 and 2016, as indicated by the 
striped and white bars respectively. Over that period the volume of final 
3It is worth noting that because of the time it takes to administer asylum claims, many first instance 
decisions made in 2016 will have concerned applications received in 2015 or earlier, and many final 
decisions made in 2016 will have concerned applications made even earlier. The same point could be 
made for the other years shown.
4Unless there are specific matters of law that can be appealed to higher courts.
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decisions more than doubled and the volume of initial decisions more than 
quadrupled. An expansion of this scale and pace in any decision-making 
system is likely to introduce challenges in terms of staff stress and turnover, 
resources and training (see for example, Sorgoni, this volume, who describes 
an increase from ten Territorial Commissions in Italy—which examine ini-
tial asylum claims—to 45 between 2010 and 2016). Secondly however, 
this rapid acceleration in decision-making lagged behind the increase in the 
number of applications (the black bars). In 2008 there was virtual parity 
between the number of new applications received and the number of first 
instance decisions made, but for every subsequent year before 2017 this par-
ity was not restored. This led to criticism that the European asylum deter-
mination system is ill-equipped to cope with rapid increases in applications. 
It has also produced delays for applicants, which have been associated with 
mental ill health by various studies (Laban et al. 2005; Coffey et al. 2010). 
From the perspective of decision-makers, the period from 2008 to 2016 
therefore constituted something of a perfect storm: an extremely rapid 
increase in decision-making frequency coupled with a demoralising genera-
tion of backlogs, delays and associated criticisms.
The plotted lines in Fig. 1.1 reveal another interesting development 
in asylum determination in Europe: the divergence between the rate of 
success at first instance and the rate of success at the point of a final deci-
sion between 2010 and 2016. During this period the rate of success at first 
instance more than doubled, from around 25% to over 60% (illustrated 
by the solid line in Fig. 1.1). During the same period the rate of success 
on appeal declined however (the dashed line), falling below 20% in 2011 
and remaining there until 2016. There are various possible explanations for 
this development. It may be that the first instance procedure improved in 
terms of its ability to detect legally well-founded5 claims. This could help 
to explain why the appeal system was less likely to deliver positive decisions 
on asylum claims: because fewer claims that reached this stage are legally 
well founded. Alternatively however, it could mean that decision makers at 
the appeal stage simply perceived there to be an improvement in the ability 
to detect well founded claims at the initial stage, because the proportion of 
claims granted at the initial stage had risen. Appeal stage decision-makers 
might reason that if a claim has not been granted at the initial stage when 
so many other claims are, there must be something wrong with many of the 
5Although it is necessary at this point in our argument to talk about ‘well-founded claims’ the discus-
sion elsewhere in the introduction makes it clear that we perceive serious shortcomings in what the law 
asserts a well-founded claim to be.
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applications that reach them. What this reasoning misses, however, is the 
possibility that there may simply be more legally well-founded claims over-
all. If this is true, there is a risk that the increase in first instance positive 
decisions is misinterpreted by appeal stage decision makers as a signal that 
first stage procedures have improved in their ability to detect well-founded 
claims, when in fact there may have been no such improvement and there-
fore no particular reason for appeal decision makers to be more conservative.
By 2017 the system seemed to be catching up again: the total number 
of first instance decisions exceeded the number of new claims for the first 
time during the period shown in Fig. 1.1 for instance. But if criticism about 
slowness and delays was not enough, the asylum determination system has 
also drawn objections based on its inconsistent treatment of claimants over 
the same period (for example AIDA 2013). International law dictates that 
refugees can only be recognised as such if they fulfil the specific definition 
set out in Article 1(A)2 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, as modified by the 
accompanying 1967 Protocol, namely that a refugee must be someone who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country. (italics added)
Yet none of these five italicised ‘Convention reasons’ are precisely defined, 
either in the Convention itself or in the UNHCR Handbook that provides 
guidance on its application,6 nor are the key notions of ‘well-founded fear’ 
and ‘persecution’. Consequently these have all been subjected to legal inter-
pretation by a whole range of national courts across Europe and beyond, not 
always with congruent results.
What is more, both first instance and appealed decision-making across 
the countries of Europe have in practice been approached in very different 
ways reflecting the different legal cultures and political circumstances of the 
member countries. This results in uncomfortable geographical anomalies 
both in the rate of ostensibly similar refugee claims that are recognised and 
granted refugee status (or another form of positive status such as human-
itarian status, subsidiary or temporary protection status), and in the pro-
cedural approach that different countries take to asylum determination. 
6UNHCR (1979, Annexes updated 2011). Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/uk/publications/legal/3d58e13b4/hand-
book-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html [Accessed 31 July 
2016].
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The  proportion of Syrian asylum seekers who were awarded some form of 
positive status in 2015 was 97% in the EU-28 as a whole for example, but 
particular countries deviated significantly. For instance, Hungary, Italy and 
Romania each awarded some form of positive status in fewer than 60% of 
cases.7 In the same year, the recognition rate of Afghans—the second most 
common nationality of asylum claimants to Europe after Syrians8—var-
ied from 78, 83 and 96% in Austria, France and Italy to 16, 14 and 5% in 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, respectively.9
International inconsistency is also evident procedurally. Figure 1.2 illus-
trates the variability in procedures among 17 member countries of the EU as 
well as three non-members,10 based on surveys carried out by the European 
Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) in 2017.
As can be seen from Fig. 1.2, procedural inconsistency is evident in relation 
to whether or not time limits apply to asylum claims, whether asylum seek-
ers have access to free legal assistance on appeal against a negative decision in 
practice, the use of video-conferencing and the degree to which appeals are 
suspensive11 and judicial, among other things. In fact, there is only unambigu-
ous uniformity of approach concerning three out of the 12 procedures shown.
If inconsistencies between countries are not troublesome enough, individ-
ual countries also often have more than one legal process through which asy-
lum claims can be determined, typically including both a regular process and a 
fast-track process for applications that are deemed to be easier to determine or 
less likely to be well-founded. The proliferation of different processes introduces 
complexity and inconsistencies within countries as well as across them. Greece, 
for example, has at least five proceedures including the regular procedure, border 
procedure, fast-track border procedure, accelerated procedure and Dublin pro-
cedure (Asylum Information Database 2018). The current form of the fast-track 
border procedure has been made possible by the European Union’s application of 
7Statistics refer to first instance decisions only. Eurostat table migr_asydcfsta, ‘First instance decisions 
on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded)’. Available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database; published 6 June 2018 [Accessed 22 June 2018].
8Eurostat (2016). Asylum Statistics. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.
php/Asylum_statistics; published 20 April 2016 [Accessed 6 January 2017].
9Statistics refer to first instance decisions only. Countries that delivered fewer than 100 first instance 
decisions are discounted. Eurostat table migr_asydcfsta, ‘First instance decisions on applications by citi-
zenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded)’. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/
database; published 6 June 2018 [Accessed 22 June 2018].
10The 17 European Union (EU) Member States comprise Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom, and the three non-EU countries are, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey.
11If an appeal is suspensive then a deportation will not be carried out until it is completed.
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the concept of hotspots to migration in 2015,12 which allows various European 
agencies to ‘assist’ countries that are receiving ‘disproportionate migratory pres-
sures’ in order to help them ‘fulfil their obligations under EU law’ (European 
Commission 2015; see also Giannopoulou and Gill, this volume). This innova-
tion, ‘supersedes the national in favour of hybrid, super-national governance’ via a 
process of what has been called ‘super-state’ formation (Painter et al. 2017: 259). 
In conjuction with the EU-Turkey deal that came into force in 2016 to facili-
tate the assessment of asylum claims received by the EU in Turkey, the fast-track 
border procedure has generated an ‘extremely truncated asylum procedure with 
fewer guarantees’ (Greek Council for Refugees 2017: n.p.), effectively turning 
the Greek Eastern Aegean islands that have been designated hotspots into sites of 
containment and deportation back to Turkey (Tazzioli and Garelli 2018).
Under these conditions asylum interviews undertaken by officials working 
for the European Union have been reportedly different to those conducted 
by Greek officials. Cases have been reported in practice where European 
Asylum Support Office experts lack knowledge about countries of origin, 
lack cultural sensitivity, employ closed and suggestive questions, use repet-
itive questions akin to interrogation, and conduct unnecessarily exhaustive 
interviews (Greek Council for Refugees, 2017).
The assessment of vulnerability is often crucial to which legal track is 
taken by an asylum application. In Greece for example, if an applicant is 
considered to be vulnerable then their application can be transferred out of 
the fast track border procedure. But deciding on what constitutes vulnera-
bility is itself highly variable and, in the absence of conceptual clarity, can 
depend upon who is making the assessment (AIDA 2017). The definition 
of vulnerability employed by the member countries of the European Union 
varies markedly: although most recognize being a child, being an unaccom-
panied child, being disabled, being a victim of torture and being pregnant 
as forms of vulnerability only a subset recognize being a victim of human 
trafficking, serious illness, mental disorders, lack of legal capacity and post 
traumatic stress disorder as forms of vulnerability (AIDA 2017: 16).
One of the most contested and protracted areas of controversy in relation to 
the consistency of procedures used to determine refugee status in Europe, and 
more broadly to ensure common standards for the treatment of asylum seekers 
and refugees, concerns the Common Europe Asylum System (CEAS), a series 
of directives intended to harmonise the procedures and standards of member 
countries, both at the first instance stage of their claim and during their appeal. 
12The ‘EU introduced the term “hotspots” in policy conversations addressing crime and natural disas-
ters, long before its deployment in the field of migration’ (Tazzioli and Garelli 2018: 6).
1 Introduction     15
Although hailed as a milestone on the road to integration in Europe, the sys-
tem has been roundly critiqued, largely on the basis of its widely acknowledged 
inability to ensure a harmonious approach to asylum seeker protection and 
refugee claim determination as the number of applications the EU received 
increased markedly in 2015. So prominent was the CEAS’s failure to unite 
the countries of Europe at the height of the increase in asylum claims in 2015 
that the European Union hurriedly sought to strengthen and reform it via a 
series of additional measures proposed in mid-2016, including turning a series 
of its ‘directives’ into ‘regulations’: in other words rendering them binding obli-
gations on member states rather than merely suggestions. The politics and legal 
significance of these developments is central to the issue of asylum determina-
tion in Europe, and is discussed more extensively in the next chapter.
Legal and Ethnographic Approaches to Asylum
The statistics and charts provided above hint at the extent and complexity of 
the contradictions and tensions within the European asylum system, as well as 
the extraordinary degree of discretion available both to countries and individ-
ual decision makers within the broad rules set out by the Union. There are a 
number of existing comparative studies of European asylum systems, both in 
the scholarly literature (Joly 1996; Cherubini 2014; Guild and Minderhoud 
2011); and in reports or web-sites curated by NGOs, such as the excellent 
interactive online resources made available by ECRE through their Asylum 
Information Database.13 Generally, however, these are written from a legal 
standpoint rather than the ethnographic perspective adopted in this volume.
There are important differences between the doctrinal study of law and 
the approach favoured by ethnographers (Kandel 1992), partly because, as 
Twining neatly puts it, ‘judges have a duty to decide… scientists and histori-
ans mainly conclude ’ (Twining 2006: 53, italics added). Doctrinal legal schol-
arship is fundamentally normative, both because its subject-matter is focused 
on norms, and because it generally locates itself within the legal paradigm, 
studying law in relative isolation from its social and political context (Anders 
2015: 413).14 Legal scholars are concerned with teasing out the ‘correct inter-
pretations of general legal abstractions’ in particular cases (hence the empha-
sis in legal education on the study of written judgments, at least in common 
13Available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/ [Accessed 6 January 2016].
14There are exceptions to this, such as the critical legal studies movement, and of course socio-legal 
studies constitutes a very different approach to studying the law.
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law traditions), and with ‘philosophical reflections on what and how law 
should be’ (von Benda-Beckmann 2008: 94). By contrast, the ethnographic 
approach to law is descriptive, and inherently comparative and relativistic.
The knowledge and forms of reasoning that characterise the formal legal 
systems of European states are highly esoteric, having diverged from everyday, 
lay understandings as a concomitant of professionalisation. However, while 
ethnographers do of course need to understand the legislative and admin-
istrative frameworks within which legal actors operate, these are neither their 
starting nor their finishing point. They approach lawyers or bureaucrats just 
as they would any other exotic group, trying through prolonged and detailed 
observation of their daily practices to understand their distinctive modes of 
thought and the practical actions that express these, or sometimes depart from 
them. Their analyses seek to set these concepts and practices within a broader 
socio-cultural context; unlike doctrinal academic lawyers, their ultimate analyti-
cal vantage point is located outside the legal paradigm itself. In fact the laws and 
judgments associated with hegemonic, state-sponsored legal systems are studied 
no differently from ‘folk systems’ of law underwritten by religious or traditional 
authorities (von Benda-Beckmann 2008: 97; see also Good 2015, 2017).15
As that last comment implies, ethnographies of law are almost always con-
cerned with situations of legal pluralism in one or more of the senses identified 
by Moore (2001). First, states themselves are internally complex, and their institu-
tions compete for legal authority, as with the very different migration policies and 
aspirations of the Westminster and Scottish governments in the UK.16 Second, the 
state may preside over diverse legal systems applying only to specific sub-sections 
of its population, as with the different family law systems for Hindus and Muslims 
in India (Solanki 2011); this has been labelled ‘weak legal pluralism’ (Griffiths 
1986). Third, the state legal system may be partly implemented by non-state bod-
ies (privately-run asylum detention centres, for example). Fourth, the state legal 
system vies with the legal systems of other states in supra-national arenas like the 
CEAS, or with international law vis-a-vis global institutions like UNHCR. Fifth, 
‘strong legal pluralism’ arises when the state is enmeshed with ‘non-governmen-
tal, semi-autonomous social fields which generate their own… obligatory norms to 
which they can induce or coerce compliance’ (Moore 2001: 107; italics added).
Moore’s notion of a ‘semi-autonomous social field’ has proved crucial for 
clarifying studies of legal pluralism. She does not see such fields as necessarily 
corresponding to particular social groupings. Rather, a social field is defined:
15Where formal state law is concerned ethnographers should avoid the ‘expertise-trap’ of simply accept-
ing what legal experts write about it (von Benda-Beckmann 2008: 101).
16Available at: http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/news/holyrood-and-westminster-could- 
diverge-immigration [Accessed 12 December 2016].
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by a processual characteristic, the fact that it can generate rules and coerce or 
induce compliance to them… The independent articulation of many differ-
ent social fields constitutes one of the basic characteristics of complex societies. 
(Moore 1978: 57–58)
So despite their capacities to generate rules and enforce conformity, such 
fields can only do so within limits; they are only semi-autonomous because 
they co-exist with, and are affected by, other semi-autonomous social fields 
that serve to set limits upon their own powers of enforcement. Moore gives 
the example of the garment industry in New York City, where formal legis-
lation relating directly or indirectly to garment production, such as banking 
law and labour law, operates alongside the quasi-legal regulations of non-
state bodies like trade unions and manufacturers’ associations, and less for-
mal rules growing out of ‘the interplay of the jobbers, contractors, factors, 
retailers, and skilled workers in the course of doing business with each other’ 
(Moore 1973: 728). Governments, of course, seek to regulate the social 
fields within their state boundaries—by means of legislation, for example. 
But legislation often fails to achieve its intended aims, or has unplanned or 
unexpected consequences, because it is not introduced into a vacuum, but 
into a situation that already contains complex sets of social arrangements 
and obligations, that may distort or even defeat its intended purpose.
We could make a case for how asylum exemplifies each of the sorts of 
legal pluralism Moore outlines, but her fourth and fifth senses seem par-
ticularly pertinent. Asylum clearly exemplifies legal pluralism in the fourth 
of Moore’s senses listed above, for instance. Thus, although the United 
Kingdom—for example—was an early signatory of both the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the subsequent 
1967 Protocol that made it less narrowly focused on the specific circum-
stances prevailing after the end of the Second World War, these were not 
formally incorporated into UK law until the coming into force of the 1993 
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act. Since then immigration and asylum 
have been subject to a growing body of UK national legislation, begin-
ning with the 1971 Immigration Act and added to at an increasingly frantic 
pace over the past two decades. They are also regulated by the Immigration 
Rules, a hugely complex body of quasi-legislative regulatory material that has 
undergone even more frequent modification.17 To a large extent, both the 
plethora of primary legislation, and the rapidly-changing Immigration Rules 
17https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules/immigration-rules-part-11-asylum [Accessed 31 July 
2016].
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reflect repeated attempts by the state to place yet more national restrictions 
upon the rights supposedly guaranteed by the international Convention.
Asylum also displays the characteristics of Moore’s fifth sense of legal plu-
ralism, ‘strong legal pluralism’. Asylum procedures involve complex interac-
tions between different professional actors (administrators, judges, lawyers, 
doctors and other ‘experts’, public service interpreters, and so on), regulated in 
complex ways by national and international legislation; by the rules of proce-
dure developed by or for different bureaucracies or court systems; by the eth-
ical codes of the professional bodies to which these actors belong; and by the 
unwritten conventions that have arisen through their day-to-day interactions. 
In addition, these procedures centre on would-be refugees from all over the 
world, and each asylum applicant carries with them their own ‘legal conscious-
ness’ (Merry 1990), generally not reflecting any prior experience or under-
standing of the national legal system within which their claim is being decided.
In short, European asylum systems are prime examples of ‘strong’ legal plu-
ralism in which, as Griffiths puts it, ‘the ‘law’ which is actually effective on the 
‘ground floor’ of society is the result of enormously complex and… unpre-
dictable patterns of competition, interaction, negotiation, [and] isolationism’ 
(1986: 39). It is hard to imagine how anything other than an ethnographic 
approach could hope to successfully disentangle processes of such complexity.
Approaching Asylum Determination 
Ethnographically
This present collection comes at a crucial time for Europe, when the 
European Union is consolidating its attempts to implement the Common 
European Asylum System; when mainland Europe is receiving unusually 
large numbers of people displaced by violence in the Middle East; when 
efforts to exteriorise border controls have heightened; and when the conse-
quences for migration patterns of Britain’s expected exit from the European 
Union are still almost entirely unclear. It represents the fruits of years of 
detailed in-person observations of the often obscured legal and administra-
tive processes by which asylum claims are decided. In what follows, a legal 
overview of the CEAS (Craig and Zwaan) precedes sections on the diverse 
actors involved, the means by which they communicate, and the ways in 
which they make their decisions on a daily basis.
The section on actors covers judges, first instance decision making offi-
cials, government legal representatives, and child asylum applicants. We 
employ the concept of ‘actors’ because it throws into relief two elements of 
these processes. Firstly, when considering the whole machinery of asylum 
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determination the concept of actors helps to make clear the diversity of 
people involved in making determination processes happen. Determination 
is not something that is simply conceived and executed by legal elites and 
politicians—for some people involved in the system of determination it is a 
daily practice, with all the connotations of work, routine, habits and norms 
that this entails. Secondly, the concept of actors emphasises the agency 
that each of these people can have within the process of determination. 
When examined in detail, asylum determination is not simply the appli-
cation of a set of legal rules to particular cases in a social, economic and 
cultural void. Rather, the wide range of people involved in determination 
can each, in their specific ways, also affect the course that the determina-
tion takes, for example via their emotional involvement, their bodily com-
portment, their language and their interactions. As such each of the actors 
we might identify as being involved in asylum determination is capable of 
acting upon that process, however subtly. A focus on the actors involved 
in determination therefore offers an antidote to the emphasis on either 
legal doctrine or outcome in legal studies. There are, in fact, more actors 
involved in determining an asylum appeal than might be imagined, from 
solicitors, barristers and judges, to caseworkers, clerks, security personnel, 
police, youth workers and a range of ‘experts’, not to mention applicants 
themselves. The mechanics of asylum determination therefore have their 
own sociology, involving rivalries, alliances, and competing cultures and 
discourses. Ethnographic analysis of courts, reception centres, tribunals and 
the back-offices of immigration decision making is ideally suited to exam-
ine these phenomena.
In her chapter on the challenges of judging asylum claims, for exam-
ple, Carolina Kobelinsky critically reflects on the intractable dilemmas that 
judges face, and the prominent role of personal convictions and emotions 
in determining life or death cases, drawing on 14 months of ethnographic 
fieldwork conducted at the French Court of Asylum. Massimiliano Spotti’s 
analysis of credibility assessments in the Belgian determination system exam-
ines how a second crucial set of actors—the immigration officials charged 
with making decisions about asylum claims at first instance—valorise 
particular forms of factual truth that often bear little relation to the lived 
histories of asylum seekers, but which can nevertheless lead to life-threat-
ening forms of identity misrecognition. John Campbell’s work on present-
ing officers who put forward the legal case against asylum seekers on behalf 
of the British Home Office during tribunal appeal hearings offers a rare 
glimpse of the fractious and obscured sociology of a world that is made 
insular by the adversarial nature of the British legal process. And Chrisa 
Giannopoulou and Nick Gill take advantage of the street-level perspective 
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offered by an ethnographic approach to report on the tensions between vul-
nerability and agency in the context of asylum seeking children in the Greek 
system of reception centres and camps.
The second section of the book turns to the pivotal issue of commu-
nication during the asylum determination process. Communication in 
asylum cases is frequently inadequate to the task. In particular, the ten-
sion between the global processes that produce asylum seekers and refu-
gees and the national and local contexts in which understanding about 
them circulates, produces the ideal conditions for mutual incomprehen-
sion and misunderstanding (Blommaert 2009). Language in asylum claim 
determination
is dominated by frames that refer to static and timeless (i.e., uniform and 
national) orders of things. So while asylum seekers belong to a truly global 
scale of events and processes, the treatment of their applications is brought 
down to a rigidly national scale, a very modernist response to postmodern real-
ities. This creates many problems—problems of justice, to name just one cat-
egory. It also lays bare some of the threads of the fabric of globalization—the 
paradox between transnational processes and national frames for addressing 
them, for instance. (Blommaert 2009: 415)
These tensions give rise to both constraints over the means of expression and 
instances of misinterpretation and miscommunication. When communica-
tive mistakes are made in this arena people’s lives are put at stake, so it is 
difficult to think of an area in which clear and effective communication is 
more important. The diversity of languages involved in processes of asylum 
claim determination, however, render the area extremely challenging from 
the perspective of the practical necessity for good quality, reliable and profes-
sional interpretaters and translators. With all these difficulties in mind, the 
chapters in this section underscore the unerring serendipity and unreliability 
of communication even in grave contexts such as asylum determination.
Julia Dahlvik’s analysis of the Austrian Federal Asylum Office, for 
instance, argues that the role and power of interpreters in the administrative 
asylum procedure is so extensive that renewed attention should be given to 
professional ethics governing their conduct. Relatedly, Robert Gibb’s analy-
sis of asylum interviews and appeals in France settles upon the metaphor of 
‘power struggle’ to capture the ways in which communication is contested 
within these settings. Matilde Skov Danstrøm and Zachary Whyte corrob-
orate the gravity of communication in the Danish asylum system, by not 
only highlighting the pivotal role of narrative in asylum appeal processes but 
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also the way in which the inability to ‘perform’ narratives convincingly can 
endanger just asylum decisions. Finally, Jessica Hambly examines the work 
of judges in asylum appeals in the British context from a fresh perspective. 
Rather than concentrating on their (mis)use of discretion, she examines the 
non-legal forms of interaction and relationships that judges form with those 
around them in the course of their work. This approach understands judg-
ing as not only a legal act of decision making, but a complex social pro-
cess of communication and competition between actors, organisations, and 
institutions.
The third section focuses squarely on the issue of decision making on 
asylum claims by judges and administrative officials. In all the chapters in 
this section, the subjectivities of the legal process of decision making are in 
evidence. For example, drawing on analysis and observation of 230 Italian 
asylum appeal decisions, as well as interviews with judges, Barbara Sorgoni 
focuses on the critical concept of credibility, arguing that internal consist-
ency of asylum claims is given too much weight in the deliberations of legal 
officials in the absence of alternative criteria. Similarly, Tone Liodden finds 
that Norwegian asylum decision makers tend to turn towards ‘equal treat-
ment’ of claims in the absence of evidence and other criteria upon which 
to base their decisions, with important implications for the kinds of jus-
tice practised in asylum determination. For Laura Affolter, Jonathan Miaz 
and Ephraim Poertner working in the Swiss context, the key issue is how 
self-understandings of their official roles inform what asylum system deci-
sion makers do and how they understand and enact ‘justice’. And Stephanie 
Schneider, in her work on the German asylum system, underscores the 
dilemmas facing system bureaucrats in an environment that overtly pursues 
productivity but delegates the responsibility for quality onto individuals.
Overall, the contributors offer a series of contextually rich accounts that 
move beyond doctrinal law to expose the gaps and variances between policy 
and legislation as they are written down and as they are practised. Not only 
do they provide empirical depth and innovative insights regarding particular 
countries but they are also adeptly theorised. What is more, through their 
proximity and juxtaposition, the contributions offer the reader a compara-
tive perspective covering ten European countries.
Although the contributors write variously from sociological, anthropo-
logical, geographical and linguistic disciplinary perspectives, they are united 
in adopting an ethnographically-based methodological approach. Through 
this rich empirical and multi-disciplinary lens, they capture the current, 
contested reality of claiming asylum in Europe, laying bare the confusion, 
improvisation, inconsistency, complexity and uncertainty inherent to the 
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process. Their fusion of empirical insights, ethnographic approaches, theo-
retical reflections and legal subject matter offers a series of windows onto 
a complex and obfuscated area of law that is nevertheless central to foun-
dational debates about the viability of the European Union and the moral 
obligations that Western developed states owe to outsiders seeking protec-
tion. Most fundamentally, this book addresses the need to find out how, pre-
cisely, claims for international protection under asylum law from some of 
the most marginalised people in the world are being handled.
References
Agamben, G. (2005). State of Exception. Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press.
Akkerman, T., de Lange, S. L., & Rooduijn, M. (Eds.). (2016). Radical Right-Wing 
Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? London: Routledge.
Anders, G. (2015). Law at Its Limits: Interdisciplinarity Between Law and 
Anthropology. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 47(3), 
411–422.
Asylum Information Database. (2017). The Concept of Vulnerability in European 
Asylum Procedures. European Council on Refugees and Exiles. http://www.asylu-
mineurope.org/sites/default/files/shadow-reports/aida_vulnerability_in_asylum_
procedures.pdf. Accessed 5 Mar 2018.
Asylum Information Database. (2018). Types of Procedures: Greece. Greek Council 
for Refugees. http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/asy-
lum-procedure/general/types-procedures. Accessed 5 Mar 2018.
Bauman, Z. (1997). Postmodernity and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi: Sage.
von Benda-Beckmann, F. (2008). Riding or Killing the Centaur? Reflections on the 
Identities of Legal Anthropology. International Journal of Law in Context, 4(2), 
85–110.
Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the 
Governmentality of Unease. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27, 63–92.
Blommaert, J. (2009). Language, Asylum and the National Order. Current 
Anthropology, 50(4), 415–441.
Boswell, C. (2007). Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the 
Absence of Securitization. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(3), 589–610.
British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC]. (2016, March 11). Syria: The Story of 
the Conflict [online]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-26116868. Accessed 4 Jan 2017.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
1 Introduction     23
Charteris-Black, J. (2006). Britain as a Container: Immigration Metaphors in the 
2005 Election Campaign. Discourse and Society, 15(5), 563–581.
Cherubini, F. (2014). Asylum Law in the European Union. London: Routledge.
Coffey, G. J., Kaplan, I., Sampson, R. C., & Tucci, M. M. (2010). The Meaning 
and Mental Health Consequences of Long-Term Immigration Detention for 
People Seeking Asylum. Social Science and Medicine, 70(12), 2070–2079.
Cohen, S. (2002). Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and 
Rockers (3rd ed.). London and New York: Routledge.
Conlon, D., & Gill, N. (2015). Editorial: Interventions in Migration and 
Activism. ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 14(2), 
442–451.
European Commission. (2015). The Hotspot Approach to Managing Exceptional 
Migration Flows. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-
we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_
hotspots_en.pdf. Accessed 5 Mar 2018.
Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. (2014). Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change 
and the Left Behind. The Political Quarterly, 85(3), 277–284.
Furedi, F. (2002). Culture of Fear: Risk Taking and the Morality of Low Expectation. 
New York and London: Continuum.
Gibney, M. (2014). Asylum: Principled Hypocrisy. In B. Anderson & M. Keith 
(Eds.), Migration: A COMPAS Anthology. Oxford: COMPAS. Available at: 
http://compasanthology.co.uk/. Accessed 30 Nov 2016.
Good, A. (2015). Folk Models and the Law. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, 47(3), 423–437.
Good, A. (2017). Law and Anthropology: Legal Pluralism and “Lay” Decision-
Making. In D. Watkins & M. Burton (Eds.), Research Methods in Law (2nd ed., 
pp. 211–238). London: Routledge.
Goodwin-Gill, G. (2001). After the Cold War: Asylum and the Refugee Concept 
Move On. Forced Migration Review, 10, 14–16.
Greek Council for Refugees. (2017). Fast-Track Border Procedure (Eastern Aegean 
Islands). European Council on Refugees and Exiles. http://www.asylumineurope.
org/reports/country/greece/asylum-procedure/procedures/fast-track-border-pro-
cedure-eastern-aegean. Accessed 5 Mar 2018.
Greven, T. (2016). The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the United States: 
A Comparative Perspective Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Washington, DC. http://
www.fesdc.org/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/RightwingPopulism.pdf. 
Accessed 5 Mar 2018.
Griffiths, J. (1986). What is Legal Pluralism? Journal of Legal Pluralism, 24, 1–55.
Guild, E., & Minderhoud, P. (Eds.). (2011). The First Decade of EU Migration and 
Asylum Law. Leiden, NL: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hopkins, S. (2016). Nigel Farage’s Brexit Poster Is Being Likened To ‘Nazi 
Propaganda’, Compared to Auschwitz Documentary Scene: A ‘Prominent’ 
White-Skinned Man Also Removed from Image. Huffington Post. Available at: 
24     N. Gill and A. Good
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/nigel-farages-eu-has-failed-us-all-poster-
slammed-as-disgusting-by-nicola-sturgeon_uk_576288c0e4b08b9e3abdc483. 
Accessed 5 Jan 2017.
Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the Securitization of Migration. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5), 751–777.
International Organisation for Migration [IOM]. (2016, December 22). Latest 
Global Figures: Migrant Fatalities Worldwide. Available at: https://missingmi-
grants.iom.int/latest-global-figures. Accessed 4 Jan 2017.
Isin, E. (2004). The Neurotic Citizen. Citizenship Studies, 8, 217–235.
Joly, D. (1996). Haven or Hell? Asylum Policies and Refugees in Europe. Oxford: 
Macmillan.
Kandel, R. F. (1992). Six Differences in Assumptions and Outlook Between 
Anthropologists and Attorneys. In R. F. Kandel (Ed.), Double Vision: 
Anthropologists at Law (NAPA Bulletin, No. 11, pp. 1–4). Washington, DC: 
American Anthropological Association.
Klein, N. (2007). The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: 
Metropolitan Books.
Koizumi, K., & Hoffstaedter, G. (Eds.). (2015). Urban Refugees: Challenges in 
Protection, Services and Policy. London: Routledge.
Laban, C. J., Gernaat, H. B., Komproe, I. H., van der Tweel, I., & De Jong, J. 
T. (2005). Postmigration Living Problems and Common Psychiatric Disorders 
in Iraqi Asylum Seekers in the Netherlands. The Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Disease, 193(12), 825–832.
Legoux, L. (1995). La crise de l’asile politique en France. Paris: Centre Français sur la 
Population et le Développement.
Merry, S. E. (1990). Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among 
Working-Class Americans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Migration Policy Centre. (2016). Migrant Crisis. Available at: http://www.migra-
tionpolicycentre.eu/migrant-crisis/. Accessed 4 Jan 2017.
Moore, S. F. (1973). Law and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous Social Field as 
an Appropriate Object of Study. Law and Society Review, 7(4), 719–746.
Moore, S. F. (1978). Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Moore, S. F. (2001). Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal 
Anthropology. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 7(1), 95–116.
Moore, K. (2010). A Cultural Study of Asylum Under New Labour. Ph.D. thesis, 
Cardiff University.
Moreno-Lax, V. (2017a). Accessing Asylum in Europe: Extraterritorial Border Controls. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moreno-Lax, V. (2017b, February 7). Accessing Asylum in Europe: Extraterritorial 
Border Controls. Podcast of Public Seminar, Refugee Studies Centre. Available at: 
https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/news/accessing-asylum-in-europe-extraterritorial-bor-
der-controls-meet-refugee-rights-dr-violeta-moreno-lax. Accessed 5 Mar 2018.
1 Introduction     25
Mountz, A., & Heimstra, N. (2014). Chaos and Crisis: Dissecting the 
Spatiotemporal Logics of Contemporary Migrations and State Practices. Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers, 104, 282–390.
New York Times. (2017, October 23). How Far is Europe Swinging to the Right? 
Aisch, G., Pearce, A., and Rousseau, B. https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2016/05/22/world/europe/europe-right-wing-austria-hungary.html. 
Accessed 5 Mar 2018.
Pain, R., & Smith, S. (2008). Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life. Farnham: 
Ashgate.
Painter, J., Papada, E., Papoutsi, A., & Vradis, A. (2017). Hotspot Politics—Or, 
When the EU State Gets Real. Political Geography, 60, 259–260.
Pollet, K., Soupios-David, H., & Teffera, A. (2013). AIDA [Asylum Information 
Database], Not There Yet: An NGO Perspective on Challenges to a Fair and Effective 
Common European Asylum System, Annual Report 2012–2013. European Council 
on Refugees and Exile.
Roitman, J. (2013). Anti-Crisis. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Schuster, L. (2003). The Use and Abuse of Political Asylum in Britain and Germany. 
London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
Simmel, G. (1976). The Stranger: The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free 
Press.
Solanki, G. (2011). Adjudication in Religious Family Laws: Cultural Accommodation, 
Legal Pluralism, and Gender Equality in India. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
Strasser, S. (2016). The Crises Effect: Global Moral Obligations, National 
Interventions, and the Figure of the Pitiful/Abused Migrant. In K. Roth & A. 
Kartari (Eds.), Cultures of Crisis in Southeast Europe: Part 1: Crises Related to 
Migration, Transformation, Politics, Religion and Labour (Ethnologica Balkanica 
18) (pp. 47–66). Berlin: Lit-Verlag and Dr. W. Hopf.
Syrian Refugees. (2016, September). A Snapshot of the Crisis—In the Middle East 
and Europe: The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Repercussions for the EU. Available at: 
www.syrianrefugees.eu. Accessed 5 Jan 2017.
Tazzioli, M., & Garelli, G. (2018). Containment Beyond Detention: The Hotspot 
System and Disrupted Migration Movements Across Europe. Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space. Early view.
Twining, W. (2006). Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (2nd ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Tyler, I. (2013). Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal 
Britain. London: Zed Books.
United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR]. (2016a). 
Mediterranean Death Toll Soars, 2016 Is Deadliest Year Yet. Available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2016/10/580f3e684/mediterrane-
an-death-toll-soars-2016-deadliest-year. Accessed 5 Jan 2017.
26     N. Gill and A. Good
United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR]. (2016b). Syria 
Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal. Available at: 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. Accessed 5 Jan 2017.
UNITED. (2015). List of 22,394 Documented Deaths of Asylum Seekers, Refugees and 
Migrants Due to Restrictive Policies of Fortress Europe. Amsterdam: UNITED for 
Intercultural Action. Available at: http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/06/Listofdeaths22394June15.pdf. Accessed 5 Jan 2017.
Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (Eds.). (2010). The Multiculturalism BackLash: 
European Discourses and Practices. Oxford: Routledge.
Žižek, S. (2009). Violence: Six Sideways Reflections. London: Profile Books.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, a link is provided to the Creative Commons license and 
any changes made are indicated.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
work’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; 
if such material is not included in the work’s Creative Commons license and the 
respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain 
permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.
27© The Author(s) 2019 
N. Gill and A. Good (eds.), Asylum Determination in Europe,  
Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94749-5_2
Introduction
Common rules on most aspects of the asylum process are in force in the 
European Union (EU), building on the international refugee protec-
tion regime. This so-called EU asylum acquis has resulted in a “Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS)”. EU legislation states that the CEAS 
is to be based on a full and inclusive application of the 1951 UN Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention). The 
principle of non-refoulement—also included in the Refugee Convention—
is the most important principle in asylum law and is laid down in several 
international legal instruments.1 This principle prohibits the forced direct or 
2
Legal Overview
Sarah Craig and Karin Zwaan
S. Craig (*) 
University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland
e-mail: sarah.craig@glasgow.ac.uk
K. Zwaan 
Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
e-mail: k.zwaan@jur.ru.nl
1E.g. Article 33, UN Refugee Convention; Article 3, UN Convention against Torture; Article 7, UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 3, European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR); Article 19(2), EU Charter on Fundamental Rights; Article 21, QD1 and QDII; and 
Article 5, RD.
28     S. Craig and K. Zwaan
indirect removal of a person to a country or territory where he2 runs a risk 
of being subjected to severe human rights violations.
The CEAS consists of rules to determine which State is responsible for 
determining a claim; to define asylum seekers’ entitlements and obligations 
as regards their reception in Member States; to regulate the asylum proce-
dure itself; and to determine who qualifies for international protection.
Unlike the rest of the chapters in this volume, this chapter is not empiri-
cal, but sets out the legal framework for asylum determination in Europe. Its 
primary purpose is to offer a reflection on and some insight into the func-
tioning of the CEAS, with a view to creating a legal background and frame-
work for the ethnographic chapters that follow.
International and European Law Framework
The CEAS is a fundamental part of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ), and its aim is to establish a fair and efficient asylum system. 
The CEAS consists of a legal framework covering all aspects of the asy-
lum process, and a support agency—the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO). One must bear in mind that achieving the CEAS’ twofold goal of 
efficiency and fairness is, from a human rights perspective, a task that cre-
ates internal contradictions, in the sense that implementing efficiency may 
rule out fairness, and promoting fairness requires an investment of time 
and effort which State authorities may discourage. The task of reconciling, 
in individual cases, the conflicts inherent in pursuing this twofold goal falls 
on decision-makers and judges (see, for example, the chapters by Kobelinsky, 
Hambly, Affolter et al., and Liodden, this volume). As demonstrated 
throughout this book, not only decision-makers, but a cast of other actors 
also have profound influences. The substantive chapters of this book provide 
perspectives on the conflicts inherent in asylum decision-making and on how 
the actors involved attempt to resolve them, but while most of the coun-
tries discussed here participate fully in the CEAS, not all do. Two Member 
States (UK and Denmark) exercise opt-outs in relation to certain CEAS 
measures, and another two are non-EU countries (Norway and Switzerland). 
However, all of the countries take part in the ‘Dublin regime’, and have other 
2Early refugee law has been ‘characterized by a complete blindness to women, gender, and issues of 
sexual inequality’ (Edwards 2010: 23). We are aware that nowadays reference would be made to ‘they’ 
instead of ‘he’, but as this is a legal chapter for reasons of clarity we are using ‘he’ if the actual legal text 
uses ‘he’.
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 associations with the AFSJ. We therefore focus in this  chapter on the CEAS, 
and on its contradictory aims and themes, because they flesh out the mean-
ing, as well as the weakness, of international protection standards, and they 
also highlight the conflicts—between fairness and efficiency, and between 
protection and exclusion—which bedevil asylum decision-making processes 
in all of the countries covered here.
Since 1999, the CEAS has gone through two phases of legislation. The 
first culminated in 2005, and the second concluded in 2013. The first 
phase focused on harmonisation on the basis of common minimum stand-
ards, leading to the second, whose aim was the establishment of a single 
asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum 
throughout the EU, an aim which has not yet been achieved. Whereas 
some common EU rules in the asylum field take the form of directly bind-
ing ‘Regulations’, most take the form of ‘Directives’, which require Member 
States to achieve a particular result without dictating the means of achieving 
that result. Directives are usually transposed into national legislation. They 
therefore depend on national implementation for their effectiveness.
The protection of asylum seekers, refugees and those in need of subsidiary 
protection can be characterised as an interplay between several overlapping 
legal regimes. The main instruments are the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, 
the UN Convention against Torture, the UN Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, EU law and the ECHR.3
Judicial scrutiny at the highest level is performed by the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU), which has jurisdiction to consider requests for prelimi-
nary rulings from national courts, as well as dealing with appeals and other 
matters. The CJEU is tasked with examining the legality of EU measures, 
interpreting EU law, and ensuring its uniform application across the 28 EU 
Member States. In the implementation of this last task, the CJEU relies on 
national courts to apply EU law uniformly in their respective jurisdictions, 
albeit under the supervision of the CJEU. The CJEU is first and foremost an 
important actor in the protection of human rights, drawing on them as fun-
damental principles of EU law, and ruling on how human rights standards 
should be interpreted across the Member States. This Court is not to be con-
fused with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), a permanent 
international court set up in 1959 with jurisdiction to rule on all matters 
concerning the interpretation and application of the ECHR; it specialises in 
3Currently, all Member States have ratified the ECHR as well as several non-EU countries and even 
some non-European countries.
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the safeguarding of a minimum level of human rights protection among the 
ECHR’s contracting parties. The ECtHR may receive applications from any 
person, group or non-governmental organisation claiming to be the victim 
of a violation of the rights set out in the ECHR by one of its state parties.
The terms used in European asylum law need some clarification. In daily 
life the terms ‘migrant’, ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘refugee’ are often used inter-
changeably, but they refer to different legal statuses. ‘Migrant’ is the gen-
eral term for people who move from one region to another. This movement 
might be voluntary or because of economic hardship or other problems.4 
The term ‘asylum seeker’ is used for someone who has left their country to 
seek international protection. In EU law, international protection takes two 
forms. In the first place, protection as a refugee: ‘refugee’ refers to a person 
who has fled their country and cannot return because of a well-founded 
fear of persecution due to their race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.5 In the second place, someone 
who has fled because they face serious harm6 may qualify for international 
protection. Serious harm may consist of: (a) the death penalty or execu-
tion; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an 
applicant in their country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a 
civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of 
international or internal armed conflict.
Situations of armed conflict and violence frequently involve exposure to 
serious human rights violations or other serious harm amounting to perse-
cution or serious harm. Such persecution/serious harm could include situa-
tions of genocide and ethnic cleansing; torture and other forms of inhuman 
or degrading treatment; rape and other forms of sexual violence; forced 
recruitment, including of children; arbitrary arrest and detention; hostage 
taking and enforced or arbitrary disappearances. In situations of armed con-
flict and violence a person may be at risk of being singled out or targeted 
for persecution or serious harm. Equally, in such situations, entire groups or 
populations may be at risk of persecution, leaving each member of the group 
at risk. The fact that many or all members of particular communities are at 
risk does not undermine the validity of any particular individual’s claim.7
6Article 15 QDII. The UK and Ireland opted into the CEAS’ first phase instruments, which means that 
they are still bound by the original QD1 and APD1. Article 15 QDI is in similar terms.
7See UNHCR (2016, paras. 13 and 16).
4See EASO Practical Guide Evidence assessment: https://www.easo.europa.eu/practical-tools.
5Article 1A(2) UN Refugee Convention.
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At the time of writing, the main CEAS legislation comprises the revised 
Dublin Regulation (Dublin III), the revised Eurodac Regulation, the 
Reception Conditions Directive (I or II), the Qualification Directive (I 
or II) and the Asylum Procedures Directive (I or II). Most of the coun-
tries whose national asylum systems provide the focus for the substantive 
chapters of this book participate in both phases of CEAS legislation but, 
as noted above, four do not. The UK chose to ‘opt in’ to the first phase of 
CEAS legislation, but then took a piecemeal approach, ‘opting out’ of the 
revised ‘second phase’ versions of the Reception Conditions Directive (II), 
Qualification Directive (II), and Asylum Procedures Directive (II), and 
‘opting in’ to the revised Dublin Regulation (Dublin III) and the revised 
Eurodac Regulation (aka the Dublin system). Denmark has a long-standing 
‘opt-out’ arrangement in relation to most CEAS measures but like the UK, 
it participates in the Dublin system. As already noted, Switzerland and 
Norway are non-EU states that participate in the Dublin system, and their 
position is, of course, of interest to the UK in the context of the June 2016 
Brexit vote. Whether, as part of the Brexit negotiations, the UK would also 
seek to continue its participation in the Dublin system following its depar-
ture from the EU is something we can speculate about, especially given the 
UK’s common interest with the rest of the EU in the security objectives of 
the Eurodac database, but nothing can be assumed.
The Dublin III Regulation establishes a hierarchy of criteria for identify-
ing which EU Member State is responsible for examining an asylum seeker’s 
claim for protection in Europe. To establish this responsibility the applicant 
is fingerprinted, and the information goes to the Eurodac database (Eurodac 
Regulation). The aim of the Dublin Regulation is to ensure that only one 
EU Member State is responsible for the examination of an asylum applica-
tion (to deter multiple asylum claims), and to allow that State to be identi-
fied as quickly as possible. The Dublin regime permits Member States to rely 
on the principle of mutual trust and the presumption that all EU Member 
States are safe for all asylum seekers: its criteria therefore provide that most 
asylum seekers may be sent back to their state of entry. This leads to an une-
qual distribution of asylum seekers amongst EU Member States and to the 
Member States where most asylum seekers enter the EU, such as Greece and 
Italy, facing problems in managing the increasing numbers of asylum seekers 
arriving (Guild 2016; Costello and Mouzarakis 2014). The extreme suffering 
which the operation of the Dublin criteria has caused to individuals has led 
to landmark cases being decided by the ECtHR and the CJEU which rec-
ognised the failure of the mutual trust principle and of the presumption of 
safety in the Dublin regime. This case law has been codified in the Dublin 
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III Regulation so that it is not possible to transfer an asylum seeker to the 
responsible Member State where ‘there are substantial grounds for believing 
that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception 
conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhu-
man or degrading treatment’. In these circumstances, the Member State that 
is prevented from transferring the asylum seeker must examine the applica-
tion itself.8
The Reception Conditions Directive9 sets out common standards for 
reception conditions for asylum seekers and makes it clear that an asylum 
seeker is entitled to reception while their asylum claim is being determined. 
It sets out rules relating to housing, food, health care and employment, as 
well as detailed common rules governing the limited circumstances in which 
asylum seekers can be detained.
The Qualification Directive10 sets out the standards to establish whether 
third country nationals or stateless persons11 should be granted international 
protection. It defines who may be a beneficiary of international protection 
and describes the content of that protection. International protection may 
be given in the form of two different statuses, namely refugee status or sub-
sidiary protection status.12 Subsidiary protection aims to cover other forms 
of protection, as guaranteed by human rights treaties, such as the ECHR 
or the UN Convention against Torture. The Qualification Directive aims to 
harmonise eligibility criteria for international protection, and incorporates 
a series of rights for beneficiaries of international protection (protection 
against refoulement, residence permits, travel documents, access to employ-
ment, access to education, social welfare, healthcare, access to accommoda-
tion, access to integration facilities, as well as specific provisions for children 
and vulnerable persons). By defining and harmonising the guarantees in 
human rights treaties which all the countries discussed in this volume have 
signed up to, the Qualification Directive (QD) provides the tools for giving 
meaning to those guarantees.
8Article 3(2) Dublin III. This Article codifies the cases ECtHR 21 January 2011, no. 30696/09, M.S.S. 
v. Belgium and Greece and CJEU 21 December 2011, joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and 
Others.
9RCDII. Denmark, and the UK are not bound by this Directive, but Ireland has opted into the RCDII 
(Recast Reception Conditions Directive). The UK is bound by the terms of RCDI.
10QDII. The UK and Ireland opted into the CEAS’ first phase instruments, which means that they are 
still bound by the original QDI.
11A third country national is a national of a non-EU country.
12Article 2 QDII; Article 2 QD1.
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The standards to guarantee access to a fair and efficient asylum system 
are laid out in the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD).13 The asylum pro-
cedure is meant to establish whether a third country national should be 
granted international protection, and whether the asylum seeker is entitled 
to have his claim processed according to the procedural standards of the 
APD. The APD aims to ensure fair, quick and good quality asylum deci-
sions, and also that asylum seekers with special needs (such as unaccom-
panied minors) receive the necessary support to make their claims. Other 
procedural rights include rights to a personal interview, to legal assistance, 
a right to appeal and the right to remain in the territory while an appeal is 
being determined.14
The Asylum Procedure: Determining Refugee—
Or Subsidiary Protection Status
In EU asylum procedures the central question that must be answered is 
whether an asylum seeker is in need of international protection. EU law 
stipulates that a person qualifies for international protection if he or she is 
a refugee and thus fears persecution, or if they would be subjected to serious 
harm when returned to their country of origin.15 Protection entails—more 
than anything else—the prohibition of ‘refoulement ’. This prohibition is 
firmly rooted in international,16 European17 and EU18 law, and means that a 
state is prohibited from sending a person (back) to a place where they could 
be persecuted or risk serious harm.19 An applicant qualifies for international 
protection if they have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or polit-
ical opinion in accordance with the 1951 Convention, or would face a real 
risk of suffering serious harm if returned to the country of origin or habitual 
residence. To determine an asylum application, evidence may be submitted 
13APDII. The UK and Ireland opted into the CEAS’ first phase instruments, which means that they are 
still bound by the original APD1.
14Articles 14, 22, 24, 46 QDII; Articles 12, 39 QD1.
15Article 4(3) QDII; Article 4(3) QD1.
16Article 33 Refugee Convention, Article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture, Article 7 UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
17Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights.
18Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
19Article 15 QDII; Article 15 QDI.
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by an applicant to substantiate his or her application and may also be gath-
ered by the determining authority through its own means. Evidence may 
include anything that asserts, confirms, supports, refutes or otherwise bears 
on the relevant facts in issue.
Article 8(2) APDI (Article 10(3) APDII) requires Member States to 
ensure that ‘decisions by the determining authority on applications for asy-
lum are taken after an appropriate examination’. To this end, Member States 
should ensure that applications are examined and decisions taken individ-
ually, objectively, and impartially. Article 9(2) APDI (Article 11(2) APDII) 
requires that, where an application is rejected, the reasons in fact and in law 
are stated in the decision. The obligation to state reasons for a decision that 
are sufficiently specific and concrete to allow the applicant to understand 
why his or her application has been rejected has been framed as a corollary 
of the fundamental EU law principle of the right to defence.
Actors
In the asylum procedure, where refugee status determination (RSD) and 
subsidiary protection status determination take place many ‘actors’ are 
involved. In this volume we see as main actors asylum seekers themselves 
(including unaccompanied minor asylum seekers; (Chapter 6), immigration 
officers and decision makers (Chapters 12–14), Home Office Presenting 
Officers (HOPOs; Chapter 5) judges (Chapter 3), interpreters (Chapter 7) 
and lawyers (Chapter 10). In principle, there is an even wider cast of ‘actors’ 
than this, including clerks, security staff, witnesses, MacKenzie friends, 
observers of the case such as media and researchers.
Legal texts on refugee law define actors differently. From the legal per-
spective, we think of ‘actors of persecution or serious harm’ and ‘actors of 
protection’. Actors of persecution or serious harm include: (a) the State; (b) 
parties or organisations controlling the State or a substantial part of the ter-
ritory of the State; and (c) non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that 
the state and international organisations, are unable or unwilling to provide 
protection against persecution or serious harm.20 Actors of protection, pro-
tect against persecution or serious harm. These can be: (a) the State; or (b) 
parties or organisations, including international organisations, controlling 
20Article 6 QDII; Article 6 QD1.
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the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State; provided they are 
willing and able to offer protection.21
With regard to the actors in the chapters of this volume, some defi-
nitions, as well as guidance about their role and treatment are also to be 
found in the CEAS. Article 2(l) QDII defines an ‘unaccompanied minor’ as 
a minor who arrives on the territory of the Member State unaccompanied 
by an adult responsible for them whether by law or by the practice of the 
Member State concerned, and for as long as they are not effectively taken 
into the care of such a person; that includes a minor who is left unaccom-
panied after they have entered the territory of the Member State. Also in the 
APD special rules apply to asylum seeking children, and it should be borne 
in mind that according to preamble (33) to the APD, the best interests of 
the child should be a primary consideration of Member States when apply-
ing the APD, in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. In assessing the best interest of the child, Member States should 
in particular take due account of the minor’s well-being and social develop-
ment, including their background.
With regard to immigration officers and decision makers, para. (16) of 
the preamble to the APD states that:
It is essential that decisions on all applications for international protection be 
taken on the basis of the facts and, in the first instance, by authorities whose 
personnel has the appropriate knowledge or has received the necessary training 
in the field of international protection.
And in relation to HOPOs (Chapter 5), who represent the UK’s Home 
Office at appeal hearings, para. (17) of the APD’s preamble states ‘In order 
to ensure that applications for international protection are examined and 
decisions thereon are taken objectively and impartially, it is necessary that 
professionals acting in the framework of the procedures provided for in this 
Directive perform their activities with due respect for the applicable deonto-
logical principles’.
The central role of judges is recognised in Article 46 APDII concerning 
the right to an effective remedy for challenging a negative decision.22 Even 
in areas where common standards apply, there is need for judicial scrutiny 
22Article 39 APDI.
21Article 7 QDII; Article 7 QDI.
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of first instance decisions. In 2015 Hungary recognised only 10% of its asy-
lum seekers as needing protection. The figure in Germany was 40% and 
it reached 65% in Italy. The differences regarding refugees from Iraq were 
particularly extreme. On the EU average, one in two was considered wor-
thy of protection, in Italy almost all and in Greece only 3%—in spite of 
the fact that all follow the same European law. European courts have high-
lighted, and even heightened, the contrasting situations in different Member 
States. For instance, ever since the ECtHR in 2011 cited grave shortcom-
ings in the Greek asylum process, and declared the living conditions of refu-
gees there to be ‘inhumane’ (see also Giannopoulou and Gill, this volume), 
Germany has not sent any asylum seekers back to Greece.23 Nor is Italy nec-
essarily a secure third country. At the end of 2014, the human rights court 
decreed that the Swiss-ordered deportation of an eight-member family from 
Afghanistan was ‘inhumane treatment’—because no assurance could be 
received from Italy that the children would be housed in a manner suitable 
to their age and that the family could remain together.24
Communication
The UNHCR Handbook is the authoritative source of guidance for govern-
ment decision makers, and it acknowledges that some asylum seekers might 
be reticent with officials due to their experiences in their home country. 
Many are tired, anxious or feel inhibited during the interview.25
Communication in asylum interviews is different from everyday con-
versation due to at least three factors (Doornbos 2005). First, the interloc-
utors often do not speak the same language (van der Kleij 2015: 253). In 
the vast majority of cases, the officer conducts the interview with the assis-
tance of an interpreter, employed by the Ministry of Justice, Border Agency, 
etc., on a sessional basis. Secondly, communication in asylum cases is a form 
of intercultural communication (Kälin 1986: 23). Thirdly, communica-
tion in asylum cases is a form of institutional interaction: communication 
within a strictly organised, often bureaucratic context (Drew and Heritage 
1992). The CEAS framework acknowledges that the asylum process needs 
23Judgment of the ECtHR 21 January 2011, Application no. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. 
and CJEU 21 December 2011, joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and Others.
24ECtHR 4 November 2014, Application no. 29217/12, Tarakhel. See also: http://www.zeit.de/
gesellschaft/2016-03/european-asylum-law-refugees-turkey/seite-2.
25Para. 198 and 199 UNHCR Handbook.
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to provide a context within which communication is possible, but it takes 
a pragmatic approach. Preamble (25) APDII provides that ‘every applicant 
should have […] the opportunity to cooperate and effectively communicate 
with the competent authorities so as to present the relevant facts of his or 
her case’. Expanding on this, Article 12 APDII specifies that providing the 
services of an interpreter is a basic guarantee for asylum applicants when 
submitting their case to the competent authorities, and Article 14 requires 
the competent authorities to:
select an interpreter who is able to ensure appropriate communication between 
the applicant and the person who conducts the interview, in a language pre-
ferred by the applicant, unless there is another language which he or she 
understands and in which he or she is able to communicate clearly.26
Throughout this volume, and particularly in Part II, perspectives on com-
munication build on the linguistic, cross-cultural and bureaucratic issues 
referred to above, and consider in detail the influence which the actors 
involved have on the process. They examine the provision of interpretation, 
the interviewing and decision-making processes, etc., and they reflect on the 
roles of the interpreter, applicant, decision maker, lawyer and other actors 
who influence the process in formal and informal ways. The interpreter’s 
active role in communicating between applicant and decision-maker, and 
the implications of their ability, through their omissions and interventions, 
to influence the fairness (or otherwise) of the outcome of the claim come 
in for particular attention. These chapters capture the challenges posed to 
the asylum process by cross-cultural communication, and they also bring out 
the essentially narrative and communicative nature of the asylum process 
(Zahle 2005). The pragmatic approach to communication which the proce-
dural rules of the APD take—requiring provision of an interpreter capable 
of ensuring ‘appropriate communication’—struggles to embrace the com-
plex communication needs that accompany the recounting of traumatic per-
sonal experiences, and as these chapters show, the rules rely heavily on the 
behaviour of individual interpreters and decision-makers.
26Reasonable requests that the interpreter be of the same gender as the applicant should also be com-
plied with, and interviews with minors should be conducted in a child appropriate manner (Article 14 
APDII).
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Decision Making
Being recognised as a refugee or receiving subsidiary protection is vitally 
dependent on the legal or administrative process by which governments 
determine protection claims. In relation to the decision-making process, the 
UNHCR handbook states:
It should be recalled that an applicant for refugee status is normally in a par-
ticularly vulnerable situation. He finds himself in an alien environment and 
may experience serious difficulties, technical and psychological, in submit-
ting his case to the authorities of a foreign country, often in a language not 
his own. His application should therefore be examined within the framework 
of specially established procedures by qualified personnel having the necessary 
knowledge and experience, and an understanding of an applicant’s particular 
difficulties and needs. (UNHCR 2011, para. 190)
The ECtHR has held that individuals need access to the asylum procedure as 
well as adequate information concerning the procedure to be followed. The 
authorities are also required to avoid excessively long delays in deciding asy-
lum claims. In assessing the effectiveness of examining first instance asylum 
claims, the ECtHR has also considered other factors, such as the availability 
of interpreters, access to legal aid and the existence of a reliable system of 
communication with asylum seekers.27
Standard and Burden of Proof
The effectiveness of the right to asylum and to be protected against refoule-
ment would be undermined if States placed too heavy a burden on appli-
cants of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm. As 
regards the standard of proof, the asylum seeker is expected to show that 
there is a ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ of future persecution or that 
there are substantial grounds for believing that they face a real risk of seri-
ous harm. This standard is relatively relaxed: it is far lower than the crim-
inal law standard, and even the usual civil law standard, and this suggests 
that proving an asylum claim should be comparatively straightforward. 
27ECtHR 21 January 2011, Application no. 30696/09, M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece, para. 293.
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Understanding why it is not straightforward requires us to consider in some 
detail what is involved in substantiating an asylum claim.
States are afforded extensive discretion when laying down the rules for 
asylum procedures regarding the burden and standard of proof. As regards 
the burden of proof, this is placed on the asylum seeker. Usually states expect 
asylum seekers to adduce evidence in order to substantiate their asylum 
claim. For many asylum seekers, it is difficult to obtain such evidence.
States will take into account different forms of evidence—including 
documents and other evidence—concerning the position and personal cir-
cumstances of the applicant: their nationality; the reasons for applying for 
asylum, including previous persecution; the situation in the country of ori-
gin; the applicant’s activities in the country of refuge; and the availability of 
safe third countries. Medical reports, country of origin information (COI) 
and language analysis are also relevant in this framework.
Evidentiary Assessment
Evidentiary assessment can be defined as the primary method of establishing 
the facts of an individual case through the process of examining and com-
paring available pieces of evidence. The assessment of evidence is, in gen-
eral, not regulated by international law (UNHCR 2013). The 1951 Refugee 
Convention does not provide for any specific provisions dealing with evi-
dentiary assessment. Some guidance has, however, been developed in the 
field both in the form of the UNHCR Handbook (UNHCR 2011, see 
above) and in the UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee 
Claims (UNHCR 1998).
As regards the assessment of evidence, the Qualification Directive con-
stitutes the first legally binding supranational instrument of regional scope 
establishing what criteria the applicant needs to meet in order to qualify for 
international protection. The Qualification Directive relies to a large extent 
on international and European refugee and human rights instruments and 
jurisprudence.
European countries have different legal traditions and varying practices 
regarding evidentiary assessment. If Member States apply similar legal con-
cepts on eligibility for international protection, but their treatment of the 
evidence is different, they may reach different conclusions. Asylum proce-
dures are different from other legal procedures, due partly to the serious con-
sequences of the decision taken, and partly to the lack of the usual means 
of establishing objective evidence. In most cases the asylum narrative is the 
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main source of evidence, whereas in other types of case, there are likely to be 
other witnesses who can support or call into question aspects of the claim-
ant’s account. Therefore, establishing requirements for specific procedural 
norms for the assessment of evidence and the knowledge of these standards 
are essential for a fair and effective asylum decision-making process.28 As a 
result, the Qualification Directive not only defines what a refugee or person 
needing subsidiary protection is, but it also establishes procedural norms for 
the assessment of evidence in asylum claims.
Procedural Norms for the Assessment 
of Evidence (Article 4 QDI; QDII)
Article 4 QDII29 addresses the assessment of facts and circumstances with 
regard to qualification for both refugee and subsidiary protection status. 
Article 4(1) QDII, together with Article 4(2) QDII, stipulates that it is the 
duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application 
in cooperation with the applicant. Article 4(2) QDII lists the relevant ele-
ments required for the substantiation of an application for international 
protection. These consist of the applicant’s statements and all the docu-
mentation at the applicant’s disposal regarding his age, background (includ-
ing that of relevant relatives), identity, nationality (ies), country (ies) and 
place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, 
travel documents, and the reasons for applying for international protection. 
Article 4(3) QDII states that the assessment of an application should be car-
ried out on an individual basis and lists non-exhaustively some of the factors 
that should be taken into account. Moreover, Article 4(5) QDII states that 
where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documen-
tary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation when five 
stipulated conditions are met.30 These conditions are:
28See also EASO (2015).
29The text of Article 4 is the same for QD1 and QDII, but here we refer to QDII.
30The terms of Article 4 QDI are the same as Article 4 QDII, and therefore, the same measures 
apply in the UK. UK Immigration Rules say that confirmation of the person’s statements will not 
be needed (when the five conditions in Article 4(5) QDI noted above) are met: Immigration Rules 
Part 11 Asylum: Rule 339L. (339 N ‘In determining whether the general credibility of the person has 
been established the Secretary of State will apply the provisions in s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.’).
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a. the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application;
b. all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted, and 
a satisfactory explanation has been given regarding any lack of other rele-
vant elements;
c. the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do 
not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to 
the applicant’s case;
d. the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possi-
ble time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having 
done so; and
e. the general credibility of the applicant has been established.
This provision is intended as a ‘translation’ of the ‘benefit of the doubt’ idea. 
The principle of the benefit of the doubt recognises the considerable difficul-
ties that applicants and decision-makers face gathering evidence to support 
the claim, and that there may still be some doubt regarding the facts.31 As 
the UNHCR Handbook puts it:
After the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his story there 
may still be a lack of evidence for some of his statements. […] It is hardly 
possible for a refugee to ‘prove’ every part of his case and, indeed, if this were 
a requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognised. It is therefore 
frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. (Para. 203)
To sum up, the principle means that, when the conditions in QD Article 
4(5) are met, corroboration (confirmation) of the applicant’s own statements 
are not required in order to ‘substantiate’ (prove) their claim for interna-
tional protection.
Credibility Assessment
The consequence of recognising that the applicant’s statements can be suf-
ficient to establish an asylum claim is that the outcome of the claim fre-
quently turns on the credibility of those statements. UNHCR, in the 
exercise of its supervisory responsibility in relation to refugee protection, 
31UNHCR Handbook para. 203.
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has produced guidance relevant to the assessment of credibility (UNHCR 
2013), but neither the APD nor the QD explicitly or comprehensively pre-
scribes how credibility assessment should be carried out.
So, although the international and European legal framework  establishes 
principles and standards, it provides no predetermined structured approach 
for the assessment of credibility. A national approach therefore will and may 
be based on free evaluation of the evidence. As the substantive chapters 
show, the experience of asylum seekers is often that reliance on credibility 
does not work to their benefit, in the positive way that the benefit of the 
doubt principle, as discussed by Zahle (2005), suggested that it could. 
Instead, it works against them, and they meet a ‘culture of disbelief ’ 
(see Kobelinsky, Hambly, Affolter et al, Schneider this volume).
Article 4(2) the Duty to Co-operate
The CJEU has—in a preliminary ruling—clarified the scope of application 
of the duty to cooperate in Article 4(2) QD. First, the court states that the 
assessment of facts and circumstances takes place in two separate stages. 
The first stage concerns the establishment of factual circumstances which 
may constitute evidence that supports the application, and the second stage 
relates to the legal appraisal of that evidence, which entails deciding whether 
there is a need for international protection.32 The Member State’s duty to 
cooperate with the applicant, according to the CJEU, is only applicable to 
the first stage, when the facts and circumstances are being established, and 
can therefore be understood as the duty to cooperate to assemble all relevant 
evidence that supports the application, or to cooperate with the applicant 
as he takes on the burden of proving the case. Cooperation does not extend 
to the task of assessing whether the applicant has shown that a real risk of 
persecution or serious harm on return exists, or that s/he has discharged that 
burden to the required standard of proof.33 According to the CJEU the duty 
to cooperate means, in practical terms, that if, for any reason  whatsoever, 
32CJEU 22 November 2012, C-277/11, M.M. para. 64.
33‘Not needing confirmation’ suggests a relaxed burden of proof and ‘cooperation’ suggests a relaxed 
standard of proof for asylum processes compared with civil and criminal processes. ‘Substantiation’ 
therefore incorporates both the burden and the standard of proof since a claim will be substantiated if 
the applicant discharges the burden of proof by providing evidence to the standard required.
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the elements provided by an applicant for international protection are 
not complete, up to date or relevant, it is necessary for the Member State 
concerned to cooperate actively with the applicant, at that stage of the 
procedure, so that all the elements needed to substantiate the application 
may be assembled.
The CJEU judgment is a reminder that according to the case law of the 
ECtHR and in international refugee law the burden of assembling all rel-
evant information for an application does not fall exclusively upon the 
applicant, but is shared with the government.34 The bureaucratic setting 
of asylum decision-making does not encourage cooperation, and it is unu-
sual to expect decision makers to cooperate with evidence-gathering, as asy-
lum decision makers are expected to do, in case such cooperation interferes 
with the decision maker’s adjudicative role. That is why the duty to cooper-
ate does not extend to the legal appraisal of the evidence, and the decision 
maker’s consideration of whether, according to the standard of proof, the 
claim has been substantiated. There are indications in some of the chapters 
below of the struggles that decision-makers face as they attempt to reach a 
balance between cooperating with the applicant and practising the ‘organ-
ised detachment’ that their bureaucratic setting demands (see for example 
Schneider, this volume), and even national courts have placed limits on the 
scope of duty to cooperate.35
Judicial Remedies
Judicial protection is a crucial safeguard for asylum seekers. At the European 
level, judicial remedies are provided by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) and the ECtHR. In the absence of an international judicial 
remedy that States are prepared to use, and bearing in mind that the provi-
sion of the Refugee Convention permitting States to refer disputes to the 
International Court of Justice has never been invoked,36 the CJEU plays 
a crucial role in interpreting EU asylum law. This interpreting role may 
34See also UNHCR Handbook, para. 196.
35TN(Afghanistan)[2015]UKSC 40, [73]; MJ(Afghanistan)[2013] UKUT 253(IAC).
36Refugee Convention Article 38.
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directly or indirectly define the standards for EU Member States (Garlick 
2015: 108). But while European-level remedies contribute to the develop-
ment of refugee law, they remain remote from the experience of most asy-
lum seekers, since they usually come into play only where a case raises an 
aspect of EU refugee law that requires clarification, or after national reme-
dies have been exhausted. Unsurprisingly, then, these ‘high level’ remedies 
are not addressed by any of the authors here, whose research focusses on 
the national level, where the roles of the state representative (Campbell, this 
volume), of the asylum advocate (Hambly, this volume) and of the judge 
(Sorgoni, this volume) are examined.
The EU system of judicial protection is based on the principle that all 
individuals are entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights they 
derive from the EU legal order. Judicial remedies in asylum cases are there-
fore a matter for the national courts of the Member States (Boeles et al. 
2014: 411). At the national level, access to an effective remedy to chal-
lenge a negative decision must be available (Article 46 APDII; Article 39 
APDI). The ECtHR has held that, in order to be effective, the appeal must 
be ‘suspensive’, meaning that appellants must be permitted to remain on 
the territory pending the outcome of their appeal.37 The scope of an appeal 
should permit a full review (APDII Article 46), allowing not only conclu-
sions on the law but also factual conclusions, including about credibility, 
to be reviewed. Further evidence can also be submitted, such as independ-
ent expert reports about the appellant’s linguistic background, where the 
state authorities have used in-house linguistic analysis to cast doubt on this 
(Zwaan 2010). Information on how to appeal, details of time limits, etc., 
should accompany a negative decision (APDI Article 9), and appellants 
should also receive legal advice and interpretation services (Article 39 APDI: 
Article 46 APDII). As the chapters below illustrate, however, the above 
safeguards do not of themselves ensure effective access to the appeal right 
in practice, and inadequate legal representation (or none at all), poor inter-
pretation, battle-weary judges, aggressive State representatives and the for-
mality and technicality of the procedures can present asylum appellants with 
insurmountable barriers rather than access to justice. Despite these obstacles, 
success rates at appeal frequently run at between 20 and 30% (see Gill and 
Good, Kobelinsky, Campbell, Hambly, Sorgoni, all this volume; Liodden, 
this volume, reports a lower proportion in Norway), indicating how 
37Gebremedhin v France 25389/05, ECtHR, 26 April 2007; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey 
30471/08, ECtHR, 22 September 2009.
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 important the right to appeal safeguard is for refugee protection, as well as 
its potential.
Final Remarks
European Union Law has many parents and foster parents (Koopmans 
1991: 506), and these parents and foster parents are firmly rooted in the 
legal traditions of the Member States. Almost all European asylum deci-
sions stay within national legal systems, never reaching the lofty heights 
of the CJEU or the ECtHR. This means that, although we now have the 
European Union’s CEAS, national legal traditions retain considerable influ-
ence over asylum processes. We do not have space here to explore the impact 
which the different European legal traditions have on asylum processes, or 
their relationship with legal integration (Bobek 2013), but we have taken 
as a point of departure the legal origins approach, because we see it as an 
approach which looks for the correlations between legal traditions (Nicola 
2016: 869). There are many correlations between the asylum systems dis-
cussed in this volume, but three deserve emphasis. First, of course, there 
is the correlation between the human rights standards which bind all the 
states studied here, and their translation into CEAS measures, as seen in the 
Qualification Directive Article 4 on the burden of proof to be applied in 
national asylum processes. Secondly, correlations of concern about national 
security and sovereignty are also present in asylum systems. Mechanisms to 
address security issues can be found in refugee law itself, and the fingerprint 
and other personal data collected under the EURODAC Regulation also 
address Member States’ security concerns, as does the CEAS’ home within 
the EU’s Area of Freedom Security and Justice. This can lead to a situation 
where judges, rather than presenting a challenge to State authorities, might 
be just as likely to be discussing the merits of deferring to them, particularly 
where there is a climate of insecurity (Harvey 2005). At the same time, the 
realities of refugee status determination across Europe reflect a collective fail-
ure on the part of Member States to work in solidarity to protect refugees 
(Campesi 2018). This leads us to the third and final correlation. This final 
correlation is also the most hopeful, as it is the one between the “legality 
principle”—of respect for the individual and the protection of the person in 
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the determination of asylum cases (Harvey 2005), and the evidence in this 
volume’s ethnographic chapters of “legal consciousness”, in the sense of there 
being actors involved in all of the asylum processes studied here who con-
tinue to struggle with concepts of justice and fairness in their routine expe-
riences and perceptions of law in their everyday lives (Merry 1990; Cowan 
2004). Long may they continue to struggle with those concepts.
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Introduction
‘I was shocked to see to what extent we don’t practice law here. From the 
legal point of view, the questions raised here are very poor.’ With these 
words a judge expresses his initial malaise when he was appointed to the 
French Court of Asylum after many years working on taxation. He then 
develops his reasoning:
[T]here are few technical aspects involved in decision-making. In fact, there 
are some thorny questions but we do not raise them, for instance, concerning 
the notion of nationality or of residence; but most of our decisions completely 
rely on the intime conviction.
Like many of his colleagues, he argues that the court case law is not con-
sistent and that the domestic law—which incorporates the Geneva 
Convention—provides a vague and loose definition of who is a refugee. The 
judge highlights the intime conviction as the key element involved in asy-
lum adjudication. However, this notion, which could be translated as inner 
or deap-seated belief, does not exist in any asylum regulation or law. It just 
appears in the French Code of Criminal Procedure as the unique standard 
3
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for ascertaining judicial truth but it is not clearly defined. Its article 353, 
which is read to the jurors when they leave the Assizes court to deliberate, 
states that:
The law does not ask the judges and the jurors composing the Assize court to 
account for the means by which they convinced themselves; it does not charge 
them with any rule from which they shall specifically derive the fullness and 
adequacy of evidence. It requires them to question themselves in silence and 
contemplation and to seek in the sincerity of their conscience what impression 
has been made on their reason by the evidence brought against the accused 
and the arguments of his defence. The law asks them but this single question, 
which encloses the full scope of their duties: have you an inner belief?1
Inspired by the idea of ‘moral proof ’ (Leclerc 1995), this fragment comes 
from the French Revolution; it was written by a lawyer and deputy at the 
Parliament who contributed to the Criminal Code of Brumaire year IV 
(Inchauspé 2015: 604). The Anglo-Saxon tradition does not base its crim-
inal procedure on this notion of inner belief but on reasonable doubt. 
Evidence that is ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is the standard required to val-
idate a criminal conviction. As with intime conviction, reasonable doubt is 
never clearly defined in British law. The US Supreme Court provides some 
elements of definition in a 1994 ruling:
It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, 
and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary 
doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and con-
sideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition 
that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of 
the truth of the charge. (Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 1994)
The ambition of adjudication in common law is respect for freedom, 
whereas in the French tradition it is the search for truth (Inchauspé 2015). 
However, in both cases the goal is to reach a moral certainty based on evi-
dence provided before the court. This paper seeks to examine the ways in 
which this moral certainty is reached by asylum judges who, as the chair 
quoted earlier, understand their task through the notion of inner belief.
The use and implications of the intime conviction in criminal courts has 
been examined by scholars from a legal perspective (Leclerc 1995; Inchauspé 
1Art. 353, Code de procédure pénale.
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2015), and more recently by psychological approaches, based among oth-
ers on psychoanalysis (Ducousso-Lacaze and Grihom 2012; Jacob Alby 
2015), cognitive-experiential self-theory (Esnard et al. 2013), and foren-
sic psychology (Pham and Reveillère 2015). The present paper does not 
intend to engage in a debate with these different analyses but rather to pro-
vide an ethnographic approach to intime conviction, grounded in the way 
court actors bring the notion into play during their daily practices of justice. 
Furthermore, the argument builds on a central element relating all the liter-
ature regarding this topic: the existence of emotions at the basis of the inner 
belief of the adjudicator.
Drawing on data collected between 2009 and 2011, covering 14 months 
of ethnographic fieldwork at the French Court of Asylum,2 in charge of 
examining the cases of asylum seekers rejected by the French Office for the 
Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), I will explore in this 
chapter how this intime conviction that the court’s actors talk about so fre-
quently (see Greslier 2007; Belorgey 2003; Valluy 2004) is fabricated, and 
the way it impacts on asylum decision-making. I argue that the court’s actors 
use this notion as a way of pointing out the “subjective” elements of adjudi-
cation, such as their affects, moral values and political orientations, and thus 
legitimise their decisions when the legal elements seem to be lacking. I will 
also contend that judges’ intime conviction cannot escape from the current 
suspicion economy surrounding asylum seekers and refugees.
The suspicion at work in the adjudication process, understood as a 
systematic attitude of distrust or disbelief towards asylum requests, is 
constructed in response to the political discourse and at the same time par-
ticipates in its construction (Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012). Contemporary 
representations and practices regarding asylum are undermined by suspicion 
(Daniel and Knudsen 1995; Bohmer and Shuman 2008; D’Halluin 2012; 
Valluy 2009). Asylum, and more generally, migration, have become highly 
politically contested in France and elsewhere in Europe. Although many 
scholars have argued that the distinction between political and economic 
causes of exile is difficult to sustain (Castles and Miller 1993; Schuster 2003; 
Zolberg 1983), public discourse associates asylum seekers with “bogus refu-
gees” who come not for political reasons but for purely economic motives. 
2The material was collected from observations of public hearings, hearings behind closed doors, in- 
camera deliberations, and the everyday activities of rapporteurs, in charge of the in-depth examination 
of the cases. I also conducted interviews and had many informal conversations with judges, rapporteurs, 
lawyers and interpreters. The data was completed by examining a corpus of 60 rulings focused on a par-
ticular case law related to cases motivated by the sexual orientation of claimants (see Kobelinsky 2015a).
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However, this distinction and the suspicion it triggers have not always been 
at the core of asylum policies and representations. For nearly 30 years fol-
lowing the establishment of the bureaucracy of asylum in 1952, most for-
eigners who sought the protection of France as refugees received it. Since 
then, the situation has reversed, and most claimants see their applications 
successively rejected by the OFPRA and the remedy body. By the time of 
my field research, in 2009, the OFPRA acceptance rate was 14.3%, and the 
Court’s 26.6%. In 2010, it went down to 13.5 and 22.1% and in 2011, the 
tendency continued as the OFPRA granted protection in 11% of cases and 
the Court in 17.7% of appeals (CNDA 2009, 2010, 2011).
The chapter is organised as follows: in the first section, I briefly describe 
the different steps and actors involved in decision-making at the court. I 
then focus on the hearing as a crucial moment in which adjudicators scru-
tinise the asylum seeker trying to build their inner belief. The third section 
examines the emotions at play during the encounter with the claimant and 
its weight in decision-making. The fourth section moves from the affects to 
the values at the core of asylum adjudication. Eventually, I come back to the 
notion of intime conviction and its intimate connection to the moral econ-
omy of asylum.
The Appeal’s Path
Decision-making in this court nowadays involves three moments or steps. 
When an appeal is recorded by the registry and the case file is requested 
from the OFPRA, the court first of all evaluates whether or not it is admis-
sible. The court can give a direct ruling to reject certain cases due to foreclo-
sure (i.e. when the deadline for appeal has expired). Since 2004, it can also 
reject cases after an initial evaluation of the well-founded-ness of the claim 
(i.e. when applications for re-examination do not present any new facts). 
During the period covered by my fieldwork, around 20% of the cases were 
rejected after this initial examination.3 The other cases continued along the 
path to further evaluation.
The next step implies an in-depth examination of the case carried out by a 
rapporteur. By the time of my fieldwork the court employed approximately 
3In 2009, 14.6% of the cases were rejected by ordonnance, direct ruling after this initial evaluation 
(CNDA 2009). In 2010, the percentage climbed up to 20.2% (CNDA 2010) and in 2011, the per-
centage of cases rejected was 22 (CNDA 2011). The tendency, in terms of cases rejected by direct rul-
ing, still remains around 20%.
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120 rapporteurs, half of whom were civil servants, the other half of whom 
were working on a contractual basis. Most rapporteurs are young, between 
the ages of 25 and 40, and a large proportion of them are women. For some 
this is their first professional job. Among rapporteurs, many have a law or 
a political science degree. To ensure good performance, in 2010 the Court 
set the number of cases each rapporteur must handle every year to 403. 
Without counting the time that it takes to draft the decisions—which is 
also part of the everyday activities of the rapporteurs—and the time spent at 
hearings, this leaves them on average a little more than half a day to prepare 
each report. In 2012, after a series of collective protests, the number of cases 
to be handled each year was reduced to 387.
The main activity of the rapporteur consists in the study of the narrative, 
that is the story of persecution generally co-constructed by the applicant and 
their legal representatives or advocate. They also examine the synopsis of the 
interview the claimant had at the OFPRA, and other documents provided 
to support the story, in order to be able to give a recommendation to the 
judges. Either he or she thinks protection should be granted or, on the con-
trary, that the appeal should be dismissed. Sometimes the rapporteur may 
reserve his or her judgment and does not provide any clear recommenda-
tion, based on the possibility that unclear evidence in the case might be clar-
ified by explanations given at the hearing.
Rapporteurs consider five major elements when examining the cases: 
(1) its legal content, that is, the application of the Geneva Convention, 
Subsidiary protection,4 and specific case law; (2) what they call the “coher-
ence” of the narrative, which stems from its internal logic as well as from 
possible discrepancies between the initial story and the answers provided 
during the interview with OFPRA; (3) the plausibility of the story in the 
light of the geopolitical situation in the country of origin, which is usually 
called the “external logic”; (4) the accuracy of the answers, the perception of 
spontaneity having a significant positive value; and (5) the examination of 
the supplementary documents in the file (such as medical certificates, press 
articles, etc.). Although rapporteurs combine these elements in different 
ways (some of them considering the “external logic” or the “coherence” of 
the narrative as the most important aspect, others preferring to focus on the 
supplementary evidence), the recommendations they produce are all very 
4The 2003 Reform of the Immigration Law introduced subsidiary protection as a protection regime 
which can be granted—by the OFPRA and the Court—to those who are subject to serious threats in 
their country. More precarious than conventional asylum, subsidiary protection requires an annually 
renewable residency permit.
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similar both in the expressions used and the meaning of their findings. This 
technical expertise almost systematically leads to casting doubt on the appli-
cations, which rarely present all the elements expected by the rapporteurs. 
Most recommendations are then in favour of rejecting applications based on 
the vagueness of the story and the lack of supporting evidence.
The five elements mentioned above create a form of distance and detach-
ment (see Schneider’s chapter, this volume, for a discussion of detachment), 
giving an aura of “objectivity”, highlighted by all the rapporteurs I inter-
viewed, as the most important aspect of their examination. However, some 
of them acknowledge they do also form their recommendations on the basis 
of their inner belief. While discussing the evolution of the institution with 
reference to the introduction of permanent chair judges who work fulltime 
in the court—which, as I will explain more fully later, is not the case for 
most judges—a rapporteur with three years of experience stresses the impor-
tance of building her own personal intime conviction:
The profession of rapporteur is very hybrid in its skills and tasks. And with 
the arrival of the permanent chairs we have to be careful not to become the 
secretary of chairs saying, ‘do some research on this Congolese political party, 
on this Sri Lankan case law’ […]. We have to be able to think by ourselves 
and to write the report based on our inquiries and our own intime conviction. 
(Interview, rapporteur, 3 November 2009)
A rapporteur with many years of experience in the Court also admits that 
ultimately his recommendations are based on his intime conviction:
I analyse carefully the legal elements, the geopolitical components and the evi-
dence supporting the narrative to be the most objective I can. But, then, there 
is also a more general thing, I make up my mind, I try to think as if I were the 
person and build my inner belief. (Conversation, rapporteur, 27 November 
2009)
In this excerpt, the inner belief is related to a sort of empathy of the rappor-
teur who “tries” to imagine what it would be like to be in the asylum seeker’s 
situation. Although he does not put it clearly, he seems to make a distinction 
between the technical elements helping to provide objectivity and a more 
general impression, based on empathy—and in all likelihood associated with 
feelings and emotions—which form his intime conviction. Another rappor-
teur makes a more explicit connection between this notion and the “subjec-
tivity” of adjudicators when she comments on the judges’ way of proceeding:
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There is a very subjective part in decision-making, the intime conviction lies 
in the judges’ belief in the narrative and the applicant. We [rapporteurs] tend 
to reduce this through our technical examination but we cannot deny there is 
something else at play. (Conversation, rapporteur, 19 January 2010)
The rapporteur suggests that their in-depth examination is mainly based on 
the technical elements mentioned above rather than on a more subjective 
component, thus coinciding with the rapporteurs’ general discourse on their 
way of studying the cases, as opposed to the judges’ approach to the cases.
After the presentation by the rapporteur—whatever the recommendation 
is—a board of three judges examines the case during a public hearing in 
which they confront the asylum seeker, who can be provided with an inter-
preter on oath, and with the advice of a legal representative.5 The board of 
judges is composed of three members: a chair who is usually a magistrate 
from civil or criminal justice or a former member of the Conseil d’État; an 
assessor who is either a law scholar or a former officer of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the field; and another asses-
sor who is usually a mid-level bureaucrat, a former ambassador or teacher 
appointed by the vice president of the Conseil d’État at the suggestion of 
OFPRA’s Board of Directors.6 Until 2009, the 160 judges were all tempo-
rary appointees who convened only a few times each month. The reform 
enacted by the law of 20th November 2007, served to reduce the number 
of temporary magistrates and to recruit ten permanent judges who would 
be responsible for about 40% of the caseload. The goal was to address the 
inadequate coordination among the decision-making bodies and to work 
towards the standardisation of case law, specifically to thereby reduce the dis-
parities in decisions because, according to unofficial data circulating in the 
institution, the admission rate varied between one in every 20 cases and one 
in every two depending on the chair.
During the hearing—which will be analysed in detail in the next section—
the rapporteur summarises the facts pointed out by the claimant and the 
5With effect from December 1, 2008, every claimant has access to a lawyer who is paid for by the state, 
whereas prior to that date only claimants who had entered France with a legal permit had access to legal 
aid.
6Exceptionally, three boards of judges can come together in order to evaluate cases that are referred by 
the chair of the court or by a panel of judges, and they will introduce a new line of judicial precedent. 
The issues at stake are substantial insofar as the decisions made are intended to crystallise the position of 
the court not only on judicial elements, but also, more generally, on political issues, whether in relation 
to the situation in certain countries or regarding how to deal with a set of claims with the same charac-
teristics. These rulings are supposed to become the court’s case law.
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decision made by the OFPRA, presents the supporting documents and pro-
vides a recommendation. The board of judges then listens to the claimant’s 
legal representative and asks questions to the asylum seeker. Decisions are 
then made during in-camera deliberations7 after the hearing, which normally 
do not take more than 30 minutes for the whole set of cases (between six and 
13). The rulings are posted three weeks later in the entrance hall of the court. 
The board of judges either overturns the OFPRA decision and grants protec-
tion, or upholds the negative evaluation in which case the dismissed person is 
asked to leave France within 30 days. In the case of rejection, the dismissed 
person has one final opportunity to request that the case be re-opened. This 
procedure entails applying to the Préfecture, which verifies the existence 
of new evidence. In this case, the OFPRA provides a certificate for re- 
examination and the Préfecture has to extend the residency permit. The 
case then passes via the OFPRA and finally back to the court, where the 
claimant is given a new public hearing. If this is not successful, the rejection 
of the application is final. The person then has 30 days in which to leave the 
country before the Préfecture issues an ‘Obligation to Leave France ’, which, 
after the 30 days, is a binding measure of removal and can be enforced.
Seeing or Not Seeing the Refugee
The hearing is when the board of judges meets with the asylum seeker and, 
for most of them, the moment in which they learn about the case. For every 
judge I spoke with, the encounter with the asylum seeker is considered cru-
cial. As in any other legal proceeding, the asylum courtroom is a codified 
and ritualised setting, where everyone takes on a role and pursues an objec-
tive. Applicants are expected to play a role consistent with their condition—
suffering victims, seasoned activists, etc. The manner in which they talk, 
look, and move are all very important to the way in which the adjudicators 
regard them and consider their claim. As Gibb establishes (this volume) even 
the physical space of the hearing can influence how applicants are “seen” 
by officials. For all of them the encounter is the very moment in which the 
inner belief is built. Legal aspects, documentary evidence, arrangements of 
objects, the ‘bodily hexis’ (Bourdieu 1977) of the applicant, the language 
skills, the knowledge (or the misreading) of the political and social situation 
7In-camera means, in legal terms, that the deliberation takes place behind closed doors with only the 
three members of the board and the rapporteur present.
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in the country of origin will merge over the course of the hearing to provide 
the judges with an understanding of the case and the claimant.
In asylum procedures, as historian Gérard Noiriel (1991) wrote in the early 
1990s, the official’s task is based on the principle that the individual is an 
applicant, that it is their job to prove their identity and legitimate right to asy-
lum (see Craig and Zwaan, this volume, who set out how the burden of proof 
is laid upon the asylum seeker in European law), but that the public author-
ities must establish the nature and quantity of evidence needed. A policy of 
proof is thus established, and it has become vital to provide a body of evidence 
in support of an account, but it is rarely sufficient because in most cases the 
documents provided are inconclusive or contested and the asylum application 
is rejected. If the hearing appears to be a crucial moment—in which a rappor-
teur’s recommendation of rejection could potentially be reversed—its impor-
tance reaches its peak when it comes to evaluating applications grounded on 
persecution related to the sexual orientation of the asylum seeker.
The specificity of these cases, as I have argued elsewhere (Kobelinsky 
2015a), lies in the fact that instead of concentrating their evaluation on the 
evidence of persecution, the judges focus on the veracity of the claimant’s 
homosexuality. Once this has been established, persecution no longer has 
to be proven. It is therefore the ascertainment of homosexuality that paves 
the way to the refugee status. And this seems to happen during the encoun-
ter. The judges seek to question the claimant on what they consider to be 
evidence of their sexuality. For instance, some judges try to test the asylum 
seeker’s ‘gay knowledge’, to use the expression of one rapporteur, asking 
questions about gay meeting places in France. Other court actors believe it 
is possible to ‘see’ an applicant’s homosexuality during the hearing, based 
on their appearance and attitude. ‘To be honest, he didn’t look gay at all’, 
commented a rapporteur, standing in front of the coffee machine during 
a break between two hearings. Minutes earlier we had been listening to a 
young man from Pakistan who was seeking refugee status on the grounds 
of his persecution as a homosexual in his country of origin. Clearly, he had 
failed to convince them, and they suspected him—as one of the judges later 
told me—of not being a ‘true’ homosexual. Other adjudicators seem more 
modest about their ability to ‘recognise’ homosexuals during the hearing: ‘It 
is true that sometimes their behaviour cannot be differentiated’, one of them 
confided. ‘Differentiating’ and ‘looking’ are both terms that presume there 
to be obvious homosexual attributes.8 Many judges expected at the hearings 
8‘Recognising’ or ‘seeing’ the homosexuality would mean seeing the feminine side to a man or the 
masculine side to a woman, which refers more to issues of gender than of sexuality.
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to see before them the images conveyed by the media of white, well-off, fem-
inine men (see Morgan 2006). The young Pakistani who ‘didn’t look gay at 
all’ was clearly not effeminate enough.
Claims made on the grounds of sexual orientation implicitly demonstrate 
the difficulties in providing evidence to support the narrative that ultimately 
lies in all asylum claims. They also illustrate the shift that has occurred in the 
test of truth, from examining the truthfulness of an account towards assess-
ing an applicant’s sincerity during the hearing. As such, it is no longer facts 
but people that are subject to judgment, with applicants whose claims are 
grounded in persecution related to their sexual orientation expected to cor-
respond to the stereotype of a homosexual, at least during the face-to-face 
encounter with the judges.
Emotional Judges
In most of the observed hearings, the judges seem to show no emotion or 
feeling. Comments such as ‘we know this story’ or ‘it is the tenth time we 
hear the same thing’, are openly expressed by judges during hearings or 
in the deliberations, showing a sort of frustration with requests which ‘are 
always the same’. The repetitive nature of the cases, together with the rou-
tinisation of the process of decision-making, lead to an erosion of emotions 
(Fassin 2001) and a form of indifference (Herzfeld 1992). However, the asy-
lum court is an emotional bureaucracy (see Graham 2002) and sometimes 
the encounter with the claimant may stir up affects, which will be consid-
ered as a component of the judges’ intime conviction. Let us consider the case 
of a young asylum seeker coming from the Republic of Congo:
The clerk calls the next case and a young, rather slender woman dressed in 
jeans and a long black sweater, her long hair straightened and pulled back 
with a headband, sits trembling on a bench in front of the board of three 
male judges and next to her legal representative. She confirms in a feeble and 
almost inaudible voice to the rapporteur, who raised the question, that she 
does not need an interpreter. The chair asks the rapporteur to start his reading. 
According to the report, the brother of this 19-year-old claimant belonged to 
the paramilitary group known as the Ninjas and an enemy group called the 
Cobras wanted to exact their revenge on her. She had been repeatedly threat-
ened and assaulted before leaving the country. Her remarks were vague and 
not very developed. In support of her application, the woman produced a 
medical certificate from a physician. In his conclusions, the rapporteur invited 
the asylum seeker to revisit the attacks she had endured and to explain what 
fears she had should she return, but he proposed that the appeal be rejected for 
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unsubstantiated facts. The chair then invites the lawyer to make the statement. 
He emphasises the paramilitary activities of the claimant’s brother and violence 
in the village where she resided; he stresses ‘her physical and psychological fra-
gility’. After thanking the legal representative, the chair turns to the woman 
and says softly: ‘We will not ask you many questions’. He then asks the other 
magistrates if they have any questions. The judge for the UNHCR asks her 
about her fears in the event that she should return to her country. The appli-
cant replies that she is afraid of being raped and killed. This is the only ques-
tion. The chair concludes the hearing, which lasts just 22 minutes. [Two and a 
half hours later, during the deliberations behind closed doors, the case is dis-
cussed:] The chair asks his colleagues: ‘What is your belief (conviction ), what 
do you think?’ And quickly adds ‘I couldn’t bear to let this girl…’ [he stops as 
if the rest of the sentence was obvious to everyone] … ‘but how to draft the 
decision?’ The judges all agree that the case should be overturned: ‘She looks 
confused, helpless,’ says the older assessor. ‘No one will probably ever know 
what she went through’, adds the assessor appointed by the UNHCR. All nod, 
including the rapporteur. ‘I’ll find something [to be the basis of the decision] 
and show it to you’, says the rapporteur to the chair. (Fieldnotes during the 
hearing and the deliberations, June 2011)
In this case, the attitude of the asylum seeker seemed fundamental when it 
came time to form an inner belief and make a decision. She was perceived 
as a fragile young woman, devastated by events that, in the words of one of 
the judges, ‘no one will probably ever know’, implying that something even 
more dramatic might have happened—perhaps sexual assault—which she 
did not share in her written account. Her body language became an indica-
tor, if not of the sincerity of her remarks, then at least of the truth of her suf-
fering. Her young age and the lost look on her face seemed to arouse a form 
of empathy and a feeling of compassion in the chair as well as in the other 
judges, who were both used to sitting with him. The emotion felt and their 
desire to help this young woman allowed them to overlook the weakness of 
the case as noted in the report.
As in many cases I observed, in which sentiments such as admiration, 
compassion or esteem are at work (Kobelinsky 2015b), this one shows that 
the inner belief of the judges is formed, at least in part, by the perceptions 
and feelings produced during the hearing. Affective reactions of course 
depend on the dispositions of the judges towards emotion, rooted in their 
personal backgrounds and their distinctive social characteristics. By virtue 
of their history, their political ideas, and their various identities—social, 
 sexual, gendered, etc.—judges’ sensitivities may diverge. But these reactions 
also depend in part on the ability of applicants to elicit emotion. Those who 
have the support of NGOs, the lawyers who frequently argue in the court, 
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and the individuals familiar with the bureaucratic world of asylum all know 
that during the hearing, as one applicant told me, ‘you have to be convinc-
ing’, which also implied ‘moving’. This suggests that applicants sometimes 
implement strategies to elicit emotional responses that predispose those who 
experience them to support the cause being defended (Traïni 2010). This 
premium placed on emotion penalises less demonstrative applicants whose 
stories are commented on as unconvincing during deliberations.
Although they are rare, these emotions also reinforce the distinction 
between those who are regarded as real refugees and those who are believed 
to exploit the system, as the affective reactions of the judges become an indi-
cator of the sincerity of the applicants. And because these expressions remain 
infrequent, it can be said that the majority of the latter—those who do not 
provoke particular emotions—are not real refugees just as is the case for 
those who do not ‘look’ gay when applying on the grounds of persecution 
based upon sexual orientation.
Asylum as a Value
As we have seen, judges attach a great importance to the hearing as they 
compare the file to the individual, the analysis of documents provided to the 
impressions produced when listening and seeing the claimant; impressions 
which will inform the inner belief of asylum adjudicators. But this intime 
conviction also rests on the judges’—and more broadly all the court actors—
conception of asylum. For all the judges and rapporteurs I had the chance 
to observe and discuss with, asylum is an institution to be protected. As a 
permanent chair put it:
I set up strategies to try to find the truth and form my [inner] belief. We can-
not debase political asylum, we have to be cautious and study the evidence and 
what comes from the hearing, we cannot grant the refugee status to anyone. 
(Interview, chair judge, 14 October 2010)
The judge is putting forward the need to preserve the institution of asylum 
from any kind of abuse. In the same vein, another judge, with a background 
in the civil domain and sitting in the court for many years, asserted during 
an interview:
I take time to ask questions, to try to understand, of course I do make mis-
takes, it is not easy. People make stuff up, and we try to find out what lies 
closest to reality in order to help the people who really need it. We need to 
help those who have been persecuted, and we must also uphold the Geneva 
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Convention […] Asylum is a precious instrument of protection. (Interview, 
chair judge, 23 November 2009)
Asylum is shaped as a valuable institution, which protects people and which 
in turn needs to be protected. Another judge commented during an informal 
conversation: ‘We must guarantee this possibility to receive people who cannot 
live in peace in their country because they chose a different lifestyle or because 
they defend a different ideology. It is our duty to protect this right’. Most of 
the adjudicators I discussed with use almost the same words to account for 
their willingness to assist refugees as well as to protect the right of asylum. This 
was also evident in the comments made by a rapporteur who declared in an 
interview: ‘We have a long tradition in France of protecting the persecuted, it 
is something very important, and our job is to contribute to that’. The empha-
sis on the protective dimension of the court’s actions is often propounded by 
judges and rapporteurs whenever they explain the way in which they conceive 
their work. In their discourse, it also usually appears a reference to a tradition 
of refugee protection which they must continue. A chair admitted at the end 
of one hearing in which no case had been overturned: ‘You can’t flout the prin-
ciples of asylum, you can’t grant the status to just anyone, you must respect 
these principles handed down to us from after the war’. In every case, asylum 
is presented as endowed with a powerful moral burden and value which must 
be defended. It then seems that these demanding criteria for granting protec-
tion leads to the disqualification of most of those who apply because the more 
asylum becomes an idealised entity, the harder it is to establish connections 
among actual stories, real individuals, and this abstract institution.
The Moral Certainty of Defending Asylum
In criminal courts, you may not make the right decision but you always base 
your rulings in facts, concrete data. In the asylum domain, we confront some-
thing else, we confront a narrative and you have to evaluate its credibility, and 
we confront a moving reality, we examine the sincerity of the applicant […]. 
Asylum decision-making is not exact science, there is a portion of chance, of 
personality, of rigour or humanism, of affects, there is a portion of unknown 
[…] and from it, we wonder about the truth of the case, we form our belief. 
(Interview, chair judge, 23 June 2010)
With these words, a chair judge sitting in the French Asylum Court for five 
years, and with more than two decades of experience in criminal courts, 
summarises the complexity of asylum adjudication. As he points out, during 
the hearing, judges examine, aside from a few legal and geopolitical points, 
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the ‘sincerity’ of the applicant’s narrative of persecution as well as his or her 
attitude and reactions. ‘Do you believe that?’ or ‘What is your belief?’ are 
the questions often asked by the chair to the two other judges during the 
in-camera deliberations. This is also the question rapporteurs ask them-
selves when they finish reading a file. Decision-making then relies on the 
inner belief that the asylum seeker is telling the truth: the truth about his 
sexual orientation, which did not seem to be the case for the young Pakistani 
mentioned earlier; the truth about her suffering in the case of the young 
Congolese woman. More broadly, the inner belief about the claimants’ 
refugeeness.
The judge also introduces, in the extract above, the affective component 
of decision-making. As we have seen, whether by their occasional pres-
ence or by their frequent absence, emotions are part of asylum adjudica-
tion. Moreover, emotions and cognitions are interdependent in this process 
(Pham and Reveillère 2015). A chair judge, with a long experience in crim-
inal courts—where the notion of intime conviction comes from, as already 
mentioned—clearly understands and accepts this interconnection:
I am an emotional [person] but you cannot be taken by your emotions, you 
have to understand them and relate them to the evidence and the situation 
in the country of origin […] and there is your inner belief. But we have to be 
cautious, I have already said it but it is very important, we cannot grant the 
refugee status to anyone. (Interview, chair judge, 14 October 2010)
In this excerpt, the judge acknowledges the importance of his emotions in 
decision-making and asserts the need to connect them to other elements—
such as the evidence provided by the claimant and what he knows about 
the geopolitical context in which the story takes place—in order to form his 
intime conviction. And at the same time, he also couples this notion with 
the value he ascribes to the refugee status when he insists on showing cau-
tion because, as he had mentioned earlier in the interview—and as quoted 
in the previous section—asylum cannot be ‘debased’. This understanding of 
asylum, which as we have seen is shared by the court’s actors, is intimately 
linked to the suspicion economy surrounding asylum seekers and refugees. 
In order to win the day, shape a positive belief, and be granted asylum, it is 
necessary to correspond to the ‘archetype of a refugee’ (Akoka 2011), this 
ideal construct of a valuable institution which needs to be protected from 
abuse. Adjudicators consider asylum to be not only a right or a political 
institution, but also a moral principle to which they must attest. The ‘moral 
certainty’ on which the judges’ intime conviction rests is thus, above all, that 
of protecting refugee status from asylum seekers.
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Introduction
The present paper—part of a larger ethnographic enquiry aimed at 
documenting and understanding the process of doing asylum seeking in the 
age of globalisation—deals with the process of identity (mis)recognition that 
has led to the rejection of an asylum-seeking application. More specifically, the 
paper documents two things. First, it documents the discrepancy between the 
story narrated by the poorly educated asylum-seeking applicant (see Danstrøm 
and Whyte, this volume, for a discussion of the role of narrative in asylum 
determination) and the type of factual knowledge sought by the officials judg-
ing the truthfulness of his identity claim. Second, it documents how the lack 
of factual knowledge is a product of a discrepancy in naming practices, i.e., 
the discrepancy between the official naming of things and places of interest 
drawn by the authorities from the internet—and the locally based naming of 
things used by the applicant. The case documented here, as well as pointing at 
the politics of suspicion in the asylum-seeking procedure, also serves the met-
onymic function of laying bare some of the torn ligaments around the bones 
of globalisation. It encapsulates how migratory experiences are registered into 
administrative prescriptive accounts of what someone should say and how 
someone should name things in order to give proof of identity.
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Globalisation, the EU and the Diversification 
of Diversity
Globalisation has brought about an intensification of the worldwide mobil-
ity of goods and information, but also of human beings. Asylum-seeking 
is one of the by-products of this mobility and it links local happenings to 
(political) events occurring many miles away. The EU and the ‘floods of 
asylum seekers’ that try to reach its soil are no exception to this. Yet, the 
migrants who knock at the EU’s doors pose a problem to border control 
authorities in that they cannot anymore conceptualise migrants as people 
engaged in a linear move ‘from the rest to the West’ (Hall 1992). Rather, 
these globalised migratory flows are at present one of the most tangible 
testimonies of super-diversity. That is, rather than falling into the ‘eth-
nic minority paradigm’ of an earlier era in migration studies, they embody 
what Vertovec terms, in its hyphenated version, the ‘diversification of diver-
sity’. That is, a process in which diversity moves beyond ethnic minority 
group membership and boundaries and gives way to ‘an increased number 
of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, 
socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants’ (Vertovec 
2007: 124). It follows that present day diversity calls for all sorts of urgent 
interventions that Europe, its member states and their institutions will have 
to face. There is the question of border control at both European as well as 
nation-state level. Further, there is the question of nation-states confronted 
with obligations to their citizens in their asylum-seeking politics, policies 
and practices and last, there is the question of securitisation of borders that 
brings up issues of institutional framing of the identities of the newly arrived 
migrants within a regime of suspicion. In reaction to the above, the EU 
engages in deploying strenuous efforts to safeguard its maritime shores and 
territorial borders. Typical of these efforts are those measures that set up—
to borrow Bigo’s terminology (2008)—a ‘ban-opticon’, that is, a means for 
channeling mobilities, modulating their intensities, speed, mode of move-
ment and coagulation through measures of surveillance. Language is also an 
element taken up for surveillance administered at the institutional gates of 
each nation-state, e.g. the testing and consequent measurement of someone’s 
proficiency in the language of the host country (see for instance Kurvers 
and Spotti 2015) but also in the language of the country of origin (see for 
instance Spotti 2015). Shibboleths of securitisation, however, are also pres-
ent once the asylum-seeking migrant manages to enter the EU. When 
entered, in fact, nation-state based institutional bodies are put in place with 
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the task of gathering information about someone’s history of migration and 
of assessing the truthfulness of his/her narratives on the basis of a search in 
the applicant’s narrative for tangible, factual, proofs of identity. As Craig 
and Zwaan note (this volume), it is not only the responsibility of the asylum 
seeker but also the determining state to gather such evidence. These proofs 
of identity rest on the ‘ergoic’1 equation that, if you know facts X and Y, 
then you really ought to be from place Z and thus be who you claim to be.
With this backdrop in mind, the present paper focuses on a rejected 
asylum-seeking application in Flanders, Belgium. The story concerns an 
unschooled illiterate young man, whom for the sake of argument here we 
call Bashir, who claims to be from a particular country and more specifically 
from a specific city within it. The letter of rejection of his asylum-seeking 
application, a by-product of the bureaucratic production of textual artefacts 
within the Belgian asylum-seeking procedure, is our key text here. After 
dealing with language in intercultural and multilingual institutional encoun-
ters like the one of asylum, this chapter presents an analysis of Bashir’s life 
story, appropriately anonymised, and of the letter of rejection that he had 
received from the authorities assessing his application during the time in 
which I was carrying out my ethnographic interpretive fieldwork. We then 
tease apart the motivations that led the authorities to conclude that Bashir 
was not the nationality that he claimed to be and, in so doing, we focus 
more closely on the practice of naming places and the internet. It is when 
the referents encounter an institutional figure, for example, a police officer 
enquiring about their conduct and asking for their name and proof of iden-
tity, that naming becomes a verifiable matter. A matter that brings along 
with itself the issue of identity as it can lead to identity (mis)recognition 
and dismissal. Along this line, the analysis I present confronts and compares 
Bashir’s story and practice of naming with the information gathered by the 
institutional figures that are in charge of assessing his application. This is 
further confronted with an interview carried out with another refugee from 
the same country, whom I call Majid, and who is used here as tertium com-
parationis in that he knew Bashir and his case. The implications of Bashir’s 
case—as the analysis and its interpretation point out—are both analytical 
and societal. They are analytical in that they display the influence of the web 
and its authority in the process of asylum approval and with that the dis-
crepancy between the web-based (toponymic) knowledge that the immigra-
tion authorities expect to hear from the applicant and the local register used 
1The term ‘ergoic’ is an adjectivisation of the latin causative conjunction ergo meaning in English 
‘therefore’.
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for the naming of places. They are societal in that they show how a discrep-
ancy between applicant and authorities in the form of knowing and naming 
places is taken to be a valid proof that corroborates the politics of suspicion 
(Bohmer and Shuman 2018) that characterise the institutional side of asy-
lum seeking applications in present day Europe.
Asylum, Institutional Encounters and the 
Authority of the Web
Although nation-states across Europe have their own idiosyncratic differ-
ences in dealing with asylum seeking applications (UNHCR 2013), the soci-
olinguistic, sociological and discursive processes that are embedded in this 
procedure have already awakened the interest of several disciplines ranging 
from sociolinguistics to discourse studies to the sociology of transnational-
ism (Blommaert 2005; Marijns 2006; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014). For 
instance, among the procedures studied, there are the institutional encoun-
ters between authorities and the applicant, who has to prove the truthfulness 
of his migration story, of his origin, and through that give tangible proof 
of identity. In the gamut of organisations involved in serving asylum seek-
ers and supporting them in their claims, we see that the encounter with the 
institutional reality that will have to assess their application is still central. It 
is the institutional environment where the interview with the applicant will 
take place—which functions as an extension of the nation-state authority—
that imposes its language norms, literacy norms and requirements of fac-
tual knowledge upon an applicant engaged in telling his/her migration and 
asylum story. Straightforward as it may seem, the encounter between the 
authorities on the one hand and an applicant on the other gives birth to a 
complex sociolinguistic environment. As Jacquemet points out in his work 
(2011, 2013), these institutional encounters become loci of trans-idiomatic 
practices, that is, loci where multilingualism is the common currency and 
where the multilingual interactions between the authorities and the appli-
cant are made even more complex by the digital interfaces that both appli-
cants and authorities use during their encounter. As I show later in this text, 
on the side of institutional authorities, we often find the use of available 
web-based resources dealing with the country of origin the claimant claims 
to come from. On the side of the claimant, in contrast, we often find elec-
tronically mediated communication and identity profiles, e.g. through social 
media channels, that aim at corroborating identity claims (Huysmans 2014).
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The Belgian Asylum Procedure
According to the Dublin Regulation, the asylum applications for which 
Belgium is responsible are transferred to the Commissariaat General voor 
de Vluchtelingen en de Staatslozen (henceforth CGVS). The CGVS, an 
independent administrative authority, is exclusively specialised in asylum 
decision-making. In a single procedure, it examines first whether the appli-
cant fulfils the eligibility criteria for refugee status and whether they are eli-
gible for subsidiary protection status. The CGVS holds four competences. It 
grants or refuses refugee status or subsidiary protection status. It decides on 
the admissibility of asylum applications of EU citizens, persons from a safe 
country of origin or persons already having obtained refugee status in an EU 
Member State that is still effective, and of subsequent applications. It applies 
cessation and exclusion clauses or revokes refugee or subsidiary protection 
status (including on the instance of the Minister). It confirms or rejects the 
refugee status of a refugee recognised in another country. Last, it rejects asy-
lum applications for technical reasons and issues civil status certificates for 
recognised refugees. There is no provision in Belgian law imposing an obli-
gation on the CGVS to take a decision within a given time in the regular 
procedure. Given that Bashir’s case came to a resolution in 2012, it is worth 
looking at the regulations that were in place in Flanders and Belgium more 
generally during 2012, when Bashir had his institutional encounters with 
the CGVS.
At the beginning of 2012, the then Secretary of State for Asylum and 
Migration declared in the Belgian parliament that it was her intention to 
provide for a quick and high quality procedure that allowed applicants to 
have an answer within an average timeframe of 3 months at first instance or 
6 months including a final decision on appeal. To achieve this, the “Last-In-
First-Out” (LIFO) principle was introduced. This meant that priority was 
given to handling the most recent asylum applications, and the capacity of 
the asylum authorities was reinforced with an extra 100 (temporary) staff. 
This resulted in a considerable shortening of the total processing time of 
new asylum applications and a higher overall output that year. New appli-
cations lodged in 2012 were processed on an average of 80 calendar days. 
Although laudable when taking into account the backlog of older files (i.e. 
one or two years old), the average processing time was still 291 days at the 
end of 2013.
Studies that, from an ethnographic interpretive perspective, have inves-
tigated encounters between asylum seeking applicants and authorities show 
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that language is a key feature—but not the only feature—of such institu-
tional encounters. Rather, it always involves a communicative event that 
sees the production of a ‘text’ about the identity of the applicant. The com-
municative event—either through oral, written or pictographic modes of 
communication (see Johnston 2008: 21–41)—draws on linguistic commu-
nicative proofs, i.e., which languages do you speak? How well have you mas-
tered them? What do you not know of that language? However, it also draws 
on the factual knowledge the applicant holds (Blommaert 2001: 413–449) 
about the place he claims to come from. The text being produced by the 
applicant and the authorities during the institutional encounter of the long 
interview therefore serves the purpose of substantiating someone’s applica-
tion and it does so by having the applicant match the expectations of the 
factual knowledge the applicant holds and can produce about the place 
s/he claims to come from. It is worth noting though that these encounters 
and the communicative events happening around the asylum adjudication 
do not only take place off line. Rather, as Jacquemet explains (2014: 201–
202), the asylum procedure and its protagonists are part of a late-modern 
communicative revolution in which the technological development that 
grants the retrieval of information about a country or about a language spo-
ken in a given country become tangible proofs of truthfulness, something 
I call here web-truths. In particular, examining a case of asylum in contem-
porary institutional realities, means that the analyst has to account for the 
implications brought to bear by the digitalisation of information, where dig-
ital information is overlaid, confronted and used to measure the first hand 
off line information presented by the applicant. It is therefore impossible to 
neglect that an asylum applicant, and those institutional figures called on 
to assess his case, cannot escape the power of technologies and the fact that 
these online aids hold a strong influence on the assessment of a case. Failure 
to recognise this can lead to disastrous consequences of communication 
breakdown due to intercultural havoc and identity dismissal leading to an 
application rejection.
Such a heavily institutionalised process of acceptance or rejection involves 
several stages of text production and manipulation. First, there is the text 
that an applicant prepares—often orally together with other asylum appli-
cants—before the interview with the authorities. Then there is the life-story 
text authored by the applicant during the long interview, an institutional 
encounter that has as its main purpose the gathering of the applicant’s 
migration history and motivation for filing a request for asylum. This text 
production process, often taking place either in a language that may serve as 
lingua franca or through the mediation of an interpreter (Inghilleri 2010), 
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also sees the authorities involved in the entextualisation of the applicant’s 
story into a format, that of the legal case, that fits institutional preset nar-
rative criteria. It is then the turn of the authorities to produce a transcrip-
tion of the (recorded) long interview carried out with the applicant. It is 
this transcription then—an interesting trans-idiomatic textual product in 
its own right (Jacquemet 2009)—that once assessed turns into yet another 
institutional text; that of an official letter, redacted for the case of Belgium 
in either Dutch or French, spelling out the reasons that have led either to 
accept or reject the application. This decision letter—in our case a letter of 
rejection—serves the purpose of illustrating what it means to be an asylum 
seeker within the globalised politics of suspicion in Belgian Flanders.
Method
This study, part of a larger ethnographic interpretive inquiry entitled Asylum 
2.0, builds on data collected through three rounds of sites visit aimed at 
shedding light on what it means to do asylum seeking in an age of glo-
balisation both on and offline. In approaching this theme, I did ethno-
graphic interpretive fieldwork at an asylum-seeking centre in Flanders, the 
Dutch speaking part of Belgium. The data for this case study were collected 
between the 13 and the 26 October 2012, during my first field visits to the 
centre. My position at the centre was that of a buffer zone between the staff 
and the guests. In fact, when asked by the guests—asylum applicants—who 
I was and what exactly I was doing there, I candidly explained to them that 
I was engaged in writing a book about what it means to be an asylum seeker 
and what asylum seeking implies, and that I was there to document their 
daily lives. All the participants embraced my doings and none of them opted 
out; rather they reacted enthusiastically to being made to feel that their lives 
mattered and that there was somebody interested in them and their experi-
ences. Living along with them, having breakfast with them, talking to them 
while drinking endless cups of sweetened Afghani tea, following their daily 
doings that ranged from Dutch language lessons to knitting lessons, to gym 
activities to simply hanging around at the centre kicking a ball about in the 
evenings. In other words, what I did was deep hanging out in the cultural 
ecology of this institutional space. The project, in its ethnographic approach, 
combines insights, methods and epistemological as well as ontological 
stances stemming from linguistic ethnography (Blackledge and Creese 
2009; Blommaert 2010; Rampton and Tusting 2007; Copland and Creese 
2015) and socio-culturally rooted discourse analysis (Gee 1999). In both 
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frameworks, there is the underlying assumption that the way individuals 
speak as well as speak about things reflects their culturally embedded under-
standing and their perception of the world.
The centre, located in a formal cloister, has big rooms assigned to families 
and rooms assigned either to pairs of male or female individuals, on a first 
come first served basis. Rather than using a nationality based criterion or an 
ethnic grouping criterion, the director of the centre had opted—where he 
and his team members felt it not to be a risk—to put together people of dif-
ferent ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds. In October 2012, while I 
was engaged in my ethnographic fieldwork, the centre catered for 61 guests, 
an odd term used in the official jargon quoted by its director so to signify 
hospitality and inclusion (see also Gill 2016). Following the information 
gathered at the centre during intake talks, its guests were from the follow-
ing (often pre-supposed) nationality backgrounds: 13 from Afghanistan; 12 
from ‘The Russian Federation’—mostly from Armenia and Chechnya—nine 
from West Africa; nine from Bangladesh; seven from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The remaining 11 guests originated from what have 
been categorised as ‘other countries’ (andere herkomstlanden ) in the unofficial 
statistics of the centre including various African countries, China - allegedly 
from Tibet - Albania and Ukraine. 40 of these guests were male, 21 were 
female. 11 of them were unaccompanied minors, though three of them still 
needed to give age-proof through bone scans. Only one guest had entered 
the centre in 2010 while the rest had entered in 2011 or 2012. Only two 
guests had passed their 50s, confirming the trend that seeking asylum is 
mostly a practice for either unaccompanied minors or young (often male) 
applicants ranging from their early 20s to their late 30s. All names given 
in this case study are pseudonyms so as to grant participants protection 
and privacy, and where necessary dates and locations have been removed. 
My chats with them were informal although I wrote synopses of the topics 
and the key points we discussed. Although video recording was not possi-
ble, audio recording happened when I felt a talk I just had was particularly 
interesting and revealed a facet of doing asylum seeking. In that case, guests 
were asked whether they felt like telling me their story again while being 
audio recorded. Access to their files—granted by the centre director and by 
the applicants—has helped me shed light on the same people but this time 
not from their first-hand lived perspective of doing asylum but through the 
legal lens that investigates the applicant during the whole procedure. Here 
too, guests at the centre were told of my access to their procedural files and 
were given the opportunity to either agree or disagree with it. None of them 
though disagreed.
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Bashir’s Asylum Application
Before we enter Bashir’s life story as presented to us by the authorities in their 
rejection of his application, we must first make a very basic point. On the 
one hand, Bashir’s life story is a narration put together by someone who is 
a young adult, who has gone through violent events that have characterised 
his country of origin and, in particular, his family. Further, this is the story 
of someone who—like many other asylum applicants—was asked to pro-
duce a coherent factual narrative about his country of origin and place of liv-
ing. Although this request may seem to any literate individual an easy one to 
match, this person has no formal schooling in any language and—on top of 
it all—has very limited reading and writing skills in the Latin script through 
which all institutional documents are mediated. On the other hand, Bashir 
can read the Qu’ran because he received Qu’ranic schooling. We further have 
to picture his life history at a time and at a place of political tensions that 
have had severe repercussions within his family. The texts we present and use 
as primary data sources are extracts taken from the letter that sums up the 
findings that have emerged from Bashir’s narrative during the long interview 
in which the CGVS asked him to give evidence of his identity as a [Bashir’s 
nationality] from [major city in Bashir’s country of origin]. It was impossible 
for me to gain direct access to the actual interview or to the immediate tran-
scription produced by the CGVS. This means that the object of our analysis is 
the letter that the applicant, Bashir, received. In the letter at hand, typewritten 
and signed by a representative of the Belgian immigration authorities, we find 
first the negative result of Bashir’s application, followed by a detailed over-
view that reports the grounds upon which Bashir’s rejection has taken place. 
This letter, though, is not only a document but also the product of a long 
and complex process of entextualisation. The letter funnels the findings that 
emerged during the long interview and renders Bashir’s rejection indisputable 
in that it is based on a lack of factual knowledge. Because the asylum proce-
dure is a matter of assessing someone’s claims of origin, origin being under-
stood as a Cartesian matter of direct matching between applicants’ knowledge 
and their identity claims: for example, you know fact X hence you are truly 
from place Y, its lack has led the authorities to the conclusion that Bashir’s 
story had to be truly false. As in every epistolary exchange, so in this one there 
is an addresser, i.e. the CGVS, and an addressee, i.e. the unschooled illiter-
ate Bashir. It being in French and Bashir being illiterate in this language, the 
letter had to be read out to him by his roommate Majid, a young man who 
came from a well-educated preacher’s family in Bashir’s country of origin. The 
text of the letter sent by the authorities runs as follows:
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Of XXXX2 nationality and [ethnicity 1] ethnic origin through your mother 
and [ethnicity 2] through your father, you arrived on Belgian soil on XXXX 
and made a request next day for asylum XXXX.
You invoke the following facts in support of your asylum application:
Your father is [ethnicity 2] and your mother is [ethnicity 1]. The respective 
families of your parents wanted them to separate because of their different eth-
nicity. On XXXX, your father was stabbed by some members of your mater-
nal family. You took your father to the XXXX hospital, but since it was late 
and the service was closed, the doctors made you wait until the next day. Your 
father died the next morning. Also since that day, you have not seen your 
brother who went looking for medicine for your father. During XXXX, your 
mother’s brothers said they would kill you. You and your mother did not dare 
to return home and lived outside. On XXXX, your mother entrusted you to 
XXXX, [an official] who was your father’s friend. You stayed at the home of 
this person until XXXX, the day you left [your country of origin]. (Rejection 
letter BK, fieldwork 8.10.2012)
As the passage above shows, the letter starts with Bashir’s national and eth-
nic identity affiliation as somebody of [country] nationality. The letter fur-
ther states that Bashir is offspring to a [ethnicity 2] father and a [ethnicity 
1] mother. While going through the text, we see that Bashir’s story serves 
as testimony of the profound division amongst two major ethnic groups in 
Bashir’s country of origin, a division that is deeply entrenched in Bashir’s 
family and in its misfortunes. Bashir’s maternal side of the family was in pro-
found disagreement with Bashir’s father, and there was pressure for his par-
ents to separate due to their ethnic backgrounds, which at the time was also 
associated with the political conflicts tearing apart the country. The inner 
family tensions had escalated to an episode of violence when Bashir’s father 
was stabbed by his mother’s siblings. After having been taken to a major hos-
pital, in the centre of the city where this occurred, his father passed away 
due to the injuries received. Bashir reported that after his father’s burial 
he got threatened by his mother’s siblings. Because of this Bashir and his 
mother never went back to their home, and soon afterwards Bashir’s mother 
had given him into the custody of an official who had been friendly with his 
father. Bashir then stayed at the official’s place until he helped Bashir leave 
the country. His asylum application was received in Brussels and examined 
two and a half months later. His hearing at the CGVS took place in the 
2Here and hereafter the ‘XXXX’s are included to protect the confidentiality of the subject.
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same year. Below we find another excerpt taken from CGVS’ letter of rejec-
tion that reads as follows:
Next, while you said that you have lived all your life in the neighbourhood 
of XXXX, which is located in the municipality of XXXX, you were only 
able to mention four neighbourhoods in this municipality (see p. 14) and 
were not able to specify in which neighbourhood of XXXX you lived (see p. 
13) although there are four: XXXX I, XXXX II, XXXX Mosque and XXXX 
Pharmacy. Next, you said that you slept with your mother for 10 days in a 
mosque, but you were unable to name it (see p. 13). Likewise, you could not 
give the name of any large mosque in [city] which is astonishing insofar as you 
say you studied the Qu’ran every day and that [a large mosque], is in front of 
the hospital where you claim to have taken your father (see the documents 
attached to your administrative file: XXXX published on XXXX.com, map 
from Google Maps, and article XXXX published on petitfute.com). In addi-
tion, although you could accurately quote the name of the most widespread 
bottled water, the currency used in [country], the [name of the governmental 
headquarters], the names of two mobile operators, and say what a “[specific 
musical instrument used in the region]” is (see pp. 15, 16), you were how-
ever unable to describe the [nationality] flag correctly or give the name of the 
[nationality] football team. Likewise, although you say you used to go to the 
market with your father (p. 7), you were not able to name it and when asked if 
you knew the names of the markets, you were content to answer “this is called 
‘in the city’” (see p. 15). Next, you said that you watched television (see p. 
10), but you were unable to give the name of any [nationality] channel, saying 
that you watched “[same nationality] TV channels. And also movies. I listen 
to music” (see p. 15). He3 then asked you if you knew the name of the large 
football stadium in [city], to which you answered in the negative and said that 
a site is currently under construction [elsewhere] (see p. 15).
The original text of the rejection letter is in French, French being the pro-
cedural language through which the authorities corresponded with Bashir. 
Although I could not be present at the interview, there is no indication of 
the presence of an interpreter, which makes me assume that the interview 
took place in French, this being the working language of communication 
3The ‘he’ here could either be referring to the interviewer or to a possible interpreter that might have 
been present to facilitate the interview process.
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between the interviewee and the authorities. This text authored by the 
CGVS is an evaluation as well as a response to Bashir’s story. Its main aim 
is to point out the lack of factual knowledge and inaccuracy Bashir showed 
when answering the questions posed by the CGVS’ officers during the 
long interview. The above text, in summary, takes the form of a checklist. 
More specifically, a checklist that recaps the information that Bashir man-
aged and did not manage to produce and that ended up disqualifying him 
as someone from the country in question and more precisely from the spe-
cific city Bashir claimed to be from. Bashir’s knowledge fell short when he 
was asked to name which of four areas he lived in.4 This lack of knowledge 
was compounded by Bashir’s not knowing the (official) name of any big 
mosque in the city, a lack of knowledge deemed astounding (etonnant ) as 
Bashir claimed to have studied the Qu’ran every day, although without being 
specific on the whereabouts of his studies. Further, this astonishment came 
from the fact that a large, well-known Mosque—is located right in front of 
the hospital where Bashir had brought his badly beaten father (information 
about this mosque used by the authorities, however, is the official informa-
tion available from the internet, including its official name). The link the 
authorities make in the text above is ergoic and runs as follows. If you really 
studied the Qu’ran then it means you should have studied in a mosque. 
Further, if you are really from the city in question you should be able to give 
the official name of the mosque you used to attend. Given that you cannot 
do so and given that—as we have retrieved from the internet—this mosque 
is large and well-known, then we can cast serious doubts on the truthful-
ness of your identity claims. The case of the naming of the mosque is of 
further interest because the authorities rely here on web based information 
that uses the official name of this mosque. The first one is a web site giving 
news about the country; the second is Google maps; and the third and most 
intriguing one, is petitfute.com—a website that gives handy tips to French 
speaking tourists wishing to explore far away exotic countries.
The testing of Bashir’s factual knowledge that serves to prove his ‘indig-
enousness’ (or lack thereof ) continues. As we read, Bashir was able to pro-
duce the name of the bottled water most sold in the country. He further 
was able to name the money used in the country and to explain what the 
specific musical instrument used in the region is, the name of at least two 
mobile networks operating in the country as well as the official name of the 
4The city in question is divided into what we shall call wards, with each ward consisting of more than 
one neighbourhood.
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governmental headquarters. However, he failed to describe correctly the flag, 
or to name an unspecified football team. The final disproof of identity was 
his inability to name the market where he went with his father as well as 
the proper name of any market in the city, where he replied “this is called 
‘in the city’”. He further did not know the name of any national TV chan-
nels to which question Bashir responded “the [national] TV stations and also 
movies and listening to music”, an answer that seems more apt to answer a 
question about his favorite pastimes. Last, he did not know the name of the 
big football stadium in the city. As explained in the final part of the letter, all 
these questions were considered manageable for someone of Bashir’s age and 
educational level.
A Chat with Bashir’s Roommate
Given that Bashir relied almost blindly on Majid, a fellow guest at the cen-
tre who is also from Bashir’s country, I did hang out with them both quite 
often. After Bashir had left, I decided to have a chat with Majid about 
Bashir’s rejection, as he was the one who had read the rejection letter out 
to Bashir because Bashir could barely read Latin script. Majid comes from 
a well-known Quranic preachers’ family in the city in question. Majid’s 
application—corroborated by his physical impediment—had already been 
approved by the CGVS. Being aware that this could also have led to the 
discussion of sensitive information, I obtained Majid’s consent to have an 
informal chat with him first. After that, I asked him whether it was fine 
that I taped him. In what follows, I present two extracts in English from my 
conversation with Majid, which took place in French. The first extract deals 
with Majid having to speak to Bashir’s mother on a mobile phone. The epi-
sode runs as follows:
Extract 1
Majid: One day Bashir came into the room.
Max: hm
Majid: He called his mother.
Max: hm
Majid: So, his mother asked him whether he did his prayers
Max: hm
Majid: Daily
Max: Yes, yes, yes
Majid: He said yes (but) his mother did not trust him.
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Max: Right!
Majid: He gave me […] to reassure his mother, he gave me the phone, so I had 
occasion to talk to his mother, so I then I spoke to his mother. So when I 
spoke to his mother, she asked me directly […].
Max: Sorry I don’t understand.
Majid: She told me, my origin is [Bashir’s nationality], I, I […] I, myself, have 
been born in XXXX, she told me, I myself am originally from [town in the 
country in question].
Max: From [same town] what, you?
Majid: Yes, she told me Ah! Me too I am from [same town], which family in 
[same town] do you come from? Which family? The [X]’s family. So she said 
fine, I know them, the [inaudible], that family is well known there, and I 
believe you.
Max: Well known?
Majid: Well known.
Max: Okay, your family, his family?
Majid: My family.
Max: Your family.
Majid: So, we spoke, she asked me whether Bashir was doing okay and 
whether he said his prayers, and whether he did this while I was there, 
because I [inaudible] here, so I do every [inaudible]
Max: hm
In the above, although the reported speech centres around Bashir’s 
mother making sure that her son has done his daily prayers, we see more 
things emerging. The mother of Bashir, who is from the country that Bashir 
is from, claiming to be from a town of 15,000 people over 100 kilometers 
away from the capital city and coming to trust Majid because of him being 
the son of a well known family there. The conversation unfolds as follows:
Extract 2
Max: But, but also, Bashir’s language, you told me that Bashir’s language is not 
the same as the one reported on the letter (the letter from the CGVS: MS).
Majid: No, I have said, I did not confirm that he does not come from there, I 
say that he does not speak the language spoken there.
Max: He does not speak the language spoken there?
Majid: Exactly, he speaks better the language of the capital, the XXXX 
language.
Max: Oh, yeah?
Majid: Me too, I speak better XXXX then my mother tongue, the language 
of my mother and of my father, because I grew up in [city], you are forced 
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to speak that language. But I speak French well too, that’s better here in 
Belgium.
Max: Is [it] very different from your mother’s and father’s language?
Majid: Yes, very different, very different, very very different, there is no link 
between my language, but the language of [inaudible], the other is the lan-
guage of the market…
Max: Hm, of [tradespeople].
Majid: Yes, people who [trade].
Max: Oh right, so that is XXXX.
Majid: Yes.
Max: Okay, but, but, but, but […] but I spoke to Bashir, once or twice and 
his French is way different than your French.
Majid: But yes, of course, it is not the same thing, I myself have studied, I 
have finished my studies, Bashir has not been to school.
Max: He has not been to school?
Majid: He entered school here.
Max: Oh yeah?
Majid: Yes! I am convinced [of that: MS] because it is me, to whom he went 
to, when there was a letter to send or to read he asks me whether I can read 
it for him. He knows absolutely nothing in French.
Max: Absolutely nothing. Oh yeah?
Majid: Yes!
Max: Okay, okay, so writing is also extremely difficult for Bashir, right?
Majid: No! He cannot write!
Max: hm.
Majid: The papers are negative.
Max: Yes, I know.
Majid: There you go. For him the motivation, they have asked him how many 
[wards], there are in [the city in question] […].
Max: Yes, I know, I know, I have seen the report.
Majid: There you are. He started to recite the [neighbourhoods within a par-
ticular ward] and he did not understand.
Max: Right, right.
Majid: He did not understand the difference between [wards] and 
[neighbourhoods]
Max: He did not understand the difference, hm
Majid: Between [wards] and [neighbourhoods]. But it has only to do with 
the fact that Bashir has not gone to school and not because Bashir does not 
come from [the country in question].
Max: Hm, okay, okay.
Majid: The same thing goes for everything, the mosque, the market. The mar-
ket is at the centre of town so for him that is ‘town’ and the mosque, well, 
that is one big Mosque, but there at home we call it the big mosque.
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Extract 2 shows how close Bashir was to Majid, asking him to read or 
write letters on his behalf implied a high level of trust. Second, we discover 
that Bashir, because of his lack of schooling, did not know certain (basic) 
notions like the difference between [wards] and [neighbourhoods]. Even 
more interesting is Majid’s insight into Bashir’s language repertoire. Aside 
from claiming that Bashir’s proficiency in French is very limited, French 
being the language in which the report was written and in which Bashir 
had decided to give his answers during the interview, we find also another 
interesting sociolinguistic element. That is—following Majid’s own self-re-
ported language proficiency and meta-linguistic judgement on Bashir’s 
language repertoire—Bashir is mostly proficient in another language, a lan-
guage that one who grows up in the city in question would know. This 
language stems from the same language family as Bashir’s father’s language. 
Although I did not have a chance to gather data on Bashir’s own sociolin-
guistic repertoire as he had already left the centre, Bashir’s reported soci-
olinguistic repertoire and the lack of schooling give an interesting insight 
into what might have gone missing with the naming of things during the 
interview which was fully carried out in French. Aside from the issue of 
the language in which Bashir was mostly proficient, it is also interesting 
to notice Bashir’s failure to differentiate between [ward] and [neighbour-
hood], as well as his inability to give the proper names for the market and 
mosque, all things that did not surprise Majid. In Extract 2, the names 
Bashir gave to places like the market and the mosque—which Majid 
too refers to as ‘the big mosque’ (la grand Mosquee )—are reported to be 
common naming practices ‘there at home’. Naming practices that do not 
match the register the CGVS’ authorities draw on through their web-gath-
ered information.
It Is All About Naming Things Right
As shown in the extract above, as well as in the letter explaining Bashir’s 
rejection, much of the doubt cast by the authorities on Bashir’s identity 
comes not only from his incapacity to articulate knowledge about the city 
in which he grew up, but also from his inability to name places correctly. 
Although Bashir’s lack of knowledge could easily be attributed to what 
McDermott names inarticulateness:
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[S]ituations that organise inarticulateness are legion, and it is easy to name the 
most obvious occasions. Funerals, police inquiries, job interviews, class and 
race border encounters, tax interrogations, sex talk with children, group ther-
apy, television interviews, and first dates - all are potential tongue-stoppers.  
A folk account would have it that whenever our words can be immedi-
ately consequential and long remembered, the pressure can get to us, and 
new heights of eloquence and new lows of inarticulateness are frequent. 
(McDermott 1988: 38–40)
The ambiguous relationship between names and the things they refer to, 
e.g., places, has been a matter of interest for linguistic anthropology for dec-
ades and it has informed inquiries into the question of whether the name 
of a given thing is given from the point of view of the individual or of the 
collective. The relationship is not just reflective: rather there are processes of 
enregisterment at play that construct the practice of naming as local knowl-
edge praxis. Given that enregisterment is the sociolinguistic process through 
which someone establishes the desire to be recognised as a specific someone 
(see Agha 2003; Karrebaek 2011), we shift the analysis here from differences 
between ‘languages’ to differences within languages, e.g., ‘ways of speaking’, 
‘ways of narrating’, and ‘ways of naming things’. In sum, we take a close 
look at all those bits within language that make someone part of the appro-
priate register of belonging in that s/he narrates things the way they should 
be narrated and s/he names things the way they should be named. Bashir’s 
letter exemplifies that it is not only the process of naming but within that 
the process of enregistering (Agha 2003: 231–235) the names of things, like 
a mosque, in the way the authority wishes to hear them. More specifically, 
the process of naming is not solely an arbitrary process of making denota-
tional and connotational meaning match one another. Rather, the process 
of naming comes with a history of use (inter-textuality), as well as with a 
history of sociocultural evaluation and assessment (a notion termed pre- 
textuality by Marijns and Blommaert 2002: 13). In the case of proper 
names, as Agha shows (2003: 247), the speech chain structure in which 
the action of naming is involved serves to maintain the coupling of a name 
with a referent, e.g., the association of a certain name with a given person or 
object. The fact that a name refers to that specific person or object is, at first, 
something shared by those who were involved in the immediate naming 
ceremony, e.g., an inauguration. It is then through the process of name 
transmission across socio-cultural networks, that other members become 
acquainted with somebody’s or something’s proper name even though they 
were not present at the naming ceremony. The naming ceremony therefore 
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produces a continuous speech chain that needs neither to be attended to or 
verified but that needs to be known by those who claim to belong to that 
network.
To link the above to my data, I refer to the different registers of naming pub-
lic spaces of interest in the city in question drawn upon by the authorities and 
by Bashir, bearing in mind the specific reference to the naming of the mosque 
Bashir claimed to have attended while following Qu’ranic classes. In the case of 
the co-presence of a speaker, in this case an individual naming things, and of a 
hearer, in this case an authority figure hearing how things are named, the issue 
of matching register is key to understanding the breakdown reported by the 
authorities in this letter of rejection. Unfortunately, I could not be present at that 
interview nor could I get hold of the whole transcript of the interview as it was 
not in possession of the asylum-seeking centre. However, the text of the rejection 
letter reported in Fig. 1 and 2 and the counter evidence provided by Majid are 
both very telling. They show how Bashir repeatedly fails to match the register 
that is expected from him that is, the official register he should draw upon in 
order to have his voice recognised by the authority as indexing his  indigeneity, 
an indigeneity embodied in the naming of things in the right way. In other 
words, what emerges from the letter is an act of (web-based) misrecognition in 
which the CGVS—an institution that clearly operates on behalf of the State—
sees a lack of verification of the identity of the applicant. As Benedict Anderson 
states in his work on nations as imagined communities (1993), this register of 
talking about a nation embodies a set of prescriptions of what the other under 
scrutiny should say and know in order to have his identity match what the 
authorities believe that someone who is indigenous should say and know.
Conclusions
As Shannahan puts it (2015: 77), institutional interviews for asylum assess-
ment are places where the voice of the asylum-seeking applicant—not 
proficient in French—finds itself confronted with the institutional voice—
in French or at least in one of its vernacular varieties—produced by the 
officer(s) that is assessing the case. The communicative situation that unfolds 
is expected to follow clear patterns of questioning as well as clear patterns 
of understanding and answering along the institutionally favoured matrix 
of what is considered valid proof of ‘country talk’. Consequently, the appli-
cant does not only need to understand the language that is being spoken 
and what is being spoken about, but—in order to fit the institutionally 
held frame of valid knowledge (cf. Bohmer and Shuman 2008: 7)—must 
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also strive to match the register used by those who are asking the questions. 
These registers, within the social interactions involved in the asylum inter-
view, play a significant role in the processes of origin assessment, in that they 
enable the authorities to determine the applicant’s identity according to the 
attributes of their story. As Goffman warns us:
[W]e lean on anticipations that we have, transforming them into normative 
expectations, into righteously presented demands. […] It is when an active 
question arises [as to whether these demands will be filled] that we are likely 
to realise that all along we had been making certain assumptions as to what 
the individual before us ought to know to be members of a society. (Goffman 
1963: 2)
The letter has been analysed as a text that encapsulates a complex sociolin-
guistic event. Further, it has been rendered into a bureaucratic text by the 
authorities, that is, a text that homogenises what someone of Bashir’s age 
and educational level is expected to know about the country he claims to be 
coming from. Yet as Gee reminds us:
The fact that people have differential access to different identities and activi-
ties, connected to different sorts of status and social goods, is a root source of 
inequality in society. […] Since different identities and activities are enacted in 
and through language, the study of language is integrally connected to matters 
of equity and justice. (Gee 1999: 13)
The naming register used to define markets and mosques, or everyday items 
like money, are models of knowledge that link naming to indigeneity, lead-
ing to the socio-cultural recognition of the applicant as someone who is 
telling the truth. To rage against the bureaucratic oddity that is at the core 
of this study is of very little use. Rather Bashir’s case evaluation shows a 
glimpse of the valence of factual information for the assessment of identity 
claims in an asylum-seeking procedure (Ochs and Capps 1996: 417–419, 
deals with the indexical value of language). That is, the valence of Bashir’s 
claim is based on the complex associative networks that underpin the ideo-
logical expectations of what someone who claims to be from a certain place 
should know about that place and in particular, how he should express this 
knowledge. Further, what this paper has shown is not only evidence of how 
the emergence of register discrepancy gives way to misrecognition of iden-
tity claims. It also shows how identity is local knowledge dependent and it 
challenges someone’s authenticity where this authenticity is being judged 
by a different institutional matrix of knowledge. It is the matching or 
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mismatching of the above that determines who may speak, what they may 
speak about, and, in particular, how they may speak about their own life his-
tory of migration. As in so many other domains of contemporary social life, 
language turns out to be a problem in the asylum procedure. The denial of 
its inter-lingual as well as intra-lingual complexity is a source of rather fun-
damental, though often invisible, injustice. The straightforward anchoring of 
a personal identity, a process fraught with complications even in homogene-
ous communities of people belonging to a single national entity, cannot and 
should not be taken for granted in asylum seeking procedures even when its 
demarcation seems to be helped by the omnipresent authority of the web.
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Introduction1
While conducting fieldwork on the British asylum system between 2007 and 
2009 I was given permission by the Home Office to ‘shadow’2 and inter-
view five Home Office Presenting Officers (HOPOs) who were attached to 
a London Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT). This presented a rare 
opportunity to understand the work of an important unit of the Home 
Office. HOPOs were eager to talk about their work, their insights into the 
cases they worked on and about their training and careers. The first section 
provides a brief overview of the role of HOPOs and their work. In the sec-
ond section I look at a first-tier asylum appeal and a second stage recon-
sideration appeal to illustrate how HOPOs represent the Home Secretary. 
The third section briefly examines the views of Immigration Judges about 
the work of HOPOs. Finally, I pull together the different strands of my 
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argument to show how the adversarial nature of asylum appeals and the 
structural position of HOPOs in the appeal process helps to explain why 
they are so elusive in the Tribunal and what their work involves.
The Role and Work of HOPOs
HOPO are junior-level civil servants who have either been recruited 
directly into the civil service to work as HOPOs or they have worked else-
where in the civil service and have applied to become a HOPO. HOPOs 
are assigned to a ‘Presenting Officers Unit’ (POU) that is attached to one 
of thirteen Tribunals located around the United Kingdom; their task is to 
represent the Secretary of State for the Home Department (hereafter the 
SSHD) in all appeals heard by the Tribunal. The number of court/hearing 
rooms in a Tribunal determines the number of HOPOs assigned to a POU. 
At the time of my fieldwork there were two POUs in London—Islington 
and Feltham—which were staffed by 116 and 70 officers respectively (they 
were supported by 105 and 45 administrative staff, respectively).3
The entry requirements for a HOPO depend upon how individuals are 
recruited: existing civil servants need to arrange a transfer, however new 
recruits must possess a BA and must pass the civil service examination (all 
the individuals I interviewed had bachelor degrees, a few had MAs). None 
of the HOPOs I met had formal legal training. Salary varied with respect to 
their level of experience: in 2007 salaries ranged from £24,000 to £29,000 
p.a. At that time the job was sufficiently interesting and the pay sufficiently 
good that staff turnover was not a problem.4 The vast majority of HOPOs 
are in their mid- 20s or early 30s. There is a preponderance of female staff; 
most HOPOs have a university degree and have worked as a HOPO for 
three to five years (a small number have worked in the Home Office for 
much longer). HOPOs are drawn from a wide range of ethnic groups.
New HOPOs are eased into their jobs. They first undergo an initial ten-
day classroom induction course where they are introduced to the main 
areas of immigration and asylum law, legislation (several major pieces of 
3Information about staffing, training and POUs is taken from replies to my FOI requests dated 26 
February 2007 and 23 March 2007.
4At various times the Home Office has not maintained staffing levels with the result that workloads 
have increased dramatically and an increasing number of appeals have been adjourned because IJs are 
reluctant to hear an appeal without a HOPO present (they are concerned that their decisions will be 
reconsidered).
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legislation relating to asylum and immigration law came into force prior 
to and during the period covered by this fieldwork), case law, Home 
Office policies (see Fig. 5.1) and basic advocacy skills. Training focuses on 
the principal types of cases which HOPOs handle: asylum and immigra-
tion appeals, bail, deportation, settlement applications and human rights 
appeals. Training is supposed to provide HOPOs with the basic practical 
skills needed to carry out their work such as cross examination, ‘submis-
sion techniques’ and general court etiquette. HOPOs are not tested about 
their knowledge at the end of the course,5 though their performance is said 
to be monitored by their team manager and is reviewed after six months 
on the job.
At the end of the induction course HOPOs observe cases for two days 
before taking an ‘easy’ case load for six weeks while they are mentored by a 
senior HOPO. After four to six months they attend a three day ‘consolida-
tion course’. New staff are expected to turn to experienced staff for guidance 
and advice. Each POU has a library containing relevant legal texts, but more 
importantly HOPOs have access to a comprehensive online library and 
information service that provides access to case law, legislation and to HO 
policies, instructions etc.
The ‘instructions’, rules etc. summarised in Fig. 5.1 are issued by the 
SSHD to enhance her control over the UK border and prevent claimants 
from securing status (Campbell 2017: Chapters 1–2 and 8). However 
it is clear that the sheer number of Instructions/Rules makes it difficult 
Type of Instruction and number of instructions
Asylum Policy Instructions 39 European Casework Instructions 14
Asylum Process Guidance 18
Information Management 
Guidance
1
Contact Management Information 2 Nationality Instructions 101
Detention Service Orders and related 
instructions
77
Non-compliance with biometric 
registration regulations
4
Immigration Directorate Instructions 35
Operating standards for pre-
departure accommodation (return 
of families)
1
Enforcement Guidance and Instructions 6 Statelessness Guidance 1
Entry Clearance guidance 18
Working in the UK casework 
instructions
3
TOTAL 320
Fig. 5.1 Home office asylum and immigration instructions and rules (May 2013)
5By contrast caseworkers in immigration law firms who are responsible for taking and filing an asylum 
applicant’s initial claim with the Home Office, are required to undergo formal training and to pass 
national accredition examinations.
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for Home Office case owners, entry clearance officers and HOPOs to 
assess asylum applications because they are not allowed to exercise any 
discretion in the way they interpret and apply the instructions/rules. In 
this context the provision of ad hoc one-day training events to update 
HOPOs on changes in the law and legislation are arguably inadequate, 
particularly since HOPOs are not required to attend or indeed pass train-
ing courses.
The AIT allocates cases to a court, and one week before the hearing the 
head of the POU allocates cases to individual Presenting Officers who are 
assigned to ‘run’ the cases to be heard by Immigration Judges (IJs). The 
number of appeals heard by an IJ—his or her ‘list’—varies with respect 
to the number and complexity of the cases listed but averages five appeals 
a day (lists contain a mix of asylum and other appeals). The Home Office 
anticipates that a HOPO will prepare for court the day before they are 
expected to ‘assist’ an IJ (preparation time varies from about one to one 
and a half hours for an asylum appeal and perhaps 20–30 minutes for 
other types of appeal). In a similar way to how French asylum rappor-
teurs are allocated a quota of cases (Kobelinsky, this volume), a HOPO’s 
case load is said to be ‘11 in 20’ or ‘eleven lists a month’ (one day in 
court followed by one day of preparation during a calendar month)6: they 
remain with an assigned judge until the ‘list’ is completed. HOPOs assist 
IJ’s; Senior HOPOs assist ‘Designated Senior Immigration Judges’ (DIJs) 
who hear more complex appeals and are responsible for managing the 
Tribunal.
When HOPOs enter the Tribunal about half an hour before cases 
are scheduled to be heard, they go to the Presenting Officer’s Preparation 
Room where a lot of banter occurs as they chat about their work, lawyers 
and the judges whose court rooms they are assigned to. The elusiveness of 
HOPOs in the Tribunal is, I think, directly linked to their sense of belong-
ing to ‘a family’. i.e. the POU. Their constant movement between the POU 
and the Tribunal means that social interaction is quite limited except just 
6Senior Presenting Officers (SPO’s) are required to take cases in court one day out of every five. 
However because they are also expected to ‘assist’ Designated Immigration Judges on difficult cases they 
are frequently in court and are expected to: (a) be familiar with COIS (Country of Origin Information 
Service, now called Country Policy and Information Service) reports and policy statements; (b) look at 
applications and check them against policies; (c) help process cases swiftly by checking bundles/files; 
(d) write to legal representatives informing them of decisions; (e) deal with any follow-up issues from 
appeal cases; (f ) try to ensure that appeals won’t be postponed; and (g) to expedite case hearings, they 
are expected to pick up ‘floats’ (last minute cases listed for a hearing) and assist IJs to determine these 
appeals.
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before hearings begin and during lunch when interaction is convivial and 
high-spirited. Individual HOPOs are appointed to liaise with other POUs 
and the Country of Origin Information Office based at Lunar House (in 
South London) and they are responsible for monitoring Home Office 
information and case law on specific countries of asylum, e.g., Somalia, 
Eritrea, Sri Lanka. At the end of each day HOPOs are expected to record 
basic details on each case they complete on a special database and to refer 
any cases of potential fraud or of wider ‘intelligence interest’ to the POU 
Intelligence Liason Officer. These reports are also used to inform the Appeals 
and Litigation Team (in central London) that the SSHD should seek to 
reconsider an IJ’s decision by filing an appeal.
There is little prospect of promotion for HOPOs unless they transfer to 
a different post, though the individuals I spoke to enjoyed their job as ‘pre-
tend barristers’ (though some female officers do not enjoy the rough and 
tumble of court room exchanges). Indeed many HOPOs delay entering the 
court room until shortly before the hearing begins in order to avoid barris-
ters, some of whom can be quite aggressive and who attempt to corner them 
in an effort to find out the Home Office position on their client’s appeal. 
Attempts to avoid legal counsel arise, I think, because HOPOs realise that 
their legal training (and the time they spend preparing a case) is far more 
limited than what is expected of experienced legal counsel (though legal 
counsel are not always well prepared either). In contrast, some young male 
HOPOs enjoy adversarial conflict; one told me that the UK Border Agency 
(UKBA)7 is obsessed with winning cases and that POU units around the 
country are engaged in an informal competition to achieve the highest 
‘win-ratio’ (see Gill 2016: Chapters 3–4 on the competitiveness among 
officers).8
HOPOs are expected to meet ‘performance targets’ which have expanded 
in recent years. In 2007 HOPOs were supposed to ‘maintain’ 15% of all 
asylum and deportation initial decisions and 20% of entry clearance initial 
decisions (this expectation is somewhat at odds with the fact that IJs decide 
appeals). By 2013 their targets were increased such that they were expected 
7HOPOs worked in the UKBA at that time of my research. It was re-incorporated into the Home 
Office in 2013.
8In response to an FOI request about this, the Home Office denied knowledge of such a competition. 
The competition is probably based on comparing monthly performance statistics for each POU which 
are published by the Home Office.
96     J. R. Campbell
to ‘maintain 70% of asylum appeals and 60% of all other appeals’.9 To 
achieve these targets they are expected to10:
1. ‘Ensure each case is fully argued in court’ by delivering ‘a persuasive and 
cohesive argument’.
2. ‘Pursue all relevant and appropriate aspects of the appellant’s case or 
claim.’
3. ‘In court, robustly defend the decision under appeal but be mindful that 
you must disclose evidence and material that is relevant to the facts at 
issue, irrespective of which party to the appeal this assists, in order to 
achieve a just determination of the case. You must not knowingly mislead 
the Immigration Judge or permit the Immigration Judge to be misled.’
4. ‘Test the evidence …’.
5. ‘You should ensure that cases are dealt with as efficiently and quickly as 
possible and oppose unmeritorious adjournment requests.’
Once we step back from official representations about HOPOs and examine 
them at work it is possible to discern significant discrepancies between the 
way their role is publicly defined and how they perform their work. One 
important observation is that unlike barristers/advocates, IJs and bailiffs, 
HOPOs are not ‘officers of the court’ who have an obligation to promote 
justice and the effective operation of the judicial system. Indeed HOPOs are 
not bound by a professional code of conduct which means that regardless 
of what is stated in Home Office professional standards guidelines, they are 
not legally required to assist the court to achieve a fair decision. Observation 
makes it clear that most HOPOs steadfastly see their job as ‘defending’ the 
initial Home Office decision regardless of whether that decision was fair. 
In this regard it is important to note that between 2007 and 2009 Home 
Office caseworkers refused at least 80% of all initial asylum applications 
they considered; however between 25 and 33% of all initial decisions were 
overturned on appeal in the Tribunal. Their task of defending the SSHD is 
ensured by the imposition of management targets on HOPOs and because, 
according to my informants, in 2001 the Home Office withdrew the right of 
HOPOs to concede a case. Today if a HOPO is allocated to defend a poorly 
argued decision they will ‘redraft’ a refusal letter or they may only make a 
brief final submission in court.
10Source: ‘Presenting Officers Professional Standards’ provided in FOI request 26714, dated 8th April 
2013.
9Source: Home Office FOI request by S. Medley (dated 8th April 2013) Req. FOI 26714.
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Litigating Appeals
Individuals who have applied to the Home Office for asylum but whose 
initial application was refused by the Home Office have a right of appeal 
to the AIT against that decision. The AIT presides over an adversarial legal 
arena which brings together parties with very different interests in the out-
come of an appeal (Campbell 2017). The Tribunal is formally independent 
from the Home Office; nevertheless the decisions of IJs are increasingly con-
strained by the SSHD’s rules and regulations which, as with HOPOs, limit 
their discretion in deciding claims. During an appeal Immigration Judges 
(IJ) use Tribunal Procedural Rules and Practice Directions to control pro-
ceedings and process appeals in a speedy and efficient manner. In the asy-
lum appeals I followed all applicants were represented by legal counsel. More 
recently, however, it is clear that on average twenty-one percent of appli-
cants were unrepresented in the period 2011–2012 (Burridge and Gill 2017: 
30). When applicants are not legally represented this allows greater scope 
for HOPOs to influence the outcome of the appeal, i.e. more appeals are 
dismissed.
HOPOs ‘resist’ an appeal by defending the original decision of a Home 
Office case owner (who does not appear in court). Normally asylum appel-
lants attend appeals. At the start of the hearing the IJ determines the order 
in which appeals will be heard and, together with legal representatives and 
the HOPO, s/he sets a nominal time limit for each appeal within which the 
parties are expected to conclude their arguments. Finally ushers and admin-
istrative staff assist the Tribunal to conduct its business.
Case 1. First Tier Asylum Appeal of HZ
The appellant was a 60-year-old national of Eritrea who was given leave to 
enter the UK as the spouse of a British citizen in May 2005. In 2007 he 
applied for ‘Indefinite Leave to Remain’ and was refused. Before his appeal 
was heard he applied for asylum in September 2007 ‘because of his politi-
cal opinion’. The SSHD refused his appeal and issued removal directions to 
Eritrea. The Home Office ‘Refusal Letter’ (RFRL) argued that the appellant 
was an ‘insufficiently prominent’ member of a political opposition party and 
‘would not be of interest to the authorities’ if he were returned to Eritrea.
His appeal was heard in early 2008 at a London Tribunal and concerned a sur 
place claim for asylum. As defined in the UNHCR Handbook (1992): ‘A person 
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who was not a refugee when he left his country, but who becomes a refugee at 
a later date, is called a refugee ‘sur place’ (paragraph 94). Expressed slightly dif-
ferently, UNHCR notes that ‘a person becomes a refugee ‘sur place’ due to cir-
cumstances arising in his country of origin during his absence’ (paragraph 95). 
Two case ‘bundles’ were submitted to the Tribunal prior to the hearing which 
contained all the evidence and country reports which both parties relied upon 
to argue the claim. The Home Office bundle included a screening interview 
and ‘Statement of Evidence Form’ (SEF) with AK and the Home Office RFRL. 
The appellant’s bundle contained his counsel’s skeleton argument, a new witness 
statement by the appellant, extensive photographs, witness statements from his 
solicitor and his witness, a copy of a membership card indicating membership in 
an opposition political party and a copy of the party’s political programme, two 
expert reports and eight objective reports addressing the political situation in 
Eritrea.
The IJ took an unusually active role in the proceedings. As the appellant 
was called to give evidence, the IJ echoed the statement of HZ’s counsel that 
‘the issues are quite narrow’ by stating:
Very narrow! He made his claim when he did; there was no need to claim 
[earlier] because he was on family reunion. In terms of credibility, his case is 
to show his political activities to date pre-date his application [for asylum]. 
There it is, fairly narrow. The case of Danian11 supports the appellant. It 
doesn’t actually matter what his reasons were, this cannot be challenged. Is 
that about it?
The appellant’s representative led him through his witness statements and 
asked him whether his ‘activities were a ploy to claim asylum? Can you com-
ment on this?’ The appellant replied: ‘I believe the Home Office is wrong. 
These are my beliefs and principles.’
The HOPO undertook an extensive cross-examination that questioned 
the appellant’s knowledge of and engagement with Eritrean opposition 
politics. Fifteen minutes into the cross examination the IJ interrupted the 
HOPO to clarify a point of law regarding Immigration Rule 395C which 
11The reference is to a case heard by the Court of Appeal, Danian [1999] INLR 533, which reaffirmed 
that a person who had a well-founded fear of persecution on Convention grounds could not be denied 
the protection of the Convention on the grounds that their activities after arriving in the UK gave rise 
to a fear of persecution even if they had been carried out in bad-faith. While the appellant’s activities 
would need to be carefully scrutinised, if their action did give rise to the possibility of serious risk on 
return then they would be entitled to asylum.
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allowed him discretion to decide the case,12 an issue which the Home 
Office Refusal Letter had failed to raise. When the HOPO confirmed that 
the issue had not been raised, the IJ stated: ‘Yes, it’s wrong. Frankly this is 
a strong asylum case. I am reluctant that it should be kicked into touch’. 
At this point, cross examination resumed and addressed the nature of his 
activities in the UK, his membership in an opposition political group, his 
fear of being returned to Eritrea, and his Art. 8 claim under the European 
Convention on Human Rights regarding his right to a family and private 
life.
When cross examination concluded the IJ again stepped in by stating that 
‘There is nothing to re-examine is there?’. He asked a few questions of the 
appellant: ‘Your sons are here. That’s a strong link for you. But if suddenly 
there is an uprising in Eritrea you would go back to help rebuild?’. The 
appellant answered: ‘Yes’.
The witnesses were then called to give evidence regarding the appellant 
and his involvement in opposition politics in the UK and the likelihood 
that the authorities were aware of his activities. When this concluded and 
it was time for the HOPO to cross-examine the witnesses, the IJ stated: ‘Is 
there anything left?’ The HOPO asked one question regarding how often 
the witnesses had seen the appellant distributing political material on public 
occasions.
As the HOPO began her final submissions, which relied upon the Refusal 
Letter and which did not take issue with the appellant’s political activities in 
the UK, she was constantly interrupted by the IJ who commented that even 
though the appellant was likely to be subject to a ‘low level’ risk on return, 
nevertheless ‘He probably would attract attention […] From everything we 
read about Eritrea, it is a matter of concern.’ The IJ also commented on ‘the 
vast amount of high quality evidence’ before him, including photographic 
evidence, and he stated that ‘The case comes down to the objective evidence; 
nothing has gotten better in the past four years.’
Agreeing with the HOPO that Home Office COIS reports failed to pro-
vide information about the political organisation which the appellant had 
allegedly joined in the UK, nevertheless he concluded that the expert evi-
dence on the political party was undisputable. The IJ then rhetorically 
stated: ‘What tops it?’ To which the appellant’s representative said: ‘His 
immigration history’.
12See: ‘Goodbye Paragraph 395C?’ at: https://www.freemovement.org.uk/goodbye-paragraph-395c/ 
accessed 1 July 2012.
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The IJ stated: ‘Yes. When the Home Office see this [i.e. an asylum claim 
made after entering the UK which alleges involvement in political activities] 
they are suspicious. But this is a different type of case. I am privileged to 
hear it.’ The IJ then stated: ‘I allow the asylum appeal and the human rights 
appeal’.
Comment: This appeal hinged on the failure of the Home Office to 
properly consider the application as a sur place asylum claim (because 
the appellant had entered the UK lawfully under a grant of fam-
ily reunion) rather than as an unfounded claim as defined by Sec. 8 
of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. 
Furthermore, the IJ invoked IR 395C to prevent the Home Office from 
withdrawing its original decision in order to reconsider the claim. IR 
395C allowed the IJ to overturn the Home Office decision and grant the 
appeal. The appeal is unusual for a number of reasons. First very few sur 
place claims are made. Second most IJ’s do not intervene quite so ` in 
hearings nor do they overrule HOPO arguments. Finally, it is extremely 
rare for an IJ to announce the decision at the end of the appeal (nor-
mally they ‘reserve their decision’, write it up afterwards and send it to 
the applicant and the Home Office within ten to fourteen days of the 
hearing).
Case 2. Second Stage Reconsideration Appeal 
of AK
When the Tribunal refuses an appeal against the initial decision of the 
Secretary of State, the applicant may have a right to appeal against the deci-
sion if the IJ made an error of law in deciding the appeal. In such cases the 
applicant’s representative makes an application to the Upper Tribunal setting 
out why the decision should not be allowed to stand and asking the Tribunal 
for a reconsideration of the initial appeal.
In October 2006 the first tier of the Tribunal convened to hear an 
appeal by AK, a 35-year-old asylum applicant from Eritrea. The IJ dis-
missed AK’s appeal.13 The applicant’s legal representative filed an appli-
cation for reconsideration to the Upper Tribunal where, upon looking at 
the papers summarising the case, a Senior IJ (hereafter, SIJ) concluded 
13I attended the reconsideration appeal and took my own notes of the proceedings. In addition I have 
the entire case file and an interview with the barrister who represented AK.
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that ‘the IJ was procedurally unfair in finding that the appellant was no 
longer working for the Defence Forces until he left Eritrea without giv-
ing him the opportunity to deal with that point, when that evidence was 
accepted in the RFRL’, i.e. Home Office Refusal Letter. That decision led 
to a ‘First Stage Reconsideration’ where an SIJ concluded that there was 
‘a material error of law’ in the initial determination. The SIJ identified 
13 issues in the initial decision that were linked to an ‘evidential lacunae’ 
for the period 1999 to 2005 in the appellant’s account. A further error of 
law concerned the need to find ‘the true circumstances in which he left 
Eritrea’ (the reference was to MA (Draft evaders—illegal departures—risk) 
Eritrea CG [2007] UKAIT 00059 )14 which focused on the issue of ‘illegal 
exit’ from Eritrea and whether individuals who had left Eritrea without 
obtaining an official exit visa and a passport were at risk for a Convention 
reason if they were ‘returned’, i.e. deported as failed asylum seekers, to 
Eritrea.
The reconsideration appeal was heard in May 2008 by a Designated 
Immigration Judge (DIJ). The Home Office bundle included the 
Screening and Statement of Evidence Interviews, the RFRL and a copy of 
the first determination of the claim. The appellant’s bundle contained the 
decision by the SIJ setting out the errors in law of the first determination, 
copies of all the original submissions made by the appellant, correspond-
ence between the appellant’s legal representative and the Home Office 
and a new witness statement by the appellant. This statement provided 
further evidence about: his military service; secondment to the Office of 
the President and his work there; his political activities and his departure 
from Eritrea. The bundle also contained two expert reports. Just before the 
appeal began, counsel for the appellant said to the HOPO ‘I don’t have the 
Home Office COI report on Eritrea. I don’t need one unless you are rely-
ing on it. You didn’t serve it at the directions hearing and I won’t have time 
to read it.’ At this point the HOPO handed her the COI report which he 
did rely upon.
The reconsideration appeal began with the Senior HOPO reaffirm-
ing the reasons set out in the original RFRL and rejecting the appel-
lant’s account that he had still been in government service when he left 
Eritrea. The applicant’s representative, an experienced barrister, relied on 
DK (Serbia) [2006] EWCA Civ 174715 to argue that ‘it was not logical 
14See: https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov.uk/utiac/37868 accessed 15 June 2011.
15See: https://court-appeal.vlex.co.uk/vid/ors-52569444 accessed 15 June 2011.
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that he [the appellant] could be permitted to adduce evidence as to the 
nature of his work during that time but at the same time be prevented 
from trying to establish that he worked in the Presidential office’. In 
short, ‘the question of where A was working cannot be said to be unaf-
fected by the IJ’s error as to what A was doing between 1999 and 2005.’ 
This point was the key focus of the hearing although it was one strand of 
AK’s evidence.
After some initial sparring between the HOPO and counsel for AK, 
the latter asked the appellant to confirm his written evidence but failed to 
take him through the details regarding how he left Eritrea. The DIJ imme-
diately stepped in to ask about an untranslated document in the appel-
lant’s bundle which was said to confirm that the appellant had completed 
national service. He asked the court translator to translate the document 
which appeared to confirm that it was ‘a certificate of work participation’ 
issued by the Ministry of Defence to AK confirming his record of military 
service between 1996 and 1998 and which was intended to help him to 
‘get a part-time job’. The HOPO cross examined AK about his employ-
ment and his residence. The DIJ intervened to question AK about his 
computer training, but AK was not able to provide precise answers. The 
HOPO resumed his cross examination of AK and asked why the certificate 
had not been submitted to the first asylum hearing (he said that his mother 
had recently sent it to him). The HOPO also reiterated that AK had com-
pleted national service and he sought to clarify the nature of the computer 
files which had been submitted as part of AKs evidence (i.e. that he was 
a computer technician who had been assigned to work at Sawa military 
camp and that later he had been transferred to work at the office of the 
President of Eritrea).
The DIJ intervened on numerous occasions to ask about: the applicant’s 
family; his job in the military and his computer training; the documents 
he was now submitting; conscription; the work he reportedly carried out as 
a computer expert; demobilisation cards; the photo’s AK submitted show-
ing him in a military uniform; and about whether his mother was detained 
by the authorities after he left the country. The DIJ also questioned AK’s 
witness—who confirmed that ‘no one is allowed to ask for release or 
demobilisation’—about his legal status in the UK. It emerged that nei-
ther AK’s counsel nor the Home Office (who had been given a copy of his 
papers) had told the witness to bring verification of his legal status. The IJ 
asked the witness a number of questions about his knowledge of AK and 
was told that they had met at Sawa Camp in 1999 when both men were 
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stationed there as conscripts and that AK had transferred to the President’s 
Office in 2001.
At this point both parties made their final submissions to the DIJ. The 
principle submissions made by the Senior HOPO were:
1. He adopted the reasons set out in the RFRL.
2. AK was conscripted in 1994 in the ‘first round’ of conscription in Eritrea.
3. AK worked at Sawa military camp and at the President’s Office from 
where ‘he will never be released’.
4. AK was permitted to look for part-time work.
5. AK received demobilisation papers from the military.
6. AK doesn’t fall within the draft evaders categories [as set out in MA (Draft 
evaders—illegal departures—risk) Eritrea CG [2007] UKAIT 00059 ] nor is 
he a military deserter.
7. AK’s appeal should be refused.
His counsel began her summing up by noting that ‘the first issue is that the 
IJ’s credibility findings are mixed; there are no challenges to his two years as 
a conscript or that he worked on IT at Sawa camp. The IJ didn’t accept that 
he was involved in opposition politics while he worked at the Office of the 
President.’ In addition, counsel noted that:
1. The expert reports confirmed that after initial military training there is 
no demobilisation for men until the age of 50. The majority of conscripts 
continue to perform National Service, not military service.
2. There has been no challenge that AK left the country illegally.
3. It has not be suggested that AK obtained an exit visa.
4. There has been no challenge to his witness, he is a refugee and he has sta-
tus in the UK.
5. AK has attended political demonstrations against the Eritrean govern-
ment in the UK and has submitted photographic evidence of this.
6. Regarding the gaps in AKs initial evidence for the period 1999 to 2005, 
if he was in military service in 1999 then, subject to injury, he would still 
be in military service. Finally
7. ‘I accept that there are mixed credibility findings, you asked about other 
issues but these are not before you as we are limited by the Directions.’
Eight days after the appeal the Tribunal promulgated the DIJ’s decision 
which strongly reflected his reading of the latest Home Office COI report 
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on Eritrea. The DIJ’s findings begin with a very clear statement: ‘I come 
to the conclusion that the appellant has told so many lies that it is dif-
ficult to know what can be believed and what has been concocted for 
the claim’ (paragraph 82). In the following 37 paragraphs of the decision 
the DIJ takes exception to every element of AK’s claim and finds rea-
son to doubt his credibility on every issue, including evidence that was 
not open for him to address. This comprehensive rejection of AK’s evi-
dence on the grounds that it lacked credibility allowed her to cite case 
law—AH (Failed asylum seekers—involuntary returns) Eritrea CG [2006] 
UKAIT 0007816—to refuse the appeal because AK had been found to 
lack credibility. In subsequent paragraphs she found that AK might have 
left the country on a scholarship, that his ‘post-arrival’ political activi-
ties were not put forward during the hearing, that the certificates of his 
educational training were not the originals (and could not be accepted) 
and that any sur place activities were ‘opportunistic’.17 As if her decision 
wasn’t already clear, the DIJ concluded by stating that: ‘I consider that 
the appellant has fabricated his account of his experiences in Eritrea and 
[I] do not accept that he left there for the reasons claimed or in the cir-
cumstances claimed. I am not satisfied that he has a well-founded fear …’ 
(paragraph 128).
Comment: This reconsideration appeal arose out of an error of law by 
the IJ who decided the first-tier appeal without carefully considering all of 
the appellant’s evidence. When an appeal is set out for reconsideration, it 
is normal for the SIJ who reviewed the application for reconsideration to 
define the key error(s) in law which need to be revisited and to ‘preserve’ 
other findings of fact from being overturned by the Tribunal during the sec-
ond appeal. It should be clear that the HOPO and counsel for AK created 
the space for the DIJ to take a very direct role in the appeal. The HOPO 
was not well prepared for the appeal and at several points failed to interro-
gate key elements of the evidence and the appellant’s witness, which pro-
vided an opening for the DIJ to ask her own questions and take control of 
the proceedings. Similarly, counsel for AK seemed blasé if not ill-prepared. 
First, she failed to translate a key document supporting the appellant’s 
case. Second, she did not take the court through the objective evidence on 
16See: https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov.uk/utiac/37945. The conclusion in this country guidance 
case which the DIJ seized upon was that ‘Neither involuntary returnees nor failed asylum seekers are as 
such at real risk on return to Eritrea’.
17Contrast her reading of Danion with that of the IJ in Case 1 and see Footnote 9.
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Eritrea. Third, she simply asked the appellant and his witness to confirm 
their written statements without exploring their evidence. The DIJ imme-
diately stepped in to ask her own questions which included finding that 
the witness had not brought any documents to court to affirm his legal sta-
tus in the UK. Overall, however, what is remarkable about the appeal and 
the decision is the extent to which the DIJ intervened during the appeal 
and the fact that she took exception with every element of AKs evidence 
in refusing his appeal. Indeed she even found a form of words and reason-
ing which allowed her to address and overturn findings of fact preserved by 
the SIJ who ordered that the appeal be reconsidered. Counsel for the appel-
lant filed an appeal against this decision to the Second Tier of the Tribunal 
which was refused by an SIJ in July 2008 (the SIJ stated: ‘I am not satis-
fied that it is arguable that the judge went beyond the issues identified for 
reconsideration’). An ‘Application on the Papers’ to the Court of Appeal 
was immediately made and initially granted but, one day before the appeal 
was scheduled, it was withdrawn by a Lord Justice because, on reading the 
papers, he decided that ‘the expert report did not resolve questions for nega-
tive case law’. AK’s claim was comprehensively found to lack credibility (see 
Sorgoni, this volume, for a critical discussion of this concept in the Italian 
context) and he was now subject to arrest and deportation.18
The Views of Immigration Judges About HOPOs
For good reasons IJs generally do not comment about the Home Office 
because they have to work with HOPOs and because their decisions may be 
challenged by the SSHD who may file an application to reconsider/re-hear 
their decisions (in the period 2006 and 2009 between 32 and 46% of appli-
cations for reconsideration made by the SSHD were granted; Campbell 
2017: Chapter 6).
IJs’ views about HOPOs are clearly influenced by the fact that their work 
is scrutinised by Home Office officials. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that 
HOPOs are held in low regard by many IJs largely because of their lack of 
18In the spring of 2017 I received an email from AK requesting my assistance to write an expert report 
for a fresh application for asylum which was to be heard by the Tribunal in September 2017. During 
the past 9 years he had been supported by an Eritrean family in London. His fresh application admitted 
that he had fabricated certain elements of his claim but he was adamant that he had never been demo-
bilised from the military and that he left Eritrea illegally without obtaining an exit visa (the objective 
COI material supports this claim today as it did in 2008).
106     J. R. Campbell
legal training. For instance one IJ told me that HOPOs always attack the 
credibility of appellants, even if that is not an issue. This occurs because 
HOPOs rely entirely on the initial Home Office Refusal Letter, because they 
ask ‘irrelevant questions’ and because they focus on minor discrepancies in 
an appellant’s account without looking at the core issues or without examin-
ing the evidence in the round. The same IJ described HOPO’s as ‘xenopho-
bic’ in the sense of being biased because
they want to win […] if they can. I think they’re fair, but they can be pedantic 
[…] they go into too many discrepancies which are not entirely reasonable, 
you know, sometimes empty submissions […] which don’t hold any weight. 
They just want to be heard […] On the other hand, sometimes you get a good 
sensible one who knows that the case is watertight from the appellant’s point 
of view, and who will simply say: ‘Well I make no submissions’.
Another IJ noted that because HOPOs are not well paid and spend rela-
tively little time preparing an appeal, their performance in court varies 
immensely ranging from a small number of ‘fascist-like presenting officers 
who seem to get a great deal of glee from putting people on the spot’ to the 
majority who ‘appear to have a sort of workman mentality—it’s a job, its 
going to get done to the best of my ability’. There were also the occasional 
HOPOs who, in addition to attacking an applicant’s credibility were unable 
to put their argument in a succinct form by asking appellants straightfor-
ward questions. When this occurs the IJ will stop the HOPO and ask him 
to rephrase his question by breaking it down into as simple a question as 
possible (this is a particular problem if interpreters are being used). If that 
request fails, then IJs will rephrase the question and ask it themselves.
A third IJ told me that he believed that the training of HOPOs had 
improved in recent years and that the standard of their work was higher. He 
noted that if there was poor legal representation from either the HOPO or 
counsel for the appellant, he would ‘decide the case on the evidence before 
me’ without worrying about whether either party might seek to appeal his 
decision. Informally IJs were said to be scathing about the quality of rep-
resentation by HOPOs and legal counsel, though neither type of representa-
tive appears to be reprimanded for poor professional conduct.19
19For instance I was told that Designated Immigration Judge’s seldom ‘carpeted’ IJs for poor judicial 
decisions during their annual appraisal. It is not clear whether poor quality work by a HOPO attracts 
any sanction.
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Conclusion
The adversarial nature of asylum and immigration appeals in the UK results 
in a tense, and sometimes fractious relationship between the judiciary, the 
Home Office and the legal profession. While the legal process is supposed 
to provide equal access to justice, the cases discussed in this chapter strongly 
suggest that persistent inequality prevails. This occurs because asylum and 
immigration law is complex and, given cuts to legal aid and the imposition 
of increased charges for filing claims, asylum applicants and individuals held 
in detention face insurmountable difficulties when they are unable to afford 
a lawyer (without whose assistance their appeal will almost certainly fail; 
Campbell 2014, 2015).
Elsewhere I have argued that in the last decade the balance of power has 
decisively shifted in favour of the Home Office due to its ability to draft 
legislation, create secondary legislation and new immigration rules—as illus-
trated in this paper by changing Paragraph 395C—and its ability to fund 
extensive litigation against asylum claims which compels asylum applicants 
and their lawyers to acquiesce with the particular interpretation or rubric of 
‘law’ that the Home Office wishes to enforce (Campbell 2017).
This situation reinforces not only a wariness about the relation between 
the courts and the Home Office, but also a certain skepticism about the sys-
tem that is reflected in the views and opinions held by judges, lawyers and 
government officials. For this reason it is unsurprising that HOPOs hold 
strong views about the importance of their work, about judges (who are var-
iously seen as ‘allowers’, ‘tough IJs’ and ‘dismissers’), about lawyers (seen as 
either ‘top class QCs’, ‘bottom-feeders’ or ‘rogues’) and country experts and 
appellants (who are viewed with extreme scepticism). In court each type of 
actor expresses a strong sense of identity and solidarity as a member of a pro-
fession, be it as a member of the judiciary, a member of the legal profession 
or as HOPOs from the same POU. The world of the HOPO is an insular 
one because of the adversarial way in which appeals are heard and decided; 
because of the limited nature of their ‘legal’ training; and because they are 
tasked with defending the SSHD regardless of the evidence before them. In 
this context legal challenges against decisions by the Secretary of State are 
viewed as a potential threat to the security of the country which needs to be 
fought against; appeals which overturn Home Office decisions are experi-
enced as personal defeats. If HOPOs possess an elusive quality, it is because 
they often have to defend poorly considered decisions by other Home Office 
officials in a context where, despite the constraints placed on judges and law-
yers by the power of the SSHD, judicial decisions often go against them.
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Introduction
According to Human Rights Watch (2016), the violations of children’s 
rights in Greece during 2015 and 2016 included, among others, arbi-
trary detention. Under international law, binding European directives, and 
national law, detention of unaccompanied asylum seeking children should 
be used ‘only as a measure of last resort, in exceptional circumstances, and 
for the shortest appropriate period’ (ibid.: 1). Human Rights Watch found 
that children often faced degrading conditions in police station cells and 
in Coast Guard facilities, and unsanitary conditions in pre-removal deten-
tion centres. In some cases, children said they were made to live and sleep 
in overcrowded, filthy, bug- and vermin-infested cells, sometimes without 
mattresses, and were deprived of appropriate sanitation, hygiene, and pri-
vacy. The national response capacity is very limited as there are only a small 
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number of available places in shelters. In many cases unaccompanied minors 
are therefore put in protective custody (i.e. detention) until a place in a shel-
ter is available.
The same report found that children detained in police custody are not 
provided with critical care and services. Under international standards, 
unaccompanied asylum seeking children should be able to receive medi-
cal treatment, psychological counselling, and legal aid, and be interviewed 
in a language they understand in order to identify and address any specific 
needs, including those deriving from gender-based violence or trafficking. 
In Greece, such children are often unable to receive counselling, informa-
tion about the reasons for and duration of their detention, and legal aid. 
Although the provision of interpreters at asylum interviews with children is 
by no means a guarantee of effective communication (Keselman et al. 2008) 
the lack of interpreters is a significant practical barrier to providing care and 
information (for a discussion of the role and importance of interpreters, see 
Rycroft 2005; Gibb and Good 2014). Human Rights Watch interviewed 35 
children who were in police custody in Greece in mid 2016 and none of 
them said they had been given an opportunity to speak to the police with 
the help of an interpreter.
Furthermore, all unaccompanied asylum seeking children should have a 
legal guardian appointed to defend their best interests and help safeguard 
against risks like trafficking. None of the children interviewed by Human 
Rights Watch while in police custody had met their legal guardian, nor were 
they even aware they had one. Unaccompanied children in detention have 
a right to recreation and to education as well, but Human Rights Watch 
(2016: 3) found ‘no evidence that the unaccompanied children in police sta-
tions had access to educational opportunities or recreational activities’.
This raises the question of how these human rights failings have been 
allowed to come about. Although a lack of leadership and resources have 
certainly had an impact (indeed, the lack of resources for the protection 
of refugees in Greece has been a challenge for decades, see Black 1994), in 
this chapter we argue that these factors are only part of the explanation. It 
is entirely possible for formal legal rules to exist, but for ‘informal social 
control’ (Woodman 1998: 45) to impede and inhibit the operation of these 
laws. In the case of child migrants in Greece, these informal social forms 
of control include categorisations and associations that find expression in 
two phenomena: the discourse that is used to refer to migrants, which has 
shifted in Greece from one that is based on refugees to one that is based 
upon ‘clandestine’ migration, and the perceptions of Greek migrant children 
through the lenses of vulnerability and responsibility, which squeeze out 
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 opportunities to recognise their agency. The contingency of protection on 
these phenomena exemplifies both the plurality of the Greek migration legal 
system (see Gill and Good, introduction to this volume), and the challenges 
that this plurality presents to asylum seeking children.
The first part of the chapter sets out the history of human rights failings 
in the refugee context in Greece and the second section reflects upon the 
role of discourse surrounding refugees as a way of explaining why these 
failings persist. Drawing on two and a half years of participant ethnogra-
phy in a Greek reception centre for children in Konitsa Town, Prefecture of 
Ioannina, Greece and in the Skaramagas Refugee camp in Attica Region, 
Athens, the third section then identifies three basic stereotypes that shape 
the perceptions of asylum seeking children among host communities in 
Greece. First, in contrast to the recommendations of contemporary scholar-
ship about childhood (e.g. James et al. 1998) childhood is viewed as a linear, 
universal process implying that all children have the same needs. Second, 
separated children are seen as dependent burdens with no knowledge of 
their own ‘best interests’. And third, like their adult counterparts, they are 
seen as ‘undeserving migrants’ that should be viewed with suspicion. Taken 
together, these findings demonstrate that the discourses and perceptions sur-
rounding refugee children in Greece have had a decisive influence over their 
experiences of legal systems.
Chrisa took an anthropological and participatory approach to the field-
work (Hardman 1973). When conducting her research with unaccompanied 
minors she tried to approach them as active participants in the construc-
tion and determination of their experiences, other people’s lives and the 
societies in which they live (O’Kane 2008). In doing so she followed the 
advice of Christensen and James (2008: 3) who argue that we ‘should not 
take the age-based adult/child distinction for granted’ (ibid.: 3) and advo-
cate ‘that the particular methods chosen for a piece of research should be 
appropriate for the people involved in the study, for its social and cultural 
context and for the kinds of research questions that are being posed’ (ibid.: 
3). Accordingly, she always tried to address her participants as if they were 
adults, since they had managed to do something she had not—namely, they 
had irregularly crossed borders and walked many miles to get away from 
their country. For the purposes of the research she followed the methodol-
ogy of semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and open discussions. In 
order to protect their anonymity, the research participants chose their own 
pseudonyms and at times we have created fictional composite characters 
(discussed below in more detail) to convey the experiences of interviewees 
without revealing their identities.
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Greece’s Record on Refugee Protection
If the historical experience of refugees in Greece were a reliable indica-
tor then we might expect Greece to be strongly committed to refugee pro-
tection. After the end of World War One and the signing of the Lausanne 
Treaty in January 1923, the Greek state received around one and a half 
million refugees from Asia Minor and Pontus as a result of the population 
exchange with Turkey at that time.1 The newcomers were resettled mostly in 
rural areas, in an attempt by Eleytherios Venizelos (the then-Prime Minister 
of Greece) to rebuild and fortify the rural territories, which had suffered 
severe damage due to the successive wars in which Greece participated from 
the beginning of the twentieth century.
As Voutira (2003: 66) argues, the term ‘refugee’, when referring to the 
1923 refugees, is usually associated with positive connotations due to the 
collective perception of the ‘successful’ integration and publicly acknowl-
edged contribution of Asia Minor refugees into twentieth-century Greek 
economic, social and cultural development, especially in these rural areas. 
Accordingly, throughout the post-1989 arrivals of Soviet Greeks from 
Pontus, the newcomers preferred the term ‘refugee’, rather than ‘repatriee’ or 
‘returnee’.
What is more, if the international community’s assumptions about Greek 
refugee protection before 2007 were at all well-founded, then we might also 
expect Greece to be a model of refugee protection. For some time Greece 
was vaunted as a location in which the Geneva Convention, that sets the cri-
teria for the recognition of refugee status and envisages universally applicable 
criteria for their protection, was reliably observed. According to the provi-
sions of the Dublin II Regulation in 2003,2 Greece was a place to which 
individuals could be safely returned if they had prematurely entered another 
European country during the examination period of their asylum applica-
tions. In other words, the international community has historically consid-
ered Greece an (extremely convenient) safe host country on the fringes of 
1The full text of the Lausanne Treaty is available at: http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/ [Accessed 
17 July 2017]. The full text of the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish 
Populations is available at: http://www.hri.org/docs/straits/exchange.html [Accessed 17 July 2017].
2Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 estabishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
member state responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the member states by a 
third-country national; see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:050:00
01:0010:EN:PDF [Accessed 17 July 2017].
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Europe as conveyed by its status as a first asylum country under article 1A of 
the Geneva Convention (Goodwin-Gill 1996).
In contrast to these assumptions about refugee rights in Greece, however, 
serious concerns about the provisions for refugees on the ground have been 
voiced for well over a decade. Skordas and Sitaropoulos (2004) for example 
argued that the deficiencies of the Greek refugee system included its archa-
ism, the lack of efficient remedies and the inadequate social protection of 
refugees and asylum seekers. In October 2007, as a result of these and sim-
ilar concerns, an extensive investigation into violations of the human rights 
of refugees at the various entry points into the country was carried out by 
the German non-governmental organisation ‘PRO ASYL’, with the partic-
ipation of Greek organisations, and caused consternation due to the reve-
lations that it produced (PRO ASYL 2007). The report cited evidence of 
the intentional refoulement of refugees at sea by the Greek coast guard by 
circling boats in order to cause waves that forced them to return, the delib-
erate damaging of refugee dinghies so that they could return to Turkey but 
not travel as far as Greece, the systematic abuse of newly arrived refugees, 
and the use of inhumane, degrading and illegal detention, as well as illegal 
deportation orders.
Following PRO ASYL’s revelations various EU countries such as the 
UK, Germany, and Norway stopped referring asylum seekers to Greece 
(as the first country of entry according to the Dublin II procedure) while 
investigations into Greece’s provision for refugees were carried out (see 
Craig and Zwaan, this volume, for a discussion of the principle of mutual 
trust between states subject to the Dublin regulations, as well as its mod-
ification under the Dublin III legislation). These investigations, and scru-
tiny from the international community more generally, prompted various 
attempted improvements to the Greek system of provisions. In November 
2010, for example, Asylum Appeals Committees were introduced.3 
These were three-member quasi-judicial bodies, consisting of a civil serv-
ant as Chairman, a member nominated by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a member selected by the 
Ministry of Interior from a list drawn up by the National Commission on 
Human Rights (EEDA), an independent advisory body to the state. Their 
mandate was to examine the appeals on asylum applications submitted 
before the 6 June 2013 and rejected at the first instance by the Ministry 
3Precedential Decree 114/2010 in conformity with Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum stand-
ards of procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status.
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of Public Order (i.e. Greek Police officials). Furthermore, since November 
2011 the Greek Police were no longer responsible for examining asylum 
applications.4 Rather, an autonomous service within the Ministry of Citizen 
Protection now held this responsibility.5
Nevertheless, although these legislative changes aimed for a fairer and 
more independent system, the practical autonomy of the new asylum sys-
tem and the quality of the procedures should still be queried. For example, 
during 2016 the Asylum Appeals Committees that were created in 2010 
were temporarily entrusted with examining appeals of asylum seekers who 
had entered the country from 20 March 2016 onwards—that is, the date 
from which the joint EU-Turkey statement was implemented. These were 
asylum requests deemed inadmissible at first instance examination based 
on recommendations of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 
representatives. In 390 out of 393 cases the Asylum Appeals Committees 
overruled the negative decisions of the first instance, after ruling Turkey a 
‘non-safe country’. Roughly two months later however, by virtue of an 
amendment approved by parliament on the 16 June 2016, the Asylum 
Appeals Committees ceased to be responsible for these cases, the examina-
tion of which was assigned to new committees with a different composi-
tion. This change in legislation has been widely criticised by human rights 
organisations. Refugee rights lawyers believe this was a cynical political 
intervention by the government in order to protect and promote a policy 
related to the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement, since the previ-
ous Asylum Appeals Committees did not comply with the political goal of 
sending Syrians back to Turkey. The National Committee for Human Rights 
and the Secretary General for Human Rights expressed concern and oppo-
sition to the Ministry’s initiative at the time. In a public letter denouncing 
the amendment, 18 former Committee members, appointed by EEDA and 
UNHCR, warned that ‘managing legal issues by use of political priorities 
raises many questions about the future of the asylum system in Greece, the 
protection of human rights and the rule of law’ (see ECRE 2016; PRO 
ASYL 2016).
4Law 3907/2011 on the establishment of an Asylum Service and a First Reception Service (transpo-
sition into Greek legislation from Council Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and proce-
dures in Member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals and other provisions).
5For an overview of the Greek Asylum Legal Framework, main legislative acts and regulations relevant 
to asylum procedures, reception conditions and detention before and after the EU-Turkey Common 
Declaration on the 18 March 2016, see various reports from the Asylum Information Database, availa-
ble at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/Greece/overview-legal-framework [Accessed 20 
July 2017].
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From Refugees to Clandestines
It is difficult to isolate a single root cause of the inadequate approach to ref-
ugee protection in Greece but economic factors must be seriously consid-
ered. The economic downturn that began in Greece in 2009 following the 
world financial crisis of 2007–2008, and culminated in Greece becoming 
the first developed country to miss an International Monetary Fund loan 
repayment in 2015, has been accompanied by significant economic hardship 
across the country. This is evident in widespread job and income losses, as 
well as increasing levels of inequality. Through their analysis of the inequi-
table effects of austerity policies Matsaganis and Leventi demonstrate that 
‘almost one in ten people in 2012 were found to be not just in relative, but 
in extreme poverty in the sense of being unable to purchase the basic neces-
sities consistent with dignified living’ (2014: 220).
In turn, ‘the economic crisis has brought a massive realignment of the 
Greek electorate away from mainstream parties, giving rise to anti-system 
and anti-immigrant sentiments’ (Ellinas 2013: 543). Symptomatic of this 
realignment is the rise of Golden Dawn, a far-right nationalist Greek polit-
ical party, whose vote share in national elections increased from 0.29% in 
2009 to 6.97% in May 2012 and 9.39% in 2014, with its popularity among 
young voters almost double this (Ellinas 2013, 2015).
Contemporary refugees in Greece are often viewed in negative and hos-
tile terms. They are seen to represent a burden on the host country, and a 
particular source of discontent arises when refugees are perceived to have a 
better life than some of the Greeks themselves. While it is to the credit of 
the Greek news media that they apparently do not associate refugees with 
terrorists to the extent that the British press do (Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti 
2016), the perception that refugees enjoy better treatment by the state than 
Greek homeless people is a key source of political and social tension. Indeed, 
the incidence of racist attacks rose during the height of the refugee crisis in 
2015, with 273 incidents of racist violence recorded during that year (Racist 
Violence Recording Network 2015). This violence coincided with more 
attacks on human rights activists and ‘alarming’ (ibid.: 3) rates of involve-
ment of law enforcement officials in incidents of racist violence.
The well-being of the asylum seekers and refugees in Greece is challenged 
further by the replacement of the term ‘refugee’ with the term ‘lathromet-
anastis ’ (clandestine) in public discourse, mainly carried out by the media. 
This altered lexicon marks a distinction between the 1923 refugees who are 
strongly connected to the notion of national identity, and contemporary ref-
ugees. Although at the beginning of their settlement the 1923 refugees were 
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in many cases treated as foreigners and described as Turk-originating, nowa-
days they are widely perceived as Greeks who survived a tragedy, and therefore 
of the same ethnicity as the host population. Contemporary refugees however, 
are viewed as foreigners, since their national identity is other than Greek.
The use of the term clandestine therefore deprives contemporary refugees 
of a semantic link to the positively-viewed refugees of the previous century. 
In Greek society, no distinction is made between foreigners and strangers: 
all of them are considered clandestine. The lack of distinction (according to 
the collective perception of Greek society) between migrants and refugees 
derives from the fact that they are all ‘non-Greeks’. The reasons for their 
migration are not considered important enough to classify them as refugees. 
The 1922 refugees fought and fled from a national enemy, Turkey; although 
contemporary refugees have fled their enemies too, these enemies are not 
Greece’s national enemies. Therefore, the identity label of ‘refugee’ seems to 
be reserved for migrants with a suitable national origin and a suitable enemy.
Such a blunt and essentialising distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks 
serves various purposes (see Young 1986). It references a mythological his-
torical national purity, it ‘denies difference’ (ibid.: 1) by clumping together 
disparate identities, and it distances, or others, ‘outsiders’ in semantic and 
psychological terms. In turn, this distancing has physical effects. When enter-
ing Greece from the islands ‘clandestines’ are usually arrested and transferred 
to hotspots, with inferior living conditions (see Painter et al 2017; Pallister-
Wilkins 2018; Taziolli and Garelli 2018). These are usually placed on the 
borders of Greece, far away from the capital and even further from the centre 
of Europe. The choice of these spaces is not random. It serves the policy of 
non-visibility: tactically employing distance and remoteness as ways to perform 
and inscribe the categorical differences that are being imposed (Mountz 2013; 
Gill 2016). In these ways the discourse surrounding ‘clandestine’ migration 
has spatial and legal manifestations. Migration law in Greece, then, must be 
viewed as co-produced: the product not only of formal rules and categories but 
also of social and linguistic norms. Discourses pluralise legal processes by con-
stituting a set of informal norms that interact and compete with formal rules.
The Perception of Unaccompanied Minors  
in the Humanitarian Context
We now turn to the ways in which perceptions of children held by Greek 
officials have similar effects. Literature has highlighted how important it 
is to pay attention to whether refugee children are unaccompanied and/or 
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separated from their parents in particular. Berman (2001) reviewed sev-
eral studies that emerged on children and conflict following the Second 
World War and found that the importance of the family and community 
was a common theme throughout. It was shown that the separation of chil-
dren from their parents was often more distressing than the bombs them-
selves (Berman 2001: 245). Garmezy (1983) also found that how children 
responded to living under the circumstances of war was greatly mediated by 
the significant adults in their lives.
The mid twentieth century witnessed an increased interest in protect-
ing the rights of children and refugees. Several international conventions 
and agreements govern the treatment of asylum-seeking children.6 Most 
notable among these instruments are the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the 1989 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). These instruments, however, 
follow one dominant cultural conception of childhood. They imagine chil-
dren as having the same needs, regardless of their social, political, historical 
and economic context. While recognising that accompanied asylum seek-
ing children face their own difficulties (Ottosson et al. 2017) it is usually 
unaccompanied asylum-seeking children who are thought of as most needy 
and whose ‘remarkable coping capacities’ (Hopkins and Hill 2010: 407) are 
often overlooked and even impeded by systems of support.
As expressed in some legal narratives, the notion of children as non- 
agential, passive and as simple recipients of care has been critiqued from var-
ious perspectives. Chase (2010) for example, argues that producing children 
as subjects with little or no agency can provoke an unfortunate backlash: 
children withhold vital information during the processing of their claim as 
an attempt to regain or reclaim agency over their lives. Crawley (2010) is 
also critical of the passive view of children that is entrenched in the legal 
discourse around refugees and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, 
pointing to how a particular conceptualisation of childhood to be found 
in the legal approach, ‘undermines the ability of children to fully articulate 
their experiences and to secure access to the protection to which they are 
entitled’ (ibid.: 162). In other words, conceiving of children as passive and 
non-agential can be experienced by the children themselves as a lack of trust 
and respect.
6According to the UNHCR (1997: 1) unaccompanied minors are persons who are under the age of 18 
and “who are separated from both parents and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or cus-
tom, is responsible to do so”.
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We now briefly set out the field sites in more detail, and then explore 
three ways in which perceptions of children held by officials impact upon 
young people’s experiences of the legal processes that they go through.
The Field Sites
One of the field sites of the research was the reception centre in a small 
town in northwestern Greece. The space had been used since 1947, when 
Queen Frideriki established one of the so called Paidoupoleis—institutions 
that hosted children from the civil war stricken areas of Greece. In 1973 this 
Paidoupoli turned into an orphanage for Greek children. In the early 1990s 
it began hosting children from poor Albanian families as well. In 2008, 
following the need to create reception centres for separated asylum- seeking 
children, the Konitsa institution housed the first refugee children from 
Afghanistan and various African states. Chrisa visited this reception centre 
for the first time in 2009 and then spent a year visiting it on a daily basis 
while conducting field research for her Ph.D. thesis.
When she started visiting the reception centre, there were around 70 
children residing there, belonging to three categories: orphan children from 
Greek families; children from Albanian families; and asylum-seeking chil-
dren. Greek children were allowed to enroll in the Greek education system, 
or if they preferred they would attend the technical classes within the centre. 
The Albanian children were also allowed to attend the technical classes. The 
asylum-seeking children were not allowed to attend either a Greek school 
or the technical classes. The only provision for them was a daily two-hour 
class in Greek inside the centre. During discussions with them, they would 
often complain about life in the reception centre, how left aside and totally 
dependent on the decisions of the personnel they felt.
Another field site of the research is the Skaramagkas camp which started 
operating in April 2016, when a large number of asylum seekers who had 
been residing in the port of Piraeus in self-organised accommodation with 
tents were moved there by the Ministry of Migration. The space belongs 
to the Hellenic Navy and the site management is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Migration.7 The Hellenic Navy used to provide the food via a 
7From June 2017 till February 2018 the camp remained without site management, a fact that raised 
serious protection issues for all the population and in particular unaccompanied minors. As the offi-
cial registration in the site was the responsibility of the site management, many people who came to 
Skaramagkas during that period could not get registered as residents in the camp, a fact that excluded 
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catering contractor, and the Greek police are responsible for the safety of the 
camp. Beginning in June 2017, the NGO CARITAS (through UNHCR) 
provided cash cards with which the inhabitants could buy food.8 At the time 
of writing (mid 2017) there are almost 3000 people residing in the camp, 
all of them living in containers. The majority of the population is Syrian, 
followed by a minority of Iraqi Yezidis and Afghans. There are around 20 
unaccompanied minors in the camp. Skaramagkas camp has a Safe Zone for 
unaccompanied minors and a Child Friendly Space (CFS) which functions 
under the supervision of a Child Protection actor.9 In her work as a legal 
advisor Chrisa has come across various cases that reflect unaccompanied 
minors’ experiences of asylum procedures in Greece.
Since it was not possible to collect consent to use the interviewees’ direct 
testimony during Chrisa’s work as a legal advisor we employ a variety of 
measures. First, we do not quote from these interviewees at all. Second, 
we follow the methodology of composing fictions as a means of protect-
ing the identity of the people Chrisa spoke to from this site (Gough 2008: 
338–340). That is, we present fictional accounts concerning fictional char-
acters. These accounts are analogous to the accounts that Chrisa heard but 
do not correspond to single, real individuals. They are intended to be real-
istic, but not real. They are broadly based on the experience of a number 
of individuals, but are fictionalised in terms of content, sequence as well as 
the correspondence between events and the narratives that we ascribe to the 
characters we discuss. In this way we are able to convey the frustrations of 
the people Chrisa spoke to without compromising their privacy. While ‘in 
much everyday speech fiction is equated with falsehood’ (ibid.: 339) this 
approach recognizes the narrative force of fiction as a means of conveying 
certain forms of truth. If the assumption is made that academic research is 
chiefly concerned with documenting facts without distorting them, then it 
is reasonable to suppose that there is no place for fiction in academic work. 
But academic work, especially ethnographic work that seeks to convey 
8In the months that followed the cash cards were provided directly by UNHCR.
9Safe Zones and CFS can be found in many camps both in the mainland and the islands of Greece. 
However, the Safe Zones have limited places and often cannot accommodate all the unaccompanied 
minors of the camp.
them from the cash card program. Unaccompanied minors arriving at that time became invisible to the 
national response system as the actor responsible for registering them with EKKA (The National Centre 
for Social Solidarity, which is the institution responsible for placing them into shelters) was absent.
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meaning and feelings, is concerned with more than the brute transmission 
of facts. As such, ‘storying’ (Piper and Sikes 2010: 568) can be an indispen-
sable strategy towards the fulfilment of academic objectives and ‘an impor-
tant strategy for protecting vulnerable participants’ (ibid.: 573). In what 
follows then, the characters Ali, Jamal, Jafar and Fatima are fictional.
In terms of languages used, in the case of Konitsa Reception Centre 
Chrisa used the Arabic and Farsi interpreters who worked in the centre. She 
spoke directly with African minors in English. In the case of Skaramagkas 
she used the Farsi, Sorani and Arabic interpreters working for an NGO 
operating in the site.
Childhood as Linear and Universal
The first perception of children that becomes evident in the two sites is the 
view of childhood as a linear and universal process that is highly depend-
ent upon chronological age. This view has been lambasted by the new social 
studies of childhood, which emphasise that ‘the child [should be] conceived 
of as a person [and…] a social actor […] in its own right. It does not have 
to be approached from an assumed shortfall of competence, reason or signif-
icance’ (James et al. 1998: 207). Anthropologists in particular have played 
a decisive role in critiquing the ‘universalist account of childhood’ (LeVine 
2007: 250) that emerged in the last century from childhood cognitive devel-
opment theory and developmental psychology.
One of the most revealing narratives in the case of the Konitsa reception 
centre came from the personnel themselves. According to one of them:
They are kids, they don’t know what is best for them. We treat them as our 
own kids. I wouldn’t, for example, allow my child to visit friends that I don’t 
know, or have a sleepover at someone else’s house at that age. That is why we 
don’t allow them to visit their friends in Ioannina [a nearby town]. They are 
under our responsibility.
In this view of childhood there is often the underlying assumption that chil-
dren (taken to be people under 18 years of age) require protection, that they 
may not be capable of defining their ‘best interests’, and that they are less able 
to cope with violence and forced migration than their adult counterparts.
This view of childhood often backfires though, as “Ali’s” case illustrates. 
Ali is a 16-year-old unaccompanied minor from Iraq who arrived in Greece 
with three of his older, adult male relatives in early 2015. Ali spent much of 
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his early teenage years fighting for survival alongside his older relatives, and 
is a capable and agential individual. When they arrived in Chios Island, for 
example, they stayed on the streets for some days and then boarded a ship 
to Piraeus Port before travelling independently to Thessaloniki. There they 
followed a group of people who were heading towards Eidomeni (a village 
by the Greek—Macedonian Border).10 They stayed there for a number of 
months but got separated when the border closed.
Ali’s older relatives made it to Sweden but Ali was first detained for a few 
days and then sent to a shelter for unaccompanied minors in Thessaloniki 
after Eidomeni was evacuated. In this way measures that were framed as 
‘protective’ became a source of aggravation for Ali, reminiscent of Fassin’s 
(2005: 362) ‘compassionate repression’. Because he was under 18 years old 
he was entered into a slower and more cumbersome administrative process, 
setting in motion a tension between his agential capabilities and the passive 
and immobile child that he was expected to be. He left the shelter there after 
a few days and returned to Piraeus Port where around 1500 migrants and 
refugees had set up an informal settlement in two of the port’s docks. In 
Spring 2016 he was sent to Skaramagkas camp along with the majority of 
the people who had found shelter in Piraeus Port.
Later that year Ali was arrested and detained in Igoumenitsa Port, west-
ern Greece, while he was trying to board a ship to Italy. On his release Ali 
told the lawyer that he would not register again with a shelter and that he 
wanted to return to Skaramagkas camp. In other words he was once again 
refusing the ‘help’ that was provided for children. He also refused any refer-
ral to Child Protection officials who provide psychosocial support.
Eventually he reached France and has plans to leave for Sweden to join 
his older relatives.Throughout his time in Greece he insisted that he did not 
want to live in a shelter because he felt that he was treated as a child rather 
than as an adult. He did not want to be referred to Child Protection offi-
cials because they would not understand that he was capable of living on 
his own. Ali had lost his patience and did not trust the asylum procedures 
in Greece due to the huge delays in registering with the asylum service and 
the family reunification process. He never revealed his plans about leaving 
Greece irregularly to any of the adults involved in his ‘protection’, out of fear 
that they would call the public prosecutor to force him into a shelter. For 
10Eidomeni is the place where, in the summer of 2015, refugees and migrants gathered to cross the 
border to Macedonia and continue their journey towards the North of Europe. Many made it through 
until February 2016, when Macedonia closed the borders. For detailed information concerning the sit-
uation at the Greek—Macedonian borders at the time see Amnesty International (2015).
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him, all Child Protection officials did nothing to help his case and did not 
understand his anguish at being left behind by his older relatives. All he saw 
was a complicated bureaucratic system that was unsympathetic towards him, 
and adults who do nothing to help. In other words, Ali felt that he had to 
actively resist the model of childhood that was being imposed upon him by 
officials, who could not see past his numeric age. From his perspective their 
interventions were simply slowing his progress towards reunification with his 
family. Attempts to ‘help’ backfired in the sense that they not only caused 
additional frustration but also contributed to Ali’s separation from his family 
and led him to take further risks in pursuit of reunification with them.
Ali’s experience was not unusual. “Jamal”, another 16-year-old from Iraq 
in the Skaramagkas camp, tried to leave Greece in the summer of 2016 and 
was arrested by the Greek Police. He had been trying for two months. He 
had arrived with his uncle but the Asylum Service did not allow his uncle 
to be registered as Jamal’s legal guardian because of the lack of documenta-
tion proving that Jamal was really his uncle’s nephew. As a result his uncle’s 
immediate family were relocated to France, but Jamal could not follow.
Separated Children as Dependent Burdens
A second perception about asylum seeking children is that they are depend-
ent, and therefore burdensome to either their guardians or to the state. 
According to Zetter (1999: 74) this dependency discourse is a powerful tool 
used to restrict and contain refugees. Refugees tend to be viewed as:
a burden of dependency on the community. The concept of sanctuary cou-
pled with the loss of familiar economic and social support systems and indi-
vidual autonomy combine to construct a powerful image of dependency and 
the need for assistance.
The dependency discourse goes hand-in-hand with a humanitarian 
discourse. Malkki (1996) argues that the ‘burdensome’ representation 
of refugees—manifested in the work of refugee agencies, government and 
non-government organisations as well as media—has serious consequences 
for their lives. While she recognises that these representations help to raise 
funds and resources, they also silence their subjects.
[R]efugees suffer from a peculiar kind of speechlessness in the face of the 
national and international organisations under whose object of care and 
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control they are. Their accounts are disqualified almost a priori, while the 
languages of refugee relief, policy science, and ‘development’ claim the produc-
tion of authoritative narratives about refugees. (Malkki 1996: 386)
In the case of the refugee children Chrisa spoke to in Konista, the percep-
tion of children as dependent was at odds with their evident ability and 
desire to work, but at times was a self-fulfilling perception because it pro-
hibited this very activity. Farzin from Iran, for example, explained that it was 
precisely the lack of opportunity to work that kept him trapped in the recep-
tion centre for children. ‘I have walked for over a month to reach Greece. 
I can take care of myself ’, he explained,
If I had had some money I would have left this place a long time ago. It is so 
boring and it offers us nothing. I am not afraid to go to Germany alone. Some 
friends of mine made it, why not me? With the proper amount of money, a 
smuggler can take you anywhere. That is why I have to find a job immediately.
Mohamad from Senegal concurred. ‘We have requested that they allow us to 
work in the fields here in Konitsa, but they don’t permit it,’ he complained. 
‘But we need the money so we can get around by ourselves. Plus, what 
should we do all day? There is nothing here for us. We only sleep, eat and 
play football. They either treat us like very small children or they ignore us 
altogether.
The dependence discourse also acts to deny under 18s the opportunity 
to take part in supposedly ‘adult’ activities, which often reflects a western, 
conservative view of childhood. One under-18 Afghan refugee who spent 
time at the Konitsa reception centre explained that, ‘They don’t even allow 
us to help in the kitchen or suggest what we want to eat. We never chose our 
clothes, we get whatever people give us’. Another refugee, “Jafar”, a 17-year-
old from Afghanistan, travelled to Greece with his sister. She managed to 
reach the Netherlands and apply for asylum there but he was unable to fol-
low. He wanted to stay in the Skaramagas camp, even though he conceded 
that it is more dangerous than a shelter for children like the one at Konitsa. 
Despite the fact that he has had his money and mobile phone stolen in the 
camp, and that he really hates the food there, he values the fact that he can 
smoke and go out at night, while in Konitsa he is treated like a little child. 
Jafar tried to leave Greece twice on his own and succeeded the second time.
One of the most concerning consequences of the dependency discourse is 
its ability to undermine the trust of refugees in systems of protection, which 
has been recognised as an ‘essential component’ (Hynes 2009: 97) of their 
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effectiveness. “Fatima”, a 14-year-old from Syria, arrived in Greece in 2016 
with her adult brother and his family. They all applied for relocation but like 
Jamal, her brother could not be considered her legal guardian due to the 
lack of relevant documentation. Her brother, who lived in the Skaramagkas 
camp, was accepted by Germany via the relocation procedure. Thinking that 
Fatima faced the prospect of living in a shelter for unaccompanied minors in 
Greece, she and her brother made the decision for her to attempt to go back 
to Turkey on her own—a dangerous and illegal route—to try to reconnect 
with other members of her family there.
Fatima’s attempt to return to Turkey was unsuccessful: she was caught and 
arrested in the Evros region. She was detained for almost ten days before she 
was sent to a shelter for children in Athens. Her experience raises the ques-
tions of who she was fleeing from, and who she was trapped by.
Separated Children as Undeserving
Another aspect of the rhetoric concerning asylum seeker children is that 
of the undeserving migrant who manipulates the social care system of 
the hosting country.11 According to Watters (2008: 47): ‘“Asylum seek-
ers” [has become] a term in everyday discussion inextricably linked to 
imagery of cunning and manipulative foreigners securing generous material 
rewards from a hopelessly gullible government’. This perception was strongly 
in evidence among the staff at Konitsa. ‘They are not really refugees’ one of 
them told Chrisa,
They falsify their personal data to present themselves as refugees and take advan-
tage of the protection our state gives them. Some of them are not even children. 
They are clandestine. I wonder, how could their parents ever let them travel so 
far away from home? Why don’t they work, instead of sending their children to 
a foreign country to make money? I would never ask that of my son.
In her ethnography of a British detention centre, Alexandra Hall (2012) 
identifies the tendency among staff to assume that illegality is a matter of 
11This is currently the case with unaccompanied minors from Pakistan, Bangladesh and African coun-
tries. Due to the perception of the Asylum Service that the citizens from these countries fall under the 
category of the migrant rather than the refugee, their asylum claims are usually rejected. The minors are 
thus put in a “limbo” situation with regards to their residence status, since they cannot be deported as 
long as they are minor, nor enjoy a rights holders’ position.
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individual choice. In turn, this illegality, for the staff, is ‘because of their 
morally compromised and weak character rather than desperation and 
necessity’ (ibid.: 102). This produces a perception of undeservingness, 
according to which certain supposedly nefarious individuals choose to take 
from, but not to contribute towards, their host society. In this discourse, 
migrants are viewed as attempting to ‘escape work or fraudulently claim 
benefits, or to work illegally and escape paying taxes’ (ibid.: 103). The tell-
tale signs of such inauthenticity, as far as the staff at Hall’s detention centre 
were concerned, included everything from complaining about conditions 
and displaying too much emotion to food refusal.
Under conditions of such skepticism, moral condemnation on the basis of 
undeservingness is common, and is keenly felt by the residents of Konitsa. 
‘The personnel do not like us’ Mohamed from Senegal surmised. ‘They never 
have time for us, they don’t even have an interpreter in French. There is 
only one television with Greek channels. We have asked them many times 
to arrange it so we can watch some French channels as well, but nothing’. 
Rizula from Afghanistan agrees, explaining that:
The personnel don’t treat us well. They are much more giving towards the 
Albanians and the Greeks. They don’t allow us to go to the Greek school and 
they don’t allow us to attend the classes inside the centre either. When we tell 
them that we are bored here in Konitsa they never listen. There is nothing here 
but a small town and mountains.
These frustrations are exacerbated by not only insensitive media reporting, 
but also a feeling among the residents that the staff assent to such insensiti-
vity. ‘When we started visiting the local football pitch, the local newspaper 
wrote an article claiming that we suffer from infectious diseases,’ Rizula told 
Chrisa. What made the situation worse was the distinct lack of support that 
the refugee children received from the staff at Konitsa. ‘The personnel never 
supported us.’ Rizula recalled, displaying her own moral indignation at their 
inactivity.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated how ‘nonlegal forms of normative order-
ing’ (Merry 1988: 870) such as those that inhere in national discourses 
and perceptions, and that are held by legal subjects themselves, can inter-
rupt and recast formal legal structures. While international law sets out 
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a series of ways in which refugee protection is supposed to operate, the 
Greek case illustrates the importance of plural influences, beyond formal 
law itself, in the determination of legal experiences and outcomes. These 
include the influences of language, cultural history, economic conditions 
and assumptions about childhood. In other words, the case of refugee law 
is one example of how ‘other forms of regulation outside law constitute 
law’ (ibid.: 874).
In various ways, these influences do not auger well for refugee rights 
in Greece. The association of refugees with the discourse of clandestine 
migration has coincided with a marked increase in poverty, inequality and 
anti-immigration sentiment in the country. Although the lack of resources 
and its position as a first safe country of asylum under the Dublin regula-
tions should not be overlooked in explaining the lacklustre approach to refu-
gee rights in Greece (see Fili and Xythali 2017), the close ‘relations between 
the legal discourse and other social discourses’ (Teubner 1991: 1446) that 
scholars of legal pluralism identify is also a factor. The clandestine discourse 
has the effect of homogenising and othering the refugee population, which 
paves the way for the sort of exclusionary and illegal practices that PRO 
ASYL and Human Rights Watch have condemned in the country.
Nevertheless, as scholars of legal pluralism have argued, these interrup-
tions can also ‘sometimes be desirable’ (Berman 2006: 1155) when they 
result in ‘alternative ideas’ (ibid.: 1155). The majority of the minors that 
participated in the research faced great difficulties in understanding the 
reasoning behind the asylum procedures in Greece and Europe and posed 
very particular questions: “why can’t I go where I want”, “why can’t I 
chose how to live” and “why don’t states ask me what I want”? To be sure, 
these difficulties often result in negative outcomes: distrust of authori-
ties for example, risk-taking and reliance on dangerous social networks. 
By questioning these things and signaling their discontent, however, asy-
lum seeking children are also insisting on a different conceptualisation of 
childhood. For example, most of them refused to identify themselves as 
just ‘vulnerable’ as they felt it deprived them of the right to claim their 
maturity. They would accept their legal classification as vulnerable only if 
it would speed up the legal procedures that concerned them. These sorts 
of extra-legal interruptions of the logic of international refugee law could 
be productive if they cause legal practitioners to reevaluate the categories, 
assumptions and values that this body of law associates with being under 
18 years of age.
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Introduction
Current developments throughout the world and in specific regions have 
made asylum one of the key topics of today. Although Europe only hosts 
a small percentage of the millions of people who had to flee from their 
homes,1 asylum seekers and reception conditions have been in the focus of 
European mass media and societal debates. As this book perfectly illustrates, 
social researchers too have started to explore many different aspects of this 
complex phenomenon. The administration of asylum claims is one of these 
crucial topics that has become a separate field of investigation. Embedded in 
the context of the legal procedure, this contribution sets out to highlight the 
fundamental role interpreters play in enabling communication between asy-
lum claimants and representatives of the state. Most asylum hearings, often 
the key moment in an asylum procedure, could not take place without the 
work of an interpreter.
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I adopt a sociological perspective to first explore the relationship between 
public official and interpreter in asylum interviews. The basic assumption, 
based on existing literature, is that the relation is more complex than a sim-
ple contractee-contractor relation and, as a part of that, interpreters are 
often in a more powerful position than officials would want them to be. 
Meanwhile, it seems to be common understanding in the literature that 
interpreters are active agents rather than passive transmitters of utterances 
from one language into another (Rycroft 2005; Angelelli 2014). This eth-
nography hints at the complexity and contours of the power imbalance in 
asylum interviews. As a consequence, I argue that both researchers and prac-
titioners need to focus more on professionalism and ethics in community 
interpreting, especially in the context of international protection. While it is 
no doubt vital to not only talk about interpreters, but also hear their opin-
ion (as well as that of claimants), in this contribution I will focus on the per-
spective of decision-making officials.2
Since the turn of the century at the latest, there has been increasing soci-
ological interest in translation and interpreting. The development of a soci-
ology of translation, often a conceptual and theoretical endeavour, is based 
on works such as those of Pierre Bourdieu, Bruno Latour, Bernard Lahire, 
Anthony Giddens (Tipton 2008 in the context of asylum) and Niklas 
Luhmann, as the anthology edited by the Austria-based researchers Wolf and 
Fukari (2007) shows. One of the issues, which has nevertheless received too 
little attention to this date concerns professionalism and professional eth-
ics. Among the few works are those by Wadensjö (1999, 2007) and Grbić 
(2010), who address the topic of professionalism in interpreting, or by 
Rudvin (2007), who focuses particularly on professionalism and ethics in 
community interpreting. Both the sociological perspective and the issues of 
professionalism and professional ethics are at least briefly mentioned in two 
recent introductory publications in the field of translation and interpreting 
studies (TIS) (Pöchhacker 2016; Munday 2016). This chapter aims to con-
tribute to this area of research by exploring the relevance of professionalism 
and professional ethics in the context of asylum administration.
Since the asylum procedure takes place in a legal context, the perspec-
tive of legal interpreting and its particular challenges also provides valuable 
insights. Key works (Morris 1995; Colin and Morris 1996; Berk-Seligson 
2Due to the institutional perspective of this study, interviews with non-institutional actors were not 
included. Quotes from interviews with interpreters originate from earlier research (Dahlvik 2009a, b).
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2002) have identified a number of issues relevant to interpreting in this spe-
cific field, such as the controversial neutrality of the interpreter, which is 
connected to an inherent role ambiguity, or questions of power. In relation 
to professionalism and ethics, power in the interaction represents a key issue 
in this contribution, which connects to research on interpreter-provider col-
laboration and conflicts of control in the interpreter-mediated interaction 
(Hsieh 2010 in the medical context).
Interpreting in the field of asylum has increasingly become an object of 
research (Inghilleri 2007; Maryns 2013; Lee 2014), including a focus on the 
role of interpreters in this specific context (Barsky 1996; Rycroft 2005; Gibb 
and Good 2014; Good 2007). In the Austrian context, a number of studies 
have been carried out, investigating, for example, conflicting role expecta-
tions (Pöllabauer 2007), the interpreter’s key role in co-producing the inter-
view transcript (Pöchhacker and Kolb 2009), or mutual understanding and 
intercultural misunderstanding (Rienzner 2011). While such research is 
often undertaken from the perspectives of TIS, communication or linguistic 
studies, researchers are increasingly taking into account sociological aspects. 
Nevertheless, I argue that more in-depth empirical sociological research is 
necessary to investigate the interpreter-mediated asylum interview, a com-
plex communication situation characterised by an important power imbal-
ance, and its connection to interpreters’ professionalism and ethics.
This chapter adds to existing research by providing new insights from 
an institutional perspective. First, it explores public officials’ perception of 
interpreters and cooperation with them. Second, this contribution sheds 
new empirical light on interpreters’ active role and room for manoeuvre in 
doing interpreting in the asylum hearing as well as its conditions and conse-
quences. Building on this, the implications of the analysis for the practice of 
interpreting in asylum hearings with regard to professionalism are discussed.
The findings discussed in this contribution are based on an institutional 
ethnography (Smith 2006) case study of a branch of the former Austrian 
Federal Asylum Office3 (FAO). Through a short-term internship at this 
institution I was able to investigate processes that are otherwise not acces-
sible to the public. The larger study, which focused more generally on the 
social practices and processes at the FAO, was based on the ‘crystallisation’ 
(Richardson 2000) of semi-structured interviews with decision-making offi-
cials, participant observation of asylum hearings and office life, as well as 
analysis of records and other internal documents. For this study, I observed 
3Since the 1 January 2014, ‘Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum’.
136     J. Dahlvik
six asylum hearings, which usually lasted several hours; all but one of them 
took place with an interpreter. In addition to conversations during field 
research, I carried out 14 semi-structured in-depth interviews with different 
actors, among them decision-makers at different levels of the Asylum Office 
(frontline workers as well as supervisors), staff of one of the Initial Reception 
Centres as well as a judge of the (former) Asylum Court. The analysed arte-
facts include internal documents, such as work instructions or training pro-
grammes, as well as three individual records of former asylum claimants. 
Data was generated mainly between 2010 and 2012. The analysis of obser-
vations, interviews and internal documents first focused on thematic coding 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990) and subsequently followed the approach of inter-
pretive social research as outlined by Froschauer and Lueger (2009).
In the following, I provide a brief overview of the Austrian asylum sys-
tem and illustrate how interpreters are typically involved in the procedure. 
In the second section I explore officials’ perspectives on working together 
with interpreters, including the process of commissioning interpreters, 
quality considerations regarding the rendered services and officials’ use of 
interpreters’ ‘expert’ knowledge. This is followed by an analysis of interpret-
ers’ active interventions in the interaction which discusses them from the 
perspec tive of professionalism in interpreting. These interventions include 
manag ing the communication situation, taking over control of the situation, 
and undermining the official’s authority as the leader of the hearing. I con-
clude by highlighting the importance of professionalism and professional eth-
ics in dealing with power relations in such situations of what I call ‘proxy 
communication’, especially in the delicate context of international protection.
The Asylum Procedure in Austria and the 
Interpreter-Mediated Interview
An asylum application can be lodged with the police. The asylum claimant is 
then registered and brought to one of the Federal Care Facilities throughout 
Austria where she lives (at least) for the duration of the admission procedure. 
In the admission procedure, the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum 
(FOIA) assesses whether Austria or another EU member state is responsible 
for the procedure. If Austria is not responsible, the country through which 
the claimant entered the EU first is responsible for the procedure (accord-
ing to the Dublin Regulation). A claimant can lodge a complaint against the 
decision with the Federal Administrative Court, which will either  confirm 
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the decision of the FOIA or judge that Austria is responsible. If no com-
plaint is lodged or the Court does not decide differently within seven days, 
the claimant is transferred to the responsible EU country and can be taken 
into pre-deportation detention before that. If Austria is responsible, the asy-
lum claimant is assigned an accommodation in a regional facility in Austria. 
The Länder are then responsible for the basic care. After admission, the 
FOIA assesses in the substantive procedure whether the asylum claimant is 
entitled to international protection. If the person is granted asylum and is 
thereby a recognised refugee, she can stay in Austria and has almost the same 
rights as an Austrian. However, if there are no flight reasons according to 
the Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC), but the claimant will be in danger 
in her country of origin, she receives subsidiary protection. If neither flight 
reasons nor danger in the country of origin exist, the person may still be able 
to remain in Austria. Reasons can be that the person has been in Austria 
for many years already, is well integrated or has family members in Austria. 
The asylum claim is rejected if no flight reasons according to the GRC are 
found and the claimant does not have to fear a severe violation of human 
rights in the country of origin. The claimant can lodge a complaint with 
the Federal Administrative Court, and subsequently a complaint against the 
Court’s decision with the Constitutional or Higher Administrative Court. If 
no complaint is lodged with the Federal Administrative Court or the nega-
tive decision is confirmed, the claimant has to leave Austria. If she does not 
do that voluntarily she can be deported to her country of origin. A com-
plaint or revision with the Constitutional or Higher Administrative Court 
is possible but these options are non-suspensive, meaning that a deportation 
will not necessarily be postponed until they have been concluded.
Interpreters can be involved at any stage of the procedure where face-to-
face communication between asylum claimant and representatives of the 
authority is necessary, for example in the admission procedure, during legal 
counselling, or, if another interview is deemed necessary, in the complaints 
procedure at the Federal Administrative Court. This contribution focuses on 
the interview in the substantive procedure, which represents a cornerstone 
of the procedure. These interviews take place in caseworkers’ offices, where 
claimant, official and interpreter are supposed to sit in a triangle. The official 
leads the interview and types the transcript at the same time. At the end of the 
interview, which follows a specific structure, the interpreter sight-translates the 
transcript back into the original language so that the asylum claimant has the 
possibility to make corrections before verifying the completeness and correct-
ness of the transcript with her signature. The transcript is the key outcome of 
the interview and serves as a basis for future decisions. One of the  interpreters 
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explains why she likes to sit in a place where she sees the computer screen 
(a seating constellation which tends to ignore the prescribed triangle), 
‘Eventually, I’m liable for the transcript and the back translation. For many 
years I’ve been watching what the official is typing; it has become a habit.’
There are procedural rules on the involvement of interpreters as well as 
norms on the nature, extent and manner of interpretation, the exclusion 
(due to partiality) and liability of interpreters (Kadrić 2009) However, the 
concrete form of the interpreter’s role and a delimitation of her duties are not 
legally defined (Maurer-Kober 2006). The Act on expert witnesses and court 
interpreters regulates the administration of oath and registration of court 
interpreters, but not their implementing power. At court, it is legally the 
judge’s and not the interpreter’s decision, what is interpreted and what is not. 
According to Kadrić (2009), however, interpreters are usually not prevented 
from acting independently. In addition, interpreters are often understood 
as experts and assistants and thus as advisors of the court (ibid.). The study 
findings suggest a similar situation at the authority. It is, however, impor-
tant to note that in the administrative asylum procedure court- certification 
of interpreters is recommended but not legally required (Pöllabauer 2005). 
In addition, there are several languages for which no certified interpreters are 
available. Although it is possible to swear-in interpreters ‘ad hoc’ at court, 
Berk-Seligson (2002) points out that not even an oath sworn before court 
can guarantee sufficient qualification. Concerning the role of the interpreter 
in the Austrian asylum procedure, UNHCR Austria (2015) has recently 
edited a training handbook for interpreters in this context.
Discussion of Findings4
Officials’ Perspectives on Working Together 
with Interpreters
This section explores how caseworkers perceive and relate to interpreters, 
who are not members of the government institution but externally commis-
sioned. Decision-makers do not only have legal discretion; they also have 
room for manoeuvre in a broader sense, for example, regarding the choice 
of the interpreter. While officially they should commission different inter-
preters, as an official explains, the reasons for this rule are not quite clear; 
it might be regarded as a measure against coalition-building. According to 
4Parts of this chapter are based on an earlier publication (Dahlvik 2018).
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the official, however, the rule is rarely implemented since ‘that’s just diffi-
cult […] because if you work well together with one [interpreter], are satis-
fied with him, he knows how you work, I have the feeling he’s neutral, why 
should I then appoint another one?’. Considering her good and bad experi-
ences with different interpreters, it makes more sense for her to re-appoint 
an interpreter with whom she already works well together. Commissioning 
interpreters is one of the areas where officials’ individual approaches and 
strategies in dealing with asylum claims are visible.
A key issue regarding the cooperation between caseworkers and interpret-
ers that emerged from the data is the quality of interpreters’ work, which 
relates to issues of professionalism. Since court-approved interpreters exist 
only for a limited number of languages, for other languages uncertified 
interpreters need to be commissioned who may still have a university degree 
or other interpreting training. In addition, officials point out that whilst for 
some languages there is a larger pool of interpreters to choose from, for less 
common languages it is often difficult to find an ‘appropriate’ interpreter. To 
facilitate the commissioning process, there is thus an internal list of uncerti-
fied interpreters in addition to the official, publicly available list of certified 
interpreters. Again, this illustrates the coexistence and complementarity of 
formal and informal norms in the institution and is an example of legal plu-
ralism (see Gill and Good, this volume).
Quality of Work as an Aspect of Professionalism
Some officials point out that the lack of competences of untrained inter-
preters can lead to specific problems in the interpreting situation affecting 
the other participants. A caseworker explains that some interpreters are not 
more than ‘stopgap solutions which you don’t [commission] anymore’. She 
adds, however, that sometimes there are no viable alternatives to commis-
sioning problematic interpreters, ‘for some countries [that is, languages] 
there are no good interpreters, but you still have to recourse to them time 
and again’.5 Untrained interpreters are stopgap solutions esecially if they 
do not speak German properly. Officials are aware of this highly problem-
atic situation, ‘because you don’t know, does he translate it correctly? Or 
when writing the transcript: you have to turn the sentence around three 
times and then you can be sure that it’s not as the asylum claimant said it’, a 
5The quote also highlights the problem that countries of origin tend to be equated with one specific 
language, indicating a certain (deliberate) ignorance of the complexity of reality such as language varie-
ties (Angermeyer 2013; Maryns 2017).
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 caseworker explains. This translation of ‘her [the interpreter’s] German into 
my German’, as another official puts it, can obviously have profound conse-
quences. The official, Gabi, remembers a ‘catastrophic’ interview ‘with a des-
perate asylum claimant, all in tears, and an interpreter in quotation marks 
who doesn’t speak German, who can’t express herself ’. It is needless to say 
that commissioning unqualified interpreters in these crucial communication 
situations, decisive for the granting of international protection, can have 
dreadful consequences. The communication between two parties who do 
not understand each other is necessarily bound to fail when the interpreter 
does not possess the required language and interpreting skills.
The cooperation between official and interpreter is also connected to 
the relation between interpreter and asylum claimant. Officials often men-
tion that some interpreters may be biased which is regarded as problem-
atic since it deviates from the idea of the neutral interpreter.6 A potential 
bias, however, only seems to be a problem when it is oriented towards the 
claimant. In contrast, caseworkers typically tolerate or even appreciated it 
when  interpreters act as their assistants in the intevriew. In particular when 
‘former asylum claimants’, as recognised refugees, are commissioned for 
 interpreting—which is sometimes the case if no certified interpreters are 
available for a certain language—‘you don’t know on which side they are’, 
a caseworker highlights. Officials point out that interpreters sometimes also 
take sides against the claimant, which is often related to ethnic group con-
flicts (see also Scheffer 2001). In other cases, however, when asylum claim-
ants and interpreters share experience, for instance, from the same country 
of origin, officials argue that claimants hope to get support from interpret-
ers; this, they say, is reinforced when the latter have also gone through the 
procedure as claimants before. Interpreters are thus potentially also in the 
position to do advocacy. As Inghilleri (2003: 259) points out, ‘the decision 
to serve as conduit or advocate may result from interpreters’ qualifications, 
experiences or cultural understandings of the applicants or what is at stake 
for the applicants in the proceedings’. But even if officials find biased inter-
preters problematic, there are often no alternative choices.
6While the position of intepreters as neutral language transmitters can still be found in some of the lit-
erature, this role definition has been challenged for some time now in TIS (Gile 2009).
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The Interpreter as a Resource and Cooperation as a Game 
of Power
The idea that interpreters should be neutral seems to conflict with the fact that 
they sometimes take—or are brought into—the role of being officials’ work 
colleagues. Since the official is the one who commissions the interpreter—the 
claimant generally does not have a say in this decision (except regarding 
gender)—it is in her interest to find a person she is able to work with. As 
mentioned above, the official, Gabi, finds it natural to re-commission an 
interpreter if they ‘work well together’. The official describes her relation 
to an interpreter in the ideal case as a good team, that is, two persons who 
are well attuned to each other and know each other’s expectations. If an offi-
cial is satisfied with an interpreter’s work she will thus commission her again 
instead of looking for another person (the same is true for commissioned 
experts). Continuous good cooperation may, however, provoke the appear-
ance vis-à-vis an asylum claimant that official and interpreter work together 
in an alliance—and this might not only be an appearance. Consequently, 
the question of the interpreter’s neutrality or bias arises again, since the 
interpreter might be seen as or even start to act like a member of the insti-
tution, especially if she is not professionally trained. This might be the case, 
for instance, when the interpreter starts questioning the claimant without the 
official having asked a question.
The observation that officials and interpreters cooperate—to a smaller 
or larger extent—suggests that interpreters do more than ‘just’ translate, as 
previous studies have also shown (Angelelli 2004; Llewellyn-Jones and Lee 
2014). While one of the caseworkers first holds that interpreters ‘are there to 
translate and do nothing else’, he then admits that this does not correspond 
to reality by adding that ‘for countries [of origin] where [he is] not really 
sure’ he will also consult the interpreter for expertise. The official explains 
that he sometimes uses the interpreter’s knowledge in order to verify the 
information provided by the claimant (see also Kadrić 2009). Although offi-
cials cannot know how up-to-date or valid an interpreter’s knowledge is, this 
kind of information can feed into decisions on asylum claims. The fact that 
interpreters often also possess expert knowledge additionally makes them a 
valuable resource and partner for cooperation. In the asylum procedure, in 
order to decide upon an application, officials mostly depend on information 
from ‘outside’ the institution (such as independent expert opinions), and 
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interpreters represent one such source.7 Many interpreters who grew up or 
spent a long time in the country in question are hence regarded as knowl-
edgeable concerning the local circumstances. ‘Because some things you 
don’t think of as an official because you’re not from that cultural area […]; 
sometimes there have been really good ideas or hints, which I’d never have 
thought of. I just think in a Western way and how it is here’, the official 
Sabine explains. Due to their specific backgrounds interpreters can some-
times provide officials not only with additional knowledge but also with new 
perspectives, pointing out differences to life in Europe, as illustrated in the 
passage from an observed interview.
Official: Street names? House numbers? Do they exist there?
Interpreter: They don’t exist.
Although officials depend on the interpreter for communicating with 
the asylum claimant, they are eager to manipulate the power balance to 
their benefit by trying to keep control of the situation. Officials can decide 
whether to ask an interpreter for advice but they also have the power to 
decide how to proceed with the information provided. Even if the official 
has recourse to the interpreter’s knowledge, Veronika highlights that ‘the 
decision is eventually mine’. On the other hand, the interpreter has the 
power to decide which information to give the official and which to with-
hold. An official remembers an interview situation where the claimants’ chil-
dren started to cry and the interpreter told him afterwards that the mother 
had told the children to cry. Hence, in some aspects the interpreter is always 
one step ahead, which puts her in a powerful position in relation to the offi-
cial. This will become even more obvious in the following analysis of situa-
tions in interpreted asylum hearings.
Active Interventions in the Interaction
In line with existing research, the findings show that interpreters do not 
‘only’ translate what other interaction participants say but often act in a 
proactive way. According to Wadensjö (1999), the interpreter’s active par-
ticipation is ‘part and parcel of all interpreting’. The author thus also regards 
coordination as one of the interpreter’s tasks, this includes both ‘implicitly 
7An official explained that some interpreters are even commissioned as experts to produce reports on 
specific topics.
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co-ordinating or gatekeeping contributions’ and ‘explicitly co-ordinating 
contributions’ (ibid.). Similarly, Turner and Brown (2001) argue that man-
aging and negotiating the communication situation is one of the inter-
preter’s responsibilities. In her analysis of court interpreters’ behaviour, 
Berk-Seligson (2002) identifies different kinds of active intervention such as 
interrupting, explaining, silencing and ‘controlling the flow of testimony’. 
Similar actions could also be observed in the present study; in this section 
they are analysed in the light of professional behaviour.
The statement of one of the trained interpreters highlights their room for 
manoeuvre regarding active interventions in the interaction as well as the 
unequal power balance among the actors:
If something seems contradictory to me […] then I ask [the claimant] what he 
means. Although that’s also bad; actually the official should do that. When I 
think, ‘that’s impossible‚’ for instance, when [the claimant] mentions three dif-
ferent birth dates, then I make a comment to the official. Otherwise he might 
think that my translation is wrong […]. Sometimes, I have to ask a spontane-
ous question of understanding [to the claimant]; then I explain that [to the 
official …]. Often when there are longer passages … it can be difficult to bring 
the translation to an end because the official says, ‘we know that already’ […] 
Then I have little chance to complete the interpretation. But I rarely tell the 
asylum seeker that I haven’t interpreted everything. That’s a bad situation.
The quote illustrates different ways the interpreter can manage the com-
munication situation, and that, in this case, they tend to be to the disad-
vantage of the asylum claimant. The interpreter feels that she has to justify 
her—seemingly inappropriate—behaviour in front of the official, but not 
vis-à-vis the claimant. At the same time, she knows and acknowledges that 
her action does not correspond with professional ethics, mentioning twice 
that the situation is ‘bad.’ She seems to find herself in a dilemma since she 
knows what would officially be the right thing to do but feels the urge to act 
differently. Professionalism and professional ethics immediately come into 
play and it seems difficult for the interpreter to make them compatible with 
the pressures of a real-life interpreting situation.
In a similar vein, the following scenes from observed asylum hearings 
show how the interpreter actively structures the interaction and thus—
at least for a moment—takes control of the situation. In these situations, 
often a conversation between interpreter and official takes place while the 
claimant is left out of the conversation or talked about in the third person. 
I will discuss three key aspects: first, situations in which the interpreter’s aim 
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is to manage and clarify the communication situation; second, situations in 
which the interpreter tries to take over control of the communication situa-
tion; and third, situations in which it is questionable whether the interpreter 
takes her job seriously. While the first section includes situations where the 
interpreter demonstrates professional behaviour, the other two sections high-
light problematic situations, where the interpreter acts in an unprofessional 
way. The analysis suggests that the interpreter’s problem awareness and reflex-
ivity about her own role and action—that is professional ethics—represent 
key issues that need to be tackled.
Professional Attitudes: Managing the Communication Situation
In some situations, the interpreter feels that she needs to clarify the com-
munication situation because something is unclear, misunderstood or simply 
wrong. In one situation, for instance, the interpreter feels the urge to untan-
gle the communication and prevent any misunderstanding. In the following 
example from an observed hearing, the interpreter is unable to follow the 
asylum claimant and keeps asking the claimant for clarification. This is what 
happens next:
Interpreter to claimant: I don’t know the story, so tell me the way that  
I understand it.
Interpreter to official: I can only translate something when I understand him; 
otherwise you’ll be confused too.
Official: Please just translate anyway.
Interpreter: Okay, I’ll tell you what he says, but it won’t make any sense.
(interview 3)
Since the interpreter does not understand what the claimant is trying to 
say he asks him to explain it in a way that he will be able to understand what 
he means. In the same moment, the interpreter explains to the official why 
he just made an intervention and what the content of this intervention was 
in order to justify his unexpected behaviour. Aiming at preventing a misun-
derstanding, the interpreter takes the initiative to ask the claimant for clarifi-
cation. The official, however, does not approve of this intervention and asks 
him to translate what the asylum claimant says without any further clarifica-
tions. He obviously does not want to lose control of the situation and wants 
to be able to judge the claimant’s assertion himself without being patronised 
by the interpreter. The interpreter accepts the official’s attempt to re-establish 
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the formal power relation but warns him that the translation will not make 
much sense. In order to save his face, he thereby makes sure that the offi-
cial knows that it is not his translation which is confusing but the claimant’s 
assertion. The fact that he warns the official that misunderstandings might 
arise can also be interpreted as a measure to ensure his professionalism.
The following passage illustrates a situation in which the interpreter reacts 
to an odd, unexpected situation. While the interpreter is retranslating the 
interview transcript the claimant normally has the possibility to announce 
mistakes in the transcript, for example, when she said something different 
in the interview than what now appears in the transcript. In the current 
context, however, the claimant seems to fall asleep while the interpreter is 
back-translating the transcript:
Interpreter to official: She [the claimant] is sleeping. Do you want me to 
 continue to read?
The official does not react to his question.
Interpreter to claimant: Do you hear?
Claimant: Yes.
(interview 2)
Since the claimant’s eyes are closed, the interpreter regards her service as 
unnecessary and asks the official whether she wants her to continue with 
the retranslation although the claimant seems not to be listening. But the 
official does not react; presumably because she does not listen and does not 
expect to be addressed in this moment. Since the official does not seem to 
care whether the claimant pays attention to the translation in order to verify 
the transcript’s correctness, the interpreter takes the initiative and asks the 
claimant herself whether she is listening. When the claimant affirms that 
she is listening to the interpreter, the situation is clear and the interpreter 
continues with the back-translation.
Unprofessional Attitudes: Over-Cooperating with the Official
While sometimes interpreters need to manage a communication situation in 
order to establish clarity and prevent misunderstandings, in other observed 
interview situations the interpreter behaves like an assistant official; this is 
a well-known phenomenon (Donk 2016[1994]; Scheffer 2001; Pöllabauer 
2005). The following scenes are examples of situations in which the interpreter 
seizes the power of definition concerning the course of the interview:
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The claimant says something.
Interpreter to official: That’s completely off-topic. (o.i. 6)
***
The claimant tells something.
Interpreter to official: She now continues to talk about her sisters. Do you 
want to…?
Official: How does it relate to the departure?
(interview 7, same interpreter)
In these two situations the interpreter does not translate what the claim-
ant says but instead makes a comment to the official. Due to his experience 
regarding asylum hearings the interpreter claims to know what is relevant 
for the procedure and what is not. Instead of leaving the judgement to the 
official the interpreter judges himself that what the claimant says is not rele-
vant. The interpreter does not translate the claimant’s statement but presents 
his own conclusion, namely that the statement is off-topic. Only then, after 
his comment, he leaves it open to the official to decide whether she wants to 
hear the translation or not. In the second situation, the interpreter provides 
a summary instead of a translation, again taking over control of the com-
munication. Before directly translating what the claimant says, he asks the 
official if she wants to know what the claimant is saying. The official, instead 
of listening to the translation, asks another question. The same is true for the 
following scene, where the interpreter again provides a summary instead of a 
translation:
Interpreter to official: He’s now talking about the flight reason.
Official: No, I just want to know what’s with the house.
[…]
Interpreter to official: Now he’s repeating himself.
(interview 4)
The interpreter makes a comment to the official, assuming that what the 
claimant said is not what the official wanted to know. Instead of translat-
ing what the claimant said, the interpreter anticipates the official’s reaction 
because he knows what he is expecting. The official confirms the interpreter’s 
premonition by dismissing the translation and repeating the intention of his 
previous question. Also in the second observed instance the interpreter does 
7 Why Handling Power Responsibly Matters: The Active …     147
not translate but provides a summary to the official. The interpreter refuses 
to translate what the claimant said because he has already translated it before 
since the claimant is allegedly repeating herself. Another scene focuses on a 
situation where the interpreter comments on the claimant’s assertion and his 
in/credibility. During the interview the asylum claimant shows a big wound 
on the arm, explaining that a man bit her:
Official: Why do you think he [the perpetrator] bit you?
Claimant (Interpreter): Because I cried and maybe people heard it.
Interpreter to official: If someone bites me I’ll cry even more.
(interview 1)
At this point the interpreter does not only translate the claimant’s state-
ment but subsequently adds his own opinion on this statement, instead of 
leaving the judgement to the official. The interpreter calls the claimant’s 
credibility into question, assuming that what she said is not true. In addi-
tion, his judgement originates from a comparison with his own potential 
behaviour, thus measuring the claimant’s assertion by his personal standards. 
In this case the interpreter does not provide specific expert knowledge to the 
official as discussed before but a personal opinion. Even if the official decides 
to ignore the interpreter’s comment such interfering behaviour does not 
convey professionalism and strongly questions his alleged neutrality.
Unprofessional Attitudes: Not Taking the Job and the Asylum 
Claimant Seriously
The third aspect to discuss in the context of interpreters’ practices relates to 
their general attitude and behaviour in doing their job, which can be under-
stood as key elements of professionalism. For instance, an interpreter who 
demands that the claimant be interviewed without her children because she 
cannot concentrate otherwise (o.i. 7) shows that there are certain precon-
ditions for her to be able to work properly. In contrast, there are interpret-
ers who seem not to take their job seriously by not acting adequately for 
the context of an asylum interview. In the following scene, for example, the 
interpreter behaves in a disrespectful way towards the asylum claimant:
The interpreter is leaning backwards with stretched legs. The claimant 
keeps leaning forward when the interpreter translates what the official says.
During the interview the interpreter’s mobile phone rings; he picks it up.
The official excuses the interpreter in front of the claimants.
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Interpreter: It was only concerning my car.
Official: Can we continue?
The interpreter agrees by humming (‘mhm’).
[…]
Official: How far is it to the Indian border?
Interpreter: Not so far.
Official: Ask the asylum claimant please!
[…]
Official: Where are you living? Basic care, right, a guesthouse.
Interpreter: He says, he’s living completely privately now.
Official: I’ll check what’s registered in the computer.
The interpreter does not interpret the official’s comment.
Official to interpreter: Would you be so kind to tell it to him? (o.i. 5)
On the one hand, the interpreter shows disinterest through his body lan-
guage, leaning backwards with stretched legs. In order to understand the 
interpreter, the asylum claimant seemingly has to lean forward as he does 
so every time the interpreter translates what the official says. On the other 
hand, the interpreter also behaves impolitely und disrespectfully when he 
picks up his mobile phone and starts talking during the interview. Without 
hesitation and without a comment to the asylum claimant or the official he 
interrupts the interview. Instead, the official, who seems to be embarrassed 
by the interpreter’s behaviour, excuses the interpreter in front of the claim-
ant. The official, however, does not sanction the interpreter’s behaviour, 
for instance, by reprimanding him and reminding him of the official set-
ting. After the interpreter finished his call and explained that it was noth-
ing important, the official asks him whether they can now carry on with 
the interview.8 In the course of the interview, the interpreter continues to 
disregard the claimant by not translating certain statements. At one point, 
he seems to believe that the official addresses him with a question, which is 
actually aimed at the claimant. Since the interpreter answers the question in 
8The official is generally rather reluctant to criticise the interpreter’s unprofessional behaviour in this 
interview, possibly to save the interpreter’s face in front of me, the observer. Another explanation for 
why the interpreter is so powerful here could be that there are few alternative interpreters available for 
the required language, or other unknown dependencies.
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lieu of asking the claimant, the official requests the interpreter to translate 
his question for the claimant. At a later point, this situation is repeated since 
the interpreter does not find it necessary to translate the official’s comment 
for the claimant, but the official does, prompting the interpreter to translate 
his comment. The interpreter obviously did not deem it necessary to inform 
the asylum claimant of the official’s intention. If the official were not so per-
sistent in this communication situation (maybe due to my presence), the 
claimant would not have a serious chance to participate in this interaction. 
In sum, this interview is far away from a fair communication situation with 
equal participants.
Conclusion: Learning to Handle Power 
Responsibly
The empirical data discussed in this chapter illustrate that interpreters 
do more than ‘just translate’: while in some cases they provide the official 
with ‘expert’ knowledge, in other situations they influence or manipulate 
the communication between asylum claimants and officials. This influence 
can be in favour of the official or the interpreter themselves; but interpret-
ers sometimes also actively try to help the claimant (Gill et al. 2016). The 
analysis reveals that instead of being neutral mediators, interpreters influence 
the interaction and thus the development of the further asylum procedure; if 
interpreters act unprofessionally, this can be to the detriment of a fair proce-
dure. Professional action can be drawing the officials’ attention to important 
issues, such as real and potential misunderstandings or mistakes in the tran-
script, or explaining their own behaviour to the official in order to prevent 
misunderstandings. In contrast, problematic and unprofessional behaviour 
can be summarising instead of translating, making judgements in lieu of 
the official or commenting on a claimant’s account’s credibility. Interpreters’ 
work attitude, which is sometimes expressed through disrespectful, disin-
terested or lazy behaviour, such as deciding on the relevance of a statement 
by not translating it or not even listening to claimants’ assertions, can have 
important consequences. In sum, this ethnography highlighted the dynam-
ics of power in a situation of distinct power asymmetry. While interpreters’ 
actions and decisions are influenced by different (social, professional, institu-
tional) norms, they dispose of significant room for manoeuvre in the social 
interaction of asylum hearings, which calls for responsible agency and han-
dling of power (see also Gibbels and Schmitz 2015).
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Professionalism and professional ethics influence how interpreters per-
form their role and thus also how they handle power. This in turn affects 
their relation to officials and asylum claimants. Professionalism and pro-
fessional ethics promote consciousness and reflexivity of the interpreter’s 
own role. A professional role performance does not imply passive neutral-
ity, it means conscious and reflexive—that is professional—active interven-
tion. Although many authors have already insisted on the impossibility of 
the interpreter’s neutrality (Rycroft 2005), the question continues to be 
discussed: Do neutrality and professionalism presuppose or complement or 
exclude each other? Gill et al. (2016) point out that ‘interpreters who do 
not carry out the role of neutral facilitators of communication may not only 
confuse appellants as to their capabilities, but also lose their professional 
credibility in the eyes of other actors’. It is, however, still unclear what this 
neutrality is. I would argue that the same could happen if they try to pro-
vide a ‘verbatim’ translation—a requirement that seems to be a widespread 
legal fiction (Good 2011)—or do not take sides when it would be ethically 
necessary. In my view, a complete translation that contains all details is more 
important and can be more useful than a verbatim translation, which the 
official might not understand. Professional ethics should help to make the 
right decisions in order to reach a complete translation. For example, as 
mentioned in the first section, is it more professional to stick to the rule of 
sitting in a triangle or to make sure that the official produces a correct tran-
script? Ideally, a situation should be created where both are possible.
With this contribution I reiterate that neutrality is not generally 
desirable—setting aside the question whether it is principally possible 
or not—by bringing forth two points. First, neutrality is sometimes 
understood in the sense of impartiality; the question of taking sides is pri-
marily a political one. Here, professional ethics should provide orientation 
for interpreters. If an asylum claimant is treated unfairly, it can be unethical 
not to take sides. Second, if neutrality means being someone else’s (passive) 
mouthpiece—usually in the sense of verbatim translation—such action can 
be unprofessional and unethical. Professionalism and professional ethics may 
require the right intervention at the right time: Sometimes it would simply 
be unprofessional or unethical for an interpreter not to intervene.9
In sum, the importance of ‘well qualified, experienced and profession-
ally ethical interpreters provided with appropriate working conditions’ (Gill 
9Rycroft (2005), for example, discusses the frustrations an interpreter may face due to the limitations 
placed on her behavior. If she knows that a misunderstanding may be occurring but is officially pre-
vented from clarifying this because of the rules of conduct she is required to observe, this in my view, is 
not the right understanding of professional and ethical action.
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et al. 2016) cannot be stressed enough. A professional approach to dealing 
with power, which is related to professional ethics, is necessary in order to 
prevent situations such as in the examples discussed above. While the issue 
of professionalism is also pressing in other domains of community inter-
preting such as communication between physicians and patients, the asy-
lum procedure puts claimants in a particularly vulnerable situation. As basic 
human rights are at play, it is essential that interpreters can deal with their 
power in a competent and responsible way. Although it was not possible to 
systematically collect data on the education or qualifications of the inter-
preters who interpreted in the observed hearings, the analysis clearly reveals 
elements of unprofessional behaviour. The findings discussed in this chapter 
suggest that it is highly problematic to employ interpreters without profes-
sional training in asylum hearings.
It is likely that such behaviour is connected to the lack of professional 
training and might be preventable otherwise. In Austria, the introduction 
of a voluntary qualification measure for interpreting in the asylum proce-
dure (QUADA) provided by adult education centres in cooperation with 
UNHCR, introduced in 2015, is a first important step in the right direc-
tion.10 The curriculum includes, among others, classes on the basics of inter-
preting as well as its techniques and ethical principles. As the importance of 
professionalism in interpreting, which includes knowledge of the techniques 
and ethics of interpreting, cannot be underestimated, especially in the delicate 
context of asylum applications, I would argue that such training should be 
compulsory and paid for by the state who is legally responsible for providing 
a fair hearing. Asylum claimants have a right to a professional interpretation.
The often observed fact that power plays such a crucial role in the inter-
preted asylum hearing calls for more attention by scholars and practitioners, 
especially with regard to professionalism and professional ethics.
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Introduction
25 years ago, Michael Burawoy stated in the introduction to a collection 
of ethnographic studies conducted in the San Francisco Bay Area that the 
book’s aim was ‘to unchain ethnography from its confinement as a quaint 
technique at the margins of social science’ (Burawoy 1991: 3). Since then, 
ethnographic research has moved to occupy if not centre-stage then at least a 
prominent place in many academic disciplines and fields of inquiry (Davies 
2008: ix). Contemporary research on asylum determination in Europe, as 
Nick Gill and Anthony Good note in their introductory chapter to the pres-
ent volume, frequently adopts an ethnographic approach. This is certainly 
the case for research on asylum processes in France, where an ethnographic 
perspective has recently been brought to bear on, among other subjects, 
reception centres for asylum applicants (Kobelinsky 2010), refugee-support 
organisations (d’Halluin-Mabillot 2012), decision-making at the French 
National Court of Asylum (Kobelinsky 2014, and this volume) and the role 
of interpreters (Gibb and Good 2014).
Against this background, I draw in the present chapter on material from 
an ethnographic study of the asylum process in France in order to explore 
the following questions: What can ethnographic research contribute to 
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knowledge and understanding of the kinds of communication that take 
place at successive stages of the refugee status determination process in 
France? What light can it throw, more specifically, on the relationship 
between forms of communicative practice and the different contexts or 
spaces in which interaction between those involved occurs? Finally, what are 
some of the difficulties associated with adopting an ethnographic approach 
to investigate asylum processes and how can researchers attempt to address 
these?
In a classic ethnographic study of an English Crown Court, Paul Rock 
(1993: 6–7) emphasised that space and time were key factors influencing 
the behaviour and experiences of prosecution witnesses. Similarly, a central 
concern of this chapter will be to explore how communication and inter-
action between different participants in the French asylum process are 
shaped in part by specific features of the built environment in which they 
take place. After providing a brief overview of the refugee status determi-
nation process in France (as it operated in 2008–2009, when I carried out 
most of my research), I will examine in turn forms of communication in 
‘admissibility interviews’, asylum interviews and appeals hearings, and offices 
and corridors. In so doing, my aim is to show that one of the advantages 
of adopting an ethnographic approach when conducting research on admin-
istrative and legal asylum determination procedures is that it throws light 
on the wide range of different types of communication and interaction that 
occur within them. Determining the specific impact of each of these on the 
decision-making process is not a straightforward matter, but I will suggest 
that describing and analysing them can deepen our understanding of the dif-
ferent contexts in which those involved in the asylum process communicate 
and interact with each other. The chapter is based on ethnographic research 
I completed in the Paris region between 2007 and 2009 as part of a compar-
ative study of asylum procedures in the UK and France conducted in collab-
oration with Anthony Good.
Ethnography, Communicative Practice 
and Contexts of Interaction
The perspective on refugee status determination procedures in France 
adopted in this chapter is informed by particular understandings of ethnog-
raphy, communication and interaction, and it is necessary to make these 
explicit at the outset. This is especially important for the term ‘ethnography’, 
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since it is used in a wide variety of ways in contemporary scholarship, 
sometimes as little more than ‘a legitimising label’ (Davies 2008: ix) 
for work that departs significantly from how ethnographic research has 
traditionally been conceived within disciplines such as social anthropology 
and sociology. In this chapter, I follow Paul Willis and Mats Trondman in 
viewing ethnography as:
a family of methods involving direct and sustained social contact with agents, 
and of richly writing up the encounter, respecting, recording, representing  
at least partly in its own terms, the irreducibility of human experience. 
Ethnography is the disciplined and deliberate witness-cum-recording of 
human events. (Willis and Trondman 2000: 5, italics in original)
This definition draws attention to two specific points that I discuss further 
in later sections. The first is that ethnographic research involves using a 
number of different methods; in other words, ethnography is not ‘a method’ 
or a synonym for ‘participant observation’, even if it is often presented in 
this way (e.g. Flood 2005: 33, 43 and 46). The second is that ethnogra-
phy refers not only to a set of research techniques but also to the ‘eventual 
written product’, one that characteristically attempts to provide a detailed 
description and fine-grained analysis of the activities studied (Davies 2008: 
4–5). Each of these two dimensions of ethnography poses its own chal-
lenges. For if, as John Flood (2005: 34) has suggested, ‘the core of ethnogra-
phy is to be alert and attentive to everything around you not just particular 
segments of theoretical reality’, how can this be achieved in practice through 
specific research methods, and be adequately reflected in the subsequent 
written account? I return to this question in each of the three sections of the 
chapter where I introduce material from my fieldwork in France.
The present chapter and the others in this section of the book are cen-
trally concerned with the issue of communication during the asylum deter-
mination process, and communication, like ethnography, is a term that 
can be used in different ways. In what follows the focus is on communica-
tive practices, based on a view of communication as ‘situated action’ and of 
meaning as ‘an active process of here-and-now projection and inferencing, 
ranging across all kinds of percept, sign, and knowledge’ (Blommaert and 
Rampton 2016: 27). This approach is informed by a number of important 
advances in the study of communication within linguistic anthropology and 
social/cultural theory, which, in my view, point to specific ways of develop-
ing ethnographic research on communicative practices in the asylum pro-
cess. Drawing on Jan Blommaert and Ben Rampton’s (2016: 26–33) useful 
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review of linguistic-anthropological and other research on communication, 
I would like therefore to highlight here four key ideas that have guided the 
analysis presented later in the chapter. The first is that meaning is not com-
municated solely through language, but is instead ‘multimodal’: ‘People 
apprehend meaning in gestures, postures, faces, bodies, movements, physical 
arrangements and the material environment, and in different combinations 
these constitute contexts shaping the way in which utterances are pro-
duced and understood’ (2016: 27). The second is that ‘non-shared knowl-
edge’ and ‘inequalities in communicative resources’ can be ‘systematically 
patterned in relations of power’ (2016: 28–29, italics omitted). The third 
is what Blommaert and Rampton refer to as ‘metapragmatic reflexivity’, 
that is, the ways in which people reflect on their own and others’ commu-
nicative practices (2016: 31–32). The final insight relates to the value of ‘a 
multi-sited description of communications beyond, before and after specific 
events’, through attending to processes of entextualisation, transposition and 
recontextualisation (2016: 32–33). These four ideas underpin the analysis of 
communicative practices in the French asylum process presented later in the 
chapter.
As has just been noted, communicative practices are influenced in part 
by the contexts in which they take place. In this chapter, I am interested, 
specifically, in exploring how different ‘contexts of interaction’ affect com-
munication between those involved in refugee status determination proce-
dures in France. The focus then is on social interaction, understood as ‘that 
which uniquely transpires in social situations, that is, environments in which 
two or more individuals are physically in one another’s response presence’ 
(Goffman 1983: 2). At successive stages of the asylum process different sets 
of individuals interact, and I examine how the number of people present 
and the roles they play shape the nature of the communicative practices that 
occur and also how those concerned experience them. However, I also use 
the phrase “contexts of interaction” to refer to the different physical settings 
or locations in which individuals interact. Most obviously, these include the 
booths where asylum interviews are conducted and the courtrooms where 
appeals against negative decisions are heard, but I also examine the impor-
tance of communicative practices in two other kinds of space: staff offices 
and corridors. In so doing, my aim is to provide the kind of multi-sited 
description of forms of communication referred to above, one that is able 
to trace connections between what happens in different settings as opposed 
to viewing each in isolation from the others. The phrase “contexts of inter-
action” is also intended, finally, to direct attention to the possible impact 
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of features of the built environment—for example, the size and layout of 
rooms—on communicative practices in the asylum process.
This chapter is based on ethnographic research conducted in the Paris 
region between 2007 and 2009. It focused on the working practices of 
state officials, judges, interpreters, lawyers and members of refugee- support 
organisations (rather than on the experiences of asylum applicants 
themselves), and involved observation and semi-structured interviews (in 
French) in three different fieldsites, as well as documentary research. Firstly, 
I observed asylum interviews conducted by case-workers from the French 
Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People (Office français 
de protection des réfugiés et apatrides/OFPRA), and I also interviewed 
case-workers (officiers de protection ), heads of unit and interpreters who 
worked at the OFPRA. Secondly, I interviewed judges, rapporteurs and heads 
of unit at the French National Court of Asylum (Cour nationale du droit 
d’asile/CNDA), where I also attended asylum appeal hearings; in addition, 
I observed preparatory meetings between barristers (avocats ) and their 
clients. Thirdly, I carried out participant observation research in a drop-in 
centre for asylum applicants run by a refugee-support organisation. The 
chapter presents and analyses material from the first two of these fieldsites. 
After providing an overview of the asylum process in France as this existed 
during the central period of my fieldwork (2008–2009), I focus in turn on 
communicative practices in the following contexts: ‘admissibility interviews’ 
at the border; asylum interviews and appeal hearings; and staff offices and 
corridors. In each case, I preface my discussion by briefly considering the 
methodological issues that arose when researching the particular ‘context of 
interaction’ in question.
Determining Refugee Status in France
In France, the authority responsible for taking the first decision on an asy-
lum application is the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and 
Stateless People (OFPRA). Created in 1952, the OFPRA is a public insti-
tution with legal personality and financial and administrative autonomy 
(CESEDA 2009: L.721-1). Its head office is located in Fontenay-sous-Bois, 
which is 11-kilometres to the east of Paris. Appeals against negative deci-
sions by the OFPRA are examined by an administrative court, the French 
National Court of Asylum (CNDA) (CESEDA 2009: L.731-1), which 
is also situated near Paris, in the town Montreuil. In 2008, when most of 
the fieldwork on which this chapter is based was conducted, the OFPRA 
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registered 42,999 applications for asylum (OFPRA 2009: 10), and the 
CNDA 21,636 appeals (CNDA 2009: 7). The following overview of key 
elements of the asylum procedure in France, as this operated during the 
main period of the research (2008–2009), focuses on ‘admissibility inter-
views’ and asylum interviews conducted by OFPRA case-workers, and on 
asylum appeal hearings at the CNDA.
In 2008, 5100 people arriving in France at an airport or port applied for 
admission to French territory on asylum grounds (OFPRA 2009: 26). There 
is a specific procedure under French law in relation to asylum applications 
lodged at the border. If the person does not possess a valid travel docu-
ment permitting them to enter French territory, they can be held in a ‘wait-
ing zone (zone d’attente )’ while their admission request is examined. At the 
time of my research, a case-worker from the OFPRA’s Asylum at the Border 
Division was responsible for conducting what I will refer to here as an 
‘admissibility interview’ with the applicant, in order to determine whether 
or not their application was ‘manifestly unfounded’ (CESEDA 2009: L.221-
1).1 In the case of applicants held in the waiting zone at Roissy Charles-
de-Gaulle airport outside Paris, OFPRA case-workers conducted these 
interviews face to face in offices provided by the Interior Ministry inside the 
zone, with the assistance of an interpreter (where necessary) via a telephone.2 
After the interview, the OFPRA case-worker formulated an opinion (avis ) 
on the application, which, subject to approval by the Head of the Division, 
was then communicated to the Interior Ministry. If the application was not 
considered manifestly unfounded, the person would be allowed to enter 
French territory in order to lodge an asylum application with the OFPRA in 
the same way as an in-country applicant (see below).
At the time of the research, a person on French territory seeking asylum 
had first to apply for temporary leave to remain at the Préfecture of their 
place of residence. At the Préfecture they would be given a copy of the asy-
lum application form, which had to be returned to the OFPRA within three 
weeks (OFPRA 2011: 89). After being received by the OFPRA, an asy-
lum application was assigned to a case-worker, a state employee recruited 
1While the research was taking place, a non-governmental organisation published a report, based on 
an analysis of 96 decisions, in which it argued that there was evidence of a ‘drift (dérive )’ in this type 
of interview towards a more in-depth examination of, for example, the credibility of the applicant’s 
account, making it in practice similar to an asylum interview (Anafé 2008).
2At the time of the research, admissibility interviews with applicants held in other waiting zones 
(for example, at Orly airport or in French ports) were conducted by telephone rather than face to face. 
Since then, however, these interviews have increasingly been carried out using video-conferencing 
software (see OFPRA 2015: 18; Palluel 2016: paragraph 19).
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through competitive examination to either a permanent or a temporary 
post, and who belonged to a specific branch of the civil service (fonction 
publique ). In most cases, the case-worker would subsequently interview the 
applicant, usually at the OFPRA’s head office outside Paris. Interviews there 
were held in small booths, roughly four to five square metres in size, the 
top half of which was made of clear glass (Cimade 2010: 23; OFPRA 2011: 
103–104). The case-worker and applicant would sit facing each other across 
a table, with the interpreter (where one was present)3 usually sitting at the 
side of the table, at right angles to the other two. Since 2005, each booth 
has also been equipped with a computer, which case-workers would use to 
transcribe their questions and the applicant’s answers for the ‘report (compte-
rendu )’ of the interview. Asylum interviews varied considerably in length, 
but usually lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. They tended to 
be divided into two parts: in the first, the caseworker sought to establish the 
applicant’s identity and to collect other basic personal information; in the 
second, the focus was on the applicant’s narrative and reasons for applying 
for asylum. After the interview, the caseworker would forward a proposal to 
accept or reject the application to the head of their section (or division), the 
person responsible for signing the final decision. The applicant would then 
be sent a letter informing them of the outcome of their application.
As noted above, appeals against the OFPRA’s decisions are examined 
by the National Court of Asylum (CNDA). Appellants are entitled to be 
assisted by a barrister (conseil ) and an interpreter at their appeal before the 
CNDA. Before the hearing, a CNDA rapporteur prepares a written report 
on the appeal, concluding with an opinion (avis ), based on the current state 
of the case-file, as to whether it should be accepted or rejected. In 2008–
2009, most appeals at the CNDA were heard by panels of three judges. The 
chair (président ) of each panel was a magistrate drawn from the administra-
tive, financial or civil branches of the judiciary. The other two members of 
the panel were usually not magistrates and were commonly referred to as 
the ‘HCR assessor (assesseur HCR )’ and ‘Administration assessor (assesseur de 
l’Administration )’ respectively. The former, who had to be a French national, 
was nominated by the United Nations High-Commissioner for Refugees 
with the assent of the vice-president of the Council of State, while the 
Administration assessor was nominated by one of the Ministers represented 
on OFPRA’s Governing Board. At the time of the research, both types of 
3In 2009, 76% of OFPRA interviews were conducted with the assistance of an interpreter, compared to 
46% in 2003 (OFPRA 2011: 106).
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assessor, like the vast majority of magistrates, sat at the CNDA on a part-
time basis (CESEDA 2009: L722-1).
Appeal hearings are held in large rooms at the Court, where the panel 
of judges sit behind a long table with their backs to the window. The chair 
of the panel is in the middle, flanked on either side by the ‘Administration 
assessor’ and ‘HCR assessor’ (to the chair’s right and left respectively). Two 
other tables are placed at right angles to each side of the main table, forming 
an upside-down ‘U’ shape. The rapporteur sits behind the table on the side 
nearest the ‘HCR assessor’, while the clerk is seated at the opposite table, 
on the side nearest the ‘Administration assessor’. The appellant sits in the 
middle of another table, facing the panel of judges (and therefore with his or 
her back to the rest of the room). If a barrister and/or an interpreter are pres-
ent, they sit at the same table, to the appellant’s right and left respectively. 
CNDA hearings are public (although the chair can order a closed session), 
and there are rows of seats just inside the door, where family members and 
friends, as well as appellants, barristers and interpreters waiting for their case 
to be called, can all sit.
In 2008, a panel of judges at the CNDA could hear up to 13 different 
appeals in any one morning or afternoon session. How long the hearing 
of an individual case lasts varies, depending on its complexity and a num-
ber of other factors. However, the Cimade (Comité inter-mouvements auprès 
des evacués ), a French association that provides legal advice and other 
support to asylum seekers and refugees, observed 203 cases at the CNDA 
over a three-month period in 2009 and found that the average time taken 
to hear an individual appeal—including the report, which the rapporteur 
would read out at the start, and the barrister’s statement—was 33 minutes 
(Cimade 2010: 47). At the end of the session, the room is cleared and the 
three judges discuss all the appeals that have just come before them, decid-
ing in each case whether to annul the OFPRA’s original decision (and there-
fore grant refugee status or subsidiary protection) or to reject the appellant’s 
appeal against this decision. A letter is subsequently sent to the appellant, 
informing them of the outcome of their appeal.
This overview of successive stages in the refugee status determination pro-
cedure in France, as these existed at the time of the research,4 has introduced 
4Current asylum procedures in France differ in several important respects from those described here, 
particularly in relation to OFPRA interviews. Following new legislation that came into force on the 
1st November 2015, a barrister (avocat ) or a representative of an authorised human rights organisation 
can now be present with an asylum applicant at their OFPRA interview. The applicant can also ask to 
receive a copy of the ‘transcription’ of the interview produced by the OFPRA case-worker before a deci-
sion is made on their application (although in the case of applications examined under the ‘fast-track’ 
8 Communicative Practices and Contexts …     163
three of the ‘contexts of interaction’ that form the focus of the remaining 
sections of this chapter. I begin by examining forms of communicative prac-
tice in ‘admissibility interviews’ between asylum applicants and OFPRA 
case-workers inside the waiting zone at Roissy Charles-de-Gaulle airport. 
I then describe and compare issues of communication in OFPRA interviews 
and CNDA appeal hearings, highlighting, among other points, how the 
physical setting in which they take place can affect the experience of those 
involved. Finally, I turn to consider two further places—staff offices and 
corridors—that the research showed were also contexts in which important 
kinds of communication occur during the asylum process.
Admissibility Interviews at the Border
Towards the end of my research in France, the Head of OFPRA’s Asylum 
at the Border Division kindly arranged for me to visit the ‘waiting zone’ at 
Roissy Charles-de-Gaulle airport outside Paris and observe a series of admis-
sibility interviews between case-workers and asylum applicants there. In this 
section, I focus on one of the interviews, and discuss the problems of com-
munication that arose during it, and the implications for those involved. 
Before doing so, however, it is important to draw attention to the practical 
difficulties social scientists face in such situations, where tape recording is 
impossible and an official transcript either does not exist or is not available, 
with respect to the production of a full and accurate account of the proceed-
ings. As Anthony Good (2007: 42–46) has explained, even with ‘much fran-
tic scribbling’, the researcher is unlikely to be able to note down everything 
that is said ‘verbatim’, and so must decide what to record (and not to record) 
and, crucially, whether in later writing to paraphrase the exchanges or to 
present them as ‘dialogue’. In his anthropological study of the role of expert 
evidence in the UK asylum courts, Good opted to use direct quotations, but 
nevertheless emphasised that the ‘dialogues’ he reproduced were ‘not verba-
tim transcripts, although every effort has been made to make them accu-
rate and intelligible, while not falsifying or misrepresenting the sense of 
what was said’ (2007: 46). I adopt a similar approach, in this section of the 
procedure, it may be provided together with notification of the decision). In addition, a sound record-
ing (enregistrement sonore ) of the interview is made, and the applicant can subsequently obtain access to 
this if their claim is rejected. For further information on the current procedures, see CESEDA (2017), 
OFPRA (2015) and Palluel (2016).
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chapter and the next, regarding the presentation of translated extracts from 
the hand-written notes I took in French when observing admissibility inter-
views, asylum interviews and appeal hearings in France.
When the assistance of an interpreter is required for an admissibility 
interview conducted by an OFPRA case-worker with an asylum applicant 
at the border, this is usually provided by telephone. One of the interviews 
I observed in the waiting zone at Roissy Charles-de-Gaulle airport involved 
telephone interpreting, a service for which the OFPRA had signed a con-
tract with a company. In the interview room, the case-worker and applicant 
sat opposite each other at a table, on top of which there was a conferenc-
ing phone unit incorporating a loud speaker and a microphone. When the 
applicant was brought to the interview room, the case-worker invited him 
to sit down at the table, and, after establishing that the man spoke neither 
French nor English, phoned the number of the interpreting services provider 
and was connected to an operator.
(2.30 pm)
Cas e-worker: (Introduces himself and explains why he is ringing. ) Do you have an 
interpreter available in (name of language) for an asylum application by a 
man from (name of country X)? Just one case (dossier ).
Ope rator: (There is a pause while she checks. ) In (language) of (country X), there 
is no-one available at the moment. However, there is an interpreter availa-
ble in (same name of language) from (country Y). Do you want to try?
Case-worker: OK. We’ll see how it goes.
(After a few minutes, during which time the music of the company’s telephone hold 
system is relayed through the loud speaker, the case-worker is connected to the inter-
preter. After establishing that the interpreter has worked with the OFPRA before, 
the case-worker asks him to explain the procedure to the applicant. The interpreter 
then exchanges some words with the applicant, before addressing the case-worker 
again in French. )
Interpreter (to C-W): He says to me that he doesn’t understand me.
Case-worker: He doesn’t want to continue with you?
Interpreter: No.
Case-worker: Okay. Thank you.
(The case-worker hangs up and then phones the operator again. )
(2.39 pm)
Cas e-worker: We tried using an interpreter in (language) of (country Y) for an 
asylum application, but my applicant says that he doesn’t understand. Can 
you try to find me another interpreter, in (language) of (country X).
Operator: Okay, I’ll try.
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(For the next six minutes, the case-worker and applicant wait. The latter looks 
tired and anxious, and sits with his arms crossed. Then the operator’s voice comes 
through the loud speaker again. )
Ope rator: I’m sorry, but I haven’t been able to find an interpreter in (language) 
of (country X). Do you want me to keep trying?
Case-worker: Yes, please.
(After waiting a further nine minutes, the case-worker calls the operator again. )
Case-worker: I was just phoning to see how things were coming along.
Operator: I’m still trying, but I’m not certain I’ll be able to find an interpreter.
Case-worker: Shall we give up then? What shall we do?
Operator: I’ll keep trying.
(2.58 pm)
Operator: I’ve found an interpreter! Please wait a few moments.
Case-worker: In (language) of (country X)?
Operator: I hope so.
Case-worker (to RG): I hope so too!
(3.08 pm)
(The second interpreter comes on the line, and soon the case-worker starts to 
interview the applicant, asking him in turn to confirm his name, age and other 
personal details. This proves to be quite time-consuming, due to the fluctuating 
quality of the telephone line. Several times the case-worker has either to repeat 
his own question for the interpreter or ask the latter to repeat what he has just 
said, and the applicant sits hunched over the conferencing phone unit with his 
ear close to the loud speaker in an effort to hear the interpreter better. )
(3.32 pm)
(Suddenly, the telephone connection with the interpreter breaks. The case-
worker phones the operator. )
Case-worker: I have been cut off with my interpreter.
Operator: I’ll try to reconnect you.
(After a further eight minutes of the holding system music, the operator comes on 
the line again. )
Ope rator: I’ve been unable to re-connect you with the interpreter, but I’ve 
found another interpreter in (language) of (country X).
Case-worker: Okay. Let’s go then.
(The case-worker is connected to the third interpreter, a woman, and resumes the 
interview with the applicant. There are no further ‘technical problems’ and the 
interview ends at 4.23 pm. )
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This example highlights some of the potential barriers to achieving effec-
tive communication in the asylum process. These include the challenge of 
obtaining an interpreter in the appropriate language (as Dahlvik, this vol-
ume, attests), especially at very short notice, and the problem of relying 
on telecommunications devices such as telephones to provide interpret-
ing services.5 There is also, of course, the wider issue of the likely impact 
of the context of interaction itself on the communicative practices of those 
involved, in particular the asylum applicant. As a French non- governmental 
organisation has pointed out, the fact that the admissibility interviews are 
conducted inside the waiting zone, which is a place of detention, means 
that the applicant may not necessarily perceive the OFPRA case-worker 
to be ‘neutral and independent of the border police’ (Anafé 2008: 10, my 
translation). This could result in a reluctance on the part of the applicant to 
communicate fully to the case-worker the reasons for their application to be 
admitted to French territory.
The opportunity to observe the admissibility interview discussed above 
provided me with an insight, finally, not only into some of the communi-
cation problems that can arise in such contexts but also into the immediate 
implications of these for both the applicant and the case-worker. At the end 
of the interview, which had lasted almost two hours, with several false starts 
and delays, and the involvement of three different interpreters, the applicant 
must have felt exhausted. The interview must have been tiring and frustrat-
ing for the case-worker too, and he now found himself, as he explained to 
me once the applicant had left the interview room, in the situation of having 
just over half an hour to prepare decisions on several applications before he 
was due to finish work for the day. ‘I don’t know how I’m going to manage 
it’, he said to me. An hour and a half later, when the Head of the Asylum 
at the Border Division and I left the waiting zone, the case-worker was still 
there drafting his decisions.
Asylum Interviews and Appeal Hearings
Two of the most important contexts where the issue of communication 
arises during the refugee status determination process are asylum interviews 
and appeal hearings. Many different kinds of communicative practice can 
5In the other two admissibility interviews I observed before the one discussed here, no interpreter was 
used, as the case-workers conducted them directly in Arabic and French respectively.
8 Communicative Practices and Contexts …     167
occur during these events, and the aim of the present section is to explore 
some of these. I consider in turn OFPRA asylum interviews and appeal 
hearings at the CNDA, before briefly comparing the two contexts. The dis-
cussion focuses on how features of the built environment affected the com-
municative practices and interactions that took place in the interview booths 
and hearing rooms. As noted earlier, adopting an ethnographic approach 
involves an attempt ‘to be alert and attentive to everything around you’ 
(Flood 2005: 34), and this led me, when observing asylum interviews and 
appeal hearings in France, to notice how different the physical settings were 
in which they were conducted, and then, in subsequent interviews with key 
participants, to want to investigate the implications of this further.
At the time of the research, each interview booth at OFPRA’s main office 
was equipped with a desktop computer, which the case-worker was expected 
to use to record their own questions and the applicant’s answers as the inter-
view proceeded. The fact that the entextualisation of the interview was 
carried out in this particular way—that is, in situ and by the case-worker 
responsible for conducting it—had a bearing on the nature of the interac-
tion and on the communication of meaning. As one case-worker told me, 
the sound of the computer keyboard tended to resonate in the small booth, 
and this could make it difficult to hear what the applicant or interpreter was 
saying: ‘There’s the noise of the keyboard. You hear click click click click 
click click click click, and sometimes you can’t hear anything else.’ A more 
serious issue identified by participants, however, was the potential impact of 
the presence of the computer on the multimodal communication of mean-
ing. As one interpreter commented:
There are things that you [i.e. the interpreter] can feel (ressentir ) by body 
movements or gestures, and which the case-worker will not necessarily see. 
Here too we shouldn’t delude ourselves: the case-worker is in the process of 
examining the application, and they are asked to pay attention to this sort 
of detail, but at the same time they have to write, since everything must be 
recorded in minute detail. We [i.e. interpreters] are sitting facing the applicant. 
We see their body movements, we see everything that happens, we’re aware if 
they hesitate or are in distress.
Many of the case-workers I interviewed also recognised that their having to 
transcribe the interview at the same time as conduct it could hinder effective 
communication with the asylum applicant. Two of them expressed the point 
as follows:
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We are so busy all the time typing the interviews – we have our eyes glued to 
the screen – that the relationship (échange ) with the applicant can be difficult 
to establish. We don’t look the applicant in the eye during the whole interview. 
Thus it’s very difficult to establish contact.
The drawback of the computer is that we look at the applicant less. As a result, 
you are in your bubble, and it’s happened to me that suddenly I’ve heard the 
applicant cry and I’ve said to myself, ‘Damn (mince ), what’s happened?’ I 
didn’t see it coming in fact.
What the above extracts highlight is how the adoption of a specific pro-
cedure for the entextualisation of an asylum interview, involving in this 
case a modification of the physical environment through the addition of 
a desktop computer to be used by the case-worker, affects the process of 
communication.
Appeal hearings at the CNDA take place in much larger rooms than 
the booths used for asylum interviews at the OFPRA, involve more peo-
ple and are held in public. Here too, though, communicative practices can 
be shaped by aspects of the physical setting. In several hearings I attended, 
for example, I observed at a certain point that the CNDA rapporteur 
passed a note to the HCR assessor sitting to their right. Later, during 
an interview, a rapporteur explained to me what was happening on these 
occasions:
There are certain presidents who ask the rapporteur at the end if they have a 
question to ask. It’s quite rare. It’s a personal choice […]. But it is possible for 
us to intervene. We have little, informal practices (petites pratiques ) with the 
HCR assessors, because it’s the assessor who is seated nearest to us. So, some-
times there’s a question that hasn’t yet been raised, and which, for us, is really 
decisive. We write a little note, we ask the assessor if they would mind asking 
the question. But otherwise we do not normally intervene at all.
In other words, the seating arrangements facilitated informal interaction and 
communication between the CNDA rapporteur and HCR assessor during 
the actual proceedings. I did not observe such occurrences very often and 
their significance should not be over-stated, but they are the kind of ‘detail’ 
that ethnographic research can highlight, thereby contributing to a broader 
and deeper understanding of different forms of communicative practice in 
the asylum process.
Before concluding this section, I consider briefly interpreters’ experiences 
of working in these two settings: OFPRA interview booths and CNDA 
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hearing rooms. In France, the provision of interpreters in the asylum process 
has been organised since 2003 through a system of competitive tendering 
(marchés publics ), covering both the OFPRA and the CNDA. Most of the 
interpreters I interviewed for the research had interpreted at the two insti-
tutions, and they were therefore in a position to compare them as ‘contexts 
of interaction’. They could hold contrasting views, as the following extracts 
from interviews with two different interpreters show:
The environment [at the OFPRA] is exhausting in fact. The booths are very 
small, the lighting plays a part too, the noise of the computer: all that contrib-
utes to (joue sur ) the tension. It’s similar (proche ) to a police interrogation; at 
least, you could say that the conditions are similar to that. Therefore, I think 
that it’s a lot more exhausting than in the [hearing] room.
Here [at the OFPRA] we are in a different setting. We are a bit as if we were 
en famille, in inverted commas. We are in a small booth […]. We are closer, 
both to the applicant and the case-worker. So, we are a bit more relaxed, in the 
way of working […]. Whereas at the Commission [the CNDA], the hearings 
are public. We have to deal with everything that surrounds us: the noise from 
the corridors, people who are speaking [in the rows of seats] behind, crying 
babies, the panel of judges, the rapporteurs, and the lawyer. There’s a certain 
number of actors who intervene and you have to put everything together […]. 
Several people consider that it’s easier to work at the OFPRA, because we are 
in a more relaxed setting.
What these comments highlight is the fact that individuals do not neces-
sarily experience in the same way how characteristics of a particular setting 
influence the nature of the interaction and communication processes taking 
place within it. This may seem an obvious or even banal point, but I would 
argue that it is differences such as these that an ethnographic perspective 
can reveal, thereby contributing to a more detailed description and nuanced 
analysis of the asylum process.
Offices and Corridors
Significant forms of communication and interaction between participants 
in the refugee status determination process occur not only in asylum inter-
views and appeal hearings (although these are clearly crucial events) but also 
in other contexts. In this final section, I explore some of what happened, 
during the time of my fieldwork, in two much less prominent settings: the 
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offices of OFPRA case-workers and CNDA rapporteurs, and the corridors6 
and waiting areas of the CNDA building. While I had access to the latter, 
I did not carry out observational research actually in staff offices. However, 
case-workers and rapporteurs talked to me about their offices when I inter-
viewed them. This illustrates how an ethnographic approach, involving the 
combined use of several different research methods, has the potential to gen-
erate a multi-sited description of forms of communication, the importance 
of which has been emphasised by Blommaert and Rampton (as mentioned 
above).
Many of the OFPRA case-workers and CNDA rapporteurs I interviewed 
explained to me that they were based (or had been based) in ‘open plan 
(open space )’ offices with other colleagues having the same responsibilities, 
and that this facilitated communication between them. For example, one 
case-worker told me that she discussed her files, in an anonymised way, and 
exchanged useful information she had found on the countries of origin of 
applicants, with a small group of other case-workers. She added:
What plays a role too is even the material structure itself. Obviously I talk with 
the people with whom I share my office. We are in a big office; there are four 
of us. It’s true that we discuss the files, and I know that in our office if there’s 
one of us who’s working on a file and is asking herself a question about it, she 
interrupts the other three, asks them her question, and they reflect on it. We 
all do that, in fact.
Other case-workers and rapporteurs also emphasised the importance of open 
plan or shared offices (as well as corridors and staff canteens) for the ‘socialisa-
tion’ of newly appointed staff, ‘collective work’ and the informal ‘pooling (mutu-
alisation )’ of knowledge, experience and information. This highlights that while 
case-workers and rapporteurs ultimately are individually responsible for exam-
ining particular asylum applications and preparing reports on specific appeals, 
respectively, it would be a mistake to view them as working in isolation through-
out the whole process. Both before and after their involvement in asylum inter-
views or appeal hearings, they are engaged in forms of communicative practice 
with colleagues, in offices and other spaces, and these help to shape their work.
The final ‘contexts of interaction’ I wish to consider (albeit very briefly) in 
this chapter are the corridors and waiting areas of the CNDA. I went to the 
6Social scientists working in other areas have suggested recently that greater attention should be paid to 
corridors (see, notably, Armstrong 2015). It would be interesting to investigate more thoroughly their 
role(s) as sites of interaction and communication in the asylum process.
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Court on a regular basis over a period of nine months in order to observe 
appeal hearings, and I was struck by the amount of communication and inter-
action between participants that occurred outside the actual hearing rooms. 
In the waiting areas, for examples, secretaries would check that appellants, 
interpreters and barristers were present for particular hearings, and appel-
lants sitting there would sometimes start talking to each other. Conversations 
involving judges, and sometimes also rapporteurs, interpreters and lawyers, 
would also take place in the corridors on the way to and from the coffee-ma-
chine during breaks between hearings, while barristers and their clients might 
have brief exchanges on their way to and/or from the hearing rooms.
The significance of corridors emerged particularly clearly in the interviews 
I conducted with interpreters who worked at the CNDA. Several interpret-
ers explained to me, for example, that there was a tendency for appellants to 
try to make contact with them there, or for barristers to request their assis-
tance (‘Can you give me five minutes’ help to explain two or three things 
to the appellant?’). In order to maintain their neutrality, they would there-
fore try to avoid putting themselves in that position. As one interpreter com-
mented: ‘We are obliged not to move about too much in the corridors and 
so on. We stay in the hearing room [while waiting to interpret in a particular 
case], but even there, they come looking for us!’ Another interpreter con-
trasted the open, public nature of the CNDA hearings with the more closed 
environment of the OFPRA asylum interviews. In the latter, he remarked, 
the interpreter was already in the booth when the applicant entered after 
being called from the waiting area by the case-worker, and this contributed 
to creating a more formal atmosphere from the start.
In this section I have identified a number of different types of communi-
cation that occurred in staff offices, and in corridors and other spaces, during 
the asylum process in France at the time of my research. Each merits a much 
more detailed examination than I have been able to provide here. However, 
I have included them in this chapter in order to illustrate the point that an 
ethnographic approach to studying the asylum process can—and, I would 
argue, should—throw light not only on asylum interviews and appeal hear-
ings, but also on what happens in other relevant (but less central) contexts.
Conclusion
This chapter brings an ethnographic perspective to bear on the issue of com-
munication at different stages of the refugee status determination process in 
France. One of the advantages of adopting an ethnographic approach, not 
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only to this specific question but also to the study of the asylum process 
more generally, lies in both the depth and the breadth of understanding it 
offers of the activities concerned. On the one hand, it can provide a richly 
detailed, contextualised account of a particular phenomenon; on the other, it 
holds out the possibility of tracing connections between apparently unrelated 
or distant phenomena. In this chapter, for example, I have sought to docu-
ment forms of communicative practice in a range of ‘contexts of interaction’ 
involving participants in the French asylum process, and at the same time to 
show some of the links that exist between what happens in these different 
settings. This has led me, in a similar way to Rock (1993) in his ethnographic 
study of an English Crown Court, to explore ways in which space—and 
notably aspects of the built environment—can affect interactions between 
participants in legal (and administrative) processes and how these are expe-
rienced by those involved. In order to do this, it was necessary to use two 
main research methods: observation played an important part, but so did 
semi-structured interviews, generating valuable insights into forms of com-
municative practice I was not able to observe directly as well as into partici-
pants’ reflections on their own and other people’s situated actions. As I argue 
at the start of this chapter, ethnography is most appropriately viewed not as 
‘a’ method or just another word for participant observation, but instead as a 
combination of research techniques and a distinct kind of written account.
Assessing the precise impact on the asylum determination process of the 
different communicative practices analysed in this chapter is not always a 
straightforward matter. In some cases, the nature of the effect is relatively clear 
and direct, as illustrated by the problems that having to rely on telephone 
interpreting caused for the OFPRA case-worker and asylum applicant in the 
admissibility interview described above. It is much more difficult, however, 
to evaluate the part played by conversations in staff offices and corridors, for 
example, on decision-making about specific asylum applications or appeals. 
This would require a much more detailed examination of the different factors 
that can influence the decision-making process, an exercise undertaken by the 
contributors to the final section of this collection but outwith the scope of 
the present chapter. Nevertheless, ethnographic research on different forms of 
communicative practice has, as I have aimed to show here, an important con-
tribution to make to broadening and deepening knowledge and understand-
ing of the complexity of refugee status determination processes, not only in 
France and other European countries, but elsewhere in the world too.
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Introduction
Seeking asylum is in fundamental ways a narrative undertaking. After all, 
the ability to construct a convincing, coherent, and consistent narrative is 
crucial to a successful asylum claim (Bohmer and Shuman 2008; Eastmond 
2007; Good 2007). In Denmark, the Head of the Danish Refugee Appeals 
Board (RAB) Secretariat, has estimated that 9 out of 10 cases before the 
RAB are determined on the basis of credibility (P1 2014). Credibility, in 
turn, is often determined on the basis of judgments of narrative consist-
ency (are there discrepancies, or ‘divergences’ as they are termed in the 
Danish context, in the narrative?) and authorship (does the narrative seem 
self- experienced?). This raises particular questions as to how narratives are 
constructed and assessed in the Danish asylum system—and indeed to what 
extent these two processes are separable. For asylum seekers, this narrative 
task is made more difficult by the opacity of the asylum system to them. 
Most cannot easily make sense of the bases for judgment of their asylum 
motives and this uncertainty fundamentally structures their experiences 
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of the system. The lawyers provided for them after an initial rejection are 
meant to help with this by re-presenting their claims before the RAB. The 
mediating role the lawyers play sheds light on both the narrative logics of 
the asylum determination system and the everyday narratives of asylum 
seekers waiting in asylum centres.
Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Denmark, this chapter investigates 
the ways in which asylum seekers and asylum lawyers present and re-present 
asylum narratives across two contrasting, yet interlinked, contexts: Danish 
asylum centres (termed ‘camp’ by the asylum seekers) and the RAB (‘court’ 
to asylum seekers). Among asylum seekers at Danish asylum centres, narra-
tives of asylum almost never include the substance of asylum seekers’ legal 
claims (their asylum motives). Details are guarded, not least from other 
asylum seekers. The asylum process itself, on the other hand, is a recur-
ring topic, where interpreters, caseworkers and the general attitude of the 
Danish asylum system are regularly discussed. By contrast, asylum narratives 
presented at the RAB are meant to focus exclusively on content and per-
formance (which is so crucial to asylum claims, as Kobelinsky, this volume, 
attests), at least insofar as they relate to the specifics of the asylum seekers’ 
claim as mediated by their asylum lawyers. While context thus strongly 
shapes the kinds of asylum narratives that are presented and shared, this 
chapter suggests that themes of uncertainty, credibility and authorship are 
central both in the Danish asylum process and for the ways in which it is 
understood by the actors invested in it.
A terminological note is in order from the outset. While we write broadly 
of ‘asylum narratives’ as any of a range of narratives associated with the asy-
lum system, we distinguish between two modes of narrating asylum in the 
two contexts of court and camp, which we might conceive of as stories for 
and stories of asylum. The first is what lawyers and adjudicators call the ‘asy-
lum motive,’ that is the narratives processed by the Danish asylum authori-
ties, which form the basis for their decisions on the application. The second 
is what we term ‘asylum talk’ which covers the narratives asylum seekers tell 
each other about the system they are caught up in. These two kinds of narra-
tives are of course quite distinct: They have separate structures, turn-taking 
conventions, and consequences. They are part of different kinds of narrative 
exchanges and subject to different sorts of judgments. However, they do also 
connect and influence each other, if unevenly. The stories asylum seekers tell 
each other about the asylum system may influence the ways in which they 
tell their stories in the court setting. Conversely, it is often experiences with 
the asylum determination system that shape the kinds of stories told in the 
camps.
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The uneven power relations between the two contexts can be seen in the 
bearing they have on each other. The judgment of the credibility of the asy-
lum motive at court has profound consequences for the future lives of asy-
lum seekers, while the narratives about asylum in circulation at the camp 
have little or no effect on the bureaucratic system of judgment. This is illus-
trated neatly by the fact that while court is a frequent topic of conversation 
at the camps, life in the camps is largely considered irrelevant at court. This 
disconnection is in itself important for how asylum seekers view the asylum 
system. It shapes the kinds of conversations they have about the system, and 
may thereby also shape the ways in which asylum seekers experience and 
participate in court proceedings.
A Narrative Approach
Asylum motives are often the main evidence on which asylum decisions are 
made (Kjær 2001; Bohmer and Shuman 2010), and narrative approaches 
naturally have some history in the study of forced migration, particu-
larly when conceived methodologically e.g. as the collection of life sto-
ries (Krulfeld and MacDonald 1998; McKinley 1997; Omidian 1994). 
Narrative approaches to the asylum process have usefully examined issues 
of credibility (Good 2007), emotion (Kobelinsky 2015), resistance (Smith 
2015, 2016) and mistrust (Daniel and Knudsen 1995; Bohmer and Shuman 
2008; see also Kobelinsky, this volume). Marita Eastmond (2007), building 
on Edward Bruner (1986), has scrutinised narrative as a field of knowledge 
production, which ‘provides a site to examine the meanings, which actors 
ascribe to experience’ (2007: 260). Experience, Eastmond argues, gives ‘rise 
and form’ to the narratives, but is also ‘organised and given meaning’ when 
it is narrated (2007: 249). Eastmond points out that what is remembered 
and expressed by a narrator is situated in the specific encounter between the 
narrator and the audience, marked by the power relations between them. 
What is expressed is affected both by accounts of the past and present, but 
also by thoughts and dreams of the future (ibid.).
Our approach here differs somewhat in that our primary focus is not so 
much to understand the experiences of asylum seekers before they came to 
Denmark, but rather to better understand the Danish asylum system itself. 
In this chapter, we ask what sorts of narrative conventions structure Danish 
asylum practice, how are they practised, and how do asylum seekers make 
sense of these structures?
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Following a brief description of the Danish legal context, we consider the 
trajectory the asylum motive takes before it reaches the RAB. Our task is not 
to look at the content of the asylum seekers’ life stories as such (Kälin 1986; 
Blommaert 2001; Ghorashi 2008), but rather to look at the production of 
the asylum motive as a narrative tool to analyse the systems of judgement. 
Indeed, we argue that the asylum determination system profoundly shapes 
the asylum motives, while at the same time ascribing authorship of them 
solely to the asylum seeker.
We then turn to the narrative work asylum seekers engage in at the 
camps, as they struggle to make sense of the Danish asylum bureaucracy. 
Refugee narratives are often judged based on how they conform to standards 
of ‘good’ narration (Vogl 2013), but these standards are more visible to asy-
lum lawyers than asylum seekers. Struggling to make sense of these narrative 
models and to find avenues for action to help guide their cases in a favour-
able direction, asylum seekers draw on their own experiences and those of 
others, conveyed through narrative, as they discuss systemic logics, individ-
ual caseworkers, and possibilities for action.
Finally, the Refugee Appeals Board serves as a site of narrative judgment, 
in which various actors work to present and re-represent the asylum motive, 
ascribed to the asylum seeker. Judgments often turn on the presence of 
‘divergences’ and on whether asylum motives are deemed ‘self-experienced.’ 
Here the performance of the asylum motive can play a crucial role in the 
determination. However, this performance at court takes place as frustration 
has built among asylum seekers in the camps, and lawyers are particularly 
alert to the importance of managing the affective presentations of asylum 
seekers. In this sense, the trajectory of the asylum motive is influenced by 
the trajectory of what we might call asylum seekers’ ‘asylum careers’, and 
asylum motives and asylum talk intermingle.
Methods
This chapter draws on ongoing ethnographic engagement with the Danish 
asylum context from the two authors. Danstrøm conducted five months 
of fieldwork in 2012 with Danish asylum lawyers, which included partici-
pant observation at the RAB and with asylum lawyers, as well as interviews 
with lawyers, judges, NGOs, and Immigration Service officials. She was the 
first researcher to be granted access to the closed RAB hearings, which came 
about in large part through her participant observation with the asylum law-
yers. Whyte originally conducted a year’s fieldwork among asylum seekers at 
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a Danish asylum centre in 2001–2002, which included participant obser-
vation and formal and informal interviews with asylum seekers, Red Cross 
staff, and Immigration Service caseworkers. Since then, he has continued his 
engagement with the field, conducting several shorter research projects with 
asylum seekers and refugees in Denmark. This chapter thus draws both on 
the authors’ original findings and later ethnographic work in various con-
texts. By juxtaposing these ongoing engagements, we aim to examine the 
‘linkages’ (Colson 2007) that shape the interactions across the two narrative 
contexts of camp and court. We have anonymised all our informants and 
cases and use pseudonyms throughout.
Legal Context and Background
The criteria to achieve refugee status in Denmark are formalised in the 
Danish Aliens Act (DAA 2016). The Danish system of course draws on the 
1951 UN Refugee Convention, and can grant full Convention status under 
‘Section 7.1’ of the Aliens Act. However, a number of subsidiary forms of 
protection have been added. Thus ‘Section 7.2’ refers to Article 3 in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (EC 1950), granting a separate 
status to a wider group of refugees, while a new ‘Section 7.3’ was imple-
mented in 2015 to grant temporary protection for one year (to be assessed 
by the authorities annually). The latter was aimed at the Syrians entering 
Denmark at the time. These subsidiary forms of status do not all give access 
to the same range of rights, e.g. to family reunification or welfare services, as 
Convention status does.
The Danish Immigration Service (DIS), under the Ministry of 
Integration, processes asylum applications in the first instance in Denmark. 
Initially, the case will be assessed according to the Dublin regulation, which 
among other things entails that asylum applications can only be processed in 
one EU country. DIS can further dismiss cases as ‘manifestly unfounded’ if 
they are considered without substance or prospects according to section 53b. 
These cases cannot be appealed, but will instead be assessed by an NGO, 
the Danish Refugee Council, which may refer the case back to the so-called 
‘normal procedure’.
In the last few years, first instance recognition rates have been exceptionally 
high. In 2016, 72% of asylum claims were granted one of the three forms of 
protection status. However, just five years earlier, in 2011 average recognition 
rates were only 33%. This change is in large part due to the relatively large 
number of Syrians and Eritreans, who claimed asylum in the last few years.
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In the normal procedure, a rejection is automatically appealed to a qua-
si-judicial body, the RAB. Established in 1983, the aim was to have inde-
pendent adjudicators settle the practice on asylum in Denmark, rather than 
the previous ad hoc administrative system (Christensen et al. 2006: 464ff.). 
It is a uniquely Danish construction. In most other European countries asy-
lum rejections can be appealed and processed in (specialised) courts with 
open hearings. By contrast, RAB hearings take place behind closed doors 
and with the involvement of both judges and others. It consists of a number 
of smaller boards, which comprised five members in 2014: a judge from the 
regular court system, who functions as a chairman; two judicial represent-
atives from the Ministry of Integration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
respectively; a lawyer from The Danish Bar and Law Society; and lastly a 
member appointed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). The Ministry of 
Integration is thus represented both by the DIS, presenting the reasons for 
their first instance rejection, and by a representative sitting on the Board to 
which that decision is appealed.
However, the number of board members and the institutions they repre-
sent have changed several times from seven to three to five members, follow-
ing shifting political priorities of successive governments. In particular, the 
members appointed by DRC have been subject to political discussion—and 
a new amendment to the Aliens Act effective from 1st January 2017 once 
again removes the DRC members (as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to keep an uneven number). These changes speak directly to the heavily 
politicised nature of the Danish asylum system.
Another important aspect of the Danish system is that appeals to the 
RAB are final. The substance of the cases cannot be appealed beyond the 
RAB (Section 56, 8 in the Danish Aliens Act (DAA 2016)). The only 
exceptions are on the basis of complaints concerning procedural irregular-
ities. However, even cases brought on procedural grounds have generally 
been referred back to the RAB with the conclusion that the complaint was 
in fact linked to the substance of the case (see note 1008 to Section 56, 8, 
DAA 2016). Further, cases cannot be taken before the Ombudsman, who 
can only initiate cases concerning asylum himself (Section 58, DAA 2016). 
Nevertheless, there are some other options used by asylum seekers and their 
lawyers. In theory, there is a possibility of getting temporary humanitarian 
protection upon a separate application (section 9b paragraph 1), though this 
possibility has been undermined in recent years, and was only granted in 
76 cases in 2012 (DIS 2013). Further, asylum seekers can apply for a ‘reo-
pening’ of their case. However, this requires that ‘new substantial informa-
tion’ has come to light in the case. Lastly, if all national options have been 
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exhausted, the case could be taken to the UN Committee or the European 
Court of Human Rights. However, since asylum seekers do not receive legal 
aid from the Danish state beyond the RAB and this appeal is not suspensive, 
this is rarely exercised.
The Trajectory of the Asylum Motive
The asylum motive—what we have called the story for asylum—is not a 
fixed narrative. Rather, it is ambiguously perpetuated and re-shaped through 
a number of versions before it reaches the RAB. Jan Blommaert calls this 
process ‘discourse circulation’ (2001: 438), stressing the trajectory (cf. 
Maryns 2006) of the narrative going from oral to written, passing differ-
ent interlocutors or co-narrators even, including interpreters, along the way. 
Spotti and Gibb (this volume) explore this process, which they refer to as 
‘entextualisation’, while Dahlvik (this volume) discusses the influence inter-
preters can have over narratives.
To illustrate these points, it is worth sketching out this trajectory before 
the motive comes before the RAB. In doing so, one further point must be 
kept in mind: The asylum motives that come before the RAB are a particu-
lar subset of the asylum motives, since they by definition have been rejected 
in the first instance. While this may speak to the particularities of the case 
and the credibility of the asylum seeker, we argue that the trajectory itself 
also shapes the asylum motive, as it is presented and represented through the 
determination system.
An asylum case in Denmark starts with an initial registration of the claim-
ant by the police, who record their identity and travel route. After the reg-
istration, the asylum seeker will be asked to fill out an asylum application 
form in their native language, if possible. If this is done, it will be translated 
and serve as the basis for the case throughout the process. A short ‘motive 
and information interview’ is then conducted through an interpreter, after 
which a DIS caseworker summarises the case.
The next version, the asylum interview, is sometimes enacted up to a year 
after arrival depending on the current caseload. This is carried out by a DIS 
caseworker (and an interpreter), who questions the asylum seeker in more 
detail. The caseworker produces a written summary of this interview, which 
forms the basis for the first instance judgment by the caseworker. This text, 
in other words, combines summary with judgment. For rejected cases that 
end up before the RAB, the summaries are often explicitly skeptical of the 
asylum motive. In one example, the caseworker wrote: ‘When asked if the 
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applicant does not agree that it seems implausible to be able to see the three 
men accurately from a 50 meters distance […]’. Or: ‘It seems odd that they 
would give the applicant a bible only two to three months after they met the 
first time […]’. Also phrases like, ‘it seems striking’ or ‘it seems noticeable’ 
are commonly used, as are terms such as ‘implausible’ and even ‘weird’ or 
‘strange’. The language then is often one of disbelief or suspicion tied to par-
ticular narrative conventions (Good 2007; Vogl 2013). The representatives 
from the DIS explained that this line of questioning was meant to help the 
asylum seeker by giving them a chance to explain what seemed unlikely to 
the representative. ‘It’s to be fair to them’, as one put it. The lawyers, how-
ever, felt that it confused their clients, and some lawyers expressed the con-
cern that this was intended to ‘test’ the asylum seekers on the motives and 
provoke the so-called ‘divergences’ that could undermine the asylum seekers’ 
credibility. As Hanne, an asylum lawyer, put it in frustration with a particu-
lar summary, ‘In other judicial proceedings, an interrogator would stop the 
suspects if they were saying things to harm their case before a lawyer was 
present. But in the DIS it’s as if the opposite is the case’. In any case, as 
we will discuss in the following section, this explicit mistrust is experienced 
keenly by the asylum seekers themselves.
If a case is rejected in the first instance, it is automatically appealed, and 
a lawyer is appointed, who receives the existing case files, as do the adjudi-
cators. The lawyer usually has a meeting lasting from two to six hours with 
the client to go through the case again. On this basis, the lawyer writes a 
submission to the RAB, summarising the asylum motive yet again, but in a 
manner designed to support a positive judgment.
Two of the key elements forming the basis for asylum decisions are 
whether the asylum motive contains ‘divergences’ and whether it seems 
‘self-experienced’. These terms tie in closely to concerns with consistency 
and credibility. As a RAB chairman put it: ‘If the asylum seekers’ explana-
tions show some significant discrepancies of one kind or another […], then 
you can get the suspicion that this in fact is a fabricated asylum motive.’
Susan Coutin has shown in Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum cases 
in the US that the smallest ‘plot hole’ in the narrative can lead to a rejec-
tion (2001: 84). The lawyers’ job is therefore to sort out the versions from 
the first instance and frame yet another, in the form of the submission, to 
address these ‘plot holes’. As the lawyer Martin complained, ‘We are never 
invited in until afterwards, right? […] and if there are the least of divergences 
between the summary of the [asylum] interview and some report from the 
police […] then we are sold. You are out. That is definitely wrong […]’.
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This focus on divergences can play out in ways that highlight both issues 
of interpretation and authorship. An Afghani asylum seeker’s interview 
with DIS was too long to finish in one day, so his interview was split in 
two sessions with one month between them. In the first summary, it was 
stated among other details that he had ‘a conflict with his relatives’. In the 
second interview, it was stated that he had ‘a conflict with his cousins’ and 
was ‘scolded by the local community’. However, the terms ‘relatives’ and 
‘cousins’ were seen as diverging by the DIS caseworker. At his meeting with 
his lawyer, the client explained that he used the term ‘scolding’ [skæld ud ], 
in a sense more severe than the Danish translation could capture, meaning 
something like ‘personal threats’. The case was rejected in the RAB as well. 
In this case, it seems the adjudicators read the translation and the written 
summaries as if they were the exact words of the asylum seeker. The words 
were considered his own, though the asylum seeker did not recognise their 
use or the meaning of the Danish term ‘skæld ud ’—to which he was ascribed 
authorship.
The perception of divergences in the asylum motive alongside a num-
ber of other elements (see below) may lead adjudicators to suggest that the 
asylum motive is not ‘self-experienced’. Indeed, one of the common rejec-
tion phrases used is that ‘the RAB does not find that the explanations seem 
self-experienced’. This speaks directly to questions of authorship, suggesting 
that the asylum seeker is not the proper author of the asylum motive. The 
bureaucratic and legal practice is quite clear: the asylum motive belongs to 
the asylum seeker alone and judgments of the asylum motive will determine 
whether the asylum seeker is granted protection status or not. However, the 
authorship of the asylum motive is rather more vexed than the asylum sys-
tem presumes and accepts. Indeed, lawyers complained that the common 
issues of poor translations in the system, in which interpreters might change 
aspects of the narrative (see Dahlvik, this volume), carried little weight 
before the RAB. However, as we have seen, even beyond issues of translation, 
the asylum motive is co-produced by a range of other actors and is repeat-
edly represented and summarised in a way that may render it unrecognisable 
to the asylum seekers themselves. As Bruner has shown, narratives emerge 
in collaboration between speaker and audience (Bruner 1986). Indeed, the 
multiple narrative contexts and audiences may risk facilitating the narrative 
‘divergences’ that shape decisions on credibility. Thus the procedure disem-
powers asylum seekers in putting forward the asylum motive on their own 
terms (cf. Giordano 2008: 590; Good 2007: 23). While the asylum motive 
thus risks fragmentation across its trajectory, the different versions are held 
together by the ascription of authorship to the asylum seeker.
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In practice, then, asylum motives are continually produced in the asy-
lum system through particular narrative contexts, audiences, and modes of 
questioning, meaning that they reflect not only the experiences the asylum 
seekers present as a basis for their asylum claim but also the asylum determi-
nation system itself. While the experiences narrated are of course not about 
the asylum system, the manner in which they are presented, the questions 
asked to elicit them, and especially the ways in which individual experiences 
are joined to form a narrative—the asylum motive—are structured by the 
asylum system. The key point here is that there is no ‘original’ asylum nar-
rative that may be elicited in or twisted by the asylum process. The asylum 
motive is a narrative that only makes sense within the asylum determination 
process.
Before discussing how the assessment takes place before the RAB we look 
at how the tales of the asylum system, asylum talks, circulate in the asy-
lum centres and how this circulation is somewhat separated from the legal 
context.
The Circulation of Asylum Talk at the Camp
While waiting for their cases to be processed, asylum seekers in Denmark 
are housed in asylum centres—‘camps’ to the asylum seekers. These are 
located around the country, often some distance from urban centres. DIS 
is responsible for the accommodation and care of asylum seekers, but they 
subcontract this work to other organisations. Currently, the Red Cross oper-
ates about a third of Danish asylum centres, while municipalities run the 
remaining two-thirds. Unlike other countries, no private contractors run 
asylum centres in Denmark, though many are involved in catering, main-
taining buildings, and security tasks.
Life at the camps is marked by the tight living conditions and the 
uncertainty of the asylum process. Asylum seekers often live four or more 
to a room with little or no privacy and very limited funds (called ‘pocket 
money’, paid out bi-weekly). They are restricted from working and pursuing 
education, while they wait. Their lack of money and the generally remote 
locations of the camps make mobility very difficult, so many asylum seek-
ers simply sit and wait for the months or years it takes for their cases to 
be processed. The asylum system requires asylum seekers to participate in 
‘internships’ [praktik ] and other activities with the explicit goal of avoiding 
inactivity. However, these tasks often relate to cleaning, operation, and ser-
vices at the asylum centre itself. They largely fail to counter the impression 
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of stasis and wasting one’s time prevalent among asylum seekers. In prac-
tice, the life of asylum seekers involved a great deal of sitting around, drink-
ing tea, smoking cigarettes, playing pool, and watching tv, while waiting for 
news of their asylum case. This said, the common category, asylum seeker, 
tends to obscure the diversity of asylum seekers. Experiences of waiting (cf. 
Rotter 2016; Griffiths 2014) and of the asylum system more generally are 
fundamentally informed by the diversities of gender, age, class, health, eth-
nicity and so on.
At the same time, the asylum period is one of profound uncertainty for all 
asylum seekers. They wait while fundamental decisions about their future are 
made elsewhere in bureaucratic systems that are often opaque to them. This 
uncertain waiting takes its toll. As has been well established in the literature, 
extensive waiting times in the asylum period carry serious mental health 
consequences (Filges et al. 2016). However, they also impinge on social life 
at the asylum centres. Asylum seekers are unsure of the role the asylum cen-
tre operators have, and what their connection is to other asylum authorities, 
like the Immigration Service. This shapes their interactions with staff, who 
they worry may cause them problems but also hope may help their cases. 
They are also unsure of other asylum seekers, whose motives they may mis-
trust and who they are concerned may react unpredictably, because of the 
mental strains many are under. While social life among asylum seekers at the 
camps was thus at times strained, it nevertheless was an important part of 
most asylum seekers’ daily lives. Most found friends, even if these were fleet-
ing acquaintances, given the suddenness with which asylum seekers could 
move or be moved.
Asylum seekers seldom discussed their cases at the camps, and this was so 
for a number of reasons. First, the narratives presented to asylum authori-
ties were often of a very personal and at times shameful nature. They might 
include experiences of humiliation, abuse, and even sexual assault. These 
were not stories to share with virtual strangers—nor indeed necessarily sto-
ries to share even with close family. Second, the experience of profound 
mistrust from asylum authorities and the fact that the narratives making up 
their cases were so to speak already in process made it a pragmatic point 
to keep quiet and wait for a decision. Third, many asylum seekers did not 
trust each other. There were everywhere stories about spies and enemies, 
also among compatriots and co-ethnics, who might use personal knowl-
edge against the narrator and not least family in the home country. Fourth, 
some stories were embellished or outright constructed. Some asylum seekers 
presented narratives, which they had been told by smugglers or other peo-
ple they trusted in this matter, were likely to gain them ‘positive’ decisions. 
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Or they embellished stories in manners they thought or had been told were 
strategic. This did not necessarily indicate that they did not have a valid asy-
lum claim, but it did certainly make this minority less likely to discuss these 
narratives in public (cf. Beneduce 2015).
For all their reticence about their individual cases, asylum seekers rou-
tinely discussed the asylum system itself. They talked about named case-
workers, but also the vulnerability of the system to random factors. As one 
asylum seeker nervously joked, ‘Sometimes I think what if the person sitting 
with my case had a bad day. Maybe their dog was run over and they come 
to the office and then look at my application. How will they decide? Maybe 
on that day, everyone gets negative’. Similarly, we have heard versions of a 
story about two brothers seeking asylum from the same village for the same 
reasons, but where one got positive and the other negative, repeated across 
more than a decade. Further, there was an oft-expressed worry that asylum 
authorities were not able to distinguish truth from falsehood. Asylum seek-
ers spoke of how ‘people with real problems’, who did not have the time 
and opportunity to go about finding corroborating evidence for their claims 
before they fled, were at a disadvantage to ‘cheaters’ because asylum author-
ities could not tell who was who. In other words, there was a widespread 
concern that the asylum system did not properly ‘see’ them (Whyte 2011; 
Kobelinsky, this volume).
And they spoke in detail about the problem of incompetent—or even 
malicious—interpreters. Stories abounded of interpreters who did not 
speak the language properly, who made unprofessional comments, or who 
simply seemed not to like the asylum seeker in question. This is part of a 
larger problem of interpretation in asylum hearings (Gibb and Good 2014; 
Pöllabauer 2004; Dahlvik, this volume), but also a specific problem in 
Denmark where a troubling number of court interpreters have been shown 
not to be up to their jobs (Christensen and Martinsen 2012; Graversen et al. 
2015).
These kinds of conversations were a basic part of camp sociality: ways of 
interacting with other asylum seekers, who one did not know, in uncertain 
circumstances. One key aspect of this form of sociality at the camp was that 
the asylum seekers with most experience of the asylum system naturally were 
the ones who had waited the longest. But these were also a particular subset 
of asylum seekers, whose cases for one reason or another were dragging on. 
Asylum seekers were of course well aware of this, and people with a greater 
expectation of receiving asylum, often based on their country of origin, gen-
erally took these stories with a pinch of salt.
9 Narrating Asylum in Camp and at Court     187
But asylum talk can also be seen as an attempt to better understand the 
uncertainties of the asylum system, in much the same way as asylum seek-
ers’ discussions of the role and meaning of documents in Denmark (Whyte 
2015). Many of these narratives were not necessarily coherent (Hyvärinen 
et al. 2010), but spoke in fragmented form to particular understandings of 
and attempts at understanding the asylum system. Unlike the required struc-
turing of their asylum motives, concerns about consistency were not para-
mount, nor were the sources of these stories probed.
Walking back to the camp with Nazir, a young Afghan man, he started 
talking again about his waiting time:
I wait and wait and nothing happens here. I have been waiting 11 months 
now and still no interview, no letter, nothing. My friend told me that I should 
go to Norway, present all my papers there. They will send me back here, of 
course, but then they will have to give me a decision. What do you think?
This sort of plan was not uncommon and spoke to a common conception of 
having been forgotten. Reminding the asylum authorities of one’s existence 
in one way or another might then reactivate the processing of one’s case. 
But it was also considered dangerous, as it could cause annoyance and possi-
bly delay matters further. Nazir was not convinced that it was a wise move. 
‘I talked to a man called Sader, some of the other Afghanis told me about 
him. He knows about these things, he has some kind of organisation to help 
Afghanis. He told me not to do it. He said it would make my case more 
complicated. But still […]’.
Though not many asylum seekers necessarily carried out plans like these, 
they still returned to them time and again. This kind of asylum talk can 
be seen as a way of trying to find ways forward in an opaque system. Like 
attempts at procuring documents to strengthen one’s case (Whyte 2015), 
Nazir’s ‘But still […]’ speaks to his desire to reclaim a sense of agency, to do 
something to advance his life. Unlike some others, Nazir recognised that this 
plan was not necessarily well-judged. But in any case it also had a significant 
social element. Connecting with and seeking advice from other people, also 
created and maintained certain forms of sociality prevalent at the camp. In 
that sense, asylum talk was both text and context for everyday life in the 
camps.
Discussions of the asylum system were often accompanied by sudden out-
bursts of anger and bitterness. ‘I hear that in England they give passports 
even to their dogs. Their dogs! But here I cannot get positive. I get nothing. 
Negative. This is Europe: we think it is a democratic place, but for them us 
188     M. S. Danstrøm and Z. Whyte
black-haired people are less than their dogs,’ as a young Palestinian man said 
bitterly. Or as Abu Minna explained sitting in the kitchen at camp, his voice 
rising as he spoke about his interview with the Immigration Service, ‘How 
can they tell me I am lying! They do not know my situation. I was in prison! 
The police beat me! Now this woman [the caseworker] talks to me as if I am 
a liar. I was so angry!’. His coffee cup quivered on the way to his lips. ‘First 
they put us in this prison,’ he waved his hand around the camp kitchen. 
‘Wait wait wait, every day. Every day, nothing. Then they treat us like liars. I 
get so angry!’
These attempts at understanding the asylum system went hand in hand 
with the emotional outbursts. And they were of course brought with them 
to the RAB, to which we now turn.
Asylum Narratives at the RAB
Having described the trajectory of the asylum motive and contrasted them 
with the asylum talk of the camp, we turn now to the RAB as a specific site 
of narrative judgment in which competing versions of asylum motives are 
presented, represented and performed.
In so doing, it is worthwhile establishing the ‘stage’ on which these per-
formances take place. The RAB is made up of two waiting rooms for the 
asylum seekers, where lawyers have pre-meetings with their clients; one 
police room, where the lawyers and interpreters sit: one room for the law-
yers (which is mainly used for discussing determinations with clients after 
the hearings); and one room for DIS representatives. In addition, there are 
rooms for the actual hearings.
The chairman always initiates the hearing by stating the rights and duties 
to the asylum seeker and explaining the process of the hearing. But a num-
ber of versions of the asylum motive co-exist and compete there. All of the 
written versions of the asylum motive across its trajectory are present in the 
paperwork. It is worth noting that the various interviews are not normally 
recorded (until recently asylum seekers were not allowed to record their own 
interviews), therefore it is not possible to go back and listen to the initial 
story to clarify any misunderstandings. The RAB is dependent on the writ-
ten versions before them. On top of this, an oral version of the narrative is 
performed, when the lawyer interviews the client (through an interpreter) 
before the adjudicators, who also ask questions to illuminate the case. A rep-
resentative from the DIS is also present to defend their rejection, though 
the vigour with which they do so varies significantly. While some only state, 
‘DIS recommends an affirmation of the rejection’, others interview the 
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asylum seeker again. These proceedings are taken down as minutes by a 
legal secretary. When all parties have had a chance to ask questions, the law-
yer adds a new version in the form of the closing statement. This generally 
has the form of a competing reading of the various versions of the asylum 
motive, designed to explain possible discrepancies and to give the impression 
of consistency.
On the basis of this process and the various competing presentations of 
the asylum motive, the RAB renders its judgment. In so doing, it produces 
a final edition of the motive, which comes in two different written versions. 
The adjudicators in the RAB vote immediately after the hearing and draw 
up the final determination to the applicant. Besides the outcome of the case, 
it also consists of a summarised asylum motive as written by the legal secre-
tary. This version can be found online as part of the ‘RAB practice’ in short 
form containing the asylum motive together with the outcome. The prac-
tice is important to refer to in future cases for both lawyers and adjudicators 
(RAB 2014).
While the various competing versions of the asylum motive are all impor-
tant, a key part of the proceedings comes from the performance of the asy-
lum seekers themselves. As a chairman explained: ‘They [asylum seekers] can 
look alike when they are on paper, but the credibility impression can be very 
different [during the hearing in the RAB]’. This is a performance that their 
lawyers work hard to manage to ensure that the asylum motive steers clear of 
‘divergences’ and appears ‘self-experienced’. This is illustrated in an interview 
with Mette, talking about the meeting between the lawyer and the client:
‘The meeting is about making [the clients] understand what it takes to get 
[the adjudicators] to believe their story. I explain how a story affects others. 
If you just sit and answer yes and no and if there are divergences, then you 
don’t seem credible. You have to explain it down to the detail. You have to 
mention things that you only can say if you have experienced them yourself. 
For example ‘and then he did this and then I thought that was strange…’. 
Or ‘this officer wore these clothes, there were five stars on the shoulder…’. 
If he can make small descriptions of how it all adds up somehow. And then 
try to make them understand. It is also important that you can feel that it 
affects them to sit there and tell the story that you can feel that this is some-
thing they have experienced. It can be hard to make them understand. They 
also have a different cultural background for how to tell a story’.
For Mette, then, a successful presentation did not just involve telling the 
story coherently and avoiding divergences, but also had to be told in par-
ticular ways, involving the cultural repertoires of the narrator and the audi-
ence (Eastmond 2007: 249). Mette tried to make her clients understand 
that the judges had to ‘feel’ that the applicant was actually there through 
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the performance of the narrative. This embodiment of the narrative was not 
something that all asylum seekers practised in a way that was appreciated by 
the adjudicators, as indicated by the quote. What Mette was implying was 
that representation is also about instructing the asylum seekers in the impor-
tance of presenting the asylum motive in an appropriate way. That is, using 
the body to convince the RAB, during the actual hearing, that it is in fact 
‘self-experienced’.
One of the problems facing lawyers in this endeavour is the built-up frus-
tration, fear, and anger of the asylum seekers. Hanne was representing a cou-
ple from Iran with a young daughter. The mother was crying in the asylum 
seekers’ waiting room, as Hanne was in the midst of the pre-meeting with 
her client. She turned to the mother: ‘You really ought to stop crying. It 
doesn’t pay off to cry in front of the Board; you don’t win anything by doing 
that’. Here it becomes clear that the anger and frustration that is so evident 
in the camp—in the asylum talk—cannot be exposed in the RAB. It is to 
be separated from the legal procedure and assessment of the asylum motive 
even though, for the asylum seekers, these contexts are inseparable. In other 
words, while it was important for asylum seekers to convey feelings about 
their past in an appropriate way, it was equally important to keep their feel-
ings about their present hidden away.
Before the Board, the husband explained that the police in Iran had held 
him back, and that their home had been searched several times. Hanne 
interrogated him about the incidents in his home: ‘What happened exactly 
when the police came to your house? How many officers were there? 
(Client/interpreter): ‘There were many; maybe four. They held me like this’ 
[the client gets up, takes his arms together on the back to show that he was 
handcuffed. He bends down, indicating that they pushed his head towards 
the floor]. ‘They searched my house for flyers; everything was torn into 
pieces. That happened several times’.’
After the hearing, Hanne seemed satisfied: ‘They really explained them-
selves well; you really felt like you were present. That is really good’. After a 
short waiting time we were called back into the hearing room. The adjudi-
cators stressed that the explanation seemed ‘self-experienced’ and was thus 
‘accepted’. The couple was granted asylum. Both the lawyer and adjudicators 
thus emphasised the performance of the narrative as a decisive factor.
For asylum seekers, this experience was often demeaning. Many experi-
enced the court setting in highly moral terms as a space in which they were 
mistrusted and even accused of dishonesty. As one young Afghani man said, 
as he returned to the RAB waiting rooms, shaking with anger, ‘They didn’t 
believe me! That man [from the Immigration Service] spoke lies about my 
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father! He said I was lying!’. His older brother, whose case was being heard 
with him, looked slightly stunned himself, cheeks flushed, but put his hand 
on his brother’s shoulder. ‘Wait, just wait’. ‘I wanted to punch him. How 
can he sit and lie like that? And the lawyer! He said nothing!’.
Conclusion
As will be evident from this description, camps and courts provide two rad-
ically different narrative contexts for asylum seekers. They are connected 
by the asylum seekers themselves of course, but also by the negotiations of 
legal and moral judgements that frame the two contexts. While the RAB 
sees itself as making legal judgements on specific cases, it seems clear that 
they also take account of a range of extra-legal factors from credibility to 
performance. For asylum seekers, these factors tend to loom large and often 
formed grist for the mill of their asylum talk.
At court, asylum seekers’ asylum motives are significantly formed in inter-
action with powerful interlocutors and re-presented by their lawyers. While 
asylum seekers remain responsible for these narratives, in the sense that they 
are the ones who bear the consequences of the RAB’s decision on them, 
the motives are also significantly beyond asylum seekers’ control. Asylum 
motives are attributed to asylum seekers but are not necessarily fully theirs 
in an experiential sense. Indeed, as we have argued, the performative require-
ments put on them may tend to leave little space for their own sense of pres-
ence at the court. They tend not to feel heard or understood throughout the 
asylum determination system. However, the right kind of performance, the 
embodiment of the narrative, can in some cases overrule a narrative that was 
previously in the procedure considered not credible—when it affirms the 
‘self-experience’ of the incidents expressed. By contrast, in the camp, asylum 
seekers are all too frustratingly present. They feel they are wasting their time 
there, waiting for their cases to move forward. But they do not generally dis-
cuss their asylum motives at the camp, instead engaging in what we have 
called ‘asylum talk’ through which they attempt to make sense of the seem-
ingly opaque asylum process they are in together.
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Introduction
Asylum appeals in the UK have been characterised as problematic,  chaotic 
and inconsistent by academics, practitioners, governmental and non- 
governmental organisations (Amnesty International, Still Human Still Here 
2013; Asylum Aid 2011; Bail for Immigration Detainees 2006; Baillot et al. 
2012; Feder 2010; Gill et al. 2015, 2016; Good 2007; Independent Asylum 
Commission 2008; Jubany 2011; Thomas 2011). A common focus amongst 
critiques is the heavy reliance on judicial discretion in the credibility assess-
ment process, which creates space for substantial variances in terms of how 
appeals are decided. However, previous socio-legal research on adjudication 
in other contexts highlights the significance of interactions and relation-
ships between judges, representatives and other courtroom actors (Conley 
and O’Barr 1990; Cowan and Hitchings 2007; Eisenstein and Jacob 1977; 
Fielding 2011; Kritzer 2007; Leverick and Duff 2002; Mack and Roach 
Anleu 2010). Asylum appeals represent a unique site of symbolic struggle, 
where law functions as one resource among many. This chapter explores how 
interactions and identities shape the asylum appeals process. It does so by 
focusing on the experiences and work of asylum lawyers, exploring differ-
ences in professional backgrounds, personal relationships and organisational 
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dynamics. Success in asylum appeals depends on mastering the rules of the 
tribunal game. This requires an appreciation of what matters alongside ‘the 
law’, and understanding how to act, engage, and mobilise resources effec-
tively. This chapter argues that by looking at the role of interactions and 
identities, we gain a sense of the numerous legal and non-legal rules of 
engagement in asylum appeals. Concordant with Gill and Good’s reflections 
in the Introduction to this volume, the present chapter demonstrates the 
multiple legal pluralities of the asylum process. This offers a new perspective 
on how legal values of fairness and justice in refugee determination proce-
dures are so often subsumed by political, administrative and economic con-
cerns to control migration.
Adjudication is a complex social process of communication and com-
petition between actors, organisations, and institutions (Bourdieu 1987; 
Hawkins 2002; Moorhead and Cowan 2007). Asylum appeals, like other 
adjudicatory processes, are not a simple application of law to a set of 
facts. Law operates through relationships, networks, routines and symbols 
(Bourdieu 1987), and ‘incorporates countless, varied and often ambiguous 
rules […] operating with different purposes and with vastly different mate-
rial and symbolic resources’ (Ewick and Silbey 1998: 17). The construction 
of legal decisions is dependent on the personalities, preconceptions and dis-
positions of actors involved, but is also linked to wider social, political, eco-
nomic and historical contexts (Hawkins 2003; Lipsky 1969).
Asylum representatives are said to work ‘in the space between law and 
administration’ (James and Killick 2012: 430). By centering the voices of 
asylum advocates and observing them in action at the tribunal, this chapter 
constructs a picture of how law functions in asylum appeals as one social 
force among the multiple, often conflicting, duties, goals, values, and inter-
nal logics at play in the appeals system. The quasi-legal nature of asylum 
appeals manifests in relationships and communication between actors situ-
ated in multiple, intersecting social fields. In this sense, asylum appeals can 
be conceptualised as ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ (Moore 1973). Such a 
methodological approach calls for the study of law, rules and official behav-
ior in terms of their social context and ‘connection(s) between the internal 
workings of an observable social field and its points of articulation with a 
larger setting’ (Moore 1973: 742). While legal rules and procedures play a 
significant part in setting the rules of the game, those wishing to play (and 
do well) are also subject to extra-legal forces. The significance of ‘semi- 
autonomy’ of the social field lies in the way norms, decisions and practices 
are generated both within the field, and through interactions and vulnerabil-
ities vis-a-vis the wider social matrix (ibid.: 720).
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This chapter unpicks the dilemma whereby asylum appeals are anticipated 
by lawyers, and indeed appellants, to be determined within a system of ‘legal 
rational norms’, whereas what they frequently encounter is the ‘highly polit-
icised’ system of immigration control (Appelqvist 2000: 87). Key to analysis 
here is an exploration of the significance of personal and professional iden-
tities and relationships. Emphasis shifts away from individual immigration 
judges, instead zooming out to the wider tribunal workgroup and the role of 
non-lawyers and non-law in the asylum appeals process.
The UK Asylum System
Asylum decision-making in the UK is a hybrid process; both administrative 
and judicial bodies deal with claims for refugee status. Protection claims are 
initially made to the Home Office, either on arrival to the UK at the port 
of entry, or, more often, at a later date in Croydon (South London). The 
applicant first undergoes a screening interview by an Immigration Officer 
(Home Office civil servant), covering basic information about their back-
ground and reasons for claiming asylum. At this stage, the individual risks 
being detained if their case is seen as straightforward—for example, if the 
Home Office wishes to invoke Dublin procedures, meaning the individu-
al’s application will be processed by the first EU Member State where fin-
gerprints were taken or an asylum application was made.1 Alternatively, the 
applicant will be assigned a caseowner and given a longer, more detailed 
substantive interview. A legal representative may be sought at any stage, but 
legal aid funding is not available until the substantive interview. Even then, 
many asylum applicants are unable to access legal representation owing to 
time constraints and lack of available service providers. Based on the evi-
dence given in interviews and any additional evidence submitted, the Home 
Office makes a decision on eligibility for refugee status or for a subsidiary 
form of protection on human rights or humanitarian grounds.
Positive decisions result in a grant of refugee status and leave to remain 
for five years.2 However, most claims are not successful; approximately 65% 
1The Detained Fast Track (DFT) procedure is currently suspended following a series of legal challenges. 
In January 2017 a High Court ruling confirmed the fast-track procedure in operation between 2005 
and 2014 was unlawful.
2Until recently, this status would be upgraded to ‘settlement’ or ‘indefinite leave to remain’ on applica-
tion after five years. Now, after the initial five years, a person with refugee status will need to undergo 
a ‘safe return review’ procedure to assess whether circumstances have changed such that they are no 
longer in need of protection.
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of initial decisions are refusals. Of these, around three quarters go on to 
appeal to the First Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). It is 
at this stage, when seeking to appeal an initial refusal, that many will look to 
lawyers to guide them through the more legal stage of the process. Indeed, a 
common reason for negative initial decisions going unchallenged is lack of 
access to quality legal advice, due to scarcity of legal service provision and 
changes to legal aid funding (Burridge and Gill 2017).
The Immigration Tribunal was originally conceived as an administrative 
body staffed by lay personnel. Over time, the tribunal has become increasingly 
judicialised (Rawlings 2005; Thomas 2003a, b). It is now run by Her Majesty’s 
Courts and Tribunals Service and presided over by legally qualified judges 
appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission. At the time of fieldwork 
(2012–2014) there were 19 hearing centres spread across the UK. On average, 
around one quarter of appeals at that time resulted in the Home Office’s initial 
refusal being overturned. However, research has shown sizeable discrepancies in 
terms of success rates across different tribunals (Gill et al. 2015).
Appeals against First Tier decisions may be taken to a superior level—
the Upper Tribunal—with permission from the First Tier. If the First Tier 
Tribunal refuses, the appellant may apply to the Upper Tier to have that 
decision overturned. A small number of cases may progress outside the 
Tribunal system to the Court of Appeal (Court of Session in Scotland) and 
Supreme Court where ‘important points of principle or practice’ or ‘other 
compelling reasons’ are at stake (R (Cart) and ors v. Upper Tribunal and ors 
[2011] UKSC 28 ).
The asylum process has been characterised as a system caught between 
administration and adjudication (Thomas 2011). While civil servants at 
the Home Office deal with initial claims, the appeal stage marks a shift into 
a more legal arena. Yet actors at this level continue to be a mix of legal and 
non-legal professionals; even though judges are now required to have a legal 
background, representatives are not exclusively drawn from the legal profes-
sion. A lawyer may represent the Home Office, but most often it is a Home 
Office Presenting Officer (HOPO) who does the job of arguing against a pro-
tection claim (see Campbell, this volume). On the appellant’s side, where a 
representative is present they may be regulated by one of four different pro-
fessional bodies.3 Not all asylum representatives are ‘lawyers’, understood in 
the narrow sense as solicitors and barristers. The four professional bodies that 
3A number of asylum appellants appear unrepresented in hearings, with the proportion of unrepre-
sented varying significantly between tribunal locations (for detailed discussion of this see Burridge and 
Gill 2017).
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regulate asylum representation are the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA); 
Bar Standards Board (BSB); Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner 
(OISC); and the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives (CILEx). A person 
accredited by any of these four regulatory bodies may represent appellants in 
appeals to the tribunal. This arrangement invites a complex mix of personal, 
organisational and institutional pressures into asylum appeals, and contributes 
to the unique character of this adjudicatory setting (Thomas 2011: 48).
Methodology: Studying Lawyers in Asylum 
Appeals
The focus of the present work is on the perspectives and work of asylum 
lawyers at the tribunal. The advocacy stage of the process is often under-
taken by barristers, having been instructed by solicitors or advisers.
Fieldwork consisted of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 15 
asylum advocates (11 barristers, two solicitors and two solicitors who had 
trained as barristers) and 25 days of observations at two different hearing 
centres. The interview sample size was small, and not intended to be rep-
resentative, although did include a number of well-known asylum law-
yers, seen as significant players in the field. Participants were recruited via 
a range of methods: websites (blogs and chambers), social media (twitter), 
personal contacts in asylum and refugee networks, and invitations to partic-
ipate handed out at tribunals. While some advocates were clearly identifia-
ble as ‘cause lawyers’—doing legal work as a way to fight (what they saw as) 
an unjust immigration regime, others were motivated by intellectual inter-
est, career progression or had just landed on asylum work by chance. Thus, 
while not representative, interview data gave rich insights into the experi-
ences and work of a small cross-section of asylum advocates.
The tribunals were selected for several reasons. First, the advocates inter-
viewed appeared relatively frequently at one or both of the centres. And, 
second, the sites had contrasting characteristics in terms of size (fewer than 
ten courtrooms/over 20 courtrooms), location (out of town/town centre), 
and appeal success rates (low end of the scale/high end of the scale). Ethical 
issues including consent, anonymity, risk to participants, and impact on 
the asylum field were given detailed consideration. For interviews, signed 
consent forms were used and names, workplaces, and identifying fea-
tures were anonymised. Asylum hearings are generally open to the public. 
However, given the rarity of observers, and the close and intense nature of 
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many  asylum hearings, it was felt appropriate to speak to the tribunal staff 
in advance of hearings. In any case, advocates and judges often wanted to 
know who was present prior to hearings commencing. Where any objection 
was made owing to the nature of the appeal or vulnerability of the appel-
lant, the hearing was not observed. Detailed notes were taken during hear-
ings, but names, locations and any identifiable features of the case were left 
out. In terms of impact on the asylum field, the commitment to anonymity 
reflected a concern to reflect accurately the interview and observational data, 
without risking relations between advocates, clients and judges.
Lawyers occupy a distinct vantage point owing to their movement 
between different tribunals and interactions with different communities of 
practice. Their perspectives—how they experience their roles, the day-to-day 
practicalities, constraints, and pressures faced—give significant insights into 
variations in practices of judges, representatives and hearing centres. Rock’s 
(1993) seminal ethnographic study of a Crown Court characterised the 
courthouse social world in terms of a network of concentric circles, with 
judges at the centre—the ‘most august, sacred and protected’ circle—and, at 
the outer reaches, civilians—those who pass through in large volumes with-
out spending much time. Between these layers are degrees of insider status. 
Proximity to the inner circles depends on frequency with which actors meet 
‘in conditions of intimacy and interdependence’, and the extent to which 
actors are ‘sentimentally’ and ‘practically’ embedded within the organisation 
(Rock 1993: 185–192). Trials under the adversarial system, argues Rock, 
are staged conflicts between actors playing out defined roles, where insider 
and outsider status can be key in terms of shaping role performance. In asy-
lum appeals, Rock’s social circles are tested by a disrupted adversarial model, 
whereby insider status is garnered not only by regular interactions at a par-
ticular location, but also depends on professional background and status 
(Gibb, this volume, as discusses the significance of space and layout to legal 
processes in the context of the French asylum determination system).
Previous studies from the UK, US and Canada have demonstrated the 
critical role played by lawyers in asylum proceedings (Bail for Immigration 
Detainees and Asylum Aid 2005; James and Killick 2012; Rehaag 2011; 
Schoenholtz and Bernstein 2008; Schoenholtz and Jacobs 2002; Thomas 
2011). It has been argued that it is up to lawyers to bridge the divide 
between the ‘fearful chaos of the refugee experience and the logical and 
unrealistic expectations of law and government’ (Showler 2006: 210). To 
succeed in an asylum appeal, individuals must convince the judge of a credi-
ble account of persecution, relating to one of the Convention categories (see 
Sorgoni, this volume, for a critical discussion of the concept of credibility). 
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However, many asylum stories are complex, fractured accounts that do not 
fit into the technical requirements of refugee law. Individual experiences of 
persecution require shaping into a legal claim for protection. Lawyers often 
conceptualise their role as translators, turning people’s stories or problems 
into the language of the law:
I tell all my clients - our role is to act like an interpreter. Instead of interpret-
ing their words from their national language into English, I translate their 
words into what we call the law.
But this act of translation into ‘the law’ is a complex process of communica-
tion and interaction. Lawyers’ framing devices—their structures of knowl-
edge, experience and meaning used when making decisions (Hawkins 2002: 
52)—are built on past interactions and relationships, not only with individ-
uals, but also with their institutional and organisational contexts (Morison 
and Leith 1992). It has been argued:
[T]he process whereby barristers creatively construct legal information is 
shaped by the nature of the information available, time limitations, a consid-
eration of how the information will be viewed by the judge/court, policy ques-
tions, their own experience of the courtroom and trials, and practical demands 
of the situation, rather than general caselaw principles. (Roach Anleu 2010: 93)
Although judges determine the final outcome of the asylum appeal, law-
yers may also be seen as decision-makers in their own right; the process of 
building and presenting an asylum appeal involves numerous judgments by 
lawyers about what information is significant, and how others will receive it. 
In this sense, lawyering is a contextual and collegial endeavour. Looking at 
what guides divorce lawyers in their day to day work, Mather et al. (2001) 
identify three traditional perspectives. The first sees lawyers guided by their 
law school socialisation and formal professional codes (‘the professional’). 
The second view looks to economic incentives and material conditions of 
work driving lawyers (‘the workplace’). Third, lawyers are seen as motivated 
by their individual identities, values and characteristics (‘the personal’). To 
these three outlooks, Mather et al. add a fourth—‘professionalism in prac-
tice’. This amalgamates the three traditional approaches into an enhanced 
model of how lawyers understand and make decisions at work. Legal practice 
is constituted through professional, personal and practical action. Moreover, 
they argue referencing Lave and Wenger’s (1991) key concept, lawyers act 
within ‘communities of practice’—loosely-defined, overlapping groups built 
around particular courts, law firms (or chambers) and specialisms.
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Through their communities of practice, lawyers are motivated to act 
according to ‘common expectations and standards’ (Mather et al. 2001: 6). 
But, as shown below, lawyers in the asylum field find themselves working 
within multiple fractured and intersecting communities, where aims and 
expectations vary according to differences in personal and professional iden-
tities. From the lawyers’ perspective, a fundamental concern when it comes 
to the problematic nature of asylum appeals is the intrusion of political and 
administrative personnel and values into what (they say) ought to be an 
adversarial system built on juridical values. The battle between governmen-
tal rationality and legal authority in asylum appeals has received in-depth 
analysis by Thomas (2011). In his comprehensive review of asylum tribunal 
architecture, Thomas argues that:
the influence the immigration bureaucracy exerts on both the design and oper-
ation of the appeals process (means that) the structural relationship between 
the tribunal and the Home Office reinforces the sense that while the legal 
model plays an essential role in the decision process, it is a supporting role 
nonetheless. (2011: 55–58)
The view that asylum appeals should operate predominantly under an 
administrative, or bureaucratic, decision-making model where efficiency 
and value for money are prioritised over juridical values such as independ-
ence and procedural fairness is resisted by asylum lawyers, as will be seen 
below, and by the judiciary, as expounded by the outgoing President of the 
Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal in 2016:
We are not a statistically driven conveyor belt. Rather we, the Judges of this 
Chamber, are serious professionals, constantly alert to the judicial oath of 
office and the privilege of serving the community in the best possible ways.4
Asylum lawyers find themselves, and more importantly their clients, caught 
at the centre of this conflict between law, politics and administration. Asylum 
appeals represent a unique adjudicatory setting, where individual identities, 
professional actors and social worlds collide. The work and experiences of asy-
lum advocates provide insight into the problematic nature of asylum appeals, 
where the significance of law, in the narrow sense, is put into doubt. To 
4Justice Bernard McCloskey’s section on the Immigration and Asylum Chamber in the Senior President 
of Tribunals’ Annual Report 2016 at p. 38. Available at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/The-Senior-President-of-Tribunals-Annual-Report-2016-final-1.pdf. Accessed 18 
September 2018.
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understand how legal rules function in asylum appeals requires looking at the 
broader ‘operative rules of the game’ (Moore 1973: 243). Exploring the social 
context of asylum tribunal adjudication, we can observe the role of organisational 
pressures, relationships, status, and expertise in conditioning the appeals process.
Lawyering in a Hostile Environment
‘It’s one rule for the state and another rule for my clients’.
Asylum is a challenging area of legal practice. One immigration barrister 
describes this area of work as ‘the hardest and most bitterly fought, most 
controversial, most convoluted, perhaps most poorly funded and sure most 
tilted battleground between the individual and the state’ (Yeo 2012).
Asylum applicants face an ever-thickening web of practical challenges such 
as access to legal advice, criminal sanctions, and restrictions on access to health-
care, housing and other social services. Historically, UK attitudes to seeking asy-
lum have been bound up in political, media and social paranoia surrounding 
‘benefit tourism’, ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and ‘clamping down on abusive claims’ 
(Clayton 2010: 15). In 2012, the creation of a ‘hostile environment’ for irregu-
lar migration became official government policy. Hostile environment measures 
in the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 included greater barriers to health-
care, housing, bank accounts, and a reduction in appeal rights against deporta-
tion. However, the ripple effect of the hostile environment is felt beyond these 
schemes. Asylum decision-making is frequently described as operating within a 
‘culture of disbelief ’ (Anderson et al. 2014; Griffiths 2012; Jubany 2011; Souter 
2011; Schneider, this volume) and in an atmosphere of ‘lawlessness’ (Juss 1993; 
Shah 2005). In the tribunal, advocates felt the impact of broader social currents:
I’ve had comments from judges that say things like ‘times are hard’, you know, 
‘we can’t afford to let this person become a burden on the taxpayer’. Or things 
like ‘if we open the door to this one, when’s it going to end?’. So there are defi-
nitely political judgments.
It’s so political. So political. And you feel a lot of the time as though it’s 
not about the law at all. It’s about what the front page of tomorrow’s Mail or 
tomorrow’s Express is gonna look like. And that is very difficult.
I think it’s such a political thing. And we talk about, you know, this Judge 
has got the Daily Mail tattooed on their inner eyelids. You know, they come in 
with all those anti-immigrant headlines very fresh in their minds, and seem to 
come in with a view that everybody’s lying, everybody’s here for the benefits, 
everybody’s here for the NHS […].
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Lawyers felt their role as legal representatives was undermined by decisions 
based on politics of exclusion and denial, rather than legal rules and prin-
ciples. This was felt more acutely in some hearing centres than others, sug-
gesting that decision-making practices were linked to the wider tribunal 
community, not only individual judges.
I think there are certain cultures that grow around hearing centres. And they’re 
not really applying the law; they’re applying the kind of culture that is in that 
particular place.
Advocates expressed preferences for certain tribunals based on multiple, 
interlinked characteristics. These include the general feel of the tribunal— 
‘unpleasant’, ‘polite’, ‘bleak’, ‘less adversarial’, ‘a little bit more liberal’, and more 
specific reasons relating to differences in decision-making practices, relation-
ships with judges and personnel, and the practicalities of hearing centre loca-
tions. Significantly, these perceptions of differences between tribunal cultures 
were further linked to quality of justice; where an appeal was listed for hearing 
was seen as a ‘massively important factor’ in terms of how an appeal would run.
Going deeper into these preferences, and drawing on observational data 
from two tribunals, the remainder of this chapter explores differences in appeal 
processes by looking at the significance of lawyers’ communities of practice, 
and ways of building, and benefiting from, insider status at the tribunal. First, 
insider status was gained through establishing ongoing personal relationships 
between actors working together frequently. This was seen as advantageous 
in respect of improving advocates’ ability to litigate, but undermined by even 
closer relationships between HOPOs and judges. However, a different kind of 
insider status was felt through professional lawyer networks, which were seen 
as inaccessible to ‘non-lawyer’ HOPOs. The intersections of professional com-
munities of practice with those based on locality, and the blurred lines around 
insider status created by these relationships, directs us to consider further the 
atypical nature of adversarial adjudication in asylum appeals.
‘If They Like You, It Helps’: Personal 
Relationships and the Significance of Being 
Local
Alongside formal law and legal training, advocates’ work is shaped by rou-
tines, repetition, development of informal knowledge and status as insider 
or outsider in the everyday workgroup (Kritzer 1990, 1998; Morison and 
Leith 1992: 77–78). By looking at ‘beliefs and practices shared by personnel, 
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such as judges, solicitors and clerks, working in a particular court’ (Leverick 
and Duff 2002: 43), previous court culture studies highlight how shared 
practices, expectations and informal norms develop among participants who 
work together regularly and condition adjudicatory processes (Eisenstein 
and Jacob 1977; Mather et al. 2001).
In asylum appeals, local networks were seen as significant in shaping 
advocates’ interactions with tribunal staff and judges. Regular attendance at 
a hearing centre was advantageous where it facilitated building relationships 
of trust and personal rapport. Advocates found that being known by judges 
and Home Office representatives could afford additional reliability and legit-
imacy to their case. There was a suggestion that advocates who lived and 
worked in the same area as tribunal staff and judges were afforded ‘a little bit 
of favour’. As one advocate remarked:
I mean, I know them [so] I think it probably does [help] a bit. Does it help 
the eventual decision? I hope it does. Does it help my day-to-day work? Yes. I 
mean, they probably accept things from me. They know I’m not going to, you 
know, pull the wool over their eyes.
Of the two tribunals studied here, one had a relatively small body of staff 
and judges, and advocates appearing regularly there felt they knew most 
members of the workgroup. At this location, local ties between regular 
participants were signified by the use of forenames or ‘mate’ (more often 
between men). Also at this location, small talk and friendly chat between 
local advocates, tribunal staff and Home Office personnel was common. 
Some advocates spoke of having close relationships with judges and others 
outside the tribunal workplace, often going to the same social and sport-
ing events. Some advocates had links with the local Home Office Unit, 
who they would phone in advance of a hearing to clarify issues. This, they 
said, led to more effective and fairer hearings, because both sides were more 
attuned to what the other would be arguing.
To the contrary, advocates based far away from the smaller hearing 
centre, or who attended infrequently, found this a difficult place to rep-
resent appeals. One advocate spoke of the significance of regional accents 
in terms of marking out advocates as locals or outsiders, which, he said, 
impacted on interactions with tribunal staff. In his experience, advo-
cates with non-local accents had experienced harsh treatment, for exam-
ple having their appeals dismissed despite calling ahead to say they were 
late. At the smaller tribunal there was a clearer group of Rock’s habitués 
(1993: 192–194)—advocates who were not part of the inner most cir-
cle, but who were known by tribunal staff, HOPOs and judges. The 
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differences between insiders and outsiders were more marked at the 
smaller tribunal than the larger tribunal.
While the advantage of relationships at the smaller tribunal was linked 
to familiarity and trust, at the larger tribunal, with the pool of judges, 
staff, Home Office representatives and advocates much larger, workgroups 
were more fluid and relationships of familiarity harder to foster. However, 
knowing the judges and Home Office representatives was still seen as 
advantageous owing to greater predictability; advocates were better able to 
understand and anticipate how appeals would run.
Advocates with knowledge of particular judges said this often gave them 
an immediate indication of which way a hearing would go:
Generally, the more you go to the tribunals, and the more you get to know 
judges (…), when you know on the day who you’ve got as a judge, it tends to 
be a fairly good indicator of how your prospects will end up.
Advocates do not know the identity of the judge until arrival at the tribu-
nal. Each morning, hearing room schedules are displayed on the wall of the 
common space, with the name of the Judge, the Home Office representa-
tive, appellants’ representatives and the hearing type (asylum appeal, immi-
gration appeal, or visa appeal, for example). A day’s list generally comprises 
two or three appeals, depending on factors such as anticipated level of com-
plexity and number of witnesses to be cross-examined. All hearings are listed 
for 10 a.m. At this time, usual practice is for the Judge to invite all parties 
into the hearing room to establish who everyone is, discuss any issues and 
set an order for the day’s proceedings. By this point, many advocates said 
they already had a good idea of the outcome of their hearing, based on prior 
knowledge of judges as ‘refusers’, ‘dismissers’, or conversely, judges who were 
seen as particularly accepting of asylum claims. For instance, before one 
hearing, the appellant’s advocate remarked to the Home Office representa-
tive ‘I mean, look, we’re before Judge M-. He’s not gonna dismiss it, let’s 
be honest!’ That said, whereas some judges were viewed as serial refusers or 
allowers, others were seen as notoriously unpredictable:
When you find out who the judge is, that’s gonna give you an indication as to 
how long you’re gonna be there, if your case is 50:50 – which way it’s gonna 
go, et cetera. And then you get some judges that just make it the most unpre-
dictable event in the world, ‘cos it’s massively inconsistent […].
These were seen as the most difficult judges to appear before. Advocates 
preferred predictability, even where this meant knowing there was a strong 
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chance they would lose the appeal, because even in this scenario they were 
better able to plan their strategy and more alert to the possibilities of onward 
appeals. Advocates spoke of methods for collating information on different 
judges—lists, spreadsheets and keeping files with judges’ previous determi-
nations. Where an advocate had no prior experience with a particular judge, 
they might text or email around on the morning of the hearing to gauge 
others’ experiences. In this way, the decision-making environment is con-
ditioned by repetitive interactions between judges and representatives, not 
only through personal interactions but also via reputation.
Predictability was significant not only in terms of having an idea of which 
way the hearing would go, but also when it came to how advocates managed 
the appeal. Whilst the core substance of the asylum claim would remain the 
same, advocates adapted their performance in recognition of judicial prefer-
ences. Advocates developed a sense of how best to handle different judges, 
for example where judges were seen as more active or interrogatory, advo-
cates might anticipate this, and warn their clients to be patient and toler-
ant of interruptions. Some judges were known to require more in terms of 
advocates setting out the law, whereas other judges considered themselves 
the experts and, as one lawyer said, ‘they don’t want a lecture in refugee law.’ 
By building up experience and knowledge of other actors, advocates devel-
oped a sense of how to ‘read (one’s) court’. As a senior judge said to one law-
yer—‘well, I’m sure you know, Mr C, what you can say to some judges and 
what you can’t say to others.’
Appellant lawyers come and go with their clients, whereas judges and 
Home Office representatives sit through the day’s hearings together. Even 
where advocates felt they benefited from pre-existing workgroup relation-
ships, their opposition—the Home Office—benefited even more so.
Sometimes you can know a judge has a certain tendency or whatever you 
can use to your advantage or at least mitigate it if you know it’s going to be a 
problem. But the Home Office spend far more time there than we do, so they 
get to know their idiosyncrasies in even more detail than we do […].
The judges and HOPOs certainly seem very friendly together […] and they 
probably trust one another because they work together quite frequently.
HOPOs were seen as much closer to the inner circle of the tribunal. This 
was reinforced by the provision of permanent, private office space for the 
Home Office on tribunal sites, and the fact that HOPOs and judges were 
seen as moving in shared spaces inaccessible to lawyers. Segregated zones 
varied between hearing centres, but included lifts, stairways, corridors 
and meeting spaces. The layout and circulation routes of hearing centres 
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 facilitated interactions between some, while preventing interactions between 
others. Lawyers’ access was restricted to the same as their clients: waiting 
rooms, public corridors and a few private consultation rooms or booths 
available on a first come, first served basis. That Judges and HOPOs were 
seen as interacting in spaces behind closed doors fuelled perceptions of the 
Home Office as a favoured litigant, better able to benefit from personal rela-
tionships than lawyers who, although they might be regulars, are less embed-
ded within hearing centre communities.
Knowing each other is seen as advantageous insofar as a level of trust, 
personal rapport and reliability is built between actors at tribunals. Insider 
status is built through regular interactions and the development of social 
capital. However, while personal ties are perceived to play a role in shaping 
the course of appeals, lawyers highlight another significant form of insider 
status, linked to professional, rather than geographical, communities of 
practice.
‘We Recognise Our Own’: Professional 
Relationships and the Significance  
of Being a Lawyer
When you’re in the tribunal there’s more of a concentration on knowing that 
your opponent is not a lawyer […]. As a lawyer, there’s a certain approach to 
the law you have in relation to looking at a case, the analysis and how you 
present a case.
A defining element of asylum tribunal adjudication is the presence of 
‘non-lawyers’ as representatives of the Home Office. Barristers may appear 
on behalf of the Home Office as part of a scheme initiated to plug a gap 
that left many appeals unrepresented on the Home Office side, but most 
appeals are done by HOPOs (see Campbell, this volume). Some have a legal 
background, but may not have progressed through the vocational stage of 
training to become a qualified barrister or solicitor. For lawyers, this made 
a marked difference to the way hearings were run, notably with respect to: a 
mismatch in professional duties; divergent organisational pressures; conflict-
ing aims in adjudication; and imbalanced skills and work techniques.
As an officer of the court I’ve got duties to the court […] it’s about providing a 
fair hearing for the client’s case.
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Barristers have an overriding ‘duty to the court in the administration of jus-
tice’. This is found in the Bar Code of Conduct, and includes specific obli-
gations to: not knowingly or recklessly mislead or attempt to mislead the 
court; take reasonable steps to avoid wasting the court’s time; and ensure 
one’s ability to act independently is not compromised. The barrister’s duty to 
his or her client is subject to this primary duty to the court.
[The Home Office] don’t have the duty to the court in the same way as we do. 
I mean, they’re not lawyers. They’re civil servants and they’re there to do a job.
The key aim of the HOPO is to ‘ensure appeals go through the system 
efficiently’ (HOPO Training Pack: 108). HOPOs’ professional standards 
emphasise maintaining ‘a high degree of professionalism and (behaving) 
consistently in line with Home Office values’, delivering ‘robust’ defence of 
the decision, and quick and efficient case disposal. This contrasts with the 
legal advocate’s duty to ensure the administration of justice. HOPOs are 
precluded from knowingly misleading the Judge, or advancing arguments 
not in accordance with the law. However, conflicting professional values led 
advocates to view HOPOs as ‘institutionalised’ into Home Office culture, 
where the aim was always refusal rather than ensuring a fair hearing.
Lawyers were frustrated by what was seen as an undermining of core legal 
principles and failure to facilitate proper functioning of an adversarial pro-
cess. They contrasted Home Office culture (‘it’s just statistics, statistics, sta-
tistics’) with legal culture, in which primacy was given to rule of law and 
justice. HOPOs were seen by lawyers to discard legal rules as unimportant, 
just ‘niceties of a fair hearing’.
It’s very frustrating, I suppose, because it’s not two-sided. There’s things we 
have to do, you know. We can’t tell the judge things about the law that we 
know aren’t true. Whereas the Home Office have been instructed by their 
superiors to make submissions which the Home Office knows are unlawful 
[…]. It just doesn’t seem fair.
Such feelings were perpetuated by evidence of the target culture at the 
Home Office, where the stated aim was to control ‘win rates’ (Home Affairs 
Select Committee 2012: 25), with incentives such as gift vouchers, cash 
bonuses and extra holidays offered to HOPOs for meeting targets (see also 
Campbell, this volume).
The asylum chamber is characterised by legal actors as ‘a place where facts 
are meant to be established in a collaborative process which is not hostile 
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and not meant to re-traumatise the person’. Collaboration and cooperation 
were seen as possible where the Home Office was represented by a barrister.
My face lights up when I realise I’ve got counsel on the other side because you 
can have a sensible conversation. And they don’t seem to have this mentality 
that they need to always have their Home Office hat on, even when we’re hav-
ing counsel to counsel discussions.
Appeals with a HOPO, on the other hand, were generally more confronta-
tional and hostile—‘I am for the Secretary of State; you are for the appel-
lant. I see no need for cooperation.’
A further distinction lies in the nature of the ‘client’ on either side. Part 
of a lawyer’s duty to their client is to try and reach agreement on some 
things—‘So you go in there, before the judge, and say “look, can we agree 
on any of this?”’ In asylum appeals, however, the lawyer–client relationship 
is not reflected on both sides.
I take instructions from my client. I advise my client. My client tells me 
what to do. Who instructs the HOPO? Unfortunately that’s why it’s difficult. 
Because, you know, if they had a client and you had a client and both your 
clients were in the room, you could say to them, ‘Look, you talk to your cli-
ent, I’ll talk to my client, and we’ll see what we can do’. But their client isn’t 
a client. Their client’s this monster; it’s the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.
The breakdown in the idealised adversarial model espoused by the advocate 
here reflects the presence of different institutional actors at the tribunal, with 
alternative, and often incompatible, modes of practice. Home Office materi-
als also demonstrate this opposition in relation to ethos and language:
Whilst it is unavoidable that technical issues will have to be addressed, there 
is no necessity to use some of the language that the judiciary or legal profes-
sionals may use. For instance, if you are presenting an immigration case, the 
decision you are supporting is not your ‘instructions’ – it is a decision made 
in another business area in line with the law, the Immigration Rules and UK 
Border Agency policy that you are advancing in support of the strategic aims 
of the Agency. (HOPO Training Pack: 105)
Advocates often produce a skeleton argument prior to the hearing, outlin-
ing the main issues, evidence and any calls for further instructions on either 
side. The skeleton argument is passed to the judge and opposition on the 
10 Interactions and Identities in UK Asylum Appeals …     211
morning of the hearing, or a couple of days before. In addition to this, advo-
cates often liked to get a sense of who they were up against—‘to try and 
test the water…’ so they might have an idea what to expect during cross- 
examination, or be able to streamline the issues for the hearing.
The good thing about being an advocate is that the advocacy doesn’t start at 
the time of the hearing. The advocacy starts well before the hearing, because 
even before the hearing commences, you go in and you see your opponent.
Pre-hearing exchanges ranged from informal conversations about week-
end activities, sport and mutual acquaintances, to more formal discussions 
of the legal issues. However, this practice was not seen as useful in all cir-
cumstances, where a particular HOPO was seen as ‘unpleasant’, ‘confronta-
tional’, or ‘frankly quite irritating’, or because HOPOs lacked discretion to 
concede or narrow many points.
A further divergence in work techniques arises in the main body of the 
asylum hearing—the cross-examination. Lawyers had a strong preference for 
being against a similarly qualified opposition, not because it made their case 
any easier (on the contrary, it was often seen to make things harder), but 
because this gave greater predictability and integrity to proceedings. As one 
advocate said of the junior barristers instructed by the Home Office:
They knew how to cross-examine; they knew how to focus on the issues. So 
although on the one hand they were more effective as representatives, at the 
same time, because they were doing things in a fairer way, it was a much better 
hearing and the outcomes were often fairer.
Home Office barristers were seen as more polite, focused, adept at getting to 
the point and skillful at putting forward the case for the opposition. Cross-
examination by HOPOs, on the other hand, was described as hostile, insen-
sitive, and ‘just interminable, useless, repeating the same points again and 
again […]’.
One thing you’ll get from counsel is that they’re bound by the Bar Code of 
Conduct, and they know how to cross-examine. So, that’s a double-edged 
sword. If your client is telling the truth, um, that can often work in your 
favour. Because […] they won’t ask irrelevant questions, and they won’t just 
dig… whereas HOPOs will do that. On the other hand, with counsel it’s, you 
know, when you’re trained, you’ll ask a question, get the answer you’d want 
and then back off. One of the things you learn in bar school, in pupillage, is: 
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don’t ask a question you don’t know the answer to. Don’t. And know when not 
to ask a question too many.
Fairness, as argued by the previous advocate, was also a question of pre-
dictability (knowing what your opponent was going to do) and respect 
for customary legal practice and training. Advocates’ preference for strong 
representation on the opposing side was built on an idealised view of the 
asylum hearing as a legal exchange between two, similarly qualified, oppos-
ing factions. The adversarial system is designed ‘not as an inquiry into the 
final truth of a matter, but as a struggle […] between two competing, par-
tial and incomplete cases’ (Rock 1993: 31). Such a model presumes a level 
of equality on both sides in terms of legal skill and knowledge. A fair and 
effective hearing was seen as one in which the issues were properly focused 
and probed without resort to hostile or insensitive questioning techniques. 
Advocates had confidence that cross-examination would be ‘proper’ where 
they encountered a similarly trained (and regulated) opposition, even 
though this was more likely to highlight gaps in evidence that they would 
rather not have revealed. Thus, the threat identified by advocates here is to 
the ‘ceremonial, disciplined, and staged’ (Rock 1993: 27) nature of adversar-
ial hearings. Winning appeals for clients was important. But of comparable 
importance was adherence to professional codes and display of good legal 
practice.
Advocates felt subject to double standards, with Judges’ ‘huge tolerance’ 
of ‘systematic flouting’ of the rules and ‘egregious errors’ made by HOPOs 
reinforcing a view of the Home Office as a favoured party (Yeo 2012). This 
was particularly infuriating given the significant difference between the 
Home Office and legal aid lawyers in terms of funding and resources. The 
following exchange took place between an asylum barrister and judge when 
the Home Office appeared at the tribunal unprepared, without an evidence 
bundle, and requested an adjournment:
Barrister: As a matter of law, we don’t need the Home Office bundle. It is 
down to maladministration of the Home Office. Why should [the wit-
nesses] have given up their day of paid work for nothing? It is in the inter-
ests of justice to go ahead.
Judge: And therefore your proposal would be to go ahead part-heard?
Barrister: It seems exceptionally troubling. My client was ready for his pre-
vious appeal last year. The Home Office pulls the rug from beneath his feet 
and withdrew their decision. As a matter of law, all we have to prove is that 
my client is not returnable. Why should he have to wait a few more months 
just because the Home Office can’t get its act together?
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Judge: I’ve heard what you have said. The Home Office’s actions are entirely 
unsatisfactory. I’m sure [the HOPO] will convey the dissatisfaction of the 
court to the Home Office.
The barrister, despite his insistence that ‘as a matter of law’ the hearing 
could proceed, failed to persuade the Judge that day. Reluctance on the part 
of Judges to do anything more than note dissatisfaction or annoyance was 
felt by other advocates, citing routine failures of the Home Office to com-
ply with directions from the tribunal, resulting in increased time, cost and 
inconvenience to their clients and witnesses. But the force of law, in these 
instances, was rendered impotent.
Advocates’ legal arguments and expertise are often not enough to secure 
victory in asylum appeals—not because the opposition is more skilled—
but because the value of legal expertise is diminished in the asylum tribunal 
setting. Advocates wanted it to matter that they were better litigators, and 
were often quick to identify the ‘non-lawyer’ as an intruder in the adver-
sarial process. Indeed, it has been argued, ‘(l)awyers appear to be the only 
occupational group to have coined a new word—nonlawyer—to divide the 
world between insiders and outsiders’ (Mather et al. 2001: 42). But asylum 
appeals do not take place in an ordinary adversarial environment. Mastering 
the rules of the legal game—being a legal insider—is not enough.
Conclusion
The practical content of the law which emerges in the judgment is the product 
of a symbolic struggle between professionals possessing unequal technical skills 
and social influence. (Bourdieu 1987: 827)
This chapter has argued that what matters in asylum appeals is not only 
law, in the narrow sense of rules and procedures, but a range of interacting, 
and often conflicting social currents. Looking at sites of friction and strug-
gles between conflicting institutional ideologies and organisational goals 
can give greater insight into an area of social life (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992; Madson and Dezalay 2002). Furthermore, the operation of law and 
legal rules can be better understood by studying them in their social context 
and in relation to other ‘non-legal’ forces (Moore 1973). The tribunal occu-
pies a site of organiational complexity, between law, politics and administra-
tion. The asymmetric nature of asylum appeals, with the inclusion of Home 
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Office personnel, protocols and values, sets it apart from other traditional 
adjudicatory settings, such as criminal courts, which might be conceptual-
ised as operating within the boundaries of the legal field. At the asylum tri-
bunal, we observe multiple ‘intersecting, yet incompatible fields’ (Anderson 
et al. 2014: 13) with alternate logics and stakes of play (Calhoun 2003: 277; 
Harker et al. 1990; Gill and Good, this volume).
The insights gathered here relate to the stakes of play in asylum appeals. 
Insider status is valued; knowing the other tribunal members is seen as sig-
nificant in terms of improving chances of success. This kind of social capital 
is more readily accumulated and deployed by those closer to the inner cir-
cles of a particular hearing centre. The other type of insider status discussed 
here—being legally qualified and belonging to professional lawyer circles—
attracts a different kind of value. It can enhance reputation and standing 
within lawyer circles. The process of becoming a lawyer gives lawyers a set of 
rules governing language and conduct in litigation. A common understand-
ing of rules, roles and what is acceptable conduct gives lawyers confidence; 
it makes the legal game more predictable and, through this, contributes to 
reassuring them that the game is played fairly.
However, asylum appeals at the tribunal are permeated by numerous 
codes, protocols, assumptions and forms of communication as a result of the 
history and development of the tribunal as both an overseer of administra-
tive action and an instrument of immigration control. The divide between 
lawyers and non-lawyers in asylum appeals represents a struggle between 
actors, identities, organisations, and institutions. Advocates are open to 
some forms of ‘extra-legal givings’—for example the benefits gained by 
developing relationships through interactions with judges or the opposition 
(particularly where this works in their favour). Yet the legitimacy of other 
extra-legal environmental forces is heavily resisted.
Despite tribunal reforms that affirm commitments to upholding tradi-
tional legal values and procedural guarantees, advocates experienced a system 
driven by scepticism of the outsider, administrative pressures to curb immi-
gration, bureaucratic efficiency initiatives and swingeing resource cuts. This 
limits the effectiveness of good quality legal representation in appeals and 
goes some way in explaining why success rates remain at a relatively static 
25% for appellants, despite significant advances in opening up Convention 
categories. For legal advocates, the game is about achieving fair and just con-
sideration of protection claims according to the rules, procedures and prac-
tices of law. However, the force of law in asylum appeals is contained by 
other, more powerful, social forces.
10 Interactions and Identities in UK Asylum Appeals …     215
References
Amnesty International, Still Human Still Here. (2013). A Question of Credibility: 
Why So Many Initial Asylum Decisions Are Overturned on Appeal in the UK. 
Amnesty International.
Anderson, J., Hollaus, J., Lindsay, A., & Williamson, C. (2014). The Culture of 
Disbelief: An Ethnographic Approach to Understanding an Under-Theorised Concept 
in the UK Asylum System (Refugee Studies Working Paper Series, 102). Oxford: 
University of Oxford.
Appelqvist, M. (2000). Refugee Law and Cause Lawyering: A Swedish Study of the 
Legal Profession. International Journal of Refugee Law, 12, 71–89.
Asylum Aid. (2011). Unsustainable: The Quality of Initial Decision-Making in 
Women’s Asylum Claims.
Bail for Immigration Detainees. (2006). Working Against the Clock: Inadequacy and 
Injustice in the Asylum System.
Bail for Immigration Detainees and Asylum Aid. (2005). Justice Denied—Asylum 
and Immigration Legal Aid—A System in Crisis.
Baillot, H., Cowan, S., & Munro, V. (2012). “Hearing the Right Gaps”: Enabling 
and Responding to Disclosures of Sexual Violence Within the UK Asylum 
Process. Social and Legal Studies, 21, 269–296.
Bourdieu, P. (1987). The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field. 
Hastings Law Journal, 38, 814–853.
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. 
Cambridge: Polity.
Burridge, A., & Gill, N. (2017). Conveyor-Belt Justice: Precarity, Access to Justice, 
and Uneven Geographies of Legal Aid in UK Asylum Appeals. Antipode, 49, 
23–42.
Calhoun, C. (2003). Pierre Bourdieu. In The Blackwell Companion to Major 
Contemporary Social Theorists (pp. 274–309). Oxford: Blackwell.
Clayton, G. (2010). Immigration and Asylum Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conley, J. M., & O’Barr, W. M. (1990). Rules Versus Relationships: The Ethnography 
of Legal Discourse. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Cowan, D., & Hitchings, E. (2007). ‘Pretty Boring Stuff’: District Judges and 
Housing Possession Proceedings. Social and Legal Studies, 16(3), 363–382.
Eisenstein, J., & Jacob, H. (1977). Felony Justice: An Organizational Analysis of 
Criminal Courts. Boston: Little, Brown.
Ewick, P., & Silbey, S. S. (1998). The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday 
Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Feder, B. (2010). A Credible Judge of Character? A Psycho-Legal Analysis of 
Credibility Assessments for Asylum Applicants with a History of Sexual 
Violence. Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law, 24, 295–323.
Fielding, N. (2011). Judges and Their Work. Social and Legal Studies, 20, 97–115.
216     J. Hambly
Gill, N., Rotter, R., Burridge, A., Allsopp, J., & Griffiths, M. (2016). Linguistic 
Incomprehension in British Asylum Appeal Hearings. Anthropology Today, 32, 
18–21.
Gill, N., Rotter, R., Burridge, A., Griffiths, M., & Allsopp, J. (2015). Inconsistency 
in Asylum Appeal Adjudication. Forced Migration Review, 50, 52–54.
Good, A. (2007). Anthropology and Expertise in the Asylum Courts. Oxon: 
Routledge-Cavendish.
Griffiths, M. (2012). “Vile Liars and Truth Distorters”. Truth, Trust and the 
Asylum System. Anthropology Today, 28, 8–12.
Harker, R., Mahar, C., & Wilkes, C. (Eds.). (1990). An Introduction to the Work of 
Pierre Bourdieu: The Practice of Theory. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Hawkins, K. (2003). Order, Rationality and Silence: Some Reflections On 
Criminal Justice Decision-Making. In Exercising Discretion: Decision-Making 
in the Criminal Justice System and Beyond (pp. 186–220). Cullompton: Willan 
Publishing.
Hawkins, K. (2002). Law as Last Resort. Oxford Socio-legal Studies. Oxford 
University Press.
Home Affairs Select Committee. (2012). Fifth Report: The Work of the UKBA 
(December 2011–March 2012) (p. 25). House of Commons. Available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmhaff/71/71.pdf. 
Accessed 18 Sep 2018.
Independent Asylum Commission. (2008). Fit for Purpose Yet? The Independent 
Asylum Commission’s Interim Findings.
James, D., & Killick, E. (2012). Empathy and Expertise: Case Workers and 
Immigration/Asylum Applicants in London. Law and Social Inquiry, 37(2), 
430–455.
Jubany, O. (2011). Constructing Truths in a Culture of Disbelief: Understanding 
Asylum Screening from Within. International Sociolology, 26, 74–94.
Juss, S. S. (1993). Immigration, Nationality and Citizenship. London: Mansell.
Kritzer, H. (2007). Toward a Theorization of Craft. Social and Legal Studies, 16, 
321–340.
Kritzer, H. M. (1998). Legal Advocacy: Lawyers and Nonlawyers at Work. Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press.
Kritzer, H. M. (1990). The Justice Broker: Lawyers and Ordinary Litigation. New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral 
Participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leverick, F., & Duff, P. (2002). Court Culture and Adjournments in Criminal 
Cases: A Tale of Four Courts. Criminal Law Review, 39, 39–52.
Lipsky, M. (1969). Toward a Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy (p. 48). Pap: 
Institute for Reasearch on Poverty.
Mack, K., & Roach Anleu, S. (2010). Trial Courts and Adjudication. In The 
Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (pp. 545–570). New York: Oxford 
University Press.
10 Interactions and Identities in UK Asylum Appeals …     217
Madson, M. R., & Dezalay, Y. (2002). The Power of the Legal Field: Pierre 
Bourdieu and the Law. In An Introduction to Law and Social Theory 
(pp. 189–207). Oxford and Portland: Hart.
Mather, L. M., McEwen, C. A., & Maiman, R. J. (2001). Divorce Lawyers at Work: 
Varieties of Professionalism in Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moore, S. F. (1973). Law and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous Social Field as 
an Appropriate Subject of Study. Law Society Review, 7, 719–746.
Moorhead, R., & Cowan, D. (2007). Judgecraft: An Introduction. Social and Legal 
Studies, 16, 315–320.
Morison, J., & Leith, P. (1992). The Barrister’s World—And the Nature of Law. 
Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Rawlings, R. (2005). Review, Revenge and Retreat. Modern Law Review, 68, 
378–410.
Rehaag, S. (2011). The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination 
System: An Empirical Assessment. Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 49, 71–116.
Roach Anleu, S. (2010). Law and Social Change (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
Rock, P. E. (1993). The Social World of an English Crown Court: Witness and 
Professionals in the Crown Court Centre at Wood Green. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schoenholtz, A., & Bernstein, H. (2008). Improving Immigration Adjudications 
Through Competent Counsel. Georgetown University Law Center: Journal Legal 
Ethics, 21, 55–60.
Schoenholtz, A., & Jacobs, J. (2002). The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas 
for Change. Georgetown University Law Center: Immigration Law Journal, 16, 
739–772.
Shah, P. (Ed.). (2005). The Challenge of Asylum to Legal Systems. London and 
Portland: Routledge-Cavendish.
Showler, P. (2006). Refugee Sandwich: Stories of Exile and Asylum. Kingston, ON: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Souter, J. (2011). A Culture of Disbelief or Denial? Critiquing Refugee Status 
Determination in the United Kingdom. Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration, 
1(1), 48–59.
Thomas, R. (2003a). The Impact of Judicial Review on Asylum. Public Law, 
479–510.
Thomas, R. (2003b). Asylum Appeals Overhauled Again. Public Law, 260–271.
Thomas, R. (2011). Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals: A Study of Tribunal 
Adjudication. Oxford: Hart.
Yeo, C. (2012). Open Season On Immigration Lawyers. Free Movement. Available 
at: https://www.freemovement.org.uk/open-season-on-immigration-lawyers/. 
Accessed 14 June 2014.
218     J. Hambly
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, a link is provided to the Creative Commons license and 
any changes made are indicated.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
work’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; 
if such material is not included in the work’s Creative Commons license and the 
respective action is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain 
permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.
Part III
Decision-Making
221© The Author(s) 2019 
N. Gill and A. Good (eds.), Asylum Determination in Europe,  
Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94749-5_11
Introduction
In this chapter I focus on a specific moment in the Italian procedure for 
granting international protection, the first level of appeal. In Italy, asy-
lum seekers should apply for protection upon their arrival in the country, 
filling in a form (Modulo C/3) at a police headquarters. They are usu-
ally hosted in different types of centres while they wait for their hearing 
in front of a Territorial Commission (TC), the administrative board in 
charge of the first evaluation of asylum applications. If they get a negative 
decision, or a lesser protection than the one expected, they can appeal in 
front of one civil tribunal out of the 26 presently competent on asylum 
and, in case of a second negative or unsatisfactory decision, they have a 
right to a second-level appeal at a Court of Appeal. In particular, I use 
the much discussed ‘credibility issue’ as a lens through which to observe 
how this notion is conceived of and employed by appeal judges in two 
different sites. I also show how this approach can help us understand the 
nature of this ‘quasi-legal category’ (Sweeney 2009) as a flexible device 
which is, at the same time, a core issue in the refugee status determination 
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procedure,1 a sensitive category to handle with care,2 and an almost-empty 
shell that can be used for various purposes, stretching out far beyond the 
tribunals themselves. Such purposes can only be grasped when shifting 
the gaze from the mechanics of civil law as enacted inside specific local 
sites, towards national and supra-national migratory policies rooted in an 
entangling culture of indifference (Gill 2016). In their introduction to this 
volume, Gill and Good argue that the current attempt to consolidate a 
“Common European Asylum System” coincides with an unprecedented 
pressure on that same system, due to a drastic increase in the number of 
asylum seekers mostly fleeing from the war in the Middle East. They con-
clude by stressing how the ‘harmonisation’ of the European asylum system 
is still far from sight (see also European Commission 2016).
Against this context, to take a closer look at the way in which the asy-
lum appeal procedure actually works in Italy is quite important, for three 
reasons. Firstly, because Italy is in the spot-light of European and interna-
tional bodies governing migrations, being along with Greece (Cabot 2014), 
both a strategic check-point to guard the external frontiers of Europe, and 
one of the main doors for migrants to enter Europe. Secondly, because of 
some specificities of its asylum system—with two degrees of appeal on the 
merits (plus the possibility to challenge the legality of the decision before 
the Supreme Court), and with appeals being heard by civil courts instead 
of administrative ones.3 And finally, because it reveals an interestingly high 
degree of opacity, instability and variations of both decisional practices and 
underlying norms and assumptions, in a context which is as much vocifer-
ously discussed by the media as it is closed to the public and difficult to 
access for research purposes.
This chapter does not aim to be ‘context-free’, as in Bruno Latour’s 
extremely engaging work on the making of law; on the contrary, and instead 
of trying ‘to capture […] the essence of law ’ (2010: x), I rather focus in detail 
on the civil tribunal of Bologna where I conducted research in 2013–2015, 
and relate it to that of Turin where I interviewed some magistrates in 2016. 
Despite Turin and Bologna being located some 300-kilometers apart, as the 
main towns of separate regions, the two were connected in relation to asy-
lum: the Bologna TC was, at the time of my research, a subsection of the 
3As I write, a highly contested reform is being discussed (D.L 13–17), whereby the procedure is 
reduced from three to two levels of decision: i.e. TC and first Tribunal appeal only.
1See Coffey (2003), Byrne (2007).
2As the many Manuals recently published under the CREDO project show: IARLJ (2013), UNHCR 
(2013), CREDO (2015).
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Turin one.4 My empirical data are drawn from participant observation of a 
tribunal determination, interviews with magistrates and lawyers, and a col-
lective analysis of over 200 appeal decisions. By choosing to remain close 
to the local level, making space for ethnographic details, I do not intend to 
give up the possibility of showing the complex relations that tie specific legal 
procedures to a global understanding and (attempts at) governing asylum 
rights. On the contrary, I try to show how local practices would otherwise 
remain rather obscure if not related to the national and supra-national ideo-
logical and political frames that, paraphrasing Antonio Gramsci, De Genova 
has recently called ‘the “European” Question’ (2016).5 Conversely, by focus-
ing on specific sites at different times, we can see how the repeated use of 
the notion of “refugee crisis” in Europe, and the ‘politics of austerity, acutely 
affecting southern European countries in particular, coupled with border 
enforcement strategies that preemptively illegalise mobile people seeking 
asylum’ (Tazzioli and De Genova 2016: 5), strongly impact on local-level 
decisional procedures of recognition or rejection.
A Prequel
In June 2011, the lawyer I had contacted for my research on Refugee Status 
Determination Procedure (RSDP) managed to persuade a judge at the Civil 
Division of the Bologna tribunal to let me participate as observer in a case 
regarding a denied asylum seeker from Pakistan. I had already learned that 
the first instance appeal takes place at the Civil Division of one of the many 
tribunals in the country, where appeals are set up as a camera di consiglio 
(chamber of council) which—as in other legal processes where privacy pro-
tection is privileged over the public nature of the proceedings - is not open 
to the public and, in the case of asylum, has a monocratic composition. 
Thus a magistrate, the claimant, their representing lawyer and a linguistic 
interpreter are the only actors involved.6 I therefore considered myself lucky 
4While in 2010 ten TCs were operating in Italy, their number has presently risen to some 45 TCs, 
each composed of 4 members from the institutions involved (Prefecture, Police, Local authority and 
UNHCR): extended interviews are carried out by only one member, while final decisions are taken 
collectively.
5Or the need to redefine ‘what is Europe’, when the Schengen area of free mobility, at the core of 
European integration itself, seems to have failed.
6Asylum appellants usually cannot afford a lawyer: it is up to them to find those willing to give ‘free’ 
legal aid (patrocinio gratuito ), whereby their fee is actually met by the State at a lower rate. As for the 
interpreter, things differ from one tribunal to another; in Bologna, they had then recourse to resident 
migrants who consented to translate for free or for a minimal reimbursement.
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to be allowed into a usually closed context, although I was not quite sure 
about what to expect. What I definitely did not anticipate, was how quickly 
it all would go.
On the morning of the hearing I met the lawyer at the tribunal, and she 
led me, the appellant and the interpreter to the judge’s office: a small room 
simply furnished with a few shelves containing files and law books, a few 
chairs and a desk. On the walls and on the desk, some Catholic religious 
images and items were displayed. After introducing myself I was accom-
modated in a corner, while the appellant, his interpreter and his lawyer 
found seats at the desk, facing the judge. With both her posture and tone 
of voice, the judge made clear that she did not intend to waste any time, so 
while quickly flipping through the pages of the file she addressed the lawyer 
directly in Italian, questioning the nature of two new documents she found 
in the file. Since the interpreter had started to translate, the judge stopped 
him, explaining he should only translate when told to do so, and asked 
him first to confirm that he was the linguistic interpreter ‘from Pakistani 
language’.
The lawyer explained to the judge that the two new documents were, 
respectively, a medical certificate from the hospital attesting to the inju-
ries suffered by the appellant’s relatives, and the police report following 
the assault on the appellant’s relatives by a group of neighbours.7 She then 
added:
the scope of the appeal is to eliminate any doubt. The TC expressed doubts 
about this case in relation to a lack of documentation concerning medical cer-
tificates and police reports, which we now produce. But the TC did not pro-
vide clear reasons for the final denial: this fact alone is, for many judges, a 
reason to appeal.8
The judge finally told the interpreter to translate what the lawyer had 
affirmed, and to ask if the appellant wished to add anything. He replied with 
a plea; ‘to the Italian government, that I may be allowed to remain in Italy at 
7I knew from the lawyer’s file that behind the assault was an attempt to grab the land of the appellant’s 
patrilineage following the death of his father and brother; yet during the appeal there was no reference 
to those reasons, nor to documented land disputes in rural Pakistan, where the police are often unable 
or unwilling to offer protection to the party harmed, or complicit with the offenders, as Refworld 
Report attested. See: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5072ca722.html.
8The lawyer was referring to the fact that, in denying all three types of protection—refugee status, sub-
sidiary protection, and humanitarian protection (a national protection granted under Legislative Decree 
25 July 1998, no. 286, art. 5 c. 6)—the TC omitted to explain the reasons for each individual denial.
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least until the situation in Pakistan is solved. I am the only one left to sup-
port my large family and if I go back my life is at risk.’ It was at this point 
of a very short hearing that, in a few seconds, everything changed: from the 
tone of voice of the judge and the look in her eyes, to the colour of the 
lawyer’s face. The judge quickly re-read her notes through, asking the inter-
preter to translate sentence by sentence for the appellant to agree and sign 
the minutes. It thus appeared she had annotated ‘economic support’; when 
questioned by the lawyer on this point, she conceded: ‘I may have added 
“economic” to the word “support” myself, but I do not really think this is a 
matter for interpretation, do you?’. She handed over the minutes for signa-
ture, and murmuring the ritual sentence—‘I shall reserve my decision’9—she 
quickly dismissed us all. Being my first time, I did not immediately catch 
why the lawyer was literally trembling with fury, thinking this was due to 
the rapidity of the procedure and the absence of a real interview. But, as she 
explained when she burst out in front of her client, she already knew the 
outcome would be rejection because he had wrongly suggested material dif-
ficulties; ‘and he shouldn’t have! I had explained this very clearly in my office 
only half an hour before. He said he understood! He should not have ever 
mentioned economic reasons. He should have stuck to the truth!’.
What struck me then about what I had witnessed was the apparent ease 
with which a person who is endowed with the authority can decide in such 
a short time (about 20 minutes altogether) on issues relating to the life and 
death of another person. But over time, I came to realise that many more 
things characterised this particular type of legal encounter. For instance, it 
was possible to apprehend there how inaccurate the previous interview in 
front of the TC had been, where no motivation for rejection was offered, 
and a negative decision was based merely on ‘scepticism’ due to a lack of 
appropriate documentation.10 It also revealed that no real second interview 
may take place even though the judge herself had convoked the appellant; 
that complex social and cultural realties are reduced to transparent facts that 
need no further investigation, rather than being recognised truly as ‘matters 
of interpretation’ (Gibb and Good 2013); and that additional documents 
could be totally neglected, despite the whole appeal revolving around them. 
Finally, it showed how—vis-à-vis a very poor knowledge of the appellant’s 
country of origin (as signaled by the reference to a ‘Pakistani language’), and 
9With this closure sentence the judge defers the decision to a later moment.
10Notwithstanding the fact that in RSDP ‘the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is 
shared between the applicant and the examiner’ (UNHCR 1979): a principle confirmed in Italy by the 
Supreme Court (Cass. S.U. 17/11/2008, no. 27310).
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no further enquiry into the nature of violence connected to land disputes—
the decision could be based on one single ‘wrong’ word.
At the Tribunal
In 2013, two years after this experience, I was involved in the co- 
coordination of research to be carried out at the Bologna tribunal. The pres-
ident of a newly born association to which I belong11 obtained permission 
to conduct research on the files concerning asylum appeal determinations 
taken by that tribunal. During an introductory meeting, the president of the 
Civil Division—competent, among other issues, on asylum—explained how 
the system worked: the Division received and temporarily stored files about 
single appellants, containing all the documents assembled up to that stage.12 
Those documents were received only as print-outs, so they were extremely 
vulnerable: there was only one copy for each file, and if they migrated to 
the Court of Appeal, they might not come back or might be dismembered. 
All the files that did come back (and those which never migrated) should 
then be sent to the archive, located in a different building. But the files’ 
careers didn’t stop there. Once in the archive, the files underwent a new 
transformation, becoming nearly invisible: they still existed, but could not 
be easily retrieved. This happened (indeed, at that time, across the whole 
country) because asylum cases were not labelled under a single specific code 
but rather drowned in the vast sea of files from the Home Office which, 
as the president stressed, ‘literally encompasses everything’. As the president 
went on with her explanation, another quite peculiar obstacle became clear: 
namely, that our admission to the archive for study purposes would be ‘out 
of the question’, since ‘the archivist in charge doesn’t tolerate any other pres-
ence there, besides herself and a few clerks’.13
11Founded in 2013, Asilo in Europa brings together experts on asylum issues from different countries, 
in order to create a network to share knowledge and praxis, and to offer comparative and updated infor-
mation of different types across Europe.
12These comprised: the first request-form filled at a police headquarter (C3); the transcript of the TC’s 
extended interview; its final decision; its notification to the claimant; any documentation provided by 
the claimant at the first hearing; the appeal motivation from the assisting lawyer; any documentation 
added at the appeal stage; transcript of the eventual appeal hearing; the judge’s decision; its notification 
to the appellant.
13Meeting at the Bologna tribunal, 15th of March 2013. On archival relevance for anthropological 
studies and the materiality of paper documents also in asylum, see Basu and De Jong (2016), Cabot 
(2012), Hull (2012), Latour (2010), Sorgoni and Viazzo (2010), Stoler (2009).
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In sum, if we add together the fact that asylum files exist only as one-
copy print-outs, that they might migrate and get lost or damaged on the 
way, and that they were not catalogued as a homogeneous category, we easily 
understand the recent admission of Prefect Trovato at his hearing in front 
of a Parliamentary commission monitoring the influx of migrants. ‘We 
possess total national data on the number of accepted or rejected appeal 
claims’, he explained, adding that in order to get separated statistics on 
single  judiciary bodies, ‘we should go and look from tribunal to tribunal’ 
(Parliamentary Hearing 2015: 13, my translation). This admission renders 
Asilo in Europa’s research (2015) extremely valuable, being so far the only 
existing quali-quantitative study of first instance asylum appeals (in a specific 
tribunal) in Italy.
Over a period of about a year, members of the association studied and 
classified some 233 appeal files relating to decisions from 2011 to 2013. On 
the one hand this time span was compulsory, since only recent files were 
still temporarily stored inside the tribunal while waiting to be sent to the 
main archive. But on the other hand, the period proved strategic, giving us 
the additional possibility of verifying whether the unrest in Tunisia, the so 
called ‘Arab spring’, and the Libyan war in 2011–2012—which had resulted 
in a consistent increase in the number of migrants to Italy, and in ad hoc 
reception policies labelled ENA (North African Emergency)—significantly 
impacted on the decisions and, eventually, in what way. I come back to this 
latter issue below; here I want first to give some numerical data about asy-
lum appeals in Bologna, as they emerged from our research.
To classify the files, we selected some relevant criteria: age, sex and coun-
try of origin of the appellant; length of the entire determination procedure; 
if appealing from an open centre or a CIE (Centre for Identification and 
Expulsion, i.e., administrative detention); if falling under the ENA label; the 
percentage of procedurally-based decisions vis-à-vis decisions on the merits; 
and the completeness of the file. About the latter point, it is important to 
note that out of 233 files, only 22 were complete in the sense defined ear-
lier (see Footnote 12). Also, out of 233 files, 21 contained no trace of any 
decision while in 41 cases the decision was founded solely on procedural 
grounds, which left us with 171 files to analyse thoroughly. Out of 171 files, 
110 (64%) ended with a rejection of the appeal, while in 61 cases (36%) the 
judge decided to allow the appeal: in these cases, only one person obtained 
refugee status, with 22 obtaining subsidiary protection, and 38 (over 62%) a 
one-year humanitarian protection.
Turning now to the so-called ENA, and in order to understand its impact 
on appeal decisions in Bologna, we need to switch momentarily from the 
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determination procedure to the reception system, since what made that phe-
nomenon a publicly recognised political débâcle was not only the substantial 
increase in the number of migrants (from less than 5000 in 2010, to over 
62,000 in 2011), but also the Government decision to assign their recep-
tion to the Civil Protection Corps, usually in charge of natural disasters.14 
A new and temporary reception system was thus abruptly set in place with 
full power, running parallel to (and at times conflicting with) the already 
existing and tested one. To cut a long and disastrous story short,15 it is 
important to know that the logic behind the reception of those migrants 
consisted mainly in separating Tunisians from ‘Libyans’, both in spatial 
and procedural terms. The former were initially given six-months leave and 
de facto allowed to cross the national border (mostly to France), and later 
forcibly repatriated according to the Italy-Tunisia Treaty hastily signed in 
March 2011; the latter were distributed across the country in new ‘ENA 
centres’ where they were to wait until their claim for protection was pro-
cessed (which turned out to take about two years). This second group was 
almost entirely composed of sub-Saharan Africans who had been living 
and working—many already for years—in Libya when the war started, and 
who fled the country across the Mediterranean. Thus, many of those who 
applied in the first year received a denial, usually on the grounds that they 
could safely ‘go back’ to their respective ‘real’ countries of origin. In fact in 
2011, over 76% of asylum applications (out of 37,350 total applications) 
concerned persons from Africa—mostly from Nigeria, Ghana, Mali (coming 
from Libya), and Tunisia. At the end of that year, 65% of Nigerians, 76% of 
Ghanaians and 82% of Malians respectively, were denied any type of protec-
tion (Ministero dell’Interno 2016b).
What the Italian Government had not anticipated was the clogging of both 
the TCs—which collapsed under the pressure of such high numbers—and 
the tribunals, which started to receive appeals from those denied. This further 
resulted in an unforeseen extension of the declared ‘state of emergency’, and 
consequently of the life (and costs) of the new and supposedly temporary ENA 
hosting centres. After almost two years, the Home Office issued a circular16 
suggesting the TCs granted humanitarian protection to all those known as 
14For detailed descriptions and critical assessments of the ENA process see Marchetti (2012), Bracci 
(2012), Olivieri (2011) on local and national aspects respectively.
15During a public conference (Bologna, 12 April 2013) on the Civil Protection management, Prefect 
Compagnucci acknowledged that ‘in the sacred chambers of power we soon realised this had been a 
mistake, yet we did not change it. This resulted in far too lengthy procedures at an enormous cost’.
16Home Office, Circular no. 400/C/2012, 31 October 2012, Overcoming North African Emergency.
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‘ENA asylum-seekers’, a solution which eventually afforded the opportunity to 
put a political end to the emergency itself, and finally close the centres.
The present relevance of this story is that it also impacted directly on 
the tribunal’s decisions. As shown above, before the 2012 government dis-
position, TCs all over Italy tended to deny any protection to sub-Saharan 
Africans fleeing the war in Libya, on the ground that they could go back 
to their ‘country of origin’; many of them appealed against the denial. A 
founding principle of democracy, the separation of powers is particularly rel-
evant in human rights issues, and a fundamental principle according to EU 
law.17 As Sicakkan (2008: 218) proved in his research on asylum systems in 
17 European countries, ‘institutional decision-making frames where central 
authorities act as the first instance and legal courts as appeal instance’ are 
associated with procedures which are fairer with regard to applicants’ rights. 
Thus, in the ENA situation, the fact that the decisions’ outcome at first 
(state) instance switched from flat denial to humanitarian protection after 
the 2012 ministerial circular, may come as no surprise.18 But in a ‘separate 
system’, appeal courts are then expected to decide in relation to individ-
ual cases independently from the administrative instance’s previous deci-
sion. Indeed, the main purpose of a tribunal system is to allow individuals 
to appeal to an independent judicial body against a negative decision from 
the government. It should therefore be a surprise that, among the 37 appeal 
files that we analysed relating to men from Ghana fleeing from Libya, those 
seven who appealed before the 2012 government circular were all rejected, 
while 26 out of the 30 who appealed after the circular had the first negative 
decision turned into humanitarian protection.
This example seems to point to the fact that the separation of the admin-
istration and the judiciary, while existing in theory, may blur in the actual 
making of the law, especially under certain circumstances. In this specific 
event, we may reasonably think that such circumstances had mostly to do 
with the sudden and unexpectedly high increase in the number of asylum 
claimants in the space of a few months. While this is partly the case, in 
the last section I argue that there are more reasons of a diversified political 
and cultural nature behind all this. Or, to phrase it differently, the contin-
ual resort to notions such as “refugee crisis” or “migrants emergency” is pro-
ductive of specific policies, whereby human rights, embedded in a unique 
17Art. 47 Treaty of Nice.
18Indeed in 2012, when the Home Office inverted its policy, 80% of Nigerians and 89% of Ghanaians 
received Humanitarian Protection, while 78% of Malians got subsidiary protection (Ministero dell’In-
terno 2016b).
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relationship between an individual claim and a specific hosting State, are 
instead managed as political issues of border control between States, medi-
ated by EU and international agreements (Hansen and Stepputat 2005; 
Sorgoni 2011, see also Gill and Good’s Introduction to this volume). The 
ENA situation also uncovers a mechanism based on collective decisions 
rather than on the careful evaluation of individual stories, which translates 
into similar stories resulting in divergent outcomes. For instance, in seven 
cases the judge accorded humanitarian protection on the ground that ‘the 
appellant can be included among those addressed by the 30.10.2012 circular’ 
(Asilo in Europa 2015: 12, my translation) independently from their per-
sonal story, while in 16 decisions the reason for allowing the appeal referred 
to ‘a dignified affective and working life in Libya’ which had been destroyed 
by war (ibid.). No mention was made about Ghana as a safe country of ori-
gin where the appellant could ‘go back’, or that the appellant had first left 
for ‘mere personal and economic reasons’, as stated instead in all the negative 
decisions issued before the 2012 circular. Again, rather than an example of 
arbitrary interpretation of human rights laws, this shows asylum as governed 
by more or less visible migratory politics of containment and control.
So, What Does Credibility Mean?
Credibility in refugee law has been a matter of concern at least since the first 
steps towards the formulation of a common asylum policy in the late nine-
ties. UNHCR (1998) stressed the importance of oral testimony as evidence, 
especially when, as is often the case with asylum, claimants do not possess 
other types of material evidence attesting to their identity and their story of 
persecution. Given precisely this peculiarity of international protection law, 
an evaluation of the credibility of claimants’ narratives has always been an 
issue (Coffey 2003). The subsequent Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) 
consequently allows decision makers to evaluate the coherence and plausibil-
ity of the asylum seekers’ oral testimony, and their general credibility, when 
other material evidence is unavailable19 (see Craig and Zwaan, this volume, 
for an introduction to this Directive).
But the credibility issue in asylum hearings has become the object of 
intense scrutiny in recent times—as the CREDO project and its publications 
19The Directive 2011/95/EU (transposed in Italy in January 2014) replaced the 2004 QD introducing 
no amendments on this point.
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testify—with the specific aim of setting judicial criteria and standards. All 
these Manuals highlight how the effort is particularly needed in the face of ‘the 
unique nature of decision-making in this arcane and highly specialised area of 
law’ (IARLJ 2013: 11), where a core legal category in the common European 
procedure is also one which is ‘understood differently across national asylum 
systems’ (CREDO 2015), partly because the word itself is used with different 
meanings in each national language. In a somewhat circular logic, the effect 
(heterogeneity being the necessary outcome of the decision to employ a notion 
which is historical and contextual, relating as it does to philosophical and cul-
tural understandings of concepts like truth, reality, and person) is turned into 
a cause (different national understandings of credibility introduce arbitrariness 
and dis-homogeneity in an otherwise common system), therefore the notion 
needs to be standardised. Recent attempts to define it more clearly, intend 
to try and reduce such ambiguities: ‘What is needed therefore, in linguistic 
terms, is “contextual disambiguation” to ensure the concept of “credibility” is 
used correctly’ (IARLJ 2013: 12). This, it is proposed, may be obtained by 
avoiding ‘loose’ definitions of the term (‘the credibility of everything related 
to the claim’), concentrating rather on the ‘claimant’s past and present factual 
background’ (ibid., my emphasis). The material facts in the claimant’s story 
must be found internally and externally consistent (i.e., assessing discrepan-
cies within the evidence presented by the claimant, or with evidence provided 
by experts or Country of Origin Information [COI] Reports). The decision- 
maker should take into consideration the totality of the findings of fact (and 
not found the decision on single or marginal ones); any type of evidence 
produced should be carefully weighted (including documentary evidence 
acquired by the decision-maker); and relevant COI should be obtained and 
evaluated.
It seems that the above attempt at disambiguation consists mainly in 
narrowing the meaning of the notion, while at the same time limiting its 
weight: credibility is therefore explicitly linked to the facts narrated rather 
than to the individual per se; and it should be measured in relation to both 
the totality of the facts, and also other types of evidence (both material and 
non-material). By stressing the need to reduce the relative weight of ‘credi-
bility’ in RSDP, such recent efforts also indirectly signal the increased impor-
tance the notion had gained, vis-à-vis other types of evidence (Sorgoni, 
under review). The research at the Bologna tribunal confirmed the central 
role played by credibility: in 171 files, 76 (44%) were rejected because—
among other things—either the applicant or the story were declared ‘not 
credible’ (and also ‘not plausible’, or ‘inconsistent’); in 11 cases (14%) the 
lack of credibility figured as the only ground for rejection, often without 
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any further explanation (Asilo in Europa 2015). In a national legal context 
in which the adherence to a common system was at the time still young 
(Cherubini 2015), the European directives only just transposed, and a COI 
system—which could counter-balance decisions based solely on the narra-
tive’s evaluation—virtually non-existent, the use of the credibility notion in 
those years was so pervasive that the category came to mean anything, and 
nothing.
Again, the case of a man from Pakistan of Shiite orientation living in a 
Sunni majority area can help illustrate this. The TC had already denied him 
the right to any protection on the ground that the facts narrated appeared 
‘poorly credible’ because, after having been abducted and tortured by a 
group of Sunnis, he did not report to the police; his story was ‘contradic-
tory’ since he had mentioned the need to support his family; and he him-
self appeared not credible because he was not able to state the consequences 
he would face if returned, having merely declared: ‘I don’t know what could 
happen to me’.20 Five months later, at the appeal, he produced a medi-
cal certificate attesting to the injuries suffered by his son during a similar 
assault, and the related report to the local police. While no mention of this 
documentation was made by the judge, he likewise found the appellant not 
credible, mainly because he presented no proof of his Shiite faith, nor any 
information ‘about his sustenance while in Italy’.21 When weighted against 
the suggestions put forward by the above Manuals, the application of the 
credibility notion in this decision is definitely very loose, based as it is on 
marginal or totally irrelevant facts, without the acquisition on the part of the 
judge of documentary evidence or COI, and with the dismissal of primary 
documents produced by the appellant.
But credibility can reach a ‘ground zero’ level, when it is reduced to an 
empty wrapper. This is the case of a young woman and single mother from 
Senegal who was denied international protection without having been inter-
viewed: since she could not attend the first screening, the TC assumed she 
was not genuinely motivated. During the appeal hearing, she explained to 
the judge that she had obtained an official remittal of the first screening, but 
had missed its re-scheduling because they had changed the location. Despite 
the fact that no other question was raised, in the eyes of the judge the 
20The TC interpreted the sentence literally, suggesting that if the applicant didn’t even know what he 
risked, there was clearly no real danger in going back. It goes without saying that a non-literal transla-
tion could convey a totally different meaning, as in the semantic form of preterition.
21Notwithstanding the fact that the ‘sustenance’ issue has some relevance for economic migrations, but 
has none in relation to RSDP.
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appellant’s behaviour undermined her credibility since she failed to attend 
the interviews ‘without adducing any justification’ and she ‘reported nothing 
in relation to her way of sustenance in Italy’ so that ‘in sum, her whole story 
appears inconsistent, vague, without any possible ascertainment’. The prob-
lem, in this case, lies in the fact that there was no story to evaluate, neither 
at the first hearing (which never took place), nor at the appeal stage where 
only irrelevant or inappropriate questions were asked.
A loose evaluation of credibility can also take other forms, as in the case 
of a young man from Iraq. His story was in principle sadly simple: it could 
have been easily classified as an ‘instrumental later claim’ to avoid depor-
tation, from an ‘illegal migrant’ who had been working irregularly in Italy 
for over 9 years. When his irregular position was accidentally detected by 
the police, he was taken to a CIE with a repatriation order, and applied for 
asylum. He was interviewed by the TC a month later and, upon denial, he 
appealed: despite the hearing being scheduled only two months later, this 
was a non-suspensive appeal which never took place, since he had been 
deported. If the preceding story was a zero-level credibility instance—the 
non-credibility of the story grounded on an absent story—in this case we 
find an apparently unreasonable excess in the recourse to the credibility 
notion. In face of a lack of valid residence permits and a regular job, an asy-
lum claim put forward to avoid deportation is considered, by definition, not 
genuine and leads to rejection. So why did the TC feel the need to refer 
to the (non)credibility of the story in order to justify its negative decision? 
Indeed, by merely evaluating the testimony’s credibility, the TC should come 
to an opposite decision. For what is incoherent about an illiterate Iraqi Kurd 
raised by his mother in Syria until her premature death, who then worked 
in Libya before moving to Italy? And why is it implausible that he could not 
name current political parties, the outcome of the last elections, and a very 
famous museum, all in relation to a country he fled under the bombs, at the 
age of 6?
Beyond Credibility
The research I have presented shows a very loose and unmotivated, excessive 
recourse to the notion of credibility to ground negative determinations, so 
that to a certain extent a better knowledge and a more careful employment 
of the suggestions put forward by the many existing manuals on asylum 
determination, could have limited the sense of arbitrary unfairness one gets 
from reading those files.
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Yet, I am not sure that, by switching from the credibility of the applicant 
to that of the application—the credibility of the person vs that of the account 
(CREDO 2015)—the (inherent) ambiguity of the notion vanishes. What 
appears in the CREDO manuals as a move towards maximising objectivity, 
in fact obscures other aspects that cannot be neglected. One is the decision- 
makers’ own subjectivity, the processes at work in their minds in the specific 
setting of asylum hearings (Johnson 2013), as well as their ‘personal theories 
of “truth” and “risk”’, which those recent manuals acknowledge (suggesting 
they should be minimised, while leaving aside how and if this is altogether 
possible); another is the ‘need to understand subtle cultural, gender, demean-
our and linguistic issues’ (IARLJ 2013: 19), a task that cannot be improvised 
and proves extremely difficult to address; and finally the inter-subjective 
nature of the claimants’ narrative, produced with the active participation of 
many subjects beside the claimant him/herself, through an elaborate en-tex-
tualisation process (see Spotti, Gibb, this volume) which ex post attributes to 
asylum seekers, as ‘their own words’, what is in fact a stratified texture woven 
by many hands at various stages of a long procedure, in different institutional 
settings (see Danstrøm and Whyte, this volume).22 Therefore, while a loose 
use of the notion could and should be avoided, I believe that a residual and 
irreducible trace of ambiguity will necessarily remain.
But my intention here is not to offer ad hoc solutions to make the exist-
ing asylum system fairer to those ‘happy few’ who land alive at the exter-
nal frontiers of Europe, thus supporting the positivist illusion that finding 
yet more technicalities, or refining existing ones, will eventually render the 
screening of human beings ‘objective’.23 While acknowledging that legal 
processes are (necessarily?) intrinsically positivist, this recognition does not 
render the procedure ‘objective’: rejected claimants may not be ‘objectively 
undeserving’, but appear to be so after having been processed by a long, 
non-homogeneous and fragmented procedure. A procedure in which hidden 
cultural assumptions ‘typically permeate the mind-set of lawyers’ and judges 
(Grillo 2016; Ballard 2010), and which is embedded in (macro)political 
orientations. A fair recognition of the aspiration of a multitude to a digni-
22These aspects have long been addressed in anthropological critique of the asylum system; see among 
others: Blommaert (2001, 2009), Good (2007), Gibb and Good (2014), Jacquemet (2005), Maryns 
(2006), Cabot (2011) on Greece, Sbriccoli and Jacoviello (2011), Sorgoni (2013) on Italy.
23See Campbell (2013) on supposedly objective technicalities in UK; Fassin and Kobelinsky (2012) on 
deontological ethics of appeal judges in France. On a personal level, the general system presupposes a 
belief in the right to select between ‘the drowned and the saved’ (Levi 1986): a moral position I do not 
wish to embrace.
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fied and safe life does not depend on correcting some faults in the asylum 
system, as if the system itself existed in a vacuum, independent and detached 
from those global migratory politics and rhetorics in which, on the contrary, 
it is radically embedded. Such politics and rhetorics magnify the commit-
ment to homogeneous and objective determinations, while obfuscating how 
a few fair decisions are predicated upon the potentially extremely unfair 
rejection and exclusion of the majority, and their confinement in the global 
south, or in some new no man’s land as the hotspots in Greece and Italy, 
where most migrants are summarily labelled as ‘economic migrants’, i.e. ille-
gal migrants with no right to even begin to access the asylum procedure.24
In the same vein, the findings discussed here are not intended as a way to 
judge the judges: while we can acknowledge the many failings of the deter-
mination system as practiced at the tribunal in 2011 in Bologna,25 it would 
be unfair and definitely myopic to stop there. Those faults had various 
causes: the absence of a proper COI system which could provide updated 
information on the socio-political situation of the area of origin; the work-
load of judges not specifically nor solely dedicated to asylum issues; their 
reduced number vis-à-vis that of appeals; their (often) poor preparation in 
international protection and EU law; and their poor familiarity with playing 
an active role and sharing the burden of the proof.26 But we should look also 
beyond the tribunal’s rooms, the imperfections of the system, or the credibil-
ity issue itself.
And if we look at asylum recognition rates in Italy from 2008 to 2015, 
we discover that denials peaked twice: in 2011 and 2015 (Anci et al. 2016: 
103). The first is the period addressed with the former research in Bologna, 
the second coincides with my current research in Turin. There are significant 
differences between the two contexts: in Turin judges now share a database 
on determinations, classified by country and type, that allows them to com-
pare similar cases to avoid divergent outcomes; they circulate information 
from reliable and updated COI websites; an interpreter is present and paid 
by the tribunal. They are also aware of the traps of the credibility notion 
especially for ‘civil law judges, who are more familiar with documents than 
24As a response to the “refugee crisis”, the European Agenda on Migration adopted on 31st May 2015 
(European Commission 2015) introduced new border points in Greece and Italy, denominated hot-
spots, where Europol, Easo and Frontex officials support national ones to ensure quicker identification 
and fingerprinting procedures. So far, this is probably the most disputed issue of the Agenda (Amnesty 
International 2016).
25Asilo in Europa Report (2015) offers some recommendations in that sense.
26A magistrate to the author, Turin, November 2016.
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with life stories’.27 Most of all, they are acutely critical about their insuffi-
cient numbers and ‘the loneliness of the asylum judge’, especially since asy-
lum is but one among their many duties. And they relate to their insufficient 
number the fact that ‘now we don’t interview [the appellants] any more’.28
In 2011, for the first time, the European myth of safe external borders 
crashed; again in 2015 all the securitisation measures adopted proved use-
less in face of the Syrian civil war. In both cases the EU, or single European 
states, reacted by signing ‘treaties’ with non-European states in order to 
block the migrants before they even reached its external borders, while the 
rhetoric of the ‘refugee crises’ became a media and political leitmotiv and the 
term ‘crisis’ itself self-explanatory (Roitman 2014; De Genova and Tazzioli 
2016; Knight and Stewart 2016). At a national level, on both occasions gov-
ernmental circulars pushed for either collective decisions (as with ENA in 
2012), or cursory ones (as with the 19.6.2015 circular pretending each TC 
evaluate at least 16 claims per day29), justifying such extraordinary meas-
ures with reference to the sudden increase of migrants. And yet in 2015, 
154,000 migrants entered Italy (while in 2014 there were 170,000), out of 
which 84,000 applied for asylum (as opposed to 60,000 in 2014). Rather 
than supporting the fabricated sense of invasion, the numbers expose a long 
lasting political choice and self-representation of Italy as a transit country, 
an accidental destination to be dealt with through laisser-passer formal and 
informal policies (Ciabarri 2016; Kersh and Mishtal 2016; Tuckett 2015, 
2016) that periodically reiterate the ‘migrants emergency’ issue as a sud-
den and unexpected event that threatens national cultural and religious 
identity (Giordano 2014). This is a ‘politics of scarcity’ (Vacchiano 2011: 
194) where the collapse of the system is not due to an excess of migrants, 
but to a deliberate adoption of ever-temporary measures, and a systematic 
avoidance of adopting serious policies of recognition, reception and inclu-
sion. Such policies would include, among other things, a strengthening of 
the national asylum system, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. In 
the absence of this, the different responses at Bologna and Turin are but two 
sides of the same coin, and a fairer asylum system—albeit morally due—is 
but a band-aid solution fed by the same ‘culture of denial’ (Souter 2011), 
and the same self-fulfilling prophecy that ‘they’ are not here to stay. The day 
after the release of an official EC video on the effective sealing of borders,30 a 
27A magistrate to the author, Turin, December 2016.
28Ibid.
29Such circulars are not public but this one was mentioned in an official publication: (Ministero dell’In-
terno 2016a: 34).
302016: the year the EU took robust action to control migration flows https://youtu.be/
EYO0z2Tnr2A?list=PLXPWZG37uPbOH-i8kqpPoxGzLLDt9i1Sd [14 December 2016].
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judge commented: ‘why don’t they simply say that we cannot afford to pro-
tect human rights, so that we just quit?’.
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Introduction
Asylum decision-making inherently involves high stakes: when asylum 
seekers present their story to an immigration officer, they place their lives 
in the hands of another country’s authorities. Making a wrong decision can, 
at worst, be fatal. The decisions are under constant debate in the media, as 
immigration authorities are criticised either for wrongly rejecting genuine 
refugees or for admitting bogus asylum seekers. The public debate is char-
acterised by disagreement, strong emotions and conflicting ideas about jus-
tice. In this chapter, I explore what justice looks like from the point of view 
of some of the individuals who make these difficult decisions daily, namely 
caseworkers in the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI). What are 
the main challenges involved in making just decisions? What does ‘justice’ 
mean to the caseworkers who decide claims? And finally, how does the pro-
duction of justice inside the institution relate to public expectations of refu-
gee protection? The goal is to investigate some of the underlying normative 
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issues that are played out in the process of assessing asylum applications, and 
to consider the relationship between justice, discretion, and bureaucratic 
goals and values.
Refugee protection holds symbolic value to most democratic states, as ref-
ugee rights are based on liberal-universal notions of justice that are impor-
tant to the identity of democracies (Boswell 2005). There is a deep tension 
between the wish of European states to adhere to their human rights com-
mitments, while limiting migration as much as possible (Carling 2011). 
This tension means that asylum decision-makers have to handle two seem-
ingly contradictory goals in their daily work. On the one hand, they have to 
ensure that bona fide refugees are accorded their rights through protection. 
On the other hand, they have to maintain control and restrict entry of those 
not considered eligible for refugee status. The main task of caseworkers is 
to make correct distinctions among applicants, or in other words, to accord 
justice to the right group of people.
The analysis in this chapter is based on 24 interviews with UDI casework-
ers. The data collection process was guided by principles of institutional eth-
nography (Smith 2005), which is an inductive method of inquiry that takes 
the experiences of a particular group of people as a point of departure for 
exploring an institution. The focus of the inquiry is thus not on individuals, 
but on the institution (McCoy 2006). The experiences of the interviewees 
serve as a window to understanding institutional processes that shape the 
perception of justice in the asylum bureaucracy.
Uncertainty and Discretion in the Decision-
Making Process
Under the Norwegian Immigration Act of 2008, paragraph 28, a foreign 
national should be recognised as a refugee if he or she ‘has a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of ethnicity, origin, skin colour, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or for reasons of polit-
ical opinion’,1 or ‘faces a real risk of being subjected to a death penalty, tor-
ture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return 
to his or her country of origin’ (Ministry of Justice and Public Security 
1The word ‘race’, which is used in the Refugee Convention of 1951, was replaced in the Norwegian 
law in 2011 by ‘ethnicity’, ‘origin’ and ‘skin colour’ (Stortinget 2011). Similar changes have been made 
in legislation on discrimination. The term ‘race’ remains controversial in the Norwegian setting, even 
thought it has a well-established meaning in the context of international law.
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2010). If an applicant is not granted refugee status, he or she will automati-
cally be considered for a permit on ‘humanitarian grounds’ (paragraph 38), 
which can be granted in some instances for example because of life threaten-
ing illness or other grave circumstances, or because the applicant has a par-
ticular connection to Norwegian society.
If the legal criteria in paragraph 28 are considered to be fulfilled, there 
is no room for discretion in the sense that the applicant shall be granted 
asylum. The discretionary space in asylum decisions is related to establish-
ing the facts of the case and determining whether the criteria are, indeed, 
fulfilled. In order to do so, caseworkers have to interpret ambiguous terms 
such as ‘persecution’ and ‘well-founded fear’ and apply them to individual 
cases. Moreover, applicants often lack documentation that can corroborate 
their stories, which makes the assessment of credibility crucial to the out-
come in many cases. This constitutes one of the most difficult and conta-
gious points in asylum decisions, because issues frequently considered to 
be signs of non-credibility may equally be a consequence of, for example, 
communication challenges, cultural differences, anxiety, and symptoms of 
post-traumatic trauma and stress (see e.g. Rousseau et al. 2002; Gibb and 
Good 2014; Herlihy et al. 2012). Another difficulty is related to the use of 
country of origin information. Such information is often central to deter-
mining both risk of persecution upon return, and the ‘external’ credibility 
of the story—whether the applicant’s description of events is in line with 
‘generally known facts’ (UNHCR 2011: 39). Establishing these facts is often 
challenging, since the country reports that caseworkers rely upon frequently 
contain information that is ambiguous, uncertain, and can be interpreted in 
many ways (Liodden 2017: Chapter 7).
The many uncertainties in the decision-making process together make 
up a substantial space for discretion that decision-makers have to manage in 
order to reach a decision. Discretion is not only exercised at the end point 
of the process, when the law is applied, but throughout the entire decision- 
making process (Hawkins 1992b: 14). Moreover, it is largely a collective 
enterprise. Together, caseworkers have to answer a number of difficult ques-
tions, such as: At what point do acts of violence and discrimination consti-
tute ‘persecution’? What does it take for a claim to be credible enough? How 
should ambiguous information about the applicant’s home country be inter-
preted? When should the benefit of the doubt be applied?2
2On the benefit of the doubt, see Good (2015).
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Legal scholars conceive of discretion as a space where subjective forces 
enter and may threaten the rule of law—and thereby the justness of legal 
decisions. The legal profession has tended to see discretion as ‘subjective 
justice; rules are formal justice’ (Handler 1986: 169). From this perspec-
tive, discretion constitutes an unruly space outside of law. Arbitrary and 
subjective use of discretion is certainly problematic, but as Brodkin points 
out, discretion matters more ‘not when it is random, but when it is struc-
tured by factors that influence informal behaviors to develop in systematic 
ways’ (Brodkin 2012: 942). There are a number of ‘extra-legal’ factors— 
organisational, psychological, political and social—that limit and order the 
use of discretion (Hawkins 1992b; Lipsky 2010). I am interested mainly 
in those factors that shape discretion in systematic ways, paying particu-
lar attention to how interviewees described the development of what they 
referred to as ‘practice’ in asylum decisions, which I will elaborate on below.
Justice in Decision-Making
In the context of administrative-legal decision-making, justice has often 
been used to describe the substantial outcome or accuracy of a decision- 
making process, whereas fairness has been associated with the process itself. 
Conceptually, they have been brought together under the term adminis-
trative justice, which encompasses both outcome and process (Sainsbury 
1992: 302). This framework provides a set of goals or values that are use-
ful to understanding bureaucratic decision-making processes. In his analysis 
of the asylum system in the UK, Robert Thomas argues that there are four 
basic goals in legal-administrative institutions that are important to quality 
of decisions: accuracy, fairness, cost management and timeliness (Thomas 
2011: 14). There is often a trade-off between these different values, ‘as any 
effort to promote one value will often only be capable of being achieved by 
moderating the achievement of other values’ (Thomas 2011: 15).
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse all these goals and how 
they are balanced in the asylum bureaucracy. In addition to timeliness, 
I focus on two issues related to administrative justice that became points of 
interest during the analysis: the notion of accuracy, and fairness in the shape 
of impartiality and equal treatment.3 Accuracy is related to the substantial 
3Thomas (2011: 25) does not explicitly include equal treatment when he considers fairness of proce-
dure, but he mentions it as an important goal in systems where many different decision-makers are 
involved.
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decision. It refers to establishing the facts of a case in an accurate manner— 
which in asylum decisions usually means assessing the credibility of the 
applicant’s story—and subsequently applying the correct rules or criteria to 
determine the outcome. Accuracy is often described as the primary demand 
of administrative justice, since ‘no matter what other desirable attributes 
a decision-making process might embody, its decisions are unlikely to be 
acceptable if they are wrong’ (Sainsbury 1992: 302). In the words of one case-
worker: ‘That should be the essence in what we do. That we make the right 
decisions’. Despite the importance of accuracy to just decision-making, it is 
often an issue that is very difficult to determine in asylum cases, where deci-
sions often revolve more around the facts than the law, and where the assess-
ment of evidence often involves substantial uncertainty (Thomas 2011: 13). 
A decision can be legally sound, but it is hard to know whether the facts are 
correctly assessed. For asylum decisions, there is ‘no external, objective stand-
ard against which to assess their accuracy’ (Thomas 2011: 70). Decision-
makers rarely receive reliable feedback on their decisions; moreover, since 
asylum assessments are geared towards future risk, they are ‘essentially an essay 
in hypothesis, an attempt to prophesy what might happen to the applicant in 
the future’ (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007: 54).
Equal treatment is not related directly to the substance of the decision, 
but to ensuring that one individual is not treated unjustly as compared to 
others, embodied in the notion that one should ‘[t]reat equal (like) cases 
equally (alike), and unequal (different) cases unequally (differently)’ (Carr 
1981: 211). The principle of equal treatment presumably ensures consistent 
decision-making, i.e. that the outcome of cases should be relatively similar, 
regardless of who the decision-maker is. While consistent decision-making 
does not ensure accuracy—it is entirely possible for decisions to be fully 
consistent, yet substantially wrong—inconsistent decision-making is often 
considered a symptom of inaccurate decisions: ‘[I]f a decision-making pro-
cess produces disparate outcomes, then surely some of its decisions must also 
be substantively incorrect—either because genuine claims have been rejected 
and/or non-genuine claims accepted’ (Thomas 2008: 490). Studies from 
other contexts indicate that consistent decision-making is a major difficulty 
in asylum assessments, as different decision-makers appear to reach differ-
ent conclusions in similar claims (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009; Rehaag 2012; 
Riedel and Schneider 2017). Inconsistent decision-making challenges the 
idea of refugees as a clear-cut category. As Whyte (2015: 156) writes:
Refugee status is a right, conferred on appropriate persons, not something to 
be bartered for. This formal understanding of refugee determination is largely 
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fictional, as actual refugee determination procedures vary dramatically across 
space and time, resulting in much more uneven implementations of who are 
actually recognised as refugees than the rights-based ideal.
The idea of “the refugee” as an objective identity remains strong in the pub-
lic debate about asylum and bolsters the perception of a just system where 
distinctions between refugees and non-refugees can be clearly made. In the 
following sections I will, however, suggest that who a refugee is to some 
extent may be settled among decision-makers who together develop a local 
yardstick of what a just decision looks like. The present study indicates that 
this was achieved in part through comparison of cases and a focus on equal 
treatment.
Equal Treatment: Creating Local Justice?
Some caseworkers considered the uncertainty involved in the decisions to be 
one of the most difficult aspects of the job: ‘The uncertainty is the hardest 
part. That you sort of never get a final answer about whether what you’ve 
been doing for the past five years is right or wrong’. Similarly, one case-
worker said that ‘in our work, we never get a certain answer, we never know 
if what we do is right or wrong, if we make the wrong decision, nobody tells 
us, if we reject, we never hear about it again’. In a context of uncertainty, 
where many decisions were emotionally difficult, equal treatment was a form 
of justice over which caseworkers had a measure of control:
Researcher: What do you think, our asylum politics are often referred to as 
strict, but fair. Do you think that’s a good description of the situation?
Caseworker: Yes. Our policies are definitely not among the most liberal, if you 
compare with other countries. So in that way you could say that it’s strict. 
If it’s fair depends a bit on the point of view. We try to be fair in what we 
do, in the sense that we have a principle of equal treatment, but if it’s fair 
that we do not admit families with children who are in a difficult position 
[…]. I mean, that’s an impossible question to answer.
This caseworker’s view of fairness is here primarily connected to equal 
treatment—whether the decisions are fair more broadly is an issue that she 
is reluctant to go into. In addition to equal treatment, impartiality was a 
value caseworkers emphasised when they spoke about making correct deci-
sions. Like several other interviewees, the decision-maker above referred to 
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the fact that her role was to implement law and policy, which also entailed 
making decisions she did not necessarily agree with. Making the right deci-
sion seemed to many caseworkers to be closely related to their identity as 
neutral bureaucrats who followed the rules in an impartial manner, thus 
echoing classical ideas connected to the ethos of bureaucracy (Weber 1978; 
Du Gay 2000). As in other studies of bureaucracy, caseworkers tended to 
emphasise the clear boundaries between policymaking and administration 
(see e.g. Eggebø 2013; Wettergren 2010), which meant that their personal 
opinion about the justness of the decision did not—and should not—affect 
their work.
The role of the law was ambiguous. On the one hand, caseworkers fre-
quently referred to the law as a point of reference regarding whether or not 
they made the right decision. Drawing on the authority of law is probably 
particularly important in a field where decisions are emotionally and mor-
ally challenging, and their correctness is frequently under dispute. On the 
other hand, the legal framework often seemed to provide limited guidance 
in the actual decision-making process, apart from narrowing the scope of eli-
gibility. Most caseworkers I spoke to were not educated in law and did not 
engage actively with the legal framework (see also Eule 2014: 54; Dahlvik 
2014: 157). Moreover, as already mentioned, many decisions revolve around 
establishing facts rather than legal issues. In the words of one caseworker: 
‘There is nothing in the law that we can use in a decision’. She also points 
to equal treatment as a proxy for a just decision when accuracy is difficult to 
determine:
We refer to the law. Every time someone asks us or criticises us: it’s the par-
liament that has passed the law. But the law only says that those who deserve 
asylum should be granted asylum, those who do not deserve it, should not be 
granted asylum, that’s what the law says […]. So then [it comes down to] our 
practice notes, how we’ve treated previous cases. In that way, it’s equal treat-
ment. But whether we are right – who knows?
The legal definition of the refugee narrows the scope of eligibility. You can-
not, for example, be granted asylum on the basis of dire poverty or illness. 
Because there is such a large discretionary space, however, caseworkers had 
to find additional means to distinguish between eligible and non-eligible 
applicants.
Caseworkers did this by developing a common understanding of the 
assessment of cases, referred to as ‘practice’ in the quote above. Notes that 
describe current practice in the assessment of cases in the UDI constitute 
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binding guidelines for caseworkers. They describe the most common reasons 
for seeking asylum for applicants from a particular country and how such 
cases normally are assessed, given interpretations of the law and country 
information (see e.g. UDI 2016).4 Simply put, the legal ‘practice’ of a public 
institution is made up of similar decisions in a specific field, which serve as 
precedents in subsequent assessments. Practice is considered to be a formal 
source of law, below the legal framework and preparatory works in the legal 
hierarchy, that may guide the interpretation and application of general rules 
and legal provisions (Boe 2010: 145). The importance of practice for under-
standing the outcome of cases will depend on how much discretion there is. 
In situations where there is a large degree of discretion, such as in the field 
of asylum, there is potentially considerable scope, both for the political level 
and decision-makers at the street-level, for influencing the development of 
practice and thereby the outcome of many asylum cases.
Practice could not, however, be understood merely by reading the notes and 
the formal texts they were based on. It also appeared to involve a degree of tacit 
or experience-based knowledge that caseworkers shared, but which was difficult 
to put into words (see also Jubany 2011: 87). This tacit knowledge depended 
on knowledge of previous assessments, close communication with colleagues, 
and trust in their judgments. Caseworkers considered decision-making as a 
practical skill that had to be acquired through hands-on experience. Over time, 
they seemed to acquire a ‘sense of outcome’ (analogous to the intime convic-
tion that Kobelinsky discusses, this volume) that—at least in part—appeared 
to be based on recognising patterns in the case that were similar to or departed 
from previous ones. In this context, too, equal treatment was a central prin-
ciple in determining the correct outcome. By comparing cases and looking to 
the assessment of similar cases in the past, caseworkers established a common 
understanding of what a rejection or an acceptance looked like.
This understanding appeared to differ somewhat from one unit to 
another. Such differences became particularly visible when caseworkers from 
time to time moved from one unit to another, or helped out with the case-
load in a different unit than the one they normally worked in. This quote 
illustrates the perception of such differences:
Cas eworker: Practice probably differs a bit for different countries. I know that 
on some countries, they have a totally different approach, it’s sort of: ‘This 
might have happened’, and then they accept the case. There are cultural 
differences between the units.
4Author’s translations from Norwegian.
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Researcher: Yes, why do you think that is? It’s perhaps difficult to say.
Cas eworker: I don’t know. But the culture in different units is really different. 
A uniform practice… No. It depends on which interviewer you meet and 
what caseworker you get.
This caseworker suggests that what is considered to be credible or not, dif-
fers between units. Some are stricter whereas others are more lenient. In a 
recent study of the asylum bureaucracy in Norway, the researchers similarly 
concluded that the ‘threshold of what is considered to be credible, seems to 
differ in different units’ (Bollingmo et al. 2014: 97).5 They suggested that 
the variation could probably be explained by the different nature of the cases 
that units handle, but they also considered structural and cultural difference 
between the units to be important.
The development of differences may be a consequence of what Emerson 
has referred to as case-set effects (Emerson 1983). While most research on 
decision-making takes the individual case as the point of departure when 
considering outcomes, decision makers tend to ‘respond to cases in relation 
to, or as part of, some larger, organisationally determined whole ’ (Emerson 
1983: 425). Asylum decision-makers often encounter many similar claims. 
Making many similar decisions tends to produce shorthand ways of dealing 
with and classifying cases (Hawkins 1992a: 40). Comparison of similar cases 
within a caseload and with decisions in the past was an important tool in 
the assessment. For example, one caseworker said that she sometimes took 
a pile of cases with claims from the same country and categorised them. She 
tended to establish the clear rejections first. Once they had been established, 
it was easier to assess the rest. The advantage, she said, was that:
You work faster, at least. It’s more efficient. You treat like cases alike. You have 
a better chance to compare the cases and you establish a kind of, well, gut feel-
ing where you see the outcome much faster.
This approach entails that the outcome of one individual case will depend in 
part on the nature of the other cases in the portfolio. For example, Emerson 
points to studies where criminal offenses are perceived as more or less seri-
ous depending on the other cases to which officers or legal administrators 
are accustomed. Similarly, the evaluation of risk in an individual case may 
be influenced by the comparison with cases where the risk is much more 
severe (see also Bailliet 2003: 183). The characteristics of other cases may 
5Author’s translations from Norwegian.
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 contribute to slightly shifting the thresholds of persecution or perceived risk 
among caseworkers in one unit compared to those in another unit, who 
are exposed to different kinds of case sets. The same is likely to be true of 
credibility assessments. Having assessed many cases with similar claims, 
caseworkers may establish an image of what a credible applicant looks like. 
When more, similar cases come along, they will probably have to live up to 
that standard—or an even higher standard—in order to be considered cred-
ible. If many cases follow the same pattern, it will take increasingly more 
for a case to appear convincing, because it will come across as generic and 
fabricated if it does not appear in a shape that underscores a personal or 
authentic dimension not encountered previously. At the extremities of the 
scale—very clear-cut rejections and very clear-cut acceptances—case load 
effects presumably have less impact. It seems likely, however, that cases in 
the grey zone in the middle of a scale, which could potentially ‘land’ on 
either side of the line, will be affected by the features of the cases at the 
extremities. The outcome in individual cases may therefore be substantially 
influenced by the caseload as a whole and the sequencing of cases.
A locally created yardstick of what the right decision looks like, based 
on comparison, produces consistency at a local level, but such consistency 
potentially co-exists with a great deal of variation across different units. 
Thus, due to the continuous influence of past decisions and the emphasis 
on equal treatment, discretion does perhaps not so much create sub-
jective justice, but rather produces a kind of local, comparative justice 
(Feinberg 1974).
The Production of Cases
It is inherently difficult to find ways of assessing the quality and accuracy of 
decisions that involve a large degree of discretion, particularly when organ-
isational goals are ambiguous or conflicting (Lipsky 2010: 49). Measuring 
productivity and timeliness can be monitored much more easily. From 1998, 
as part of a New Public Management trend in the Norwegian welfare state, 
the government began to introduce goal and result measures to increase the 
performance of the UDI (Christensen et al. 2006: 128). Unit leaders have 
to report regularly on the ‘production’ of cases, both to their leaders in the 
UDI and to the Ministry in charge. Making accurate decisions has to be bal-
anced against the fact that the resources available for each decision are not 
unlimited, and against the need to produce timely decisions. Caseworkers 
are instructed to make decisions that are, according to the quality 
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guidelines for decision-making, ‘good enough’, which means striking a bal-
ance between acceptable quality and efficiency (UDI 2010). Several case-
workers were concerned that the focus on production could potentially 
affect the quality of decision-making: ‘They should really take seriously that 
this is a knowledge-based organisation. We don’t produce tyres or tooth 
brushes. It’s actually dangerous if we make mistakes’. Some caseworkers 
said they felt as though the pressure was increasing, while the resources and 
recognition they received from the organisation were diminishing. At the 
same time, the ‘production’ of cases is a tangible goal that caseworkers could 
strive for in a context where much else was uncertain. For example, this unit 
leader focuses on production goals when she is asked about uncertainty over 
the outcomes of decisions:
Researcher: Would you say that the majority of cases from [country X] are quite 
easy to assess, that it’s quite clear whether it’s an acceptance or a rejection?
Caseworker: Yes, it’s become more difficult now since we no longer have the 
general prohibition of return, but I would say that in most cases it is pos-
sible to reach a decision within the set time limits. It’s eight days after the 
interview. It’s quite tough, but it’s possible. The backlog that we’ve had in 
our unit has been a disruptive factor.
Instead of considering the content of the decision—and whether or not 
there is uncertainty—she emphasises the fact that more difficult cases chal-
lenge the ability to reach a decision within the set time frame. Focus is 
shifted from the content to the context of decision-making, where produc-
tion is central. Another caseworker described the assessment of cases from 
a specific country as ‘navigating in the dusk’, because there was so much 
uncertainty about the outcome. Because there was very limited and unreli-
able country information and most cases were different from each other, it 
was difficult to establish a common practice that could guide the assessments 
and thus provide a sense of whether the outcome was right or not:
It’s difficult for two reasons: First of all, it’s difficult to know whether you’ve 
reached the right decision. That’s one thing, and the other thing—which for 
many of us is the most bothersome—is that these cases are very time con-
suming, and there is no one in this organisation who understands that. You’re 
measured on production. And if you have a case that you can deal with in two 
hours, while I am on a case where the interview has stretched over several days, 
it takes three weeks to find out what to do—then there’s no understanding of 
that. So workwise, that really sucks.
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Because she navigates ‘in the dusk’, it is difficult to know whether she 
is making the right decision. But it is a reality that is difficult to change: 
there is no certain answer. This concern seems to become almost secondary 
to the pressing issue of production. Difficult cases that involve uncertainty 
about the outcome are time consuming. If she spends a lot of time on a case, 
this undermines her productivity. Hence, it is not the uncertainty around 
the accuracy of the decision that is the most difficult, but the fact that these 
kinds of decision increase work pressure. To some extent, production goals 
shift attention from the substance of decisions to the efficiency of the pro-
cess. It can be seen as a classic example of goal displacement, where the need 
to process cases quickly becomes an end in itself (Lipsky 2010: 44).
Deferred Justice? The Role of the Immigration 
Appeals Board (UNE)
Appeals mechanisms are a means of increasing the likelihood of accurate 
decisions, thereby enhancing administrative justice (Sainsbury 1992: 319). 
If an asylum claim is rejected by the UDI, the decision can be appealed to 
the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE). Moreover, if the two institutions 
treat cases systematically differently, the UDI will usually align its prac-
tice with that of the UNE (UDI 2010). To individual caseworkers, one of 
the most important functions of the UNE appeared to be that it contrib-
uted to alleviating doubt and uncertainty about the accuracy of decisions. 
Interviewees found comfort in the fact that the UNE would correct poten-
tial mistakes, thus redressing potential injustices. This is in line with other 
studies that describe how decision-makers feel reassured by the fact that 
someone else will make a second assessment (Dahlvik 2014; Baillot et al. 
2014: 533), deferring ‘responsibility for the final outcome to another supe-
rior body or role-player’ (Baillot et al. 2014: 535). In the words of one case-
worker: ‘There is the appeal. Sometimes I have to tell myself that: there is 
actually the possibility of appeal’. In Carlsen’s (2011) study of the UDI, one 
interviewee points to the idea that the notion of ‘deferred’ justice may allow 
caseworkers to work more efficiently: ‘We’ve termed it “risk control”—it 
means that our bosses accept that we make mistakes in case processing. The 
idea is that as long as we keep up a certain efficiency, potential mistakes will 
be corrected during the appeal’ (case worker cited in Carlsen 2011: 82).6  
6Author’s translation from Norwegian.
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In an interview, I spoke to a caseworker about a change in country infor-
mation, which now corroborated many applicants’ credibility instead 
of undermining it. When I asked her how she felt about the previous 
decisions—when asylum seekers perhaps had been wrongly rejected—she 
said that she took comfort in the fact that by the time these cases were pro-
cessed in the UNE, they too would have updated their information and 
would correct the decisions:
It’s no fun to think about the cases that…we’ve probably rejected a few cases 
that according to this [new practice] would have been accepted. And then you 
have to think, okay, but those cases still have not been treated at the UNE, 
and the UNE will update their practice.
As a means to address the problem of the time lag between country infor-
mation and development on the ground, the appeal plays an important 
role. It may, however, be problematic to rely too much on the appeal for 
an independent assessment in difficult cases. Bailliet (2003) found that 
some caseworkers tended to reject cases when they were unsure about how 
to resolve a complex issue, assuming that the applicant would appeal the 
case to the UNE. Caseworkers then expected the UNE to provide a signal 
to the UDI about how such cases should be solved. She comments: ‘This 
tactic does not always prove successful in those cases in which the UNE 
Secretariat adopts the same language and argumentation utilised by the 
UDI with little variation’ (Bailliet 2003: 169). In fact, a relatively limited 
number of decisions are changed upon appeal. In 2016, the UNE overruled 
8% of UDI’s asylum decisions; for 2015, the number was 16%.7 When 
decisions are not overturned, this too serves as a form of feedback, suggest-
ing that decisions are correct. According to the caseworker in the following 
quote, the UNE usually overrules UDI decisions because of changes in cir-
cumstances. With more than ten years of experience as a decision-maker, 
she could not recall a single case that had been overturned due to a different 
credibility assessment:
Researcher: If they [UNE] change a decision in one of the cases you’ve 
assessed—what do you think then?
Caseworker: That usually happens because a lot has changed during the 
appeal process. New information, that the applicant has become ill. It’s 
7See: https://www.une.no/statistikk/asylsaker/ [Accessed 24 July 2017].
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usually in those cases—psychological illness, serious physical illness—that 
the UNE changes the decision. Or due to changes in the situation of the 
country of origin […]
Researcher: So it’s quite rare that they overturn your credibility assessments?
Caseworker: I don’t think I’ve seen that.
Researcher: So it’s quite similar […]
Caseworker: I think they are stricter than us. I think so.
This lends support to the idea that credibility ‘sticks’—once lack 
of credibility has been established, it can be difficult to rebut (see e.g. 
Coffey 2003). One reason for this may be that much of the indeter-
minacy has been dealt with before the case reaches the UNE. Many of 
the discretionary decisions that caseworkers make during the process 
of assessing asylum cases can be considered ‘second order decisions’ 
(Hawkins 1986). They are numerous, but often invisible by the end of 
the process. Second order decisions ‘may not seem to be particularly 
significant, such as what information should be included as part of the 
raw material of a case, but they may have enormous implications for 
how subsequent primary decisions are made’ (Hawkins 1986: 1166). 
By contrast, ‘first order decisions’ are the salient, visible decisions in 
the career of a legal case—such as the status as an accepted or rejected 
applicant. The numerous second order decisions that caseworkers in 
the first instance make about information processing and interpretation 
are not visible in the documents that the UNE receives, but they may 
nevertheless contribute to constructing the case in a particular manner. 
Perhaps more importantly, most UNE decisions are made on the basis 
of documents only; in 2016, applicants were given the opportunity to 
provide oral testimony in 4% of cases (UNE 2017: 18). As Sainsbury 
(1992: 304) points out, one of the most important ways of address-
ing the challenge of incomplete, contradictory or unclear evidence is 
to actively involve claimants in the information collection process. It is 
presumably much more difficult to justify changing a credibility assess-
ment when the decision-maker at appeal has not heard the claimant giv-
ing evidence in person. While decision-makers in the UDI trusted the 
UNE to correct potential mistakes, it is possible that the limited number 
of oral hearings challenges the UNE’s ability to make truly independ-
ent decisions. This, in turn, may affect the UNE’s capacity to redress 
potential injustices.
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The Media Debate: Criticism and the Production 
of Certainty
The public debate in the field of asylum is a source of critique that can 
lead to deliberation about the justness of current practices and the accu-
racy of decisions. In a field where it is difficult to know whether decisions 
are accurate or not, such critique can be considered one of the few sources 
of feedback. Interviewees varied in their perception of the media debate; 
some found it interesting and enjoyed working in a contested field while 
others considered it a source of stress. They had in common, however, that 
critique in the media rarely was seen as indicative of whether or not cases 
were assessed correctly. For one thing, there is no consensus in the public 
debate. Caseworkers are sometimes criticised for being too harsh—at other 
times, for being naïve and too lenient. Moreover, criticism was often con-
sidered misguided and based on emotions instead of knowledge of the rules. 
Knowing the process from the inside changed the perspective: It meant 
understanding the constraints under which the work was conducted, the 
criteria that must be fulfilled, and the details that could produce different 
outcomes in two seemingly similar cases. Only work peers were fully able to 
understand the wide range of considerations in the assessments.
Several caseworkers appeared to feel that it was important to shield them-
selves from the emotional climate in the media debate, which could threaten 
the impartiality required to assess cases in a just manner. They emphasised 
the importance of non-responsiveness to external pressures (Lindberg 2013: 
217). If caseworkers were to become too affected by issues raised in the 
media, it could potentially conflict with their political and legal accounta-
bility as impartial implementers of law and policy. The media’s tendency to 
focus on specific individuals could in itself be viewed as a potential source 
of injustice.8 In this context, ‘justness’ was largely equivalent to treating like 
cases alike, and did not entail an evaluation of the decisions more substan-
tially. The justness of the system more broadly was considered a political mat-
ter, since, in the words of one interviewee, ‘we don’t decide, we implement’. 
It followed that the target of critique should be the political level and not 
those in charge of policy implementation. Making an exception because of 
8The most striking example that several caseworkers mentioned was the case of Maria Amelie, an excep-
tionally articulate, well integrated young woman whose asylum application had been rejected. The 
deportation of Amelie created public outrage and evoked broad sympathy across the political spectrum. 
Several caseworkers mentioned that with their knowledge of practice, they found the intense focus on 
Amelie to be highly unjust to other applicants.
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media attention might be possible within the scope of the law, particularly 
in cases concerning permits on humanitarian grounds, where legal discretion 
is rather large.9 According to established practice, however, such exceptions 
would violate the norm of equal treatment and therefore be highly unjust 
to other applicants who might have been rejected under much more dire 
circumstances.
The nature of the asylum assessments may serve as a potential buffer 
against criticism in itself. Modern bureaucracy has been criticised for the 
fact that the complexity of the system makes it difficult to establish a clear 
link between action on the part of any one individual and the outcome or 
consequences of their actions (see e.g. Bauman 1989). The consequence of a 
rejection in asylum cases may be particularly diffuse. For one thing, as noted, 
asylum assessments are directed toward future risk and are thereby hypo-
thetical by nature. Moreover, the facts of many cases are unclear and under 
disbelief, rendering the consequences of a rejection even more elusive and dif-
ficult to imagine. Applicants whose stories are portrayed in the media and 
who have been rejected due to lack of credibility are by definition not trust-
worthy sources and the lack of reliable feedback means that decision-makers 
rarely find out if they make mistakes. The importance of establishing a link 
between a decision and its potential consequences may explain why several 
caseworkers appeared to feel that the greatest injustice was done in cases con-
cerning humanitarian protection that were rejected. In these cases, there was 
usually no question about the accuracy of facts. The adverse consequences of 
return to the home country were often rather straightforward—clearly expos-
ing the relationship between a negative decision and its consequences. Cases 
concerning health issues, in particular those involving children, spurred the 
greatest sense of injustice in some of the interviewees, to the point where 
some of them questioned the legitimacy of the legal categories (compare to 
Gianopoulou and Gill, this volume). For example, one caseworker considered 
some of these rejections to be ‘unreasonable’, ‘horrible’ and ‘grossly unjust’.
In an interview, one caseworker said: ‘We are very certain of ourselves. 
And I believe that’s because we are never told that we make mistakes’. She 
added: ‘I sit here and do this day after day, I am never told that there are 
mistakes, only that this is correct. Then you become more and more cer-
tain that what you are doing is right’. These statements may at first sight 
seem puzzling, considering the frequent debate about asylum decisions in 
9Note, however, that decision-makers are subject to political instructions in cases concerning humani-
tarian protection. These instructions limit their scope of discretion, but there is nevertheless some lee-
way, depending on the country of origin and the nature of the claim.
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the public sphere. The caseworker does not refer to lack of debate in general, 
however, but to the fact that the immigration authorities rarely admit to 
mistakes in public. There is a striking contrast between the uncertainty that 
goes into the assessment of asylum cases, and the certainty with which pol-
iticians and representatives of the institution talk about asylum decisions in 
public. The following quote from the former head of UNE, Terje Sjeggestad, 
serves as an illustration: ‘Luckily, the UNE is not aware of a single docu-
mented example of the fact that we have returned someone to persecution’ 
(Stavanger Aftenblad, 18 November, 2010). The remark may not be repre-
sentative for the UNE’s stance in general, but there are strong incentives for 
the asylum bureaucracy to present outward certainty. The complexity of ref-
ugee determination calls for the confidence to make decisions that may have 
fatal consequences if they are wrong (Luker 2013: 514). The display of out-
ward certainty is presumably important to bolster the confidence and morale 
of decision-makers, as well as signaling justness to the public.
The need to maintain certainty about decisions can paradoxically be an 
impediment to attempts to monitor their accuracy. There are occasional 
public claims about asylum seekers who have been subjected to torture or 
death upon return, but there is no system for monitoring rejected applicants 
in Norway. In a written response to a request about monitoring after return, 
the Norwegian Ministry of Justice replied:
The situation upon return has been assessed when a decision has been made 
to reject a case. The Norwegian immigration authorities consider that in each 
case, the assessment of protection and the rule of law should be at a standard 
that makes it unnecessary to monitor whether or not someone who has been 
returned will be subjected to persecution (Anundsen 2015).10
In this quote, dismissing the need for monitoring is equivalent to expressing 
confidence in the assessments and the rule of law. In an interesting paral-
lel, the Netherlands attempted to monitor returnees to Iran at one point in 
the 1990s. According to a Dutch country advisor, the monitoring desisted 
in part because Iranian authorities disapproved, but also because monitor-
ing could ‘leave the impression that Dutch authorities did not trust their 
own assessments’.11 Monitoring may signal uncertainty that contributes to 
undermining belief in a just system.
10Author’s translation from Norwegian.
11E-mail from country advisor in Dutch country of origin information department, March 30th 2011 
(Landinfo 2011: 2). Author’s translation from Norwegian.
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Discussion
The institution of asylum is a powerful tool of protection and a symbol of 
a nation’s adherence to human rights; however, the institution also serves 
as a gatekeeper to the nation and is an effective tool of exclusion of those 
not considered eligible. For exclusion to be acceptable, it must be done on 
legitimate grounds. This becomes particularly urgent in a policy field where 
negative decisions often entail high human costs, such as deportation and 
detention. For example, the media regularly brings up deportations of fam-
ilies, focusing particularly on children. The communication of legality and 
certainty alleviates the moral discomfort connected to the consequences 
of asylum politics. The clear-cut distinction between genuine refugees and 
others who do not have eligible grounds for protection plays an important 
role for the public acceptance of asylum politics and the perception of such 
politics as ‘strict, but just’, which has been the slogan to varying degrees in 
Norway for the past several years.
The idea of the refugee as a clear-cut, objective identity is reflected in 
the language surrounding refugees. We speak of ‘refugee recognition’ as if 
it were an identity that is objectively present among certain individuals that 
simply needs to be uncovered. The status is ‘declaratory’, which means that 
someone ‘does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recog-
nised because he is a refugee’ (UNHCR 2011: pt. 28). Public expectations 
about justice appear to be based on this idea of clearly demarcated individ-
uals, whose rights are being fulfilled according to the law. In many asylum 
cases, however, the question is not primarily about the law, but about facts. 
During the decision-making journey, a legal decision constitutes the final 
destination, but the law often does not provide much guidance on the way.
A more accurate description is perhaps that refugees are defined into 
being in the encounter with the host states, and more specifically, during the 
refugee determination procedure (see also Stevens et al. 2014; Zetter 1991). 
Decision-makers participate in the negotiation about the boundaries of 
the refugee category daily in their work. The many uncertainties that often 
characterise decision-making, combined with the specialised knowledge of 
decision-makers, open up a discretionary space that is difficult to control 
from above and is shielded from public view. Like other street-level bureau-
crats, caseworkers not only implement policy, they also shape it in important 
ways. They try to answer many complex questions in a context where they 
are under time pressure, there is limited or ambiguous information, they 
receive scarce reliable feedback, and the decisions can be emotionally diffi-
cult. While decision-makers refer to the same legal framework, they develop 
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local norms through the comparison of cases that serve as a yardstick for 
what the eligible refugee looks like. It is, however, difficult to know how 
this yardstick relates to external reality, particularly in case portfolios where 
credibility assessment is central to the outcome. Equal treatment, or ‘follow-
ing the same practice’, can be considered to become a proxy for justice in 
a context where it is hard to evaluate the accuracy of decisions. Such con-
sistency at a local level may, however, easily co-exist with inconsistencies on 
a broader level documented by research in other countries (see e.g. Ramji-
Nogales et al. 2009; Rehaag 2012; Riedel and Schneider 2017). To some 
extent, then, justice becomes locally produced.
While decision-makers appear to become more confident in their deci-
sions with experience, they do not necessarily make more accurate—or 
just—decisions over time, particularly when there is lack of reliable feed-
back. Considering the psychological cost of doubting previous decisions 
in asylum cases, where the stakes are exceptionally high, it is even possible 
that experience may increase self-confidence at the expense of self-scrutiny. 
An institution that is constantly under criticism is perhaps less likely to 
provide an environment that encourages deliberation about the justness of 
its decisions. It seems, however, to be of vital importance to open up such 
‘critical spaces’ (Crépeau and Nakache 2008), if not in public, then at least 
internally. In a situation where there are no clear answers, engaging with 
the uncertainty and doubt that are inevitably there, may be the best way of 
improving the conditions of just decision-making.
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Introduction
‘Political and ethical issues are […] found at the heart of public debate on 
asylum, which oscillates between a preoccupation with the management of 
migratory flows and the principle of protection of victims of persecution’ 
(Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012: 469). This leads to tensions and aporia with 
which decision-makers are confronted in their everyday work. Fassin and 
Kobelinsky (2012: 470) identify three such aporia. The first refers to the need 
to simultaneously enhance the ‘greater good’ of the institution, i.e. asylum 
protection, and, at the same time, to challenge asylum applications and put 
them in doubt. The second has to do with what they define as ‘the core value’ 
in decision-making, as it is perceived by decision-makers themselves: ‘that of 
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the just decision’ (ibid.). The term ‘just’, thereby, stands both for ‘correctness’1 
and ‘fairness’. The third relates to the sanctioning of (moral) sentiments and 
their simultaneous importance as a means for determining the veracity of asy-
lum claims as well as for rendering the institution ‘human’. Related to this 
view, but more on a micro-level, much of the existing literature on street-level 
bureaucracies has dealt with practical decision-making dilemmas, particularly 
the juggling between, on the one hand, ‘compassion and flexibility’ and, on 
the other hand, ‘impartiality and rigid rule-following’ (Lipsky 2010: 15–16; 
see also Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003).
However, what became apparent in our fieldwork is that these ‘dilemmas’ 
or aporia were generally not formulated as such by the caseworkers2 them-
selves. Fassin and Kobelinsky also underline this with regard to rapporteurs 
and magistrates in the French National Asylum Court (2012: 470). This, 
we argue, is not a coincidence. Hence, even if these different rationales of 
decision-making appear to stand in conflict, ways of resolving or at least 
reducing this tension are essential for caseworkers to do their job. In this 
chapter, we look at how this is done. Our aim is not to argue that these 
‘dilemmas’ are never experienced as such by decision-makers. Sometimes 
they are. However, while this has been dealt with extensively in existing lit-
erature, not much attention has been paid to the fact that more often they 
are not. In this chapter, therefore, we deal with the ‘non-experience’ of 
dilemmas arising from what are from the ‘outside’ perceived as conflicting 
rationales of decision-making and the ways in which decision-makers deal 
with these rationales and make them fit. We argue that decision-makers’ 
‘volitional allegiance’ (Gill 2009: 215) with the asylum institution plays a 
crucial role thereby. This chapter develops an enquiry that illuminates how 
state officials themselves are governed (see also Gill 2016; Mountz 2010) 
through their involvement in particular groups within the office and the 
allegiances they develop towards them. Such an analysis involves talking to 
caseworkers about their ‘desires’, affiliations and their attempts to deal with 
the different exigencies of their work.
Just as Fassin and Kobelinsky (2012: 470) describe, for the caseworkers 
we spoke to decision-making is, ultimately, about taking ‘correct’ and ‘fair’ 
decisions. By drawing on their notion of the ‘just decision’ (encompass-
ing both ‘correctness’ and ‘fairness’) we attempt to illuminate how  asylum 
1‘Correctness’ of decisions is based on decision-makers’ evaluations and not on that of applicants.
2By caseworkers we mean the people in the office who conduct interviews, collect evidence, write deci-
sions and thus produce asylum cases.
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 decision-makers in the Swiss administration make sense of their work: how 
they invoke notions of correctness and fairness with regard to decision- 
making practices, but also the greater good of the asylum institution in 
providing protection for those deserving it, and moral sentiments such as 
sympathy and compassion towards applicants and their stories. In this chap-
ter, we show that how decision-makers make sense of what they do is influ-
enced by their affiliations to and allegiances with what we call ‘communities 
of interpretation’.3 We define ‘communities of interpretation’ as groups with 
which people identify. They have a ‘shared repertoire’ of knowledge and 
meanings (Wenger 2003) on how to interpret the law and (best) make sense 
of their work. These communities of interpretation evolve along the fissures 
between different asylum units and divisions, professional backgrounds, 
amount of working experience, and hierarchical positions. Different com-
munities of these kinds coexist within the same office. They are crucial to 
the processes whereby notions of the ‘just decision’ develop and become 
shared amongst different subdivisions of the asylum office. Gill argues that 
state officials are not only ‘compelled, disciplined or incentivised to act [“in 
accordance with state objectives”], but [are, furthermore,] ideationally con-
ditioned to freely choose to conduct themselves’ in such ways (Gill 2009: 
219–220). We argue that these little communities of interpretation play an 
important role in this regard.
By placing the relationship between asylum caseworkers and (parts of ) 
the office at centre stage in this article, we shed light on an issue that has 
received much less attention than, for instance, the relationship or encoun-
ter between asylum seekers and decision-makers (Jubany 2011; Gill 2009, 
2016; Kobelinsky 2015; Maryns 2006; Probst 2011; Souter 2011), the 
social and legal conditions in which caseworkers apply the law (Miaz 2017), 
as well as the role of evidence in such encounters (Doornbos 2005; Good 
2007; Gibb and Good 2013; Scheffer 2001). Thus, to understand why 
 decision-makers do what they do, we argue that it is important to look at 
what decision-makers themselves claim that they ‘do in the name of the 
state’ (Gupta 1995: 376). It is here that their relationship with (part of ) the 
office and their volitional allegiance to it become important.
After a short section on ‘just decisions’, where we explain how we analyt-
ically approach ‘just’ decision-making and describe our methods and data, 
we develop our argument in three main parts. The first two are organised 
3We derive this term from Wenger’s ‘community of practice’ (2003).
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around the two dimensions of what caseworkers and their superiors consid-
ered to make their work ‘just’: ‘correctness’ and ‘fairness’. In the first part 
we discuss meanings ascribed to correct decision-making. We show that 
what ‘correct’ comes to mean is shaped by institutional constraints related to 
legality, productivity and accountability. Furthermore, we argue that other 
actors such as superiors, peers and magistrates of the Federal Administrative 
Court as well as imagined figures such as ‘the Swiss people’ or ‘the tax pay-
ers’ play an important role in shaping what it means to take a ‘correct’ deci-
sion. In the second part we analyse how caseworkers negotiate ‘fairness’. We 
argue that different considerations—legal, organisational, relational, and 
moral—play into these negotiations and orient the caseworkers’ practices 
and decision-making. In this section we also show that caseworkers develop 
particular ideas about the rightful positioning in this landscape of different 
(and at times conflicting) considerations (see also Liodden and Schneider, 
both this volume). In the last part of the chapter we show how develop-
ing such ideas is influenced by the communities of interpretation that 
 decision-makers affiliate themselves with, or are affiliated with, as well as by 
the allegiances with these communities that they develop.
Tracing the ‘Just Decision’
Following Laroche (1995) we understand ‘just decisions’ as social representa-
tions. Rather than approaching decision-making as being about an individu-
alised notion of ‘choice’, we focus on how caseworkers and their supervisors 
speak about ‘just’ decisions and decision-making and try to make sense 
(and/or convey a certain sense to us, the researchers) of their work and the 
competing normative orders they have to manoeuvre within their daily 
work. Thus, in this chapter, we trace decision-makers’ practical reasoning 
(Barnett 2011: 247) of ‘just’ decision-making through their verbal accounts 
when explaining, justifying and distancing themselves from certain events, 
which we relate back to everyday practices of asylum decision-making that 
we have observed and participated in.
Since ‘just’ decision-making is not directly observable but only con-
structed in the verbalisation of practices and practical knowledge, the main 
bulk of data in this chapter is conversational in nature. The verbal accounts 
we draw on are, on the one hand, conversations between us and caseworkers 
of the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration SEM, including semi-structured 
and open-ended interviews with caseworkers as well as informal conversa-
tions with them; and, on the other hand, conversations between different 
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caseworkers that we observed, for instance, during so-called consulting ses-
sions between superiors and their employees or training sessions for new 
caseworkers.
As described in the introduction, what constitutes ‘just’ decision- making 
is contested within the institution. Such contestations render the  differing 
ideas of just decision-making visible. However, other aspects of what ‘just’ 
decision-making means may be self-evident within the institution. It is pre-
cisely such ‘normalities’ that we must attempt to grasp as ethnographers 
(see Breidenstein et al. 2013: 36). Yet, Shore and Wright also warn against 
becoming ‘inured’ to these normalities and claim that it is important to 
‘maintain sufficient critical distance to be able to keep asking fundamen-
tal questions about how [officials] conceptualise their worlds and what this 
means for theoretical debates’ (2011: 15). This was something that all three 
of us struggled with. During our fieldwork, we all became inured to certain 
‘normalities’.4 Working together and sharing our thoughts and experiences 
has helped us to recognise our own ‘normalities’ and regain critical  analytical 
distance. Our different disciplinary backgrounds—Ephraim Poertner is a 
human geographer, Jonathan Miaz a political scientist and Laura Affolter 
a social anthropologist—also proved enriching in this interpretative 
endeavour.
Asylum seekers must file their asylum application in one of the SEM 
reception centres, where they are submitted to the first steps of the proce-
dure. The procedure comprises two asylum interviews. If the reception cen-
tre cannot decide on the asylum application within 90 days, the asylum 
seeker is allocated to a canton responsible for his or her accommodation 
and support. The procedure continues at the headquarters, where the file is 
further processed, usually by conducting the second interview, undertaking 
investigations and, ultimately, taking the decision.
We all did fieldwork in different units at the SEM headquarters and in 
one or two reception centres. Jonathan Miaz conducted his fieldwork 
between 2010 and 2012, Ephraim Poertner between 2012 and 2014 and 
Laura Affolter between 2013 and 2015.5 Apart from our conversations with 
decision-makers, during our field-stays we also shadowed people in their 
daily work, went to coffee breaks and team meetings with them, sat in on 
4However, maintaining and regaining distance is not difficult only because one becomes inured to one’s 
interaction partners’ normalities, but also because as researchers we become personally involved and 
develop relationships of trust with our interaction partners (see Van Maanen 1982).
5Whilst Poertner and Affolter mostly worked with German-speaking staff, Miaz predominantly dealt 
with French-speaking caseworkers.
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asylum interviews, took part in the training sessions for new employees, etc. 
Thus, we all collected vast amounts of material by combining an approach 
of ‘classical’ in-depth ethnography of one particular site with multi-sited 
ethnography.6 A lot of this material we shared with each other to write this 
chapter. We first pooled parts of our anonymised ethnographic material and 
then both jointly and separately categorised it.
What ‘Correctness’ Means
Decision-making in the SEM is, to a great extent, about taking ‘correct’ 
decisions. This can be seen in the following statement by a head of unit 
when describing her role as a superior:
I have to make sure my people write decent [ordentliche ] and correct decisions. 
And enough. And exactly in this order. You see, for me quality is more impor-
tant than quantity.7
But what do she and others mean by correct decisions? And how is the cor-
rectness of decisions checked and measured? These are the questions we deal 
with in this section. Furthermore, we deal with the issue of quantity, which 
the superior also mentions.
A correct decision is often understood by decision-makers as one that 
one manages to get past the superior and—in case of an appeal—past the 
court. Thus, decisions that have been double-signed by the heads of units 
(even if the caseworkers know that their superiors do not always check their 
decisions very closely) and decisions that have been affirmed by the court 
are often quasi automatically perceived to be correct. When superiors check 
decisions, they pay particular attention to whether the decision is legally cor-
rect, whether it adheres to institutional practice and whether its argumenta-
tion is solid.
For a decision to be considered legally correct it must be consist-
ent with the Swiss Asylum Act, the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals, the 
1951 Refugee Convention and the rulings of the court. What ‘according 
to institutional practice’ means, on the other hand, is contested and keeps 
7Nora, head of unit, headquarters. To protect the anonymity of our interaction partners, all names are 
pseudonyms.
6Miaz and Affolter also did fieldwork in the Federal Administrative Court. Furthermore, Miaz included 
legal advice offices in his research.
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changing over time. Officially, institutional practice refers to the Asyl- und 
Wegweisungspraxis (practice of asylum and expulsion; APPAs), the institu-
tional guidelines on how to decide asylum cases from specific countries or 
regions and with specific flight motives.8 However, we argue that institu-
tional practice encompasses more than is explicitly stated in these guidelines, 
namely the collective ways for taking specific decisions within different com-
munities of interpretation in the office. This is illustrated by the following 
quote, in which a caseworker speaks about decision-making in the different 
reception centres and the headquarters:
Carmen: Sometimes we apply different measurements. And then it’s kind of 
a legal inequality. For example, we [reception centre A] once had a lot of 
[people from country Y]. With ‘country tests’ and everything we tried to 
expose them and to show that they did not really come from [country Y]. 
So, we started rejecting their claims. At the same time in [reception centre 
B] they were doing interviews and just waving them through [quickly giv-
ing them positive decisions]. Just because the practice had not been coor-
dinated. It got going after a while, but it always takes an outcry first that 
something is going wrong to get something going […].
Researcher: But don’t you have the APPAs, which define what the common 
practice is?
Carmen: Yes, […] but some APPAs are just not up to date. Sometimes we 
have already moved a step further, but it’s not in the APPA yet.
Researcher: So this means you are at liberty to create your own practice here?
Carmen: Yes, of course, but naturally in consultation with those responsible 
for that country at the headquarters. For example, the case of [people from 
country Y]; [the practice of giving more negative decisions] started here. We 
in the reception centres are usually the first ones to pick up new trends. It is 
here where you just notice them first.9
Several reception centre officials remarked that because they are physically 
so much closer to the asylum seekers (they are housed in the same building) 
and it is at the reception and procedure centres where the asylum seekers 
first arrive, they are better equipped to pick up new trends than the people 
at headquarters and can thereupon adapt their practice. But because they are 
8The APPAs are created and kept up to date by the Federführung, the person(s) in charge of a particular 
country at the headquarters in Berne. APPAs exist for the most common countries of origin.
9Carmen, caseworker, reception centre.
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not in charge of the APPAs and do not hold any Federführungen,10 this can 
result in them taking decisions that seem appropriate to them and trying 
to get them past the Federal Administrative Tribunal. If they manage to do 
so, these decisions serve as a kind of confirmation of the ‘practice’ and may, 
therefore, lead to the establishment of a new institutional practice.11 This 
shows how caseworkers ‘shape and mediate polic[ies] while translating and 
implementing [them] into action’ (Wedel et al. 2005: 34).
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, rulings by the Federal 
Administrative Court constitute a further means for measuring correctness. 
Hence, the units and divisions of the SEM keep records of how many of 
their employees’ decisions are quashed and for what reasons. A distinction is 
made between quashings that could have been avoided and those that could 
not have been and are, therefore, not really perceived as mistakes. Avoidable 
quashings are those occurring because of so-called ‘formal’ mistakes SEM 
caseworkers had made, for instance, not granting the asylum seeker the 
proper right to be heard or not making all the necessary enquiries. In con-
trast, quashings on the basis of the court judging the credibility of asylum 
claims or the scope of the refugee definition differently than the SEM offi-
cial did, are regarded as unavoidable. If individual caseworkers and/or units 
receive too many quashings, especially of the ‘avoidable’ kind, this is con-
ceived of as bad decision-making. Not only do such quashings reflect badly 
on the quality of decision-making, they also cost time (and money) and, 
therefore, stand in the way of efficient decision-making.
Efficiency plays an important role in decision-making. Thus, deci-
sion-makers’ work is not only checked in so-called qualitative terms, but also 
in quantitative ones. ‘Somehow we are always confronted with this dilemma 
(in diesem Clinch ) of not just having to demand qualitatively correct work 
from our people, but also that it ‘yields a profit’ (es muss auch etwas rauss-
chauen )’,12 said Markus, a head of unit at the headquarters. With ‘yielding 
a profit’ he was referring to the institutional demand to produce so-called 
‘output’. This focus on numerical accountability is typical of contemporary 
(asylum) administrations (see Gill 2016: 39; Poertner 2017). Quantitative 
targets are set on a regular basis for the whole institution. There is a lot of 
(political) pressure to deal with asylum applications fast and reduce the 
12Markus, head of unit, headquarters.
11Of course, this is not something that is only done by officials working in the reception centres but 
also those at the headquarters.
10In German, ‘die Federführung haben ’ means ‘to have the lead’. Here it refers to the person or the 
group of people responsible for determining a country or thematic practice doctrine.
13 Taking the ‘Just’ Decision: Caseworkers and Their Communities …     271
number of pending cases. Setting quantitative targets is a way of doing 
justice to these demands.13 This political pressure for efficiency becomes 
apparent in the statement by the same superior, Markus, that ‘we [the SEM 
(officials)] have a responsibility towards the Swiss people and the tax payers 
to not just take correct decisions but decisions of “the right quality”’. He 
then goes on to say: ‘And I deliberately speak of “the right quality” and not 
of “optimal quality”, because it could always be done better’.14 With ‘right 
quality’ Markus implies that the efforts invested to make decisions quali-
tatively better has to be measured against the quantitative demands of the 
office: it is not only important for decisions to be correct and thorough, but 
the time and effort involved matter too. That Markus considers this to be 
a political demand becomes apparent through the reference he makes to 
‘the Swiss people’ and ‘the tax payers’. Markus appears to have internalised 
a  certain sense of accountability towards these imagined, generalised and 
blurred figures. In caseworkers’ and their superiors’ discourses, these two fig-
ures are usually used to justify restrictive practices and the measures for a 
greater productivity.
The concept of ‘the right quality’ bridges quantitative and qualitative 
demands. Doing one’s job well in the SEM means making an adequate 
effort. It requires ‘practical knowledge’ to be able to assess for each specific 
case what ‘adequate’ means. Overall, it means going into sufficient depth 
when dealing with a case, but not investing more time and resources than 
necessary. This can be seen in the example of Theodor, a caseworker, who 
said that his superior had instructed him to stop always looking for material 
evidence in order to argue for the non-credibility of asylum claims using the 
criterion ‘contradiction to facts’ (Tatsachenwidrigkeit ). The superior consid-
ered this too time-consuming and had asked him to focus instead on fram-
ing his arguments along the lines of ‘insufficient substance’, which could 
be done on the basis of the asylum interview minutes alone. The example 
shows that out of all the possible legal ways to argue in a case the most 
economical ones are usually promoted.
13While many of the caseworkers who had been working at the SEM for more than 15 or 20 years told 
us that there had always been numerical measures, most of them felt the output pressure had increased 
over recent years.
14Markus, head of unit, headquarters.
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Negotiating ‘Fairness’
Corinna: I limit myself to [applying institutional practice], because I have to. 
Even if sometimes it doesn’t reflect my personal opinion. [But] sometimes 
we also have to think like a human being and not like a person who makes 
the law.15
Nora: For me being ‘fair’ means that we use the same standards for evalu-
ating each claim. This also means that if the applicant does not fulfil the 
eligibility criteria we don’t ‘bend the rules’ [drehen und biegen ] and write a 
positive decision, just because it’s quicker. It means that when we reach the 
conclusion that the case must be rejected, we take the trouble to write a 
negative decision, even if this takes us three to four days, and if one had 
just said ‘yes, it’s coherent’, it might only have taken half a day. That’s what 
it means to be ‘firm but fair’ [in der Härte gerecht ]. On the other hand, we 
try hard to do justice to each individual case, each individual problem. I can 
also sometimes ‘turn a blind eye’ [fünf gerade sein lassen ] if my gut feeling 
tells me that I shouldn’t be obstinate and that I should try to do justice to 
the individual case. […] it means that we will look at the case more closely 
and that we do not hide behind formal arguments too readily.16
We start with these two quotes because they show similar patterns regard-
ing what is perceived as fair decision-making. Both officials stress the impor-
tance of following rules (stemming from the law and institutional practice). 
This is often described as being ‘firm’ or ‘strict’, which are regarded as neces-
sities and virtues. For Nora being firm means treating everyone equally, 
which she (and many others) believe is what asylum decision-making 
should be about. Both also seem to imply that not (strictly) following the 
rules should constitute an exception. Corinna describes these ‘exceptional’ 
moments as situations in which one thinks ‘like a human being’. For Nora 
these exceptional moments arise when her gut feeling tells her to deal with 
a case more closely than usual. Both of them, therefore, imply that not only 
legal and organisational norms and constraints orient decision-makers’ prac-
tices but also moral considerations, emotions and feelings.
However, in this section we go beyond this dialectical depiction by 
extending the story in two ways. First, we argue that dealing with this 
‘dilemma’ (whether it is perceived as such by the caseworkers or not) is not 
(‘just’) about using one’s room for manoeuvre to either ‘be  compassionate’ 
15Corinna, asylum caseworker, headquarters.
16Nora, head of unit, headquarters.
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or ‘follow the law’, but about making these demands meet. Second, we 
argue that the tension between what we call ‘doing justice to the individ-
ual’ and ‘doing justice to the system’ is about more than just ‘compassion’ 
and ‘impartial rule-following’. It is about finding one’s position in a ‘moral 
economy’ (Fassin 2012: 441) fraught with pitfalls on various grounds: 
upholding legal and formal considerations without falling into the trap of 
becoming overly formalistic; seeing your room for manoeuvre in the right 
spots—whether in your fight against abuse or to provide protection to as 
many as possible; coping with being regularly lied to as well as being 
exposed to excruciating stories of suffering. No simple solution to these 
tensions exists, but caseworkers struggle in justifying their own position in 
this field of contradictory convictions on what ‘just’ decision-making ulti-
mately means. We argue on the basis of this that decision-makers not only 
have an idea of what is ‘just’ in an individual case, but develop a representa-
tion about the ‘rightful’ positioning in this landscape of contested moral 
measures.
Decision-makers’ volitional allegiance to (parts of ) the office and the 
important role that ‘protecting the system’ plays in their work are crucial in 
this regard. Caseworkers often tend to refer to ‘the system’ and their affilia-
tion to it when explaining why they have to be strict in their application of 
the law. In Switzerland, like other countries of the global North, discourses 
on ‘abuses’ and on ‘bogus’ refugees loom large (Zimmermann 2011). The 
work of asylum caseworkers is, thus, marked by suspicion concerning asy-
lum seekers’ motives for applying for asylum, which becomes particularly 
visible in credibility assessments. They argue that they have to refuse those 
asylum seekers who do not correspond to the legal definition of the refugee 
in order to protect the asylum institution from abuse, to preserve the cred-
ibility of the system and, finally, to continue to protect ‘those who deserve 
protection’, as this quote nicely shows:
I think that saying ‘no’ to someone who’s not a refugee in the sense of the 
UNHCR and of the Refugee Convention contributes to the protection of the 
asylum institution. One has to say ‘no’ to those who are not refugees in order 
to be able to say ‘yes’ to those who are.17
Fassin and Kobelinsky (2012: 465) relate these kinds of legitimation nar-
ratives back to the historical change in decision-making, when in the mid 
17Johann, asylum caseworker, headquarters.
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1980s most requests went from being granted to being rejected. They argue 
that the ‘only morally acceptable means to solve this problem is to make 
a separation between valuing asylum while devaluing those who claim it’. 
Decision-makers
not only believe that they do good work, in which they sincerely believe, but 
are also convinced that they do it even better when they are more scrupulous 
in their examination of claims and parsimonious in granting refugee status. 
(ibid.)
Decision-makers, therefore, tend to make use of explanations such as the 
one quoted above to explain how they do justice both to the system, and 
to the individual asylum seeker. Whilst some decision-makers told us that 
doing justice to the system and doing justice to the individual asylum seeker 
created a dilemma they had to deal with in their daily work, many seemed 
to agree with the idea that ‘just’ decision-making was about bringing doing 
justice to the individual asylum seeker into accordance with doing justice to 
the system. The quote above shows how this is done.
The meanings ascribed to fair decision-making so far pertain to legal 
equality. A further meaning often associated with fair decision-making is 
that of impartiality, as Nora’s quote at the beginning of this section indi-
cates. The ideal of fair decision-making is, therefore, commonly understood 
to be about finding one’s middle ground, as this quote shows:
We sometimes tease each other a bit. If one of us takes a rather strict decision: 
‘Oh, what a hardliner’. And if someone says that they had to turn a blind eye 
or take an ‘in dubio pro [refugio]’18 decision: ‘What a wimp you’ve become’. 
I think it’s important to find a middle ground somewhere. So, that you don’t 
slide towards one extreme, you see?19
It is very common within the office to denounce other decision-makers, 
 asylum units, divisions and even centres as being either ‘softies’ or ‘hardlin-
ers’. Who is considered to be a ‘softy’ or a ‘hardliner’, and what that consti-
tutes, vary. What some consider impartial decision-making, might already 
be regarded as the act of a ‘softy’ by others. In the following quote Jenny 
18This means to give the applicants the ‘benefit of the doubt’.
19Lucy, asylum caseworker, headquarters.
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criticises ‘leftists’, who are often considered to be ‘softies’ for pursuing 
 egoistic projects:
And then there are those that one knows are totally left-wing and would like 
to save the world. And they think they’ve done something good [by ‘just wav-
ing those people through’ on the basis of family reunification], even though 
some of these 16 and 17-year old women disappeared and never officially 
arrived here. […] That’s very egoistic […] and frowned upon, you see? Because 
it’s ‘professionally’ [fachlich ] just completely wrong and also legally. I mean, 
that’s just so problematic.20
Jenny uses this example to show why for her doing what one feels to be ‘per-
sonally right’ fails to do justice to the individual. She, thus, gives a twist to 
the narrative of why rightful decision-making should be orientated towards 
what is professionally and legally right, which extracts the moral basis from 
narratives that justify decision-making focusing on individual suffering. 
Attitudes like Jenny’s are, however, also criticised by decision-makers. They 
blame their co-workers (and/or themselves) for not being open enough 
towards asylum seekers and their individual circumstances and for having 
become ‘cynical’, ‘overly formalistic’ and what they sometimes call ‘law 
machines’.
Both kinds of criticism seem to involve an inherent assumption that 
‘just’ decision-making implies making personal convictions, feelings, ethics 
and notions of ethos fit. However, how this is to be achieved—whether it 
is about putting different notions of ‘just’ decision-making into a hierarchi-
cal order, what this order should be, and, thus, how different ideas of what 
makes decision-making ‘just’ should be weighted—or whether it is about 
merging personal and professional ideas of the ‘just decision’ and to what 
extent this is desirable—is a matter of contestation. This leads to tensions 
that decision-makers often experience and have to deal with in the course of 
their everyday work. How they deal with it, may, in turn, depend on case-
workers’ different affiliations and allegiances, on the one hand, but also on 
the particular situation: the case they are dealing with and the person they 
are talking to.
20Jenny, head of unit, reception and procedure centre.
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Communities of Interpretation
I have to do what the office says, otherwise I will somehow betray the office 
and I don’t want that either.21
The expression of ‘betraying the office’ in this quote suggests a close affili-
ation between the official and the office that, we suggest, cannot be taken 
for granted. It implies a struggle for the ‘ideologically affected desires of 
state personnel’ (Gill 2009: 215), their ‘volitional allegiance’ (ibid.) with 
the office (also standing for ‘the system’). It is important, however, not to 
perceive the office solely as a unified whole. Rather, it appeared to us to be 
divided along complicated and evolving lines of affiliations and allegiances. 
These changing allegiances profoundly influence what ‘just’ decision-making 
means for caseworkers in particular situations. Thus, decision-makers align 
with what are imagined as ‘just decisions’ in the communities of interpre-
tation they identify themselves with and are identified with, and distance 
themselves from other senses of ‘just’ decision-making.
These communities of interpretation evolve along the fissures between 
units, divisions, professions, experience, and hierarchy, and are crucial in 
order to grasp how notions of ‘just’ decision-making develop and become 
shared amongst different subdivisions of the office. However, we acknowl-
edge that these fissures are not dividing lines: they are, to some extent, sit-
uational: not only are they complicated and evolving, but sometimes the 
fissures run right through individuals that feel torn between competing 
senses of ‘just’ decision-making. Also, there is arguably more mutual under-
standing between the various divisions than this rather antagonistic rep-
resentation allows us to acknowledge. Officials in the office are affiliated to 
multiple ‘communities’ and may ‘change sides’. In this part we show contes-
tations between different communities of interpretation evolving around the 
role of expertise and experience for correct and fair decision-making as well 
as around the importance of a legal approach versus so-called intercultural 
sensitivity and of compassion.
Nearly all caseworkers we spoke to in the reception centres tended to 
identify themselves primarily with their centre rather than with the SEM as 
a whole. In our conversations with them they often mentioned why they 
thought the work they did was better—in the sense of being more cor-
rect and fairer—than that of decision-makers working at the headquarters. 
21Corinna, asylum caseworker, headquarters.
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The latter did the same. Decision-makers, both in the reception centres 
and at headquarters, considered it to be unfair that their decision- making 
sometimes differed. However, in order to overcome these differences they 
all expected the respective other to adapt to their way of doing things. 
Officials in the reception centres often highlighted that people at the head-
quarters in Bern were not as close to the claimants as they were. They used 
this closeness to the claimants to explain their own different, more ‘reality- 
grounded’ approach to decision-making. Officials in the headquarters, in 
turn, expressed reservations about practices in the reception centres that they 
considered to be ‘shirt-sleeved’ or ‘rush rush’ approaches, that suffered from 
a lack of either distance from the claimants or the necessary expertise. At 
stake here are different notions of ‘expertise’ that are considered necessary for 
correct and fair decision-making. Officials in the reception centres perceive 
their expertise to derive from their ‘close contact’ with asylum seekers and 
the vast number of conversations they have with them (since they conduct 
both the short and long asylum interviews, whilst the decision-makers in 
Bern only do the latter). Many decision-makers at the headquarters, on the 
other hand, consider their expertise to be greater and of more value, because 
they hold all the Federführungen and, therefore, have all the experts and their 
expertise ‘in house’.
Daniel: Those in the ‘country teams’ they’re supposed to be the specialists. 
But then someone who’s been working at the SEM for half a year or so tells 
you what to do. Well […].
Researcher: You mean that someone who’s new takes on a Federführung?
Daniel: Yes, exactly. […] To give you a specific example; I once interviewed 
a woman from Somalia. She couldn’t [tell me] anything. So I asked the 
Federführung in Bern how this works with Somali women, whether I could 
give her a removal order. And then someone [from the Federführung ] wrote 
back to me and said: ‘As a women she [belongs to] a vulnerable group’. As a 
woman you’re not per se vulnerable. […] I didn’t do it. I gave her a removal 
order anyway. And I was backed up.22
Here we see a caseworker from a reception centre challenging the exper-
tise and authority of a colleague at the headquarters. In this case, he simply 
does not follow her advice. Furthermore, the friction between newcomers or 
‘inexperienced’ decision-makers and old-established officials becomes appar-
ent in his statement.
22Daniel, asylum caseworker, reception centre.
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Newcomers sometimes accuse old-established officials of having devel-
oped a ‘cynical’ attitude towards asylum applicants over the course of their 
career that they deem incompatible with rightful decision-making. Although 
they often express a certain understanding for developing cynicism and 
even sometimes state that nobody should do this job for too long, they are 
most impressed by old-established officials who have managed to maintain 
the ability to ‘see the humans behind applications’ and to make an effort 
to ‘reset’ after every interview, approaching ‘every asylum applicant as if 
she or he were the first’. Old-established officials, in turn, are sometimes 
sceptical of approaches to decision-making that they consider put personal 
opinions and feelings above the values of the larger ‘community of inter-
pretation’, the office. Instead, they feel that some of the newcomers pursue 
‘egoistic projects’. Hence, whilst experience is regarded by newcomers and old- 
established officials alike as essential for decision-making, experience is also 
believed to sometimes stand in the way of ‘just’ decision-making.
However, what ‘seeing the human behind the application’ means in 
 practical terms is contested. What for some might fall within ‘seeing the 
human, instead of a number’, might already be regarded as ‘egoistic’ and 
‘unfair’ by others as we showed in the previous section. These differences 
in decision-making are often related back to decision-makers’ political 
 opinions, and also—more often—to their units, divisions or centres being 
‘softer’ or ‘harder’.
Furthermore, in the office, different professional backgrounds of case-
workers and superiors are also mentioned as indicative of diverging per-
spectives on what correct and fair decision-making is. The main fault line 
seems to run between those with a legal background and those without, 
the latter usually having a social sciences or humanities background. As the 
 asylum procedure involves writing legal orders, conducting interviews in 
complex intercultural settings (see Kälin 1986) and evaluating the credibility 
of asserted origin and persecution narratives, caseworkers often disagree on 
what ‘just’ decision-making means regarding these contrasting facets of their 
work. Thus, caseworkers quite often openly acknowledge taking a ‘legalis-
tic’ approach or one that departs from it and express a clear preference for 
one way or the other. Of course, this is not only related to their professional 
background, but also to how they have been trained and socialised in the 
asylum office. Hence, whilst some superiors expressed a clear preference for 
employing new decision-makers who are legally versed and/or have a legal 
background, others prefer people who have travelled, ‘who know how things 
work abroad – not just in Russia, America or France, but in Bangladesh or 
Uganda for example – [and] who can free themselves from a eurocentric 
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 perception’.23 These different employment strategies and the fact that the 
superiors themselves employ their decision-makers, explain to some extent 
why the different asylum units become important communities of interpre-
tation. Of course, this also has to do with the hierarchical structure; with the 
superiors checking their employees’ decisions and deciding whether they are 
correct or not; and with decision-makers being trained on the job within 
the units.
A further fault line of affiliation and allegiance—one that is not specific to 
the asylum office but haunts most hierarchical bureaucratic organisations in 
some form or other—is that between the management and frontline staff or 
‘street-level bureaucrats’ (see Lipsky 2010). While the former are concerned 
with broader strategic planning, organising the work of the latter and ‘steer-
ing’ the processes and outcomes of the whole, the latter are those typically 
meeting ‘clients’, processing cases and taking decisions in individual cases. 
A main tension in the office, as discussed above, arises between the man-
agement emphasising numbers and output and frontline staff who consider 
an (over-)emphasis on numbers problematic if not counterproductive to the 
complex work they do.
Vast differences seem to exist in the ways in which heads of divisions and 
units pass on the pressure to yield numbers to their subordinates: while 
some actively shield their staff from too rigid output target enforcement, 
others seem less able or willing to do so. And, as the following example 
highlights, they may themselves feel pressured or inclined to put the output 
first for career reasons or out of fear of losing their position:
It appears quite markedly; we’re only human. Now, for example: The head of 
division of the asylum procedure was only appointed ad interim and then they 
said: ‘Well, maybe he will then be appointed but maybe it [the position] will 
also be advertised’. And then he got really stressed out and he had to produce 
as good numbers as possible. So, he sat down with all the head of units and 
then they said: ‘What do we do now? We really have to increase the output, 
now that we’ve hired so many new people, now it has to rise’. […] It’s quite 
logical that these people are not efficient in the first three, four months and 
that the output rather decreases if the more experienced ones have to instruct 
the new people, if they come with questions, and they have to teach modules 
and so on. And this is logical, everybody knows that, actually in every oper-
ational management this is clear except, apparently, in the SEM, where one 
is afraid of the pressure, and of politics and such things, because these Swiss 
23Nadia, head of unit, headquarters.
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Federal Councillors24 probably need to show results soon, and therefore one 
has decided, well yes, we have to increase the output.25
This example nicely shows that even if output goals are frowned upon on the 
street-level, caseworkers try to make sense of the rationalities behind them. 
That does not mean, however, that they see them as ‘necessary’ and una-
voidable as they feel the management sometimes implies. And, more impor-
tantly, it shows that they see them as a barrier that gets in the way of what 
they consider ‘just’ decision-making.
Conclusion
‘Always remember: you are the office’, new decision-makers are constantly 
reminded in the training sessions. Thus, the expectation is that they should 
think and behave like that and not like individuals. They are asked and 
instructed to follow the objectives of the office, which—with it being a state 
institution—we can also call ‘state objectives’. The meanings ascribed to 
‘just’ decision-making by caseworkers and superiors that we have discussed 
in this chapter seem to be very much in line with these objectives. Following 
Gill (2009: 219), we argue that ‘states […] command powers that are capa-
ble of engendering the will to act in accordance with state objectives, rather 
than simply generating the necessity or imperative to do so’. We argue that 
the need and wish to ‘fit in’ plays an important role in this regard. Above 
we described the widespread denunciation of other decision-makers as well 
as whole units, divisions and centres as being either ‘hardliners’ or ‘softies’. 
Most decision-makers do not want to be denominated as either, especially 
if the denomination does not fit with that of the community or communi-
ties of interpretation they most identify with. When taking decisions, there-
fore, caseworkers not only try to anticipate their superior’s take towards their 
decisions, but sometimes also worry about what their peers might think 
about them, as this quote shows:
And then this case with ‘in dubio pro [refugio]’. Sometimes you feel really bad 
[doing this]. Because […] people speak about you behind your back: ‘Oh, she 
chose the easy way out; just quickly taking a positive [decision]. But maybe 
24The seven Swiss Federal Councillors are also ministers. One of them leads the Federal Department of 
Justice and Police, of which the SEM is a part.
25Benjamin, asylum caseworker, headquarters.
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you really struggled with [the decision]. Because sometimes, even though the 
story is not at all convincing, but if you don’t find any arguments – truly not 
and not just out of laziness – your only choice is to take a positive [decision]. 
Well, ok, maybe you could show the case to someone else first.26
This quote is typical in two ways. First, it shows the role one’s co-workers—or 
rather the anticipation of what they might think—play in decision-making. 
In line with this, many newcomers told us that it was primarily through 
their ‘coaches’, ‘godmothers’ and ‘godfathers’—who are co-workers from the 
same unit that train new employees to do the job—that they learnt how to 
‘think the right thoughts’. Second, it is not a coincidence that Helen refers 
to what her co-workers might think with regard to her taking a ‘too leni-
ent’ decision rather than one that is ‘too harsh’. While ‘overly strict’ and 
‘cynical’ decision-making is also frequently criticised and regarded as bad 
decision-making, we have never heard it being called ‘unprofessional’, 
whereas ‘lenient’ and so-called ‘naïve’ decision-making is (see also Alpes and 
Spire 2014: 269; Fassin and D’Halluin 2005: 6006; Kelly 2012; Scheffer 
2003: 456; Whyte 2011).
Being professional and fitting into their communities of interpretation 
are important for decision-makers. This can help explain decision-makers’ 
volitional allegiance to the asylum office and its objectives and ultimately to 
‘the state’ and its objectives. Through these communities of interpretation 
things become self-evident, like the need to protect the asylum system from 
being abused and to save protection for those ‘who really deserve it’. At the 
same time, it seems to be self-evident within the office that decision-makers 
should always be able to endorse and stand by the decisions they take and 
the way they go about doing so.
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Introduction
As a particular kind of authorial work practice, asylum casework revolves 
around the central goal of producing sovereign decisions. But how are peo-
ple taught to decide asylum cases on a routine basis? How are they expected 
to deal with the uncertainties, ambiguities, and the moral and ethical quan-
daries involved in carrying out this task? Based on observations of an intro-
ductory training course for decision-makers, the present paper will show 
how the induction of caseworkers in Germany centrally revolves around (a) 
the proper type and degree of emotional involvement and (b) the proper 
type and degree of individual autonomy and creativity in handling the ‘stuff’ 
of casework. It is argued that casework may usefully be understood as an 
ongoing process of boundary work (Gieryn 1983) in which the written deci-
sion functions as a boundary object (Star and Griesemer 1989; Star 2010) 
circulating among different groups of actors. During the training, references 
to emotions and materialities became linked in specific ways, depending on 
the phase of the procedure and the potential addressee. The analysis shows 
how seemingly mundane and routine aspects of asylum casework are deeply 
conflictual and emotionally charged.
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Asylum decisions are acts of certification that produce categories of iden-
tity, status and belonging. Bureaucratic work rests on systems of classifica-
tion and categorisation (Bowker and Star 1999), it continuously imposes, 
(re)produces and is itself bound by ‘principles of vision and division’ 
(Bourdieu 1994: 12–18) that present themselves as universal, disinterested 
and oriented towards the ‘common good’. What constitutes a ‘good’ deci-
sion, however, was and is an object of constant struggles. To mention but 
a few: administrative asylum decision-making is characterised by goal con-
flicts such as ‘offering protection’ vs. ‘preventing abuse of the asylum system’. 
In processing cases, staff members are expected to not only act legitimately 
but also efficiently—a point that is of particular importance in asylum sys-
tems with high caseloads. Furthermore, and this will be at the centre of the 
following discussion, a decision must both be as transparent as necessary 
and remain as opaque as possible. A minimum of transparency is required 
both for organisational steering efforts and for ensuring legal certainty. At 
the same time, not all considerations that impact on the decision-making- 
process (e.g., organisational quotas concerning the duration of asylum 
interviews, caseworkers’ feelings and emotions) find their way into the end- 
product of casework. In the written decision, the work that is invested into 
juggling these potentially conflicting demands is naturalised, objectified, and 
hence rendered invisible (Bourdieu 1989: 21ff.).
A number of studies have investigated asylum authorities ‘from within’ 
and pointed to the significance of individual and collective routines in deal-
ing with the uncertainties, ambiguities and dilemmas of asylum procedures 
(Affolter 2017; Dahlvik 2014a; Probst 2012; Scheffer 2001; Schittenhelm 
2015; Wettergren and Wikström 2014). They have stressed the extent to 
which a “culture of disbelief ” impacts on decision-making-practices within 
the authorities and shown that the categorisations that caseworkers use in 
their daily work are to a great extent determined by organisational subcul-
tures rather than by law or politics (Jubany 2011; Good 2015; Whyte 2015; 
Wikström and Johansson 2013). The present chapter builds on and seeks 
to contribute to this body of research by asking how newly recruited staff 
are initiated into practices of interviewing and decision-making. For new-
comers, the above-mentioned ambivalences are exacerbated by their lack 
of knowledge about organisational routines, expectations and rules. While 
I do not by any means suppose that training courses are in any simple 
way causally linked to actual refugee status determination practices, they 
are enlightening insofar as they constitute situations in which the taken- 
for-grantedness of organisational routines becomes an object of explication. 
During the training, particular aspects of casework were problematised, 
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rendered explicit and in this sense made public (Schmidt and Volbers 2011) 
to both the participants of the training and the outside observer. By focus-
ing on how relations to different actors, objects, and emotions are rendered 
relevant during the training, the asylum administration becomes analysable 
as part of an only ever relatively autonomous field (Moore 1972; Bourdieu 
1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant 2013; see Gill and Good, this volume) and 
the processual and conflictual character of asylum casework come into view.
The chapter is structured as follows: after a section on fieldwork and 
methods, I provide a brief overview of the administrative setting at the 
time of fieldwork in 2013/2014 and point to major changes since then. 
Subsequently, I focus on the ways in which beginning caseworkers are 
inducted into asylum procedural practices and interviewing and decision- 
making in particular. In the concluding section, I return to the role of 
emotions and materialities in boundary work in the asylum administrative 
setting.
Fieldwork and Methods
Fieldwork was conducted within the German Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF) in 2013 
and 2014.1 As a participant observer, I took part in three different train-
ing courses for decision-makers. Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with trainers, caseworkers and headquarter staff involved in training and 
quality measures. As a non-participant observer, I visited different branch 
offices for short periods of one to five days. In the course of fieldwork, a 
variety of documents pertaining to asylum casework (training material, 
handbooks, guidelines, country of origin information: etc.) was collected.
For data analysis, I use a multi-method design that combines mapping 
techniques developed for situational analysis (Clarke 2012) with the doc-
umentary method (Bohnsack 2010; Nohl 2012), a procedure based on a 
sociology of knowledge approach. These are employed to develop different 
and partial perspectives on the material (Mannheim 2013 [1936]: 237–
280). Situational maps were used to ‘lay out the major human, nonhuman, 
1The data were collected in the context of a research project on transnational administrative cooperation 
between European asylum authorities entitled ‘Europeanization of Asylum Administrative Practice?’ 
(headed by Christian Lahusen and Karin Schittenhelm at the University of Siegen), and funded by 
the German Research Foundation (DFG) as part of the research group ‘Horizontal Europeanization’ 
(FOR1539).
288     S. Schneider
 discursive, and other elements in the research situation of concern and pro-
voke analyses of relations among them’ (Clarke 2003: 559). The reconstruc-
tive interpretations of select passages from interviews and field notes were 
geared towards a more detailed analysis of the frames of reference and pat-
terns of perception, interpretation and evaluation of research participants by 
focusing on how they narrate, describe, argue and evaluate either during the 
interview or in the situations observed. For the purposes of this paper, I con-
centrate on field notes taken during a five-day introductory training course 
for asylum caseworkers. Since interviewing and decision-making form the 
core tasks of caseworkers, the two units that were devoted to these aspects 
were singled out for the following analysis. For presentation purposes, the 
original German vignettes were slightly shortened and translated into 
English by the author.
Before going into the training, the next section will offer a brief overview 
of asylum procedural practices in Germany at the time of fieldwork. Where 
applicable, I indicate and describe more recent changes.
The Asylum-Administrative Setting in Germany
The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt 
für Migration and Flüchtlinge: BAMF) is the central operative author-
ity responsible for deciding upon asylum applications. It is subordinate 
to the Ministry of the Interior and exercises its functions via decentralised 
branch-offices across the country. While people seeking international pro-
tection may be registered by several state institutions, to initiate the formal 
asylum procedure and to become an applicant in the legal sense, the protec-
tion seeker must apply for asylum in person at a branch office of BAMF.2 
Unlike in some other European countries (e.g., Sweden, see Schneider and 
Wottrich 2017), BAMF is solely responsible for taking decisions on asylum 
requests whereas all issues related to residence, social security, health, work, 
and housing are dealt with by the local foreigners’ authorities under the 
jurisdiction of the federal states. That is, caseworkers of the federal office will 
usually have very little information on the living conditions of the people 
whose cases they process. In addition, even the direct consequences of their 
decisions, i.e., either the granting of a residence permit or a deportation 
2In exceptional cases, an application may be lodged in writing. In 2015, this was the case for a consider-
able number of applications from Syria, Iraq, and Eritrea (Deutscher Bundestag 2015).
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order, will be administered and carried through by local authorities and/or 
the police.
After an all-time low of 19,164 initial applications in 2007, there has 
been a rapid increase in entry figures with 109,580 initial applications in 
2013 and 441,899 in 2015 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
2016: 13). Furthermore, the overall backlog of undecided cases has grown 
substantially, from 10,926 in 2007 and 95,743 in 2013 to 364,664 in 2015 
(Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016: 56; Thränhardt 2014).3 
Due to the very restricted recruitment of new asylum caseworkers from 
1993 onwards (Kreienbrink 2013: 406) and with the massive recruitment 
wave of 2015 and 2016, there is now a considerable age gap between staff 
that have twenty and more years of professional experience within BAMF 
and newly hired staff (Schittenhelm and Schneider 2017). As of 1st January 
2014, roughly 289 caseworkers were responsible for investigating and decid-
ing on asylum and/or Dublin cases, i.e., cases in which the responsibility 
of a member state for processing an asylum claim has yet to be determined 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2014: 38). By 1st September 2016 this number had 
risen to 1687 (Deutscher Bundestag 2016: 7, 11), although a substan-
tial portion only had time-limited employment contracts. Until recently, 
caseworkers were mainly recruited from institutions qualifying for entry 
into public administrative service (such as the Federal University of Applied 
Administrative Science) or from other federal authorities (e.g., the federal 
police, the armed forces, the federal pension fund or the customs authori-
ties). Since 2015, entry requirements have been loosened so that anybody 
with a bachelor’s degree may apply. The specific kind of knowledge rele-
vant for asylum casework is largely acquired on the job and during inter-
nal training measures. The length and nature of the induction phase have 
changed considerably over the last couple of years. At the time of fieldwork, 
new staff members were usually trained on-the-job for a period of roughly 
three months (sometimes less) under the supervision of more experienced 
colleagues or mentors. In addition, they received training courses at the 
headquarters in Nuremberg that covered legal aspects, intercultural training, 
Country of Origin Information (COI), and more practical aspects of case-
work. Starting in 2015, qualification centres have been set up where new-
comers undergo somewhat more systematic but very short initial training 
courses of four to eight weeks, depending on anticipated tasks.
3This backlog and the significant delays in stepping up the office’s staff and resources when applications 
started to increase from 2012 onwards were a recurrent theme in conversations during fieldwork.
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At the time of fieldwork, there was no explicit differentiation between 
the functions of conducting the substantive interview on the one hand and 
delivering decisions on the other. To the contrary, the unity of investigat-
ing and decision-making functions was something that the organisation 
aspired to in order to ensure adequate credibility judgements and to prevent 
a mass-processing of cases on the basis of the file alone. In practice, however, 
a considerable number of cases were decided by people who had not con-
ducted the interview, especially in branch-offices with extreme case overload 
or in situations where certain countries of origin were prioritised. With the 
introduction of so-called arrival- and decision-centres in 2015, the separa-
tion of tasks into interviewing and decision-making has become even more 
common.
With the passing of the immigration act in 2005, BAMF was assigned 
greater responsibility for issues of quality assessment and assurance.4 Since 
then, caseworkers are subject to the directives of their superiors (and, ulti-
mately, the Ministry of the Interior) whereas before they were to decide 
independently and on the basis of the law only.5 Unity of decision-making- 
practices is supposed to be guaranteed by internal guidelines and directives 
for particular case-constellations or countries of origin, including templates 
for writing decisions. That is, over the last couple of decades, the categori-
sations relevant for decision-making have become more explicit and more 
binding—in a sense, more bureaucratic. The reforms of 2015/2016 towards 
‘integrated refugee management’ have further strengthened these ten-
dencies since cases are now clustered into four main categories (countries 
of origin with a protection rate above 50%, countries of origin with a pro-
tection rate below 20%, ‘complex profiles’, Dublin-cases) before they even 
reach case-officers’ desks. Unlike in many other European asylum authori-
ties where decisions are evaluated and signed by senior officials, casework-
ers sign the written decision with their own name on behalf of BAMF. Via 
forms containing a brief overview of the decision, these are cross-checked 
by superiors in local branch offices. Appeals against negative decisions have 
to be lodged at the administrative courts within seven or fourteen calendar 
5The former practice was aimed at insulating asylum decision-making from political interference 
(Unabhängige Kommission ‘Zuwanderung’ 2001: 143). However, caseworkers seemed to apply legal 
provisions in an overly restrictive manner, which eventually came into conflict with political expecta-
tions (especially in the context of European efforts at harmonisation).
4Before, this had been the task of the Federal Commissioner for Asylum Matters who was responsible 
for safeguarding the public interest and establishing uniform decision-making-practices within the asy-
lum authority and before the courts (Kreienbrink 2013: 400). In the vast majority of cases, he appealed 
positive decisions (Weber 1998: 65; Unabhängige Kommission ‘Zuwanderung’ 2001: 144).
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days  depending on the type of rejection. Appeals against simple rejections 
have suspensive effect whereas those against claims rejected as manifestly 
unfounded or inadmissible do not. Applications to restore substantive effect 
must be substantiated and forwarded to the courts within seven calendar 
days. Decisions of the administrative courts are usually final: only in excep-
tional cases is it possible to appeal to higher instances (the High and the 
Federal Administrative Courts) or to lodge a constitutional complaint at the 
Federal Constitutional Court.
Organised Detachment
Interviews and observations at branch-offices showed how the organisation 
of casework on the ground further contributed to spatial, temporal, and 
emotional distance between caseworkers and asylum applicants. At local 
branch offices, staffs of the middle administrative service were responsible 
for registering the asylum request. They had their offices on the ground floor 
of the administrative buildings, which was also where the reception areas 
and waiting rooms for asylum applicants were located. With the help of an 
interpreter, staff informed applicants about the procedure, conducted a short 
initial interview on identity, travel routes and family relations, and opened 
up the electronic file. In the ‘ED-Room’, applicants were fingerprinted, pho-
tographed, and their height measured. These procedures inevitably involved 
some form of bodily contact, especially when bodies did not conform to 
the requirements of the technical devices used, as is often the case with fin-
gerprinting.6 It was also here that the scanners, printers and photocopying 
machines that served to produce and reproduce all the data that would even-
tually find their way into the electronic file were to be found. In short, this 
was where the ‘dirty work’ was done. This area was usually separated from 
the other areas of the building by security doors which—unless you were 
in possession of a key card—could only be opened from the inside. At the 
end of this initial screening, applicants were handed their residence per-
mit (Aufenthaltsgestattung ) for the duration of the procedure and told they 
would be informed about their appointment for the substantive interview at 
a later stage.
The offices of the members of the higher administrative service who are 
the subject of this paper, i.e., the people who conduct interviews and make 
6Apart from deliberate manipulation, fingers might be too old, too leathern from work, etc.
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decisions, were located in the upper storeys of the building. Generally, it 
was much quieter and cleaner here and the pace of work seemed slower, 
at least to the outside observer. Applicants could only enter this area once 
they had been collected from the waiting-rooms downstairs and brought to 
their interviewing officer. All applicants were invited for eight o’clock in the 
morning, meaning that many had to wait long hours, often with no access 
to food and beverages since branch offices were often located in far out and 
inhospitable areas. Asylum case officers usually only met their ‘clients’ on 
this one occasion. The interviews took place in caseworkers’ offices which—
apart from smaller individual details—were quite similarly furnished with 
officers seated behind large desks fitted with computers, and applicant and 
interpreter at a smaller desk in front on which water, tissues, a few sheets of 
white paper and pens were placed. In most cases, I took my seat at the side 
or in a corner near the door, facing the caseworker. At none of the inter-
views I observed was a legal counsel present and caseworkers told me that 
in their daily work this was nothing unusual.7 Routinely, the interview sit-
uation was thus restricted to an interaction between caseworker, interpreter, 
and applicant. While interviewees often emphasised that this setting helped 
to generate an atmosphere of trust, it also contributed to the opacity of the 
substantive interview (Schneider and Wottrich 2017).
While the interviews seemed highly ritualised regarding both their open-
ing8 and ending9 sequences, differences in interviewing style became appar-
ent with regard to the heart of the substantive interview. Here, applicants 
are asked to freely narrate their reasons for seeking protection and case-
workers are supposed to further enquire into the facts of the case and to 
give applicants the chance to clarify possible discrepancies or contradictions. 
Regarding the observed differences in interviewing techniques, our research 
has shown that there is a strong belief among German caseworkers that this 
is and should remain a matter of personality and individual style (Schneider 
and Wottrich 2017). Next to the ways in which questions are asked, the 
transformation of the spoken and translated word into the written protocol 
is a complex process with its own challenges and pitfalls (Dahlvik 2014b; 
7Unlike in some other European countries, e.g., Sweden, free legal counsel is not provided for during 
first-instance procedures in Germany (Schneider and Wottrich 2017).
8For example, all caseworkers enquired about applicants’ well-being, ensured them of confiden-
tiality, explained the purpose of the interview and then asked a set of questions from a standardised 
questionnaire.
9These often contained formulaic questions required by law like ‘What do you fear upon return to your 
home country?’ and ‘Were you able to communicate with the interpreter?’ etc.
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Scheffer 1998; see also the contributions in Part II of this volume). This is 
of particular relevance in the German case since interviews are not recorded. 
Again, caseworkers’ routines were rather heterogeneous in this regard, with 
some working with a dictaphone only, others typing or taking handwritten 
notes, and yet others using voice recognition software. At the end of the sub-
stantive interview, applicants were asked whether they wished to have the 
protocol translated back to them. In most cases I observed they declined and 
left.10 Presumably, this would have been different had they been accompa-
nied by a legal representative.
After the interview, caseworkers need to use powers of practical judge-
ment in order to assess and decide each case on an individual basis. In their 
decisions, they are asked to observe and apply legally binding rules and 
norms which, however, can in themselves be contradictory and in need of 
explication. A large share of the organisation’s steering effort goes into the 
development of tools and aids that are meant to ensure a uniform appli-
cation of the office’s policy. At the same time, output-oriented practices of 
controlling and steering played an important role in life at the office during 
the time of fieldwork. Instruments such as ‘MARiS’, the agency’s document- 
and workflow-management-system, and ‘OrAs’, an internal quota-system 
that specified productivity norms, introduced a logic of calculability and 
countability into the asylum decision-making process: via automatons, the 
completion of particular steps of the procedure was counted and entered 
the Board’s statistics, which, on the one hand, were one of the most impor-
tant means by which the organisation’s performance was measured in terms 
of legitimacy and efficiency, and, on the other hand, also one of the prime 
instruments of control that the organisation exercised over its staff. The 
number of asylum interviews conducted and decisions written was impor-
tant in the assessment of caseworkers’ performance and could be conse-
quential regarding promotions or their eventual appointment as tenured civil 
servants. What was counted and what was not affected the ways in which 
caseworkers perceived asylum applicants and their own work. Some inter-
viewees talked about applicants only as workloads to be processed, and 
cases were described as difficult or easy depending on the anticipated time 
it was going to take to close the file (Schittenhelm 2015; Schittenhelm and 
Schneider 2017). Depending on organisational prioritisation and individual 
coping strategies, some cases were treated more quickly than others. Since 
10Some caseworkers did, however, have the interpreter translate the protocol back block by block dur-
ing the actual interview.
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‘MARiS’ supports a kind of file-management that can render some cases 
very clearly visible and others nearly invisible (through various types of 
hold-files), it simultaneously enabled an emotional detachment from such 
differential treatment and from the fact that there were always more cases 
than one could possibly process. Taken together, the ways in which asylum 
casework was structured contributed to an administrative setting which was 
characterised by spatial, temporal and emotional distance between casework-
ers and clients (for similar tendencies in the UK-context, see Gill 2016). As I 
will show below, the training was geared at counteracting the potential dan-
gers resulting from this setting.
“Don’t Turn Your Heart into a Den of Thieves 
and Murderers”
The vignettes presented in the following stem from field-notes taken dur-
ing a five-day basic introductory course for asylum caseworkers. Of the ten 
participants, six were recently recruited staff with one to five months work 
experience whereas four had been ordered to re-enter the asylum unit in the 
context of rising application numbers after they had worked in other parts 
of the organisation for a number of years. Regarding gender, the group was 
split evenly. The units that are of particular interest here—interviewing and 
drafting-and-decision-making—were delivered jointly by headquarter staff 
responsible for quality assurance and experienced caseworkers from branch 
offices. Both units began with an input in the form of a lecture and then 
proceeded with a workshop unit during which trainees participated more 
actively and more practical issues were discussed.
Learning How to Interview
The first part of the session on interviewing techniques consisted of a lecture 
delivered jointly by BAMF staff and a representative from UNHCR. The 
overarching goal of asylum interviews was formulated as clarifying all ques-
tions relevant for decision-making in a fair and efficient manner. Particular 
ways of conducting interviews were discredited and trainers called on case-
workers to be empathetic, fair, loyal, sensitive, and open. To create a respect-
ful interview atmosphere, they were advised to greet applicants in their own 
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language, to enquire about their well-being, to offer water, to have tissues at 
their disposal etc. Ultimately, these recommendations aimed at transform-
ing interviewing practices from ‘police style’ to ‘dialogic communication’ 
(Schneider and Wottrich 2017). They also indicated the desired emotional 
stance that caseworkers should take towards applicants, namely one of 
friendly neutrality. After the UNHCR representative had left, the workshop 
unit on interviewing techniques began. It started out with an input on credi-
bility assessment by one of the trainers:
A handout containing a list of ‘reality criteria’11 based on forensic psychology 
is distributed. Trainer B emphasises that this is a summary of the state of the 
art at the end of the 1990s when the office had commissioned a very expensive 
workshop by a highly acclaimed forensic psychologist for all decision-makers. 
He says he doesn’t know whether much has changed in this regard since then. 
However, he says, the office now knows that a lack of reality criteria is not 
necessarily indicative of a lie. […] Trainer says it is a difficult topic. However, 
‘I still work like [professor X] told us’. He says he knows this is far from per-
fect but that he couldn’t offer anything else at the moment. The office was 
going to update the material and introduce new methods for credibility assess-
ment that he was curious to see but this was going to take another while. […] 
After having presented the different criteria in detail, the trainer recommends 
using the handout like a “blueprint” to lay over the written protocol of the 
asylum interview. He mentions non-verbal information gathered during the 
face-to-face-interaction and growing experience as a caseworker as additional 
helpful ingredients in determining credibility. His colleague quickly adds that 
non-verbal information and impressions should be noted in the written proto-
col so that third parties could relate to it, too.
The fact that the workshop unit on interviewing began with credibility 
assessment already shows how closely linked interviewing and decision- 
making are. While the input lecture centrally revolved around applicants’ 
right to be heard and around caseworkers’ duties regarding transparency and 
proper treatment of applicants what caseworkers apparently really need to 
learn is how to tell a truth from a lie. This is fundamental in maintaining 
the illusio that the asylum-bureaucratic game is worth playing. If everything 
were to be taken at face-value, there would be no need for a decision, no 
need for caseworkers, no need for an asylum authority at all. The vignette 
11For example, logical consistency of statements, and unstructured and detailed narrations that include 
descriptions of interactions, one’s own emotions, complications in the course of action etc.
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above illustrates how concepts from the world of academia may be imported 
and used to endow administrative practices with an aura of authority, how-
ever outdated they might be. In the form of check-lists, they are turned into 
useful tools for handling the complexities of credibility assessments (for 
comparison, see Sorgoni, this volume).
After this opening, trainers asked participants to jot down any questions 
they might have concerning the asylum interview. Interestingly, the ensuing 
discussion quickly moved away from the question of credibility and truth 
and focused instead on issues of personal security, health and well-being. 
Caseworkers were concerned, e.g., about how to react when an applicant 
was infected with dysentery, critiqued the lack of security measures within 
the office, and one person made a sarcastic comment on how his main con-
cern was that the bucket (to puke into) wasn’t at hand in time. This initial 
discussion showed how caseworkers used the training above all as a space 
to voice concerns and to exchange personal experiences of their daily work 
with colleagues in a safe and closed environment. The frequent reference to 
the body, to issues associated with fear and/or disgust, were indicative of the 
emotional aspects of their daily work.12 Trainers related to these concerns in 
an empathetic way but also emphasised that asylum interviews were no more 
dangerous than riding the tram and that all applicants underwent a prior 
health-check. Concerning security, they argued that the situation at BAMF 
was different from that at local foreigners’ authorities (who are responsible 
for enforcing deportations) since caseworkers first of all had something to 
offer to applicants.13 Differences in power and status, the division of labour 
and the various forms of organisational distancing described above were thus 
used to alleviate feelings of insecurity, threat and disgust.
Later on, the group returned to discuss questions of credibility assess-
ment. Questions revolved around how to deal with doubts concerning the 
truthfulness of statements during the interview in general and around cred-
ibility assessments concerning religious conversion and sexual orientation in 
particular:
One of the older participants asks how one could possibly get to the bottom of 
such things. He would consider this to be very very difficult considering that 
applicants could prepare in advance. Trainer A answers that such things should 
12On the role of disgust in organisations, see Klatetzki (2016).
13Trainers contrasted this with the situation in Sweden where caseworkers had to personally communi-
cate negative decisions to applicants.
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always be considered in light of the country-specific guidelines. Questioner 
replies that these would not help him to know whether the applicant had 
really converted to Christianity. This was very difficult for him because these 
were things taking place inside the applicant.
Questions like these illustrate how caseworkers were thankful for expertise, 
tools and ‘tricks of the trade’ to help them cope with uncertainties. However, 
eventual hopes of receiving clear guidance were frequently frustrated:
Trainer B goes on to say that, regarding homosexuality, sometimes there are 
very moving stories that need to be transported, too. ‘There, I want to feel the 
vibrations’ […]. After a discussion about the situation in a particular coun-
try of origin, the questioner again insists: There I have guidelines on how to 
decide. But my question was whether I believe him or not. Trainer A reacts, 
‘well, that’s your job’, ‘that’s why this is so highly qualified’, ‘that’s something 
you have to bite yourself through’, ‘there are no hard and fast rules’. A partici-
pant sitting close to me whispers, ‘Very helpful indeed’.
Against the backdrop of a huge apparatus of written rules, guidelines and 
databases, caseworkers were thus thrown back on their ‘emotional intel-
ligence’ as human beings (see also Kobelinsky and Liodden, both this vol-
ume). Importantly, this concerned not only the type of emotional display 
that was required of caseworkers during the interaction with applicants 
which might be considered a form of emotional labour (Hochschild 2003). 
It also involved using their bodies’ sensorimotor systems to decipher appli-
cants’ emotional displays, that is, as a kind of lie-detector. And furthermore, 
when all else failed, trainers appealed to caseworkers’ pride and implicitly 
urged them to develop a habitus comparable to a judge14—a conception 
that is deeply entrenched in the organisational history of BAMF, where for 
a long time caseworkers used to act independently from directives, bound 
only by law and their ‘intimate conviction’ (see also Kobelinsky, this vol-
ume). The latter is a notion of central relevance in the German legal tra-
dition and requires that decision-makers be inwardly convinced about the 
certainty and truthfulness of the information before them (on the difference 
between inquisitorial and adversarial asylum procedures, see Staffans 2008). 
Caseworkers were asked to enter into a kind of self-dialogue, to constantly 
monitor their own emotions and use them as guidance in situations of 
uncertainty. During the subsequent discussion of a protocol of an exemplary 
14During the other training courses I observed, similar statements included “that’s what you’re here for, 
you just have to decide”, “you are the decision-maker”.
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substantive interview, participants were asked to use the list of reality criteria 
to assess the credibility of the statements. Although the majority, including 
trainers, agreed that the overall story was coherent and plausible, two of the 
participants remained unconvinced:
Trainer B recommends paying attention to the reality criteria in the course of 
the interview and states that apparently participants used different standards. 
He suggests taking the time to go over the protocol in an unburdened way, 
maybe using a highlighter, and to then see what outweighs. He says, ‘at the 
end of the day, I can’t write a rejection if I think he told me the truth’, ‘don’t 
turn your heart into a den of thieves and murderers’, ‘don’t act against your 
own conviction’.
Appeals like these may be considered as efforts to insert or reintroduce the 
sentient bureaucrat—conceived as a ‘good’ person—as a means to combat 
practices that are seen as being too entrenched in (individual or branch- 
specific) routines and as having, in a sense, become irrational.15 The quote 
above gives us an idea of the direction this irrationality might take, namely 
that applications are rejected in spite of caseworkers’ conviction of the truth-
fulness of the account. While remaining implicit, this points to the possi-
bility that frontline-practices might become dominated by the ‘wrong’ 
emotions, either in the sense of moral indifference or even ‘negative’ emo-
tions towards applicants. The list and the highlighter are turned into tools 
compensating for such an alleged lack of emotional reflexivity (Burkitt 
2012).
Learning How to Write Decisions
The workshop unit on drafting decisions centrally revolved around the 
ways in which caseworkers should handle the written guidelines and tem-
plates for decision-making. During the training, trainers stressed how these 
functioned to safeguard transparency, efficiency, uniformity and lawfulness 
of decision-making practices. They also emphasised, however, that the flip-
side consists in the danger of not treating cases individually. A lot of effort 
was put into exposing and counteracting the dysfunctionalities of an exces-
sive use of templates. The operative part of the decision was portrayed as the 
15That is, they constitute efforts to maintain the status of asylum decision-making as a moral enterprise 
(Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012).
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“core of the administrative act” and the statement of the facts of the case 
deemed a “high art”. The written decision was likened to BAMF’s “business 
card” and instructors urged caseworkers to keep in mind that they sign it 
with their own name and personally stand for it, that it was thus also their 
own personal business card. The metaphorical language used by the trainer 
vividly refers to the relations between the world of the administration and 
the ‘outside world’. The decision is that which leaves the organisation, which 
is handed over to external actors and which may be used as an indicator of 
the office’s performance. At the same time, it connects the work of casework-
ers to that of other actors within the organisation and may also be used as an 
indicator of their own individual performance. As such, it is closely linked 
to the emotions of pride and shame. What constitutes a ‘good decision’ was 
then further specified by the trainer:
The pre-formulated paragraphs for decisions are beneficial for not having to 
start from scratch each time anew. They are a blessing, in the sense of making 
life easier and to make you feel secure, but also a curse since they may seduce 
one into using them alone. It is important, however, that you get the transi-
tions right and that you include very personal, individual things.
To write a decision ‘properly’ is thus a skilful and creative undertaking. 
However, the creativity demanded of caseworkers is restricted to particular 
elements of the decision and depends on the addressee. The operative part 
of the decision is always well structured, in the sense of it being based on 
standardised, pre-formulated paragraphs which are available in a variety of 
languages. This part of the decision is something that caseworkers are not 
supposed to change. Its main addressee is the applicant. The elaboration 
of the grounds for (negative) decisions, in contrast, is above all addressed at 
potential judicial review and not translated into the applicant’s language. 
The relations between courts and administration are structured according 
to the necessity of making the work going into the administrative decision 
accountable. From the trainers’ perspective, this requires an active transfor-
mation of the tools and aids provided by the organisation. It is casework-
ers’ responsibility to argue each individual decision and to use the available 
templates only if and where they fit the individual case. In this sense, the 
elaboration of the grounds of the decision is—or rather should be—an ill 
structured element of the decision (on the back-and-forth between ill and 
well structured, see Star 2010). When aids and tools are used without taking 
account of the individuality of each claim, the decision can lose its status. It 
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becomes a defective decision that as such may be rendered useless or even 
prove detrimental to the organisation’s reputation.
If, why, and how decisions should be argued was a subject of recur-
rent discussion during this training session. The relative autonomy of the 
organisation would be challenged if all the elements that enter into the 
decision-making process were to be made transparent. In particular, this 
concerns grounds for positive decisions. These go into an internal note but 
do not enter the written decision handed over to applicants. During the 
training, caseworkers’ reasoning revolved around the danger of providing 
future applicants with a blueprint for their statements during the substan-
tive interview if the office’s policy regarding specific countries of origin or 
specific case constellations were to be made public. In this regard, writing 
decisions is always a work of immunisation, too.
What becomes obvious, then, is that next to its interpretative flexibility 
(a decision means something different to a caseworker, a quality supervisor, 
a head of a branch unit, a lawyer, an asylum applicant) the written deci-
sion constitutes a shared space between the asylum administrative authority 
and the wider social world and enables a kind of cooperation without con-
sensus between a variety of different actors (Star 2010: 602). A lot of this 
cooperation rests on the invisible work done in caseworkers’ offices (Star and 
Strauss 1999). While the organisational setting in which this work is done 
induces more standardisation, trainers are at pains to emphasise that par-
ticular elements of the decision need to be ill structured. The dilemma that 
characterises the decision-making process from the perspective of casework-
ers can thus be formulated as a situation in which they are subject to major, 
even excessive, regulation through the organisation and the Ministry of the 
Interior, on the one hand, but are held personally accountable for the quality 
of decisions, on the other.
Conclusions and Outlook
Bureaucracy, in the Weberian ideal-typical characterisation, is geared to the 
efficient and effective implementation of rules. These rules should be applied 
in a rational, objective, fair, and impersonal manner. As a source of legit-
imacy, this model has come under increasing attack. In the literature, the 
general shift to procedural justice and proximity to citizens as new sources 
of legitimacy has been associated with more personal, even empathetic styles 
of executing bureaucratic tasks (Englert and Sondermann 2013). Within the 
German asylum administration, this shift takes on a particular twist. In the 
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course of the training, the bifurcation of rational application of rules and 
more intuitive, emotionally based approaches to casework were both chal-
lenged and reinforced. An analysis of the processual character of casework is 
helpful in explaining this apparent paradox.
While the emotions that inform the process of decision-making do not 
appear on the surface of the written end-product, they are central at several 
moments of the procedure. As the vignettes illustrate, the face-to-face inter-
action between caseworkers and applicants may be infused with emotions 
like pity, fear, and disgust. Here, caseworkers are expected to engage in emo-
tional labour by developing a neutral, yet empathetic stance towards appli-
cants. Given working conditions on the ground, this is something that must 
be actively and consciously cultivated. Artefacts like the glass of water on the 
table may function as potential symbolic substitutes for such emotion work. 
In the discussions surrounding credibility assessments, in contrast, emo-
tional appraisals were presented as being useful both as ‘lie-detectors’ and as 
‘moral compasses’. They are important in linking the situation of interview-
ing with writing the decision. Here, emotions are not so much something to 
be suppressed, controlled or managed but rather form part of more implicit 
ways of knowing-how, of intuiting situations and deciding which course of 
action to take. Trainers’ rather awkward reactions to participants’ questions 
illustrate the difficulties they are having in explicating this type of knowl-
edge. Where they get the impression that emotional appraisals point partic-
ipants into the ‘wrong’ direction, they refer caseworkers to tools like the list 
and the highlighter.
Finally, the workshop unit on writing decisions was infused with refer-
ences to pride and shame, arguably the social emotion per se (Scheff 2000). 
In this context, remnants of the former autonomy of caseworkers formed 
an important point of reference for trainers’ appeals to caseworkers’ sense of 
responsibility. Symbolically, this found expression in the fact that it was still 
individual decision-makers who signed the decision with their own name. 
The subjectification of responsibility was legitimated and further reinforced 
by the organisational narrative of the decision-maker as a quasi-judge—i.e., 
a professional who is expected to act according to the letter of the law and 
according to her own work-ethos—but without the merits that used to go 
along with that: the power and autonomy to defend decisions departing 
from political or organisational expectations with reference to one’s ‘ intimate 
conviction’. Given working conditions on the ground, appeals to casework-
ers’ pride and their capacities for empathy and emotional reflexivity are 
potentially offset by the fact that it is output rather than quality that is posi-
tively sanctioned. In this context, the various artefacts meant to decrease the 
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complexities of work (the list, the guideline, the template) might not reduce 
but rather displace them (Star and Strauss 1999: 25)—to the detriment of 
both caseworkers and applicants.
Since casework revolves around the written decision as the one central 
object linking the world of the administration with the wider social world, 
the various ways in which emotions and materialities are linked during the 
different steps in the production of this object are deeply political. Amongst 
others, they influence which elements of the decision-making process are 
made transparent or rendered opaque and thus have consequences for the 
ways in which bureaucratic work is demarcated and shielded from external 
influences. In the current situation, the sovereign act of deciding on asylum 
cases is performed by a diverse group of actors with often limited and inse-
cure employment contracts. Tasks and responsibilities have become more 
differentiated. Cases become categorised and streamlined before they even 
reach case officers’ desks, and an even greater focus is put on numbers and 
outputs. Future research will have to enquire into possible implications of 
these changes for the realities of work and work cultures within BAMF. It 
seems fair to expect that any recognition of the individual case and/or the 
applicant will now require an even greater individual effort on the part of 
caseworkers. Being a decision-maker in Germany might be “a lonely busi-
ness”, as one interviewee put it, but this loneliness is populated by artefacts, 
symbols, and emotions indicative of conflictual social relations.
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The country coverage of this volume is by no means exhaustive. The ten 
European countries that form the basis of the ethnographic case studies 
reported are not intended to be representative of Europe in any statistical 
sense, especially considering the absence of former communist countries 
located in Eastern Europe. The selection reflects a number of factors, includ-
ing the location of ethnographic projects that examine asylum determina-
tion and have been carried out in Europe, the editors’ knowledge of these 
projects and abilities to attract responses to calls for chapter contributions 
to the volume, and the access to asylum determination systems that ethno-
graphic work requires. Rather than positing that the volume explores the full 
extent of the variety of everyday practices that are bound up in asylum deter-
mination in Europe then, it is perhaps more accurate to claim that the book 
is suggestive of the extent of that variety.
One consequence of this is that the volume clearly highlights the impor-
tance of further research into the sorts of issues that have been raised. 
Hopefully therefore, the book will stimulate and encourage work that eth-
nographically explores further aspects of asylum determination, both the-
matically and in countries not discussed in this volume. Thematically, 
aspects of the determination process that deserve closer scrutiny include the 
exceptional ‘fast track’ processes that many European countries implement 
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alongside their regular procedures; the differing interpretations—not only 
in legal doctrine but also on the ground—of key terms like ‘vulnerability’ 
that often serve to regulate entry to fast-track procedures; the means of pro-
gression of some cases to the higher courts as well as the role of strategic 
litigation in facilitating this progression; and the sociology and economy 
surrounding the generation of ‘knowledge’ about source countries, for exam-
ple through country guidance information.
In terms of countries, certain states periodically distinguish themselves in 
the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees. Sweden, for example, accepted 
a very high number of Syrian refugees in 2015 and 2016 in relation to its 
population whilst Hungary and other Eastern European countries were far 
less accommodating. The Hungarian government’s continuing aggressive 
stance towards NGOs that are deemed to be supporting migration make 
maintaining academic scrutiny of these issues paramount (EU Observer 
2018). Moreover, Turkey has been deployed as part of Europe’s remote con-
trol asylum strategy since 2015 via the EU-Turkey deal, raising grave con-
cerns about human rights violations not only within Turkey but also on the 
Greek islands which have become places of routine detention and deporta-
tion (Amnesty International 2017). Given that the Turkey deal emerged at 
a time in which Europe as a whole was seen to be struggling to cope with 
the numbers of migrants arriving, this development reflects the central role 
of failure itself in the justification, production and development of systems 
of governance, including those of asylum (Foucault 1991; see also Vianelli 
2018).
Further outside Europe, the volume begs the question of how to com-
pare Europe’s asylum determination processes with those in other developed 
countries, as well as in developing country contexts. Making comparisons 
with the ways refugee law is experienced and implemented in Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the US, for example, would allow a general pic-
ture to be formed of the degree to which international refugee law functions 
to practically protect, or exclude, refugee populations in developed coun-
tries. And given that the overwhelming majority of the world’s population 
displaced by violent conflict are located in developing countries, further 
work and commentary that places the insights presented here in conversa-
tion with analyses of developing countries would be particularly welcome.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the sample of countries included in 
the volume, it makes two primary contributions. Firstly, it offers key insights 
into the messy, contingent, discretionary, unreliable, inconsistent and 
unjust processes through which legal doctrine is translated into bureaucratic 
practice in the context of large scale, international asylum decision making 
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systems. And secondly, the volume illustrates the effectiveness of meticu-
lous ethnographic research into asylum determination. In particular, it is the 
quality of the volume’s ethnographic contributions that, I hope, will form 
the criteria upon which it is judged.
In his contribution to this volume, Robert Gibb (drawing on Willis 
and Trondman 2000), gives us a clear sense of what ethnography is. More 
than just another method, ethnography can involve multiple methodolo-
gies that facilitate a direct and sustained encounter with research subjects. 
Ethnography also involves a rich written account that represents more than 
just a report of findings. How, though, can we recognise excellent ethnog-
raphy? Although ‘it is impossible to fix a single standard for deciding the 
good and right purposes, forms, and practices of ethnography’ (Bochner 
2000: 268) scholars have provided us with some clues about how to sense 
and appreciate good ethnographic method in practice (see Muecke 1994). 
We might expect excellent ethnography to be about a ‘worthy and interest-
ing’ topic, for example, to be ‘sincere’ and to bring to a chaotic or poorly 
understood arena new insights and ‘meaningful coherence’ (Tracy 2010). 
We want it to be ‘evocative’, ‘engaging’ and ‘imaginative’ (Crang and Cook 
2007: 2005). It should also display ‘abundant, concrete detail’ (Bochner 
2000: 270). We expect ‘aesthetic merit’, ‘reflexivity’ and even—ironically 
enough given the subject matter of many of the preceding chapters of this 
volume—‘credibility’ (Richardson 2000: 254). Perhaps most importantly 
though, we want a story (Bochner 2000). Something that moves us, affects 
us and calls us ‘to action’ (Richardson 2000: 254). For Bochner (2000: 271) 
this is something that hits ‘my heart and belly as well as my head […] that 
doesn’t just refer to subjective life, but instead acts it out in ways that show 
me what life feels like now and what it can mean’.
The ethnographies in this volume describe and partake in perhaps the 
central drama of contemporary society: the struggle between globalisation 
and territorial control, flow and stasis (Bauman 1998). Often however, 
the way that refugees’ role in this drama is discussed—in academic work, 
in newspapers and via social media—is either in dry and empty numerical 
terms or in ways that are trauma-heavy, pitying and condescending. Both 
these ways of talking about human displacement delete individual experi-
ence from the account: the quantitative fetish distils experience to num-
bers, targets and metrics which lend themselves to shrill and panicked talk 
of crises (Cohen 2002; see also Chapter 1, this volume); while the trauma 
fetish obscures the fact that displaced individuals are always more than refu-
gees and have characters and life histories that precede and outlive displace-
ment events. One of the primary achievements of the contributions in this 
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volume, by contrast, is their poise: resisting the temptation to either simplify 
or sensationalise the stories they recount and the systems they describe.
The ethnographies in this volume are also distinctively legal ethnogra-
phies, although this does not mean that they are solely concerned with 
the law. As Laura Nader (2016: 191) asserts, legal anthropologists should 
not set out to study only the law, and indeed they would find it difficult to 
do so, since ‘anthropologists are almost bound to be relationally orientated’ 
(Good 2007: 30) which implies that the social, cultural and geographic con-
text of the operation of the law is bound up in their approach to it. Rather, 
what is distinctive about a legal ethnography is its ability to cast legal con-
cepts and processes in a new light, and in so doing challenge legal blindspots 
and habits of thought. ‘[A] legal anthropological perspective challenges con-
ventional, doctrinal approaches to law that present it as a concept, universal 
across time and space … that represents a system of law that is coherent and 
uniform’ (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2009: 3). Ethnography’s innately ‘anti-
hegemonic’ character (Blommaert 2009: 438) allows legal ethnography to 
be capable of detecting and representing the ‘anarchic atmosphere’ (Flood 
2005: 34) of social systems by peering underneath the projected, but often 
synthetic, veneer of order that such systems, including legal ones, portray. 
These investigative abilities to discern the anarchism lurking beneath legal 
systems have fundamental implications for the law itself. It is the ethnog-
rapher’s ‘close attention to places, forms of life, conditions of speech and 
all those minor details’, Latour (2010: 199) writes, that, ‘little by little, by 
minor brushstrokes, allow one to redefine … [the] law.’
What this challenge to the projected universality, uniformity and coher-
ence of the law produces is a heightened sensitivity to the contradic-
tions and internal tensions within legal systems. This is more than simply 
a product of the ‘emphasis on differences’ (Bochner 2000: 268) that new 
ethnographies have adopted in response to the realism of traditional ethno-
graphic approaches. It refers to ‘basic differences between how lawyers and 
anthropologists think’ (Good 2007: 29). Doctrinal legal scholars and legal 
practitioners tend to be much more concerned with attributing individ-
ual blame or responsibility than anthropologists and other social scientists, 
and consequently tend to assume that there is a single cause responsible 
for most observable phenomena, rather than multiple causes. They also 
tend to be more prescriptive while social scientists using ethnographic 
methods are more descriptive, albeit seeking to provide ‘thick’ descriptions 
(Geertz 1973). These differences can be associated with a penchant for 
deductive reasoning among lawyers and inductive reasoning among anthro-
pologists (Conley and O’Barr 1998).
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Perhaps the most fundamental distinction between the two, however, 
concerns their different imaginations of how the law relates to society, which 
‘divide fairly sharply into two distinct perspectives, the instrumental and the 
constitutive’ (Sarat and Kearns 1993: 21). The instrumental view sees law 
as affecting society by ‘imposing external sanctions and inducements’ (ibid.: 
21) while the constitutive view sees law as more active in terms of ‘shap-
ing internal meanings and creating new statuses’ (ibid.: 21). What is at stake 
here is the separateness of the law from social processes. Not only, for Sarat 
and Kearns, are the law and social life mutually constitutive, but there is 
also an antagonism between them that the law, if taken at face value, effec-
tively conceals. ‘Law seeks to colonise everyday life and give it substance’ 
they argue (Sarat and Kearns 1993: 7), drawing in part on Henri Lefebvre 
(1991), but ‘law can never capture or organise everyday life… [l]aw does not 
descend on the everyday as an all-powerful outsider without encountering a 
lively resistance’ (Sarat and Kearns 1993: 8).
Of all the social scientific methodologies, this couplet of antagonism and 
resistance has been made most visible through legal ethnography. This has, 
unsurprisingly, occasionally led to disagreement. At times for instance, the 
type of knowledge generated by ethnographers can prove incomprehensi-
ble, even irksome, to the doctrinal legal mind. Good (2007), for example, 
describes situations in which ethnographic evidence has been rejected by 
judges as ‘not evidence of fact’ (ibid.: 145), but more akin to ‘commentary’ 
(ibid.: 145), a frustration related to a commonly stated complaint about 
ethnography that ‘we cannot learn anything beyond the details of the story 
told’ (Flood 2005: 48). On the other hand, the juxtaposition of the differ-
ent registers of legal and ethnographic perspectives, the latter affording a 
unique insight into the complex blend of co-constitution and antagonism 
between legal and social systems that doctrinal law tends to occlude, can 
also be highly productive. ‘When our ways of looking are incommensurable’ 
Bochner (2000: 266) writes, ‘we can look in the same places, at the same 
things, and see them differently’. For Griffiths and Kandel (2009: 158) for 
instance, ‘observations are important because they reveal […] multivocality’. 
What is most telling about their analysis is that the mutlivocality of social 
systems, including the voices of marginalised groups, is not easily accommo-
dated by legal systems themselves. If legal systems cannot detect the voices of 
the marginalised independently then ethnography becomes a crucial means 
to improve access to justice. Additionally, the inductive approach that legal 
ethnography employs promises theoretical innovation. ‘Ethnography is con-
stant surprise’ Flood writes (2005: 46) ‘[i]t gives rise to fresh theoretical 
insights as it evolves’.
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It is in this spirit that, in closing, I identify two key antagonisms that the 
ethnographies contained within this volume have illuminated. They pertain 
to tensions not only within the legal systems of asylum determination that 
our contributors have studied, but across the socio-legal divide that these 
systems span. In each case, they give a flavour of the multiple contradictions 
between legal systems and everyday social life which are often influential, 
and sometimes decisively determinant, of both the experiences and out-
comes of the law.
Fairness and Efficiency
The first antagonism concerns the tension between the administrative 
pressure to be efficient and the legal and moral pressure to be fair or just. 
Bureaucracies by their nature exert a certain amount of ‘quantitative’ pres-
sure (Affolter et al., this volume) over decision making systems, and it is well 
known that tribunals, which occupy a contested position between formal 
law and administrative bureaucracy, often find themselves compromised, 
‘caught between administration and adjudication’ (Hambly, this volume; 
see also Thomas 2011). Of particular concern is when national govern-
ments that have a degree of control over the workloads of those operating 
within the determination system, also have a vested interest in the outcomes 
reached - as is generally the case in administrative law. In the context of asy-
lum determination, this has led to various concerns (Taylor 2007), including 
that the speeding through of decisions can introduce unacceptable levels of 
chance to the process, and privilege the state as a repeat player in the system 
(Burridge and Gill 2017).
The contributions in this volume reveal at least three further facets of 
this tension. The first is the complex emotionality that is bound up in it. 
Decision makers involved in asylum determination in Europe find them-
selves at the fulcrum of the passions and dramas of the global stage: not 
only are they required to determine the legal identities of the displaced (are 
they ‘deserving’ refugees or ‘bogus’ imposters?), but also, as a collective, and 
by degrees, they determine the very identity of Europe itself (is it welcom-
ing? compassionate? coherent? chaotic?). As a result, the role of determin-
ing asylum claims is deeply contested in emotional terms. On the one hand, 
individual decision makers are subjected to an intricate form of emotional 
governance (Hunter 2015; Jupp et al. 2016) that seeks to induce from them 
‘[t]he proper type of emotional involvement’ (Schneider, this volume; see 
also Gill 2009). On the other hand, this governance is by no means failsafe: 
a range of influences vie for the ‘allegiance’ of decision makers—from the 
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judgement of other professionals (will I be viewed as a ‘softy’? Affolter et al., 
this volume) to the different office cultures that are often to be found in 
close proximity even within countries.
Second, the speed of processing decisions can warp the importance of certain 
events within the legal process. Under tight time constraints decision makers in 
many facets of social life, not just legal decision making, rely upon heuristics in 
the making of decisions (Thaler and Sunstein 2009; for a discussion in the legal 
field see Bone 2007). These are simple, efficient rules that help decision makers 
to reach a decision but that abstract markedly from the complexity of that deci-
sion by focusing on one aspect of it and giving less attention to other aspects. 
We know already that decision making on asylum applications rests too heavily 
on apparent inconsistencies in details of applicants’ stories that are peripheral 
to the overall account (Herlihy and Turner 2006). But in the presence of acute 
time pressure, single misplaced words or phrases can exert an even more dispro-
portionate influence if they activate the triggers that decision makers have cho-
sen to employ in order to simplify their work. This effect is vividly illustrated in 
Sorgoni’s account (this volume) of the 20-minute hearing at which the appel-
lant lost their claim by uttering a few ill-chosen words at the end.
Third, the imperative for efficiency can result in a perception of ‘intrusion’ 
(Hambly, this volume) among decision makers: the administration’s need 
for efficiency is seen to impinge upon decision makers’ abilities to deter-
mine cases fairly and in good time. They may become resentful and defen-
sive - ‘we are not a statistically driven conveyor belt’ one senior British judge 
has declared (Hambly, this volume; although see Burridge and Gill 2017). 
What results is a sort of insularity. Beset by the media, national governments 
and supra-national laws, a siege mentality can descend upon the offices 
and courts of asylum decision makers in practice (see also Campbell’s dis-
cussion of government legal representatives in Britain - so-called HOPOs - 
this volume). Such sentiments can be especially keenly felt because there is 
often no verifiable evidence to help determine asylum claims, and individ-
ual decision-makers are only too aware of the gravity of making potentially 
life-threatening or life-saving decisions. What all this produces is the dis-
proportionate importance of the practice of co-workers and colleagues in the 
determination of one’s own approach to cases (Liodden, this volume). The 
combination of high levels of discretion, insularity, the gravity of cases, and 
a lack of verifiable evidence means that localised office and court cultures 
are particularly influential in asylum determination in Europe—arguably 
more so than in equivalent jurisdictions that are neither so emotionally and 
politically charged, legally plural or discretionary. To understand and to change 
asylum decision making in Europe then, an approach that takes seriously 
occupational cultures in the sites at which decisions are undertaken is vital.
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Consistency and Variety
A second antagonism concerns the relationship between consistency and 
variety. In the context of asylum determination this antagonism usually sur-
faces in the form of discussion of inconsistent decisions. These are discernible 
in the variance of grant rates of asylum claims from ostensibly equivalent 
claimants. For example, claimants from the same country, making claims 
based on the fear of the same forms of persecution, have been shown to 
have highly divergent chances of success, according to which country their 
claim is heard in, which regions within countries their claim is considered 
at, which offices within regions consider their claim, and which particular 
judges within offices deal with their case (Gill and Good, this volume; see 
also Neumayer 2005; Rehaag 2012; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009). What the 
contributions in this volume illustrate, however, is the importance of con-
sidering the breadth and variety of qualitative inconsistencies in processes 
alongside numeric differences in the rate of asylum claims granted.
Between states, although the Procedure Directive of the Common 
European Asylum System is an attempt to secure ‘common’ processes across 
Europe (Craig and Zwaan, this volume), the contributions in this volume 
demonstrate that there is still an extremely long way to go before we can 
talk about genuinely common procedures. Processual variety results from the 
overlapping legal regimes produced by international and national legal plu-
ralism, the extensive discretion afforded to individual states with respect to 
the burden and standard of proof that they require, as well as the different 
legal traditions of European countries (ibid.). This can lead to considerable 
differences, such as allowing more appeals against negative decisions as a 
matter of course in some countries and not in others (see Sorgoni, this vol-
ume, for a discussion of Italy in this respect). Added to this, different states 
are also subject to different cultural influences, linguistic norms and media 
pressures, which can result in divergent interpretations of international law 
(Giannopoulou and Gill, this volume).
Within states, the contributions in this volume have revealed additional 
localised forms of inconsistency. Discrepancies in the linguistic registers of 
decision makers and applicants can be decisive in asylum claim determina-
tion, especially in the context of the linguistic complexities introduced when 
the internet is relied upon for information about origin countries (Spotti, 
this volume; see also Blommaert 2010). The places in which law is enacted 
can also make a considerable difference (Gibb, this volume). Alongside 
marked cultural differences between work teams in different courts and cen-
tres (Liodden, this volume) the micro-geographies of proximity between 
15 Conclusion     315
applicants and the other actors involved, lines of sight and the internal 
arrangements of corridors, rooms and buildings can all exert an influence 
over the communicative practices that take place (Gibb, this volume, see 
also Rock 1993; Mulcahy 2007). Added to this, the characters of individ-
ual actors within the system can play a pivotal role in legal systems. Judges 
sometimes diverge from conventions, as illustrated by Campbell’s example 
(this volume) of the judge who decided to ask an extraordinary amount of 
questions and then deliver their judgement at the end of the hearing rather 
than the usual method of sending the decision by post. More fundamen-
tally, so imbricated are legal processes by the ‘conviction’ of the judge that 
it has proven impossible to separate them in law, creating what Kobelinsky 
(this volume) calls a suspicion economy according to which cases that are not 
apparently legally watertight can be ushered through on the basis of shared 
liberal notions of compassion, whilst others attract scepticism on spurious 
grounds, like not ‘look[ing] gay at all’. Caseworkers can also differ markedly 
in their approaches to their work, often depending upon whether or not they 
have a legal background (Affolter et al., this volume). Even those without a 
decision-making role can affect the visibility and transparency of the deter-
mination process as Sorgoni’s example (this volume) of the archivist who 
tightly controls access to the records of Italian appeal procedures illustrates.
In short, the asylum determination system is riddled with a raft of different 
forms of qualitative inconsistency that the usual focus on consistency of out-
comes misses, but that an ethnographic approach is well suited to reveal (see 
Gill et al. 2018). One of the consequences of the existence of this level and 
diversity of inconsistency is the development of double standards in the deter-
mination of asylum claims. As Craig and Zwaan remind us (this volume) 
asylum seekers are expected to show ‘effort’ and ‘coherence’ during the claim 
making process. When they fail to do so to the satisfaction of the authorities, 
as both Sorgoni and Danstrøm & Whyte demonstrate in their contributions, 
the result can be a rejected asylum claim. Ironically however, the asylum sys-
tem itself would not satisfy its own criteria, since it embodies multiple forms 
of incoherence as well as a lack of timeliness in several respects.
Given the Herculean task of generating a genuinely common European 
asylum system in practice, one must ask what function the law serves in 
this area. While the law is conventionally viewed as regulatory in a practical 
sense, the stubborn resistance and infinite variety of the everyday contexts 
in which the laws relating to asylum determination in Europe are applied 
makes it difficult to accept that they achieve this objective in practice. 
Rather, it may be better to view the law in this area as essentially a statement 
of intent. If this view is adopted, then various alternative interpretations 
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of the function of the law come into view. Optimistically, this statement 
of intent can be viewed as aspirational—an ideal that Europe is striving 
towards and that, by degrees, it is gradually realising, even if progress is slow 
and geographically highly uneven. Pessimistically however, the existence of 
a statement of intent that diverges dramatically from reality runs the risk of 
obscuring important features of the law as it is practised and of therefore 
appearing hypocritical. This divergence is especially costly when attempting 
to build trust with displaced people who are often vulnerable and trauma-
tised. Once the system of determination becomes distrusted by its subjects, 
the very conditions of possibility for its effective and fair operation are 
undermined, as asylum seekers withhold and distort their own stories as a 
result (Danstrøm and Whyte this volume, Giannopoulou and Gill, this 
volume). According to this view, the notion of a common European asy-
lum system is not only at odds with what the contributors to this volume 
have discovered, but could also act to exacerbate the practical difficulties of 
asylum determination in Europe.
Needless to say, regardless of which of these two views is taken, find-
ing ways to close the gap between the formal body of doctrinal law that is 
embodied in such systems as the Common European Asylum System and 
the everyday reality of asylum determination in practice will be paramount 
in the years to come. If the ethnographies contained in this volume can help 
to achieve this, they will be excellent indeed.
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